[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 965 OPINION
In the instant case we confront the question whether the familiar withdrawal-from-sale provision in an exclusive-right-to-sell contract between an owner of real property and a real estate broker exacts an unlawful penalty within the meaning of sections 1670 and 1671 of the Civil Code. We conclude that it does not. In so holding, we decline defendant-owner's invitation to extend into this area the rule ofFracasse v. Brent (1972) 6 Cal.3d 784 [100 Cal.Rptr. 385,494 P.2d 9], which limited to quantum meruit the recovery of an attorney discharged without cause in spite of a valid contingent fee contract. Pointing out basic differences between the type of contract there involved and that before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court granting full recovery under the withdrawal-from-sale provision according to its express terms.
On April 26, 1970, defendant Erica Borden and plaintiff Ben Blank, a real estate broker, entered into a written agreement for the purpose of securing a purchaser for defendant's weekend home in Palm Springs. The agreement, a printed form contract drafted by the California Real Estate Association, was entitled "Exclusive Authorization and Right to Sell" and by its terms granted Blank the exclusive and irrevocable right to sell the property for the seven-month period extending from the date of the agreement to November 25, 1970. It further provided that if the property were sold during the said period the agent would receive 6 percent of the selling price, and that "if said property is withdrawn from sale, transferred, conveyed, leased without the consent of Agent, or made unmarketable by [the owner's] voluntary act during the term hereof or any extension thereof," the agent would receive 6 percent of the "price for the property" stated elsewhere in the agreement. (Italics added.) Relevant portions of the agreement are set forth in the margin.1 *Page 967
The findings of the trial court describe subsequent events in the following terms: "5. Plaintiff at once began a diligent effort to obtain a purchaser for said property, including but not limited to the expenditures of monies for advertisements in the newspaper, but on or about June 26, 1970, while said exclusive sales contract was still in effect and while plaintiff was making a diligent effort to obtain a purchaser, defendant, without reason or justification, orally notified plaintiff that the property was no longer for sale and that he had no further right to make efforts to sell same or collect a commission, all in direct violation of said exclusive sales contract."
Determining that the foregoing constituted a withdrawal from sale within the terms of the agreement,2 the trial court concluded that plaintiff Blank was entitled to compensation according to the agreement's provisions. Accordingly it rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Blank in the amount of $5,100 (6 percent of $85,000) plus interest. Defendant has appealed. *Page 968
At the outset we quickly dispose of two contentions relating to the substantiality of the evidence in support of the findings of the trial court which we have quoted above.
(1) First, it is contended that there was no support for the finding that plaintiff was making a diligent effort to find a purchaser for the property when it was withdrawn from the market; this, it is urged, resulted in a failure of consideration. Suffice it to say that although the record contains evidence which might support a contrary finding, it also contains substantial evidence in support of the finding made by the trial court concerning plaintiff's diligence. There is evidence in the record that plaintiff contacted several parties — members of the country club on whose golf course the property fronted as well as other persons — with respect to the property, and that he ran newspaper advertisements concerning the property during the two months which preceded defendant's withdrawal of the property. The fact that plaintiff had produced no offers prior to the withdrawal of the property from the market of course does not in itself compel a finding that he was not making diligent efforts to find a purchaser.
(2) Second, it is contended that the finding concerning defendant's withdrawal of the property from the market lacks substantial support. Again, however, our examination of the record discloses ample evidence to support the finding. The withdrawal occurred in the course of an argument which took place at the property between plaintiff and defendant's then fiance, Dr. Archer Michael.3 Defendant was also present at the time. When Dr. Michael, after making statements which might reasonably be construed as threats of physical violence, told plaintiff to take his sign off the property and leave because his services were no longer wanted, plaintiff asked defendant whether she concurred. She replied that she did, and plaintiff departed. It was only after receiving a letter from plaintiff's attorney demanding payment pursuant to the contract that she attempted to soften her position and requested that plaintiff continue his efforts to sell the property. It was wholly within the province of the trial court, as finder of fact, to determine that the withdrawal was complete and unequivocal when made and that defendant's subsequent efforts through counsel to recant were ineffective and irrelevant.
(3a) We are thus brought to the single significant issue in this case, namely, the extent of recovery to which plaintiff is entitled under the contract. *Page 969 (4) It has long been the law of this state that any right to compensation asserted by a real estate broker must be found within the four corners of his employment contract. (Crane v.McCormick (1891) 92 Cal. 176, 182 [28 P. 222]; see alsoKimmell v. Skelly (1900) 130 Cal. 555, 560 [62 P. 1067]; see generally, 1 Miller Starr, Current Law of Cal. Real Estate (1965) pp. 228-247.) By the same token, however, "[t]he parties to a broker's contract for the sale of real property are at liberty to make the compensation depend upon any lawful conditions they see fit to place therein. [Citations.]" (Leonard v. Fallas (1959) 51 Cal.2d 649, 652 [335 P.2d 665].) In short it is the contract which governs the agent's compensation, and that contract is strictly enforced according to its lawful terms.
(3b) It is equally well settled in this state that a withdrawal-from-sale clause in an exclusive-right-to-sell contract is lawful and enforceable, a claim for compensation under such a clause being not a claim for damages for breach of that contract but a claim of indebtedness under its specific terms. (Maze v. Gordon (1892) 96 Cal. 61, 66-67 [30 P. 962];Baumgartner v. Meek (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 505, 510-511 [272 P.2d 552]; cf. Kimmell v. Skelly, supra, 130 Cal. 555, 559-561; Rankin v. Miller (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 133, 135 [3 Cal.Rptr. 496]; see generally, 1 Miller Starr, Current Law of Cal. Real Estate, supra, pp. 215, 245.)
Defendant contends, however, albeit somewhat obliquely, that such clauses should be denied enforcement as an unlawful penalty4 under the terms of Civil Code sections 1670 and 1671. The same argument was urged upon the court in Baumgartner v. Meek, supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 505, and was rejected in the following language: "We think this contention cannot be sustained in view of the contrary holdings in the cases referred to [i.e.,Kimmell v. Skelly, supra, 130 Cal. 555; Walter v. Libby (1945) 72 Cal.App.2d 138 [164 P.2d 21]; Fleming v. Dolfin (1931) 214 Cal. 269 [4 P.2d 776, 78 A.L.R. 585]; Mills v.Hunter (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 352 [229 P.2d 456]]. The distinction between an action for breach of the promise by the owner not to revoke or deal through others or sell himself during the stipulated term, wherein damages are sought for such breach, and a contractual provision whereby, in consideration of the services of the broker to be and being rendered, the owner directly promises that if he sells through others or by himself or revokes he will pay a sum certain, is made clear in the cited cases, particularly in the quotations *Page 970 we have taken from the opinion in Kimmell v. Skelly. The action is for money owed, an action in debt (Maze v. Gordon,supra), and the only breach involved is the failure to pay the promised sum." (126 Cal.App.2d at p. 512.)
We agree with the Baumgartner court that the withdrawal-from-sale clause in an exclusive-right-to-sell contract does not constitute a void penalty provision. In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the teaching of our recent decision in Garrett v. Coast Southern Fed. Sav. Loan Assn., supra, 9 Cal.3d 731 [108 Cal.Rptr. 845,511 P.2d 1197], wherein we emphasized that we look to substance rather than form in determining the "true function and character" of arrangements which are challenged on this ground. (Id. at pp. 735-737.) As we there stated, "when it is manifest that a contract expressed to be performed in the alternative is in fact a contract contemplating but a single, definite performance with an additional charge contingent on the breach of that performance, the provision cannot escape examination in light of pertinent rules relative to the liquidation of damages." (Id. at p. 738.) Here, however, we do not find that the contract before us is of the indicated character. Its terms in no sense contemplate a "default" or "breach" of an obligation by the owner upon whose occurrence payment is to be made.5 On the contrary, the clause in question presents the owner with a true option or alternative: if, during the term of an exclusive-right-to-sell contract, the owner changes his mind and decides that he does not wish to sell the subject property after all, he retains the power to terminate the agent's otherwise exclusive right through the payment of a sum certain set forth in the contract.
We do not see in this arrangement the invidious qualities characteristic of a penalty or forfeiture. As indicated above, what distinguishes the instant case from other situations in which a form of alternative performance is used to mask what is in reality a penalty or forfeiture is the element of rational choice. For an example by way of contrast we need look no further than the Garrett case itself. There the contract, a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on real property, provided for the assessment of certain "late charges" for failure to make timely *Page 971 installment payments on the note — such charges to be a percentage of the unpaid principal balance for the period during which payment was in default. We held that these charges, which did not qualify as proper liquidated damages pursuant to Civil Code section 1671, constituted illegal penalties. In characterizing the subject provision we observed that its "only reasonable interpretation . . . is that the parties agreed upon the rate which should govern the contract and then, realizing that the borrowers might fail to make timely payment, they further agreed that such borrowers were to pay an additional sum as damages for their breach[,] which sum was determined by applying the increased rate to the entire unpaid principal balance." (9 Cal.3d at p. 738.) Clearly this arrangement, viewed from the time of making the contract, realistically contemplates no element of free rational choice on the part of the obligor insofar as his performance is concerned; rather the agreement is founded upon the assumption that the obligor will make the lower payment. In these circumstances, as an eminent commentator has observed, "the only purpose and effect of the formal alternative is to hold over [the obligor] the larger liability as a threat to induce prompt payment of the lesser sum." (McCormick, Damages (1935) § 154, p. 618.)
In the instant case, on the other hand, the contract clearly reserves to the owner the power to make a realistic and rational choice in the future with respect to the subject matter of the contract. Rather than allowing the broker to proceed with his efforts to sell the property, the owner, in the event that at any time during the term of the contract he changes his mind and decides not to sell after all, may withdraw the property from the market upon payment of a sum certain. In these circumstances the contract is truly one which contemplates alternative performance,6 not one in which the formal alternative conceals a penalty for failure to perform the main promise.7 *Page 972
Further considerations support our determination that the contractual provision here at issue should be enforced according to its terms. First, it is important to recognize that we are not here concerned with a situation wherein the party who seeks to enforce the clause enjoyed a vastly superior bargaining position at the time the contract was entered into. On the contrary, the contract before us was one which was freely negotiated by parties dealing at arm's length.8 While contracts having characteristics of adhesion must be carefully scrutinized in order to insure that provisions therein which speak in terms of alternative performance but in fact exact a penalty are not enforced (see Garrett v. Coast Southern Fed. Sav. LoanAssn., supra, 9 Cal.3d 731; cf. Henningsen v. BloomfieldMotors, Inc. (1960) 32 N.J. 358, 403-404 [161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1]), we believe that in circumstances such as those before us interference with party autonomy is less justified. (See generally, Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California (1972) 60 Cal.L.Rev. 84.)
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the basic contract before us shares with other purely "commission" contracts the quality of being essentially result-oriented.9 Regardless of the amount of effort expended by the broker under such a contract, he is entitled to no compensation at all unless a sale occurs. By the same token, when a sale is effected, the compensation received is a percentage of the sale price — and this is paid regardless of the amount of effort which has been expended by the broker. If in this context we view the owner's exercise of a withdrawal-from-sale clause as an anticipatory "breach" of the main contract, the "damage" sustained by the broker would not be measured in the amount of effort expended by him prior to the "breach" but rather would be measured in terms of the value of the lost opportunity to effect a sale and thereby *Page 973 receive compensation. (See Charles B. Webster Real Estate v.Rickard (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 612, 615-616 [98 Cal.Rptr. 559];Coleman v. Mora (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 137, 145-146 [69 Cal.Rptr. 166].) The determination of this value would clearly degenerate into an examination of fictional probabilities — e.g., whether the broker, if allowed to continue his efforts for the full term of the contract, would have been successful in locating a buyer and effecting a sale. This consideration further strengthens our conviction that in these circumstances the contract of the parties, entered into in a context of negotiation and at arm's length, should govern their rights and duties.
Finally, we reject the contention advanced by defendant that the rule announced by us in Fracasse v. Brent, supra,6 Cal.3d 784 [100 Cal.Rptr. 385, 494 P.2d 9] should be extended to the case at bench. In Fracasse we held that an attorney, retained under a valid contingent fee contract, upon discharge by his client with or without cause before the happening of the contingency, is not entitled to recover the full amount provided by the contract but only the reasonable value of his services rendered to the time of the discharge. From what we have said above it is apparent that the two types of contract are fundamentally different. Not only do contingent fee contracts lack provisions for alternative performance such as the one which here concerns us, but it must be recognized that the circumstances under which they are executed not infrequently find the attorney in a bargaining position vastly superior to that of the client. More importantly, however, the Fracasse decision was clearly grounded in the special relationship of attorney and client and the public policy growing from that relationship which implies a right on the part of the client to discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause. (Id. at pp. 789-791.) Clearly considerations of this nature are not present in the instant case.
For the foregoing reasons we hold that the withdrawal-from-sale clause in an exclusive-right-to-sell real estate contract, long a part of real estate marketing practice in this state and long held to be valid and enforceable according to its terms, does not exact an unlawful penalty in violation of sections 1670-1671 of the Civil Code. The judgment below, which enforced the clause before us upon a showing that the explicitly stated conditions for its enforcement were present, was fully supported by the evidence and correct in all respects.
The judgment is affirmed.
Wright, C.J., McComb, J., Mosk, J., and Clark, J., concurred.
"California Real Estate Association Standard Form
"1. RIGHT TO SELL. I hereby employ and grant Ben BlankCompany, hereinafter called `Agent,' the exclusive and irrevocable right to sell or exchange [the described real property]. . . ."2. TERM. Agent's right to sell shall commence on April 26,1970 and expire at midnight on November 25, 1970.
"3. TERMS OF SALE.
"(a) The price for the property shall be the sum of $85,000.00.. . .
"4. COMPENSATION TO AGENT. I hereby agree to compensate Agent as follows:
"(a) Six % of the selling price if the property, is sold during the term hereof, or any extension thereof, by Agent, on the terms herein set forth or any other price and terms I may accept, or through any other person, or by me, or six % of the price shown in 3(a), if said property is withdrawn from sale, transferred, conveyed, leased without the consent of Agent, or made unmarketable by my voluntary act during the term hereof or any extension thereof.
". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"5. If action be instituted on this agreement to collect compensation or commissions, I agree to pay such sum as the Court may fix as reasonable attorney's fees.
". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"Dated April 26, 1970 Palm Springs, California "X [signature] "Erica Borden, Owner
". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"12. In consideration of the execution of the foregoing, the undersigned Agent agrees to be diligent in endeavoring to obtain a purchaser.
"BEN BLANK COMPANY "Agent "By [signature) "Ben Blank"