In Re: Steven R. Drummond, Mary A. Drummond

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN RE:
STEVEN R. D RUMMOND, MARY A. D RUMMOND,
Debtors.

No. CV-23-0009-CQ
Filed February 23, 2024

Certified Question from the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona
The Honorable Paul Sala, Bankruptcy Judge
No. 0:22-BK-01765-PS
QUESTION ANSWERED

COUNSEL:

Keith S. Knochel, Nicholas R. Darus (argued), Knochel Knochel & Darus,
Bullhead City, Attorneys for Steven R. Drummond and Mary A.
Drummond

Terry A. Dake (argued), Terry A. Dake, Ltd., Phoenix, Attorney for
Lawrence J. Warfield

Brett W. Johnson, Benjamin W. Reeves, Tracy A. Olson, Ryan P. Hogan,
Charlene A. Warner, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix, attorneys for Amici
Curiae Arizona Creditors Bar Association, et al.

JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE BRUTINEL, and JUSTICES BOLICK, LOPEZ, MONTGOMERY,
and KING joined. VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER dissented.
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:
¶1 The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Arizona certified the following question to this Court: “Whether a motor
home in which a person over 18 years of age resides qualifies as a mobile
home for the purpose of claiming an Arizona homestead exemption
pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1101(A)(3).” For the reasons explained below, we
hold that a motor home does not qualify for an exemption.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Steven and Mary Drummond (the “Drummonds”) filed for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy in March 2022. The question here centers around the
Drummonds’ self-propelled motor home, a 2017 Tiffin Allegro recreational
vehicle, which they use as a full-time residence. During the bankruptcy
proceedings, the Drummonds claimed that their motor home is subject to
the homestead exemption as a “mobile home” under § 33-1101(A)(3). 1 The
trustee objected to this exemption, arguing that the Drummonds’ motor
home is not a mobile home under Arizona law. Following the parties’
arguments regarding the applicability of § 33-1101(A)(3), the bankruptcy
judge certified the question to this Court.

¶3 Because no Arizona precedent exists determining whether a
motor home qualifies as a mobile home under Arizona’s homestead
exemption statute, we agreed to resolve the certified question pursuant to
article 6, section 5(6) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-1861.

DISCUSSION

¶4 Section 33-1101(A) sets out Arizona’s homestead exemption.
The statute applies to four residence types and reads in relevant part:

1 In discussing § 33-1101, this Opinion is only referring to the homestead
exemption effective January 1, 2022. Thus, if applicable here, the exemption
would exclude up to $250,000 of equity in the motor home from the
bankruptcy estate. See § 33-1101 (January 1, 2022).
2
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
Opinion of the Court

A. Any person eighteen years of age or over, married or
single, who resides within this state may hold as a homestead
exempt from execution and forced sale, not exceeding
$250,000 in value, any one of the following:

1. The person’s interest in real property in one compact
body on which exists a dwelling house in which the person
resides.

2. The person’s interest in one condominium or
cooperative in which the person resides.

3. A mobile home in which the person resides.

4. A mobile home in which the person resides plus the
land on which that mobile home is located.

§ 33-1101(A). Determining whether a motor home qualifies for a
homestead exemption compels us to interpret § 33-1101(A).

¶5 We “determine the plain meaning of the words the legislature
chose to use, viewed in their broader statutory context.” See Columbus Life
Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Tr., N.A., 255 Ariz. 382, 385 ¶ 11 (2023). “Our task in
statutory construction is to effectuate the text if it is clear and
unambiguous.” BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 244 Ariz. 17, 19
¶ 9 (2018). Absent ambiguity, we interpret statutes according to their plain
language. Premier Physicians Grp., PLLC v. Navarro, 240 Ariz. 193, 195 ¶ 9
(2016). When a statute’s plain language is unambiguous in context, it is
dispositive. See Shea v. Maricopa County, 255 Ariz. 116, 120–21 ¶ 19 (2023);
see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 167 (2012) (explaining that courts must interpret a statute’s plain
language in context, because “[c]ontext is a primary determinant of
meaning”). Additionally, “[i]n construing a specific provision, we look to
the statute as a whole and we may also consider statutes that are in pari
materia—of the same subject or general purpose—for guidance and to give
effect to all of the provisions involved.” Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508,
509 ¶ 7 (2017). However, if more than one reasonable interpretation exists,
3
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
Opinion of the Court

we will examine secondary interpretation methods, including the statute’s
subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, as well as
its spirit and purpose to aid with interpretation. See Romero-Millan v. Barr,
253 Ariz. 24, 27–28 ¶ 13 (2022).

I.

¶6 The Drummonds argue that their motor home qualifies for
the homestead exemption under § 33-1101. Title 33 does not expressly
define “motor home,” but Title 28, which governs transportation, defines
“motor home” as “a motor vehicle that is primarily designed as temporary
living quarters and that [i]s built onto as an integral part of, or is
permanently attached to, a motor vehicle chassis.” A.R.S. § 28-4301(19)(a).
This definition suggests that a “motor home” is a vehicle and is therefore
readily and inherently movable. Consistent with this definition, the
Drummonds used their 2017 Tiffin Allegro to travel around the United
States from February through October 2019.

¶7 Section 33-1101 allows certain “mobile homes” to qualify for
the homestead exemption, but the statute does not define the term. Absent
a statutory definition, courts generally give words their ordinary meaning
and may look to dictionary definitions. Chaparro v. Shinn, 248 Ariz. 138, 141
¶ 14 (2020). When dictionary definitions are unavailing, however, context
is critical. See DBT Yuma, L.L.C. v. Yuma Cnty. Airport Auth., 238 Ariz. 394,
396 ¶ 10 (2015).

¶8 Here, dictionary definitions of “mobile home” are too varied
to categorically establish any plain meaning. See, e.g., Mobile Home,
Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mobi
le%20home (last visited Feb. 20, 2024) (defined since 1934 as “a dwelling
structure built on a steel chassis and fitted with wheels that is intended to
be hauled to a usually permanent site”); Mobile Home, Cambridge
Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/mobile
-home (last visited Feb. 20, 2024) (“[A] type of building that people live in,
usually staying in one place, but able to be moved using a vehicle or
sometimes its own engine.”); Mobile Home, Dictionary.com,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/mobile-home (last visited Feb. 20,
4
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
Opinion of the Court

2024) (“[A] large house trailer, designed for year-round living in one
place.”). One definition allows for self-propulsion, while another only
allows the mobile home to be “hauled.” But despite these differences, the
dictionary definitions all suggest a mobile home must generally have a
permanent location—either by design or intent. However, none of these
definitions describe what makes such a location permanent.

¶9 But inconclusive dictionary definitions do not render the term
ambiguous. Rather, as previously noted, “[w]e do not view statutory
words in isolation, but rather draw their meaning from the context in which
they are used.” See DBT Yuma, 238 Ariz. at 396 ¶ 10. And considering the
term “mobile home” in the context of § 33-1101(A)’s other subsections
dispels any purported ambiguity regarding the term’s meaning.

¶10 Sections 33-1101(A)(1), (2), and (4) each describe a permanent
residence in which a person seeking a homestead exemption resides. Each
subsection describes a home that is permanently attached to land—often
anchored to a foundation or at least with its wheels and axles removed,
hard-wired to electrical services, and hard-plumbed to both water and
sewer. Examined in this context, the Drummonds’ argument that the
subsection (A)(3) definition of “mobile home” includes a readily movable
“motor home” fails.

¶11 First, § 33-1101(A)(1)’s exemption includes a “person’s
interest in real property in one compact body on which exists a dwelling
house in which the person resides.” This subsection describes an occupied
structure permanently located on a parcel of land—and it is axiomatic that
both land and structures attached to it are real property. See Real Property,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“Land and anything growing on,
attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed
without injury to the land.”). And real property inherently has a permanent
location.

¶12 Second, § 33-1101(A)(2)’s exemption includes a “person’s
interest in one condominium or cooperative in which the person resides.”
A condominium is also real property permanently located where it is built.
See A.R.S. § 33-1202(10) (“‘Condominium’ means real estate . . . .” (emphasis
5
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
Opinion of the Court

added)). The same is true for a person’s cooperative interest. See Kadera v.
Superior Court, 187 Ariz. 557, 563 (App. 1996) (“[T]he cooperator has a real
property ownership interest.”). And both a condominium and a
cooperative are immobile structures inherently tied to the location on which
they were constructed. See Condominium, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/condominium (last
visited Feb. 20, 2024) (“[I]ndividual ownership of a unit in a multiunit
structure (such as an apartment building) or on land owned in common
(such as a town house complex).”); Cooperative, Dictionary.com,
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/cooperative (last visited Feb. 20,
2024) (“[A] building owned and managed by a corporation . . . .”). Though
the dictionary definition of “cooperative” is not limited to dwellings,
§ 33-1101(A)(2)’s reference to “in which the person resides” plainly
identifies a cooperative in the context of a cooperative dwelling.

¶13 Lastly, § 33-1101(A)(4)’s exemption includes a mobile home,
but also “the land on which the mobile home is located.” This requires that
a mobile home has been placed on a particular piece of real property which
is also owned by the homestead claimant. The fact that (A)(4) allows an
individual to also claim the land indicates a strong, permanent connection
between the mobile home and the land. If that were not the case, a readily
movable vehicle such as a motor home could be parked on the debtor’s land
shortly before a bankruptcy filing, and the land upon which it was parked
would be included in the homestead exemption—despite not having any
physical or permanent attachment to the land. That would be beyond the
legislature’s purpose of exempting a homestead. Cf. In re McLauchlan, 252
Ariz. 324, 325 ¶ 8 (2022) (explaining that the purpose of the exemption is to
prevent homelessness, but not “to confer any financial benefits upon
debtors beyond the exemption”). Therefore, subsection (A)(4), like the
other exemptions in § 33-1101(A), is concerned only with real property and
the structures physically attached thereto. A mobile home under (A)(4),
unlike a motor home, is physically connected to the land in such a way that
it is not readily movable.

¶14 Residences that come under (A)(1), (2) and (4) are
permanently situated and physically connected to land. Houses,
condominiums, and cooperatives are physically connected to the property
6
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
Opinion of the Court

on which they are built. These physical connections include permanent
integration with utilities, like electricity, water, and sewer. It is difficult and
time-consuming to sever these connections and re-establish them
elsewhere. Though it is theoretically possible to move, for example, a
stick-built home to another piece of land, moving such a residence requires
the effort of severing the permanent, physical connections to the residence’s
foundation and utilities, as well as attaching wheels or using another mode
of transportation. Similarly, mobile homes under (A)(4) are physically
connected to land owned by the debtor and would also be difficult to sever
and move.

¶15 This interpretation of subsection (A)(4) might suggest that
§ 33-1101(A)(3) could include a mobile home without any significant
connection to land, but that would be a misreading of subsection (A)(3)
considering the nature of mobile home ownership. Owners of mobile
homes may permanently situate their homes upon leased—rather than
owned—land. See generally A.R.S. §§ 33-1401 to -1419 (“Arizona Mobile
Home Parks Residential Landlord and Tenant Act”). Mobile home park
residents connect their homes to utilities, rendering them difficult to move,
and thus establish permanent connections with land. See § 33-1409(16)
(“‘Mobile home space’ means a parcel of land for rent that has been
designed to accommodate a mobile home and provide the required sewer
and utility connections.” (emphasis added)). Owners of mobile homes who
lease the land where their mobile home is situated would not be eligible for
the § 33-1101(A)(4) exemption because they do not own the land. Section
33-1101(A)(3) merely provides the same exemption to individuals who do
not own the property on which the mobile home is located.

¶16 Residential structures that are not readily movable and are
tied to a permanent location is the context establishing subsection (A)(3)’s
meaning because these characteristics are common among § 33-1101(A)’s
subsections. Given this contextual framework, a “mobile home” under
subsection (A)(3) describes a dwelling that is not intended to be moved once
placed and physically attached to property.

7
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
Opinion of the Court

¶17 Moreover, considering the term “mobile home” in a broader
statutory context also suggests that the term describes a permanent
dwelling attached to land. Although not an exemption statute like
§ 33-1101, a statute in a related chapter, § 33-1409, distinguishes between
mobile homes and less-permanent, readily movable vehicles. Section
33-1409 expressly excludes any “recreational vehicle such as a motor home”
from the definition of a mobile home. § 33-1409(14)(b)(i) (emphasis added).
Though this definition is only directly applicable to the chapter in which it
is found, § 33-1101 and § 33-1409 are in pari materia because they classify a
specific type of residential property and determine that property’s legal
treatment. See Stambaugh, 242 Ariz. at 509 ¶ 7. Section 33-1409 thus
provides additional context for the legislature’s use of the term “mobile
home” in § 33-1101(A)(3)—that mobile homes and motor homes are
separate and distinct.

¶18 Accordingly, a motor home cannot be a “mobile home” under
the homestead statute because it is intended to be readily movable and is
not tied to the land upon which it sits in any significant way. See
§ 28-4301(19)(a). Section 33-1101(A)(3)’s contextual plain meaning leads to
the conclusion that a “motor home” is not a “mobile home” for purposes of
this exemption.

¶19 Our dissenting colleague, however, would have us analyze
§ 33-1101(A) divorced from context, and thus have us declare the term
“mobile home” ambiguous. But it is not. We interpret statutes “according
to the plain meaning of the words in their broader statutory context, unless
the legislature directs us to do otherwise.” S. Ariz. Home Builders Ass’n v.
Town of Marana, 254 Ariz. 281, 286 ¶ 31 (2023). As explained, each
subsection of § 33-1101(A) provides the context for (A)(3).

¶20 Though not disagreeing that (A)(1) and (A)(2) describe
difficult-to-move dwellings that are physically attached to property, the
dissent focuses on the word “located” in (A)(4) to argue that an
easy-to-move dwelling could qualify for (A)(4)’s exemption. Infra ¶ 40. But
if “located” in this context does not mean physically connected, then a
bankruptcy debtor would be able to drive their motor home to a parcel of
land to protect additional assets. And as the dissent acknowledges, the
8
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
Opinion of the Court

homestead exemption protects the home, see infra ¶ 46, not the most
valuable plot of land you can drive a vehicle to for purposes of claiming an
exemption.

¶21 Ultimately, the dissent elevates the policy interests
purportedly served by the statute over what we view as the best reading of
subsection (A)(3) in its proper context. See infra ¶ 46. That we cannot do.
We defer to the legislature to exercise its prerogative to modify the statute
to better align with its policy objectives if it disagrees with our
interpretation of the statute. For all these reasons, subsection (A)(4)
requires a permanent connection with the land, and, together with (A)(1)
and (A)(2), informs us that (A)(3) also requires a permanent connection.

II.

¶22 Because § 33-1101(A)(3)’s plain meaning is clear, the statute is
unambiguous; however, even if § 33-1101(A)(3) were ambiguous,
analyzing the statute using secondary interpretive methods supports the
interpretation set forth above. See Fann v. State, 251 Ariz. 425, 434–35 ¶¶ 27,
29 (2021).

¶23 The associated-words canon, noscitur a sociis, is the
interpretive method used to “avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so
broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words,” thus avoiding
giving legislative acts “unintended breadth.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S.
528, 543 (2015) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995)).
This interpretive canon is applicable when terms are “conjoined in such a
way as to indicate that they have some quality in common.” Antonin Scalia
& Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 196 (2012).
“The common quality suggested by a listing should be its most general
quality—the least common denominator, so to speak—relevant to the
context.” Id.; see also Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S.
312, 322 (1977) (“It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that
words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.”).

9
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
Opinion of the Court

¶24 As noted above, the common characteristics among
§ 33-1101(A) subsections (1), (2), and (4) is that each describes a residential
structure with permanent connections to land. See Part I ¶¶ 10–15. This
permanent connection characteristic is the “least common denominator”
among the statute’s exemptions and provides the context in which to
conclude that a “mobile home” also constitutes a structure permanently
anchored to land where a person resides. A mobile home used as a primary
residence inherently has a permanent connection with land—it is
hard-wired to electricity and similarly connected to other utilities. But in
contrast, a “motor home” is readily movable and inherently unanchored to
land. We must not give (A)(3) “unintended breadth” by interpreting it to
include a readily movable motor home. See Yates, 574 U.S. at 543.
Accordingly, a motor home is not eligible for § 33-1101(A)(3)’s exemption.

¶25 Considering the statute’s title and subject matter also
confirms this conclusion. See State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 188, 190 ¶ 7 (2000)
(noting that where an ambiguity exists, the title of a statute may be used to
aid in its interpretation). Title 33, chapter 8 is named “Homestead and
Personal Property Exemption” and chapter 8, article 1—where § 33-1101(A)
is located—is titled “Homesteads and Homestead Exemption.” As
explained above, the exemptions found in article 1 relate to real property
and structures permanently anchored to real property. See Part I ¶¶ 7–14.
That is, article 1 is concerned with homesteads that are (1) real property,
and (2) dwelling structures that cannot be readily moved because they are
attached to real property. Cf. Real Property, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019) (“excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the
land” from the definition of “real property”). Conversely, the following
article in chapter 8 is titled “Personal Property Exemption.” Here, the
exemptions focus on personal property. Personal property is defined as
“[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not
classified as real property.” Personal Property, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019) (emphasis added). This second article is concerned with property that
is easily movable because it is not anchored to real property.

¶26 A mobile home is customarily tied to real property because of
its characteristic of permanency, see Part I ¶ 8, and such integration renders
it practically unmovable, see Part I ¶ 14. In contrast, a motor home is
10
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
Opinion of the Court

self-propelled, and thus readily movable, and has no permanent connection
with real property. Accordingly, § 33-1101’s title and subject matter further
confirm that a motor home is not eligible for Arizona’s homestead
exemption.

¶27 Whether interpreting § 33-1101(A)(3) according to its
contextual plain meaning or applying secondary interpretative methods to
ascertain its meaning, we conclude that subsection (A)(3)’s exemption
pertains to a permanent, fixed structure where a person resides. Thus, a
“motor home” cannot be a “mobile home” under the homestead statute
because it is readily movable and not anchored to land.

III.

¶28 We conclude by addressing In re Irwin, 293 B.R. 28 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2003), where the United States Bankruptcy Court for The District of
Arizona concluded that a “motor home . . . can qualify for the homestead
exemption under A.R.S. § 33-1101(A)(3).” Id. at 33. The Drummonds relied
on Irwin when asserting their homestead exemption. The dissent similarly
relies on the rationale underpinning Irwin. Infra ¶ 46. But we disagree with
the Irwin court’s interpretation of § 33-1101(A) for several reasons.

¶29 First, the bankruptcy court did not engage in an interpretive
analysis of § 33-1101(A) when it concluded that “a motor home can satisfy
the definition and purpose of Arizona’s homestead law.” Irwin, 293 B.R.
at 29. Although the court attempted to ascertain the statute’s plain
meaning, it did not consider its meaning by viewing the statute in its
broader context. See Columbus Life Ins. Co., 255 Ariz. at 385 ¶ 11. Instead, it
summarily concluded that the plain meaning of § 33-1101(A)(3) supported
both parties’ definitions of mobile home. Irwin, 293 B.R. at 30.

¶30 The Irwin court’s use of secondary methods of interpretation
to define § 33-1101(A)(3) is equally unavailing. Rather than utilizing the
previously mentioned secondary principles, the court determined that it
was “necessary to rely on the legislative purpose underlying the statute”
expressed in Matcha v. Winn, 131 Ariz. 115 (App. 1981), to define

11
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
Opinion of the Court

§ 33-1101(A)(3). Irwin, 293 B.R. at 30. However, the court’s reliance on
Matcha is misplaced. 2

¶31 In Matcha, the court of appeals stated that “the fundamental
purpose of the homestead law is to protect the family against the forced sale
of home property from certain creditors, and, to further this purpose, the
homestead laws should be interpreted liberally to advance the objectives of
the statutes.” 131 Ariz. at 117. The court’s directive to liberally interpret
the homestead law, however, was announced for a circumstance distinctly
different from the one posed in this certified question. In that case, the court
was asked to determine whether the party seeking an exemption, the
Winns, complied with A.R.S. § 33-1102, which required, among other
things, that an exemption claim be filed with the county recorder. Id. The
party objecting to the exemption, the Matchas, asserted that the Winns
failed to comply with § 33-1102’s requirements. Id. It was in this limited
context—whether there was substantial compliance with § 33-1102—that
the court of appeals announced that the homestead laws should be liberally
construed. Id. at 117–18.

¶32 This Court has previously found that the equitable doctrine
of substantial compliance is appropriate when deciding whether statutory
obligations have been met. See, e.g., In re Pima Cnty. Mental Health No.
20200860221, 255 Ariz. 519, 524 ¶ 11 (2023) (explaining that substantial
compliance “tolerates errors if the purpose of the relevant statutory
requirements was nevertheless fulfilled”); Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444,
447 ¶ 14 (2005) (allowing substantial compliance with initiative petition
statutes if the petition “fulfills the purpose of the relevant statutory or
constitutional requirements”); Pima County v. Cyprus-Pima Mining Co., 119
Ariz. 111, 114 (1978) (allowing substantial compliance with statute
requiring payment of disputed taxes because “spirit of the law” was
satisfied). This doctrine, however, is not applicable when interpreting the
text of a statute to determine its meaning. Our statutory interpretation

2 In addition to misreading Matcha, the bankruptcy court also incorrectly
attributed the Matcha decision to this Court. Matcha is an Arizona Court of
Appeals Opinion.
12
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
Opinion of the Court

jurisprudence is circumscribed, and it requires us to use established
principles of interpretation to ascertain a statute’s meaning. See DBT Yuma,
238 Ariz. at 396 ¶ 10; Fann, 251 Ariz. at 434–35 ¶¶ 27, 29. And while
applying an equitable doctrine like substantial compliance may be
appropriate in determining whether a statute’s requirements have been
satisfied, we have never used the doctrine as a method of statutory
interpretation. We see no compelling reason to do so now. Cf. Molera v.
Reagan, 245 Ariz. 291, 297 ¶ 26 (2018) (“[W]e cannot rewrite statutes to
smooth their rough edges.”).

¶33 Finally, the Irwin court’s analysis of the relationship between
subsections (A)(3) and (A)(4) also misses the mark. In support of its
conclusion that a motor home is exempt property, the court stated “the
homestead statute indicates there is no necessity that the mobile home be
affixed or even customarily used in connection with any particular real
estate, because the distinction between paragraphs (A)(3) and (A)(4) clearly
implies there need be no particular relationship to any real property.”
Irwin, 293 B.R. at 31–32. A contextual analysis of § 33-1101(A), however,
reveals that the exemptions are given to structures in which an individual
can reside and that are permanently located on real property. See Part I
¶ 15. Given that the relationship to real property is the common
characteristic among the exemptions in § 33-1101(A), the distinction
between subsections (A)(3) and (A)(4) is significant because without this
difference an individual’s mobile home located on leased land would not
be eligible for an exemption. Viewing § 33-1101(A) in context demonstrates
that the distinction between subsections (A)(3) and (A)(4) is meaningful and
reflects their necessary relationship to real property.

¶34 Accordingly, Irwin’s reliance on Matcha for the proposition
that the homestead law should be “interpreted liberally” is misplaced and
its conclusion that a motor home is exempt under § 33-1101(A)(3) is
incorrect.

13
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
Opinion of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶35 We answer the certified question by holding that a motor
home in which a person over 18 years of age resides does not qualify for the
Arizona homestead exemption under A.R.S. § 33-1101(A)(3).

14
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting

TIMMER, VCJ., dissenting,

¶36 Since statehood, Arizona has provided homeowners with a
homestead exemption to prevent families from being rendered homeless by
the debt collection process. See In re McLauchlan, 252 Ariz. 324, 325 ¶ 8
(2022); Ferguson v. Roberts, 64 Ariz. 357, 361 (1946); see also First Nat’l Bank v.
Reeves, 27 Ariz. 508, 514–15 (1925) (discussing the pre-statehood and
post-statehood homestead exemptions). Today, people make their homes
in a variety of structures. Many people live in traditional single-family
homes, condominiums, cooperatives, and permanently affixed
manufactured homes. But others live in non-traditional portable housing,
like houseboats, motor homes, and even tiny houses on wheels. The issue
here is whether the term “mobile home,” as used in our homestead statute,
A.R.S. § 33-1101(A), includes motor homes used as permanent housing,
thereby giving their owners the same homestead exemption afforded to
owners of traditional homes.

¶37 Federal courts have maintained for decades that the term
“mobile home” can include a motor home used as a permanent residence,
and I agree. See Warfield v. Froemming, 663 F.Supp.3d 1079, 1083–84 (D. Ariz.
2023); In re Irwin, 293 B.R. 28, 31 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003). I interpret “mobile
home” as used in § 33-1101(A) to mean lodging that can be moved from
place to place and is actually used as the owner’s permanent residence.
Because the majority reaches a contrary conclusion, I respectfully dissent.

¶38 The homestead statutes do not define “mobile home.” We
therefore interpret § 33-1101(A) to effectuate the legislature’s intent. See
Glazer v. State, 237 Ariz. 160, 163 ¶ 12 (2015). If the provision has only one
reasonable meaning, we apply it without further discussion. Id. If the
provision has more than one reasonable meaning, we apply secondary
principles to determine the legislature’s intended meaning, like examining
the statute’s “historical background, its effects and consequences, and its
spirit and purpose.” Id. (quoting Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284
(1991)).

¶39 The majority finds that “mobile home” in § 33-1101(A)(3)
plainly refers to “a dwelling that is not intended to be moved once placed
15
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting

and physically attached to property.” Supra ¶ 16. As such, my colleagues
conclude the term cannot include a self-propelled motor home because it is
“intended to be readily movable and is not tied to the land upon which it
sits in any significant way.” Supra ¶ 18. I disagree that § 33-1101(A)(3) has
one, plain meaning.

¶40 First, no language in § 33-1101(A)(3) or (A)(4) suggests that a
“mobile home” must be designed to stay in one location or be physically
attached to land. Subsection (A)(3) succinctly refers to a “mobile home.”
Nothing indicates whether the legislature used “mobile home” as a term of
art referring to a manufactured home, which is generally designed to stay
in one place once installed, or merely to describe a “home” that is “mobile.”
Either interpretation is reasonable. See Warfield, 663 F.Supp.3d at 1081.
Subsection (A)(4) includes a mobile home and the land on which it is
“located” within the homestead exemption. But “located” does not
necessarily mean physically attached. A mobile home resting on land and
hooked to utilities is “located” on that land. Locate, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/located (last visited Feb.
20, 2024) (defining “located” in relevant part as “to set or establish in a
particular spot”).

¶41 Second, § 33-1101’s other subsections do not establish that
“mobile home,” as used in subsections (A)(3) and (A)(4), plainly refers to a
dwelling intended to remain in one place and that is physically attached to
property. The majority reasons that because the traditional dwellings in
(A)(1) and (A)(2) are permanently affixed to real property, a “mobile home”
must be similarly affixed. See supra ¶¶ 11–12. Why? A mobile home is
inherently different from traditional dwellings. Unlike traditional homes,
mobile homes have vehicle identification numbers, are titled by the Arizona
Department of Transportation (until affixture), and are subject to security
interests. See A.R.S. § 28-2063(A); § 42-15203(B). The mobile home is taxed
as personal property unless the owner also owns the land where the home
is installed and records an affidavit of affixture. See §§ 42-15202; -15203(K).
In that situation, the mobile home is taxed as real property. See § 42-15202.
There are too many differences between traditional homes and mobile
homes to infer the latter necessarily must be designed to remain in one
location and be permanently attached to land.
16
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting

¶42 The majority also contends that subsection (A)(4) “describes
a home that is permanently attached to land—often anchored to a
foundation or at least with its wheels and axles removed, hard-wired to
electrical services, and hard-plumbed to both water and sewer.” See supra
¶ 10. It then concludes that, along with subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2),
subsection (A)(4) necessarily means that the “mobile home” in subsection
(A)(3) must be immovable. Respectfully, the majority’s characterization of
subsection (A)(4) is not supported by its language. Subsection (A)(4)
permits a homestead exemption for “[a] mobile home in which the person
resides plus the land on which that mobile home is located.” Nothing is
said about permanent attachment, a foundation, removal of wheels and
axles, hard-wiring or hard-plumbing. And as explained, a mobile home can
be “located” on land without physical attachment. See supra ¶ 40.

¶43 Third, even if the legislature used “mobile home” as a term of
art in 1971, the year the legislature included “mobile homes” within the
homestead exemption, see 1971 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 94, § 2 (1st Reg. Sess.),
the term was used broadly and could include motor homes. See Antonin
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 78
(2012) (“Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was
adopted.”). For example, some dictionaries defined “mobile home” as a
“trailer,” Mobile Home, Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 543
(1967), and then defined “trailer,” in part, as “a highway vehicle designed
to serve wherever parked as a dwelling,” Trailer, Webster’s Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary 938 (1967). See also Matthews v. Indus. Comm’n, 254
Ariz. 157, 163 ¶ 33 (2022) (turning to dictionary definitions from the time a
provision was adopted to determine original public meaning of terms).
Nothing confined that definition to non-self-propelled or difficult-to-move
homes. Similarly, nothing in § 33-1101(A) disqualifies self-propelled homes
from protection under the homestead statutes.

¶44 Fourth, the legislature explicitly defined “mobile home” in
another chapter of Title 33 as excluding “motor homes.” See A.R.S.
§ 33-1409(14)(b)(i) (defining “mobile home” for purposes of the Arizona
Mobile Home Parks Residential Landlord and Tenant Act as excluding “[a]
recreational vehicle such as a motor home, camping trailer, van, fifth wheel
trailer or other type of recreational vehicle”). This exclusion would not
17
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting

have been necessary if, as the majority posits, a “mobile home” plainly
excludes motor homes. By including the exclusion within § 33-1409(14), the
legislature acknowledged that people could otherwise reasonably interpret
a “mobile home” as including a motor home.

¶45 For these reasons, I agree with federal court decisions that
“mobile home,” as used in § 33-1101(A), can reasonably be interpreted as
either a trailer home that is not self-propelled or a motor home that is
self-propelled when either is used as a permanent residence. See Warfield,
663 F.Supp.3d at 1081; Irwin, 293 B.R. at 30. The term is therefore
ambiguous, and we can only determine the legislature’s intended meaning
by considering secondary interpretive principles. See Glazer, 237 Ariz.
at 163 ¶ 12.

¶46 The purpose of the homestead exemption supports an
interpretation of “mobile home” as any lodging that can be moved and is
actually used as the owner’s permanent residence. This Court has
consistently found that the purpose of the homestead exemption is to
ensure that “individuals whose property is subject to foreclosure are not
rendered homeless.” See McLauchlan, 252 Ariz. at 325 ¶ 8; see also Ferguson,
64 Ariz. at 361 (“The chief object of these laws is to shelter the family . . . .”).
Consequently, we “liberally constru[e] our exemption laws so as to
preserve the homestead.” Reeves, 27 Ariz. at 513; see also Wilson v. Lowry, 5
Ariz. 335, 341–42 (1898) (“It is the well-settled policy of the courts to
liberally construe those humane and beneficial provisions of the law
exempting certain property from execution for the payment of debts.”),
overruled in part on other grounds by Hoff v. City of Mesa, 86 Ariz. 259 (1959);
Matcha v. Winn, 131 Ariz. 115, 117 (App. 1981) (“[T]he homestead laws
should be interpreted liberally to advance the objectives of the statutes.”);
A.R.S. § 1-211(B) (providing courts should “liberally construe[] [statutes] to
effect their objects and to promote justice”). Interpreting “mobile home” as
including self-propelled vehicles that are actually used as the owner’s
permanent residence fulfills this purpose. In other words, whether or not
a home has a motor, the homestead exemption fulfills its purpose by
protecting the family’s interest in that home. See Warfield, 663 F.Supp.3d
at 1082 (“[T]he fact that a debtor’s home has a motor makes it no less the
debtor’s home.”).
18
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting

¶47 Relatedly, interpreting “mobile home” in § 33-1101(A) as
including a motor home if the owner actually resides there would not
permit motor home owners to abuse the homestead exemption. A person
or a married couple can only hold one homestead exemption. § 33-1101(B).
Thus, if the motor home is that home, the exemption applies to it and no
other home. Under no circumstances could a motor home owner receive
an extra homestead exemption. Whether the owner can include the land on
which the motor home is located, see § 33-1101(A)(4), would depend on the
facts of the individual case. That issue is not before us. Regardless, an
owner could not include land within the exemption simply by parking on
it, just as an owner could not tow a non-self-propelled trailer to land simply
to include that land within the exemption. See § 33-1101(A)(4) (requiring
an owner to reside in the mobile home located on the land). Thus, I do not
share the majority’s concerns about misusing the homestead exemption if a
motor home could be considered a “mobile home.” See supra ¶ 13.

¶48 The operative provisions of §§ 33-1101(A)(3) and (A)(4) are
consistent with my interpretation of “mobile home.” Those provisions
authorize a homestead exemption for mobile homes alone, see
§ 33-1101(A)(3), or for mobile homes “plus the land on which that mobile
home is located,” see § 33-1101(A)(4). A mobile home does not have to be
permanently affixed to any real estate to qualify for the homestead
exemption. See Irwin, 293 B.R. at 31–32 (“Moreover, the homestead statute
indicates there is no necessity that the mobile home be affixed or even
customarily used in connection with any particular real estate.”). The only
limitation is that the mobile home be one “in which the person resides.”
§§ 33-1101(A)(3), (A) (4); see also Morrisey v. Ferguson, 156 Ariz. 536, 536–37
(App. 1988) (finding that an individual who filed a homestead declaration
on his mobile home while in prison did not “reside” in the mobile home for
purposes of prior version of A.R.S. § 33-1101(A)(4) and, therefore, did not
comply with the requirements of the statute). Thus, the homestead
exemption can extend to both non-self-propelled manufactured homes
even if the owner does not file an affidavit of affixture, see A.R.S. §§ 33-1501;
42-15203, or to motor homes, if the owner actually resides there.

¶49 Finally, the legislature’s decision not to exclude motor homes
from the term “mobile home” as it did in the Arizona Mobile Home Parks
19
 IN RE: DRUMMOND
VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting

Residential Landlord and Tenant Act “supports the conclusion that the
term ‘mobile home’ encompasses a motor home for the purposes of the
exemption.” Warfield, 663 F.Supp.3d at 1082.

¶50 The fundamental difference between a permanently attached
manufactured home and a motor home is the latter’s ability to propel itself.
Section 33-1101(A)’s focal point for permitting a homestead exemption is
not the design or characteristics of a home—including whether it is
motorized—but whether it actually serves as the owner’s residence. Thus,
a motor home can be a mobile home for homestead purposes if the owner
actually lives there, and I would answer the bankruptcy court’s question
accordingly.

20