UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-4457
LARRY RICKY YOUNG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Graham C. Mullen, District Judge.
(CR-93-263)
Submitted: February 27, 1998
Decided: April 17, 1998
Before MURNAGHAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Charles L. Morgan, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF CHARLES L. MORGAN,
JR., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark T. Calloway,
United States Attorney, Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Larry Ricky Young was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to rob
an armored vehicle, obstruction or delay of commerce by robbery,
bank robbery, bank larceny, and interstate transportation of stolen
money. The district court sentenced Young to 108 months imprison-
ment. Both Young and the government appealed the sentence. We
affirmed the sentence with the exception of an adjustment for obstruc-
tion of justice based on Young's false testimony that he was not
involved in the robbery. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 3C1.1 (1995). Because the district court failed to make an indepen-
dent finding of perjury, we remanded for reconsideration of the
adjustment. On remand, the district court made the required finding
and reimposed the 108-month sentence. Young appeals this sentence,
alleging that the district court's findings were inadequate under
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993). We affirm.
A two-level adjustment for obstruction of justice may be given if
the defendant makes a denial of guilt under oath that constitutes per-
jury. USSG § 3C1.1, comment. (n.1). However, neither the bare fact
that the defendant denied his guilt on the witness stand nor a recom-
mendation for the adjustment by the probation officer is sufficient.
The district court must make an independent finding at sentencing
that the defendant gave "false testimony concerning a material matter
with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a
result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory." Dunnigan, 507 U.S.
at 94-95. The court may address each element of the alleged perjury
in a separate finding or make a finding that encompasses all the fac-
tual predicates for a finding of perjury. Id. at 95. Here, the district
court found that Young willfully gave false testimony on a material
matter when he denied that he had any part in the robbery and each
time his testimony materially differed from the testimony of his co-
defendant. This finding is sufficient under Dunnigan, and the court's
finding was not clearly erroneous.
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We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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