On November 9, 1961, the above-styled cause was heard on petition and proof before the Chancellor of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, Stokes V. Robertson, Jr., after a Special Committee of members of the Hinds County Bar had been appointed by the court to investigate any complaints in regard to the professional conduct of appellant and other members of the local bar, and with the result that the committee reported to the chancellor and recommended the disbarment of appellant, Lee V. Prisock, on account of alleged unprofessional conduct in his capacity as an attorney.
The specifications of the petition as grounds for his disbarment were as follows:
(1) That on June 1, 1960, he conspired with a certain Boyd Joiner and others to cause an automobile collision for the purpose of defrauding an insurance company; that in furtherance of this scheme, he planned, aided and abetted the said Joiner and others in carrying out the scheme to the point of having two automobiles collide; and that with full knowledge that the collision was intentionally caused, and the injuries complained of were nonexistent, he thereafter filed suit on such false claim in order to compel the payment of money by the insurance company. *Page 421
(2) That on or about June 26, 1961, he again conspired with the said Boyd Joiner and others to cause an automobile collision for the purpose of defrauding an insurance company; that he planned, aided and abetted Joiner and others in carrying out the said scheme of having the two automobiles collide and feign injuries therefrom, all for the purpose of forcing payment of money by the insurance company.
(3) That on or about May 27, 1961, he conspired with certain Howard Brock Zeagler and others to cause an automobile collision for the purpose of defrauding an insurance company; that he planned, aided and abetted said Zeagler and others in causing the two automobiles to collide and to feign injuries therefrom; and that with full knowledge that the collision was intentionally caused and the injuries complained of were nonexistent, he brought suit on said false claim in order to force payment of money by an insurance company.
The proof offered by the Special Committee appointed by the chancellor in presenting these charges of unprofessional conduct of the accused in his capacity as an attorney was in substance that in each of said instances, there was a conference held in the office of the accused when it was agreed and understood as to who the driver would be of the respective cars to be collided, the occupants of the cars respectively, and the injuries to be claimed by each of them as plaintiffs in the suit against the respective insurance companies who had issued liability insurance on the automobiles involved respectively; that contracts were entered into between the proposed plaintiffs and the accused in each instance as to what part of the proceeds of the insurance he was to receive as compensation for his legal services, and that the accused arranged with a doctor in advance of the feigned accidents to meet the plaintiffs at the hospital, administer treatment to them and determine how long each was to remain in the hospital. *Page 422
The proof as to the foregoing facts and circumstances, and that substantial sums of money were collected in the suits, as introduced by the Special Committee of the local bar of Hinds County, was wholly undisputed. The accused made in effect only a plea of nolo contendre as to the truth of the testimony supporting the foregoing charges. He did plead as a defense to the petition for his disbarment by the chancery court that he had been previously indicted and convicted in the Circuit Court of Hinds County on August 10, 1961, for a felony and sentenced to serve a term of three years in the state penitentiary, and that pursuant to the provisions of Section 8667, Miss. Code of 1942, Rec., he had been disbarred as an attorney. He therefore urged that the chancery court hold the proceedings filed therein by the Special Committee of the Hinds County Bar for his disbarment in abeyance until his conviction of the said felony and automatic disbarment in the said cause in the circuit court could be finally disposed of on the appeal to this Court, now being Cause No. 42,231, on our docket.
The chancellor overruled this request of the accused and proceeded to hear the proof in support of the foregoing enumerated charges, and at the close of the hearing, the chancellor entered a decree disbarring the accused from practicing law, either directly or indirectly, in any of the courts of this State.
(Hn 1) We think that it was within the discretion of the chancery court to either proceed with the hearing of the petition against the accused as filed by the Special Committee of the local bar or to hold the proceeding in abeyance pending the outcome of the appeal from the previous conviction of the accused in the circuit court for the felony with which he was charged. In the exercise of his discretion, the chancellor was confronted with the situation that the accused could appeal the conviction in the circuit court for felony, and that he could *Page 423 do so with supersedeas and continue the practice of law in the meantime, but the chancellor also had the right to proceed with the proceeding filed by the Special Committee of the local bar in the chancery court, where an appeal could be granted, either with or without supersedeas, under the authority of the chancellor or a member of this Court. Moreover, the proceeding in the chancery court was instituted and conducted as a civil proceeding by the Special Committee of the local bar appointed by the chancellor, and the proceeding in the circuit court in the felony case was a criminal proceeding in the name of the State and the conviction could have been appealed from as a matter of right with supersedeas.
(Hn 2) We find that no reversible error was committed by the chancellor in exercising his discretion in proceeding to judgment in the case pending in this Court, (Hn 3) and we find that the testimony in support of the charges preferred by the Special Committee of the local bar was wholly undisputed, that therefore the proof was ample to sustain the truth of the charges preferred and to warrant the disbarment of the accused; and that therefore the decree appealed from must be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Kyle, Arrington, Ethridge and Gillespie, JJ., concur.