NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-790
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
SEAN GIORGI.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a jury-waived trial, a District Court judge convicted
the defendant of operating a motor vehicle under the influence
of intoxicating liquor. On appeal the defendant argues that the
judge should have allowed his motion for a required finding of
not guilty. We affirm.
The offense of operating under the influence of
intoxicating liquor has three elements: "(1) operation of a
vehicle, (2) on a public way, (3) under the influence of
alcohol." Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 420 Mass. 630, 631 (1995).
At trial the parties stipulated to the first two elements.
Thus, the only issue before us is whether the evidence was
sufficient to show that the defendant was under the influence of
alcohol when he operated his vehicle. To satisfy this element,
the Commonwealth had to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant's consumption of alcohol diminished the
defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle safely"; it did
not need to "prove that the defendant actually drove in an
unsafe or erratic manner." Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass.
169, 173 (1985).
The evidence at trial showed that at approximately 11:50
P.M. on March 13, 2022, the defendant was involved in a single-
vehicle accident on Route 2 in Westminster. A State trooper
responded to the scene and observed the defendant's vehicle
"overturned on its roof at rest in the median." The vehicle had
crashed "through the center median," "rolled over multiple
times," and landed on its roof about fifty feet from where it
left the road. There was "barely any traffic" on the road when
the trooper arrived.
The defendant, who was ejected from the vehicle, sustained
critical injuries and was put in an ambulance. The trooper
spoke briefly to him in the back of the ambulance and "right
away" noticed a "pretty substantial" odor of alcohol. Right in
the "immediate vicinity" of the defendant's vehicle, the trooper
found an empty 1.75-liter bottle of rum, along with a few empty
"nips."
This evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant
operated his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The
defendant was in a serious, single-vehicle accident when there
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was little other traffic on the road, he was emitting a strong
odor of alcohol, and there were multiple empty bottles of
alcohol next to his vehicle. The judge could reasonably have
inferred from this that the defendant's consumption of alcohol
diminished his ability to operate his vehicle safely. See
Commonwealth v. Hilton, 398 Mass. 63, 68 (1986) ("The manner in
which the automobile was parked, half on the street and half on
the sidewalk, was evidence that it may have been driven by a
driver under the influence of alcohol"); Commonwealth v. Proia,
98 Mass. App. Ct. 125, 127-129 (2020) (finding of impairment
supported by evidence that defendant was involved in serious
accident, smelled of alcohol, and had bloodshot eyes and slurred
speech). Although the defendant offers alternative, innocent
interpretations of the evidence, "the weight of the evidence is
not the yardstick we use to test" sufficiency. Commonwealth v.
Rarick, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 353 (2015). Rather, we ask
whether the Commonwealth presented proof that was sufficient to
allow a rational trier of fact to convict. See id. The
evidence here and the inferences therefrom, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, met that standard. See
Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 378 (2017), quoting
Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 303 (2016) ("The
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inferences that support a conviction 'need only be reasonable
and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable'").
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin, Blake &
Shin, JJ. 1),
Assistant Clerk
Entered: March 6, 2024.
1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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