UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-7560
MCDONALD WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
D. A. HEDGEPETH; DETECTIVE SKINNER; R. BLACKWELL,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
VANCE COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (CA-96-783-5-CT-BR)
Submitted: March 17, 1998 Decided: March 31, 1998
Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
McDonald Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Keith David Burns, FAISON &
FLETCHER, Durham, North Carolina; Gary S. Parsons, David Scott
Wisz, BAILEY & DIXON, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
Appellant appeals the district court order granting summary
judgment to Appellee Blackwell and denying his motion for appoint-
ment of counsel. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
because neither order is appealable. This court may exercise juris-
diction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and cer-
tain interlocutory and collateral orders. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292
(1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In this case, claims remain pending in
the district court against other defendants. Because the district
court has not certified its order granting summary judgment as
final under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and because neither of the orders
fall within the collateral order doctrine, we lack jurisdiction to
consider the appeal either from the award of summary judgment to
Blackwell or the denial of the motion for appointment of counsel.
See Baird v. Palmer, 114 F.3d 39, 43 (4th Cir. 1997); Miller v.
Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 964 (4th Cir. 1987).
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. We deny Appellees'
motions for dismissal and Appellant's motions to stay and amend the
appeal, to examine the record, and for appointment of counsel as
moot. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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