State ex rel. Ruffin v. Indus. Comm.

[Cite as State ex rel. Ruffin v. Indus. Comm., 2024-Ohio-799.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Minnie J. Ruffin, :

Relator, :
No. 22AP-716
v. :

Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on March 5, 2024

On brief: Nager, Romaine & Schneiberg Co., LPA,
Catherine B. Lietzke, and Evan M. Schantz, for relator.

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and David Canale,
for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

IN MANDAMUS

BOGGS, J.

{¶ 1} Relator, Minnie J. Ruffin, seeks a writ of mandamus ordering respondent,
the Industrial Commission of Ohio, to grant her request for temporary total disability
(“TTD”) compensation, or in the alternative, a limited writ, remanding this matter to the
commission for a rehearing on the merits. For the following reasons, we deny her petition
for writ of mandamus.
{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
this matter was referred to a magistrate. The magistrate considered the action on its merits
and issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended
hereto. The magistrate concluded that Ruffin did not demonstrate that the commission
abused its discretion when it found that Ruffin was not entitled to TTD compensation.
Accordingly, the magistrate recommended this court deny Ruffin’s request for a writ of
No. 22AP-716 2

mandamus, as she has not established a clear legal right to the requested relief or that the
commission is under a clear legal duty to provide such relief.
{¶ 3} No objections have been filed to the magistrate’s decision. “If no timely
objections are filed, the court may adopt a magistrate’s decision unless the court determines
that there is an error of law or other defect evident on the face of the decision.” Civ.R.
53(D)(4)(c).
{¶ 4} Upon review, we find no error in the magistrate’s findings of fact or
conclusions of law. Therefore, we adopt the magistrate’s decision, including the findings of
fact and the conclusions of law therein, as our own and conclude that Ruffin has failed to
demonstrate she is entitled to a writ of mandamus. In accordance with the magistrate’s
decision, the requested writ of mandamus is denied.
Writ of mandamus denied.
BEATTY BLUNT and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.
No. 22AP-716 3

APPENDIX
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Minnie J. Ruffin, :

Relator, :

v. : No. 22AP-716

Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Respondents. :

MAGISTRATE’S DECISION

Rendered on November 9, 2023

Nager, Romaine & Schneiberg Co., LPA, Catherine B. Lietzke,
and Evan M. Schantz, for relator.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, and David Canale, for
respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

IN MANDAMUS

{¶ 5} Relator Minnie J. Ruffin seeks a writ of mandamus ordering respondent
Industrial Commission of Ohio (“commission”) to grant relator’s request for temporary
total disability (“TTD”) compensation or, in the alternative, to remand this matter to the
commission for a rehearing.

I. Findings of Fact
{¶ 6} 1. On September 12, 2008, relator was injured in the course and arising out
of her employment with respondent The Arthur Corporation (“Arthur Corporation”) when
she was pushing boxes through a machine.
{¶ 7} 2. Relator’s workers’ compensation claim was ultimately allowed for the
following conditions: sprain lumbar region; substantial aggravation of pre-existing
No. 22AP-716 4

degenerative disc disease at L4-5 and L5-S1; substantial aggravation of pre-existing
degenerative spondylolisthesis at L4-5 and L5-S1; substantial aggravation of pre-existing
stenosis at L4-5 and L5-S1; Left L5-S1 radiculopathy; major depressive disorder, single
episode, moderate. (Stip. at 391.) Relator’s claim was ultimately disallowed for the
following conditions: neuroforaminal narrowing at L4-5, moderately severe; bilateral
lumbar radiculopathy. (Stip. at 391.)
{¶ 8} 3. Following her injury, relator was placed under work restrictions or found
to be disabled from work as documented in multiple MEDCO-14 physician’s report of work
ability (“MEDCO-14”) forms beginning with a MEDCO-14 dated September 16, 2008.
Additionally, multiple C-9 physician’s request for medical service or recommendation for
additional conditions for industrial injury or occupation disease (“C‑9”) forms were filed
over the history of the claim.
{¶ 9} 4. In a MEDCO-14 dated August 20, 2012, John P. Heilman, D.C., indicated
that relator was completely disabled from work from August 20 until September 3, 2012.
Dr. Heilman indicated that relator could return to work with restrictions from September 4
until September 20, 2012 in a MEDCO-14 dated August 29, 2012. Dr. Heilman indicated
relator could return to work with restrictions from September 27 until October 31, 2012 in
a MEDCO-14 dated October 3, 2012.
{¶ 10} 5. Following the October 3, 2012 MEDCO-14, multiple C-9 forms listing
Dr. Heilman as the treating physician were filed including C-9 forms dated October 9, 2012,
March 5, 2013, and July 17, 2013.
{¶ 11} 6. On July 19, 2013, relator presented to the emergency department of the
Firelands Regional Medical Center in Sandusky, Ohio with complaints of right-sided hip
and back pain. In an emergency room report signed July 21, 2013, Amir H. Shahideh, M.D.,
stated that relator “had no red flags for back pain” and “was seen ambulating in the
emergency department without much difficulty.” (Stip. at 341.) Dr. Shahideh stated that
because relator “was complaining of pain worse in the morning and better in the evening
after she had been on her feet all day, I felt that there was some component of osteoarthritis
involved.” (Stip. at 341.) Dr. Shahideh noted that relator “did have some right-sided lower
back pain, which she said was chronic for her and this combined with her right-sided hip
pain, I felt that maybe she had some lumbar radiculopathy as well.” (Stip. at 341.) Based on
No. 22AP-716 5

the examination, Dr. Shahideh diagnosed relator with lumbar radiculopathy and
osteoarthritis.1 Relator was provided steroids and discharged home in stable condition with
instructions to speak with her primary care physician.
{¶ 12} 7. Relator retired on January 31, 2014.
{¶ 13} 8. In a letter dated February 12, 2014 addressed to relator’s counsel,
Dr. Heilman stated the following:
This letter is regarding the claim for Minnie Ruffin. I cannot
deny the objective and subjective findings continue to be the
same. Minnie is suffering from a chronic condition as a result
of her accident. Her condition is easily aggravated at work and
at home. When she exacerbates the same symptoms and same
orthopedic and neurological findings are seen. This woman
has worked hard all of her life. She is 66 years old and the work
that she does aggravates it. She probably won’t feel better until
she leaves that employment. However, she continues to
require care during these periods of exacerbation.
(Stip. at 344.)
{¶ 14} 9. A psychological evaluation of relator was conducted by Raymond D.
Richetta, Ph.D., on September 17, 2015. Dr. Richetta found relator met the diagnostic
criteria for major depressive disorder, single episode, moderate, and concluded that such
condition was a direct and proximate consequence of the allowed physical conditions in
relator’s claim.
{¶ 15} 10. In a MEDCO-14 dated September 17, 2015, Dr. Richetta indicated that
relator was temporarily not released to any work, including the former position of
employment from September 17, 2015 until March 17, 2016.
{¶ 16} 11. On October 13, 2015, relator filed a C-86 motion requesting an additional
allowance for major depressive disorder, single episode, moderate based on the report of
Dr. Richetta.
{¶ 17} 12. An independent psychological evaluation of relator was conducted by
Francis L. McCafferty, M.D., on December 12, 2015. Dr. McCafferty found that the
requested diagnosis of major depressive disorder, moderate single episode, nonpsychotic
was supported by the medical evidence in the file, the evaluation, and subjective and/or

1 Osteoarthritis was not an allowed condition in the claim.
No. 22AP-716 6

objective findings. Furthermore, Dr. McCafferty opined that the requested condition was
caused by a compensable physical injury sustained by relator.
{¶ 18} 13. In a C-84 request for temporary total disability (“TTD”) compensation
dated January 3, 2016, relator indicated that she was not presently working in any capacity
and was receiving Social Security retirement benefits. On January 12, 2016, relator filed a
C-86 motion requesting TTD compensation “from September 17, 2015 through estimated
return to work date of March 17, 2016 and to continue.” (Stip. at 364.)
{¶ 19} 14. On February 10, 2016, a commission district hearing officer (“DHO”)
conducted a hearing on relator’s January 12, 2016 C-86 requesting TTD compensation. In
an order mailed February 17, 2016, the DHO denied relator’s request for TTD
compensation. In support of the determination, the DHO found that relator “abandoned
the work force for reasons unrelated to her claim, when she terminated her employment
with the Employer on 01/31/2014.” (Stip. at 378.) The DHO concluded that relator
“abandoned the workforce, and therefore, did not suffer any loss of earnings from
09/17/2015 to the date of [the] hearing” since “there is no indication of ongoing medical
restrictions due to the allowed conditions in the claim, nor any indication of effort on the
part of [relator] to secure employment after leaving the former position of employment on
01/31/2014.” (Stip. at 379.)
{¶ 20} 15. On March 28, 2016, a commission staff hearing officer (“SHO”) conducted
a hearing on relator’s appeal from the February 17, 2016 DHO order. In an order mailed
April 5, 2016, the SHO affirmed the DHO order and denied relator’s January 12, 2016 C-86
requesting TTD compensation. The SHO found that relator was not entitled to TTD
compensation “as it appears [relator] retired on 01/31/2014, for reasons unrelated to her
industrial injury.” (Stip. at 391.) With regard to relator’s testimony, the SHO made the
following findings:
Although [relator] testified that she retired as John Heilman,
D.C., told her she would not get better until she stopped
working, there are no retirement or resignation papers
contained in the claim file which certify that [relator] retired
for reasons related to her industrial injury as alleged. The last
physical restrictions contained in the claim file were from Dr.
Heilman and certified restrictions through the date of
10/31/2012 only, per the MEDCO-14 report of Dr. Heilman
dated 10/03/2012. Despite the [relator’s] testimony that she
No. 22AP-716 7

was working under significant restrictions from Dr. Heilman
at the time of her retirement/resignation on 01/31/2014,
there are no documented restrictions in the claim for the
period from 10/31/2012 through 01/31/2014.
Further, [relator] testified she retired as Dr. Heilman had told
her that she would not get better until she left the workforce.
However, in a report of Dr. Heilman dated 02/12/2014, which
is approximately two weeks after [relator] resigned, Dr.
Heilman does not indicate his awareness of [relator’s]
resignation/retirement as he indicated she would not feel
better until she “leaves that employment.” [Relator] had
actually left the employment approximately two weeks prior
to Dr. Heilman authoring that report.
Further, [relator] testified that since her
retirement/resignation on 01/31/2014 from the named
Employer, she has not looked for any other work and has not
worked anywhere since 01/31/2014. There is a lack of
evidence that [relator] was completely disabled from all
employment at the time she retired. As [relator] was not
working or seeking work over the period of 02/01/2014
through 09/16/2015, the Staff Hearing Officer finds that
[relator] does not have any wages to replace. [Relator]
testified she has been receiving Social Security Retirement.
(Stip. at 391-92.)
{¶ 21} 16. On April 21, 2016, relator appealed the April 5, 2016 SHO order to the
commission. The commission refused the appeal in an order mailed April 27, 2016.
{¶ 22} 17. On November 30, 2022, over six years after the April 27, 2016 commission
order refusing relator’s appeal, relator filed her complaint in this mandamus action.

II. Discussion and Conclusions of Law
{¶ 23} Relator seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to grant her TTD
compensation.

A. Requirements for Mandamus
{¶ 24} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus as a remedy from a
determination of the commission, a relator must establish a clear legal right to the
requested relief, that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief, and the
lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Belle Tire
Distribs. v. Indus. Comm., 154 Ohio St.3d 488, 2018-Ohio-2122; State ex rel. Pressley v.
Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). Where the commission’s factual determination is
No. 22AP-716 8

supported by some evidence, it has not abused its discretion and this court must uphold the
decision. State ex rel. Seibert v. Richard Cyr, Inc., 157 Ohio St.3d 266, 2019-Ohio-3341, ¶
44, citing State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co., 74 Ohio St.3d 373, 376 (1996).

B. Temporary Total Disability under Workers’ Compensation Law
{¶ 25} “ ‘The purpose of TTD compensation is to “compensate an injured employee
for the loss of earnings that [the employee] incurs while the injury heals.” ’ ”
Ewell v. Montgomery Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-1078, 2014-Ohio-
3047, ¶ 13, quoting Cordial v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-473,
2006-Ohio-2533, ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm., 89 Ohio St.3d 376, 380
(2000). When a claimant is unable to work at their prior position of employment, TTD
compensation is paid. Id. In order to be awarded TTD compensation, “ ‘the claimant must
show not only that he or she lacks the medical capability of returning to the former position
of employment but that a cause-and-effect relationship exists between the industrial injury
and an actual loss of earnings.’ ” State ex rel. Ohio State Univ. v. Pratt, 169 Ohio St.3d 527,
2022-Ohio-4111, ¶ 17, quoting State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc., 97 Ohio
St.3d 25, 2002-Ohio-5305, ¶ 35. “ ‘In other words, it must appear that, but for the industrial
injury, the claimant would be gainfully employed.’ ” Id., quoting McCoy at ¶ 35. “TTD
benefits are paid during the healing and treatment period until: (1) the employee returns to
work; (2) the employee’s treating physician states that the employee is capable of returning
to the former position of employment; or (3) the temporary disability becomes permanent.”
Ewell at ¶ 13.
{¶ 26} R.C. 4123.56, which governs TTD compensation, contains restrictions
preventing the awarding of TTD compensation, providing in pertinent part:
[P]ayment [for TTD] shall not be made for the period when
any employee has returned to work, when an employee’s
treating physician has made a written statement that the
employee is capable of returning to the employee’s former
position of employment, when work within the physical
capabilities of the employee is made available by the employer
or another employer, or when the employee has reached the
maximum medical improvement.
R.C. 4123.56(A). R.C. 4123.56(B) provides formulas to compensate employees in
situations where an employee “suffers a wage loss as a result of returning to employment
other than the employee’s former position of employment due to an injury or occupational
No. 22AP-716 9

disease” or where an employee “suffers a wage loss as a result of being unable to find
employment consistent with the employee’s disability resulting from the employee’s
injury or occupational disease.”
{¶ 27} Until the enactment of 2020 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 81 (“H.B. 81”), voluntary
abandonment of employment was an affirmative defense to a claim for TTD compensation.
See State ex rel. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, __ Ohio St.3d , 2023-
Ohio-2213, ¶ 16. Effective September 15, 2020, H.B. 81 amended R.C. 4123.56 by adding
division (F), which provides:
If an employee is unable to work or suffers a wage loss as the
direct result of an impairment arising from an injury or
occupational disease, the employee is entitled to receive
compensation under this section, provided the employee is
otherwise qualified. If an employee is not working or has
suffered a wage loss as the direct result of reasons unrelated
to the allowed injury or occupational disease, the employee is
not eligible to receive compensation under this section. It is
the intent of the general assembly to supersede any previous
judicial decision that applied the doctrine of voluntary
abandonment to a claim brought under this section.
R.C. 4123.56(F). Claims pending on or arising after the effective date are subject to the
provisions of R.C. 4123.56(F). State ex rel. Autozone Stores, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio,
10th Dist. No. 21AP-294, 2023-Ohio-633, ¶ 8, fn. 1; Pratt, 2022-Ohio-4111, ¶ 10, fn. 2;
H.B. 81, Section 3.

C. Application
{¶ 28} Initially, it is important to note that R.C. 4123.56(F) does not apply in this
mandamus action since relator’s claim for TTD compensation was resolved by the
commission prior to the effective date of H.B. 81. Rather, the law as it existed at the time of
the commission’s determination controls. Pratt, 2022-Ohio-4111, ¶ 10, fn. 2. Thus, the
doctrine of voluntary abandonment applies to the question presented in this matter. No
party argues otherwise. Additionally, it is noted that despite the delay of over six years from
the commission’s final order denying relator’s request for TTD compensation to the filing
No. 22AP-716 10

of this action in mandamus, the commission did not assert the defense of laches in its
answer.2 Respondent Arthur Corporation did not file an answer.
{¶ 29} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that under the judicially-created
doctrine of voluntary abandonment, “when a workers’ compensation claimant voluntarily
removes [themselves] from [their] former position of employment for reasons unrelated to
a workplace injury, [the claimant] is no longer eligible for [TTD] compensation, even if the
claimant remains disabled at the time of [their] separation from employment.” State ex rel.
Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 155 Ohio St.3d 78, 2018-Ohio-3890, ¶ 29.
“[A]n injury-induced departure from the workforce (involuntary abandonment) and a
departure based on the claimant’s intentional conduct (voluntary abandonment) are
mutually exclusive. The former is compensable; the latter is not.” Quest Diagnostics, 2023-
Ohio-2213, at ¶ 19. See Pratt, 2022-Ohio-4111, at ¶ 24 (stating that the relevant “question
is whether those circumstances demonstrate a voluntary abandonment of the workforce—
permanent or temporary—such that the injured worker’s wage loss is not the result of the
work injury” or “[i]n other words, do the circumstances indicate that the injured worker
would be working—somewhere—but for the injury”). The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated
that “[w]hen determining whether an employee’s retirement bars a subsequent request for
[TTD] compensation, two considerations predominate: (1) was the retirement precipitated

2 “In nonelection cases, laches is an affirmative defense which must be raised or else it is waived.” State ex rel.

Spencer v. E. Liverpool Planning Comm., 80 Ohio St.3d 297, 299 (1997). See State ex rel. Plain Dealer
Publishing Co. v. Cleveland, 75 Ohio St.3d 31, 33 (1996) (stating that “[a]n affirmative defense is waived under
Civ.R. 12(H), unless it is presented by motion before pleading pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B), affirmatively in a
responsive pleading under Civ.R. 8(C), or by amendment under Civ.R. 15”); State ex rel. Witt v. Indus. Comm.
of Ohio, 154 Ohio St.3d 286, 2018-Ohio-1693, ¶ 29. “ ‘Laches occurs when unreasonable and inexcusable
delay in asserting a known right causes material prejudice.’ ” State ex rel. Technical Constr. Specialties, Inc.
v. DeWeese, 155 Ohio St.3d 484, 2018-Ohio-5082, ¶ 16, quoting State ex rel. Carver v. Hull, 70 Ohio St.3d
570, 577 (1994). See State ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145 (1995) (stating
that the four elements of laches are “(1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of
an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the
other party”). “Whether laches will bar a claim is well within the court’s discretion.” Technical Constr. at ¶ 16.

In a prior workers’ compensation decision, this court found laches barred relief in mandamus where a six and
one-half year lapse of time occurred between the commission’s denial of the claimant’s request for permanent
total disability compensation and the claimant’s filing of the mandamus action. State ex rel. McElrath v.
Cincinnati Bronze, 10th Dist. No. 95APD01-131, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2772, at *5 (June 28, 1996) (finding
that “prejudice to the commission does in fact exist as the lapse of time creates special difficulty in attempting
to defend a stale record and one that may not be subject to further clarification as a consequence of the loss of
a witness or those providing information upon which the earlier decision was premised”).
No. 22AP-716 11

by the workplace injury and (2) did the claimant remain in the work force after retiring?”
State ex rel. Rouan v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 133 Ohio St.3d 249, 2012-Ohio-4639, ¶ 1.
{¶ 30} In support of her argument that a claimant cannot abandon a job that she is
unable to perform due to the industrial injury, relator cites to State ex rel. Pretty Prods. v.
Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 77 Ohio St.3d 5 (1996) and several other subsequent cases. Some of
the cases cited by relator have been subsequently overruled or limited. See Klein, 2018-
Ohio-3890, at ¶ 30 (stating that it was not necessary to “overrule Pretty Prods. in its
entirety because its dispositive holding remains valid—a work-rule infraction may not
constitute voluntary abandonment if an industrial injury precipitated that infraction”);
State ex rel. Walmart, Inc. v. Hixson, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-323, 2021-Ohio-3802, ¶ 19
(discussing impact of Klein on voluntary abandonment precedent and holding that “Klein
must be applied retrospectively”). Furthermore, the cases cited by relator concern
voluntary abandonment in the context of termination of a claimant’s employment, not
retirement. Thus, the cases cited by relator are of limited value in analyzing the issue
presented in this matter.
{¶ 31} Considering the first question under Rouan, i.e., whether the retirement was
precipitated by the workplace injury, the record reflects relator was not under any work
restrictions related to the allowed conditions in the claim at the time of her retirement.
Indeed, the last work restrictions in the record appear in Dr. Heilman’s October 3, 2012
MEDCO-14, in which it was indicated that relator could return to work with restrictions
from September 27 until October 31, 2012. It is undisputed relator retired on January 31,
2014, over a year after those restrictions were in effect.3
{¶ 32} Relator asserts she “stopped working on the advice of her doctor, who told
her that she was not going to get any better until she stopped working.” (Relator’s Brief at
11.) There are several flaws in this reasoning. First, Dr. Heilman did not recommend that
relator leave all employment, but instead only stated that relator “probably won’t feel better
until she leaves that employment.” (Emphasis added.) (Stip. at 344.) Second, Dr. Heilman
made this statement in his February 12, 2014 letter—after relator retired on January 31,
2014. Moreover, the text of Dr. Heilman’s letter does not reflect awareness of relator’s
retirement. The text also does not indicate that the contents of the letter had been

3 See Relator’s Brief at 2.
No. 22AP-716 12

communicated to relator prior to her retirement. Thus, as to the first question under
Rouan, 2012-Ohio-4639, some evidence supports the commission’s finding that relator’s
retirement was not precipitated by the workplace injury.
{¶ 33} As to the second question under Rouan, i.e., whether the claimant remained
in the workforce after retiring, the SHO found that relator “testified that since her
retirement/resignation on 01/31/2014 from the named Employer, she has not looked for
any other work and has not worked anywhere since 01/31/2014.” (Stip. at 392.) Consistent
with the SHO’s findings, it is undisputed that relator did not seek other employment or
otherwise participate in the workforce after her retirement.
{¶ 34} Therefore, there exists some evidence in the record to support the
commission’s factual determination that relator voluntarily abandoned her employment
for reasons unrelated to her injury. It is not this court’s role to reweigh or second-guess the
evidence or the inferences raised therefrom. See State ex rel. Honda of Am. Mfg. v. Indus.
Comm., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-528, 2012-Ohio-3335, ¶ 33 (stating that the “voluntary nature
of any claimant’s departure from the workforce or abandonment is a factual question which
centers around the claimant’s intent at the time of retirement” and the “determination of
such intent is a factual question which must be determined by the commission”); Klein,
2018-Ohio-3890, at ¶ 39 (stating that “[v]oluntary abandonment of employment is
primarily a question of intent” and “[t]he presence of that intent is a factual determination
for the commission”). As some evidence supports the commission’s factual determination,
relator has not demonstrated the commission abused its discretion in denying relator’s
January 12, 2016 motion for TTD compensation.

D. Conclusion
{¶ 35} Based on the foregoing, relator has not demonstrated a clear legal right to the
requested relief or that the commission is under a clear legal duty to provide such relief.
Accordingly, it is the decision and recommendation of the magistrate that relator’s request
for a writ of mandamus should be denied.

/S/ MAGISTRATE
JOSEPH E. WENGER IV
No. 22AP-716 13

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as
error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or
legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R.
53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects
to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R.
53(D)(3)(b). A party may file written objections to the
magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the
decision.