State of Tennessee v. Tony Thomas and LaRonda Turner

03/07/2024
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
April 5, 2023 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TONY THOMAS and LARONDA TURNER

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals
Criminal Court for Shelby County
No. C17-00608, 17-00382 J. Robert Carter, Jr., Judge
___________________________________

No. W2019-01202-SC-R11-CD
___________________________________

A jury convicted two defendants, Tony Thomas and Laronda Turner, of three counts of
first-degree premeditated murder. Those convictions stem from a triple homicide that
occurred in Memphis, Tennessee, in 2015. Another co-defendant, Demarco Hawkins, was
also implicated in the killings. However, his trial was severed from the other defendants,
and he testified against Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner. After Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner
were convicted, they appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, raising five issues for
review. The intermediate appellate court ruled unanimously on three of the issues, but one
judge dissented on the other two. Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner sought permission to appeal,
and we accepted the appeal only as to the two issues on which the intermediate appellate
court was divided. First, we agreed to consider whether the prosecution breached the
requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to produce statements
made by Mr. Hawkins at proffer conferences, which were allegedly inconsistent with Mr.
Hawkins’ formal statement to law enforcement, before trial. Second, we agreed to address
whether the evidence was sufficient to support Ms. Turner’s murder convictions. Based
on our review, we conclude that the State did not breach its obligations under Brady with
regard to Mr. Thomas. Additionally, we determine that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain Ms. Turner’s convictions because Mr. Hawkins’ testimony was not adequately
corroborated.1 As a result, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in part
and reverse in part. Additionally, in this opinion, we abrogate Tennessee’s common law
accomplice-corroboration rule. However, we apply that change on a prospective basis
only, and, thus, it has no bearing on the outcome of this case.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part

1
Because of our holding that the evidence is insufficient to sustain Ms. Turner’s convictions, we
need not reach her arguments on the Brady issue.
JEFFREY S. BIVINS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which HOLLY KIRBY, C.J., and
ROGER A. PAGE, J., joined. SHARON G. LEE, J., filed a separate opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part. SARAH K. CAMPBELL, J., filed a separate opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part.

Harry E. Sayle III, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tony Thomas.

Josie S. Holland, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Laronda Turner.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor
General; T. Austin Watkins, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Andrew C. Coulam,
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Samantha L. Simpson, Assistant Attorney General,
for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

Jessica M. Van Dyke, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, The Tennessee
Innocence Project.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

This case arises from a triple homicide that took place at a duplex on 1503 Lake
Grove Street (the “Duplex”) in Memphis, Tennessee, during the early morning hours of
September 26, 2015. Eventually, three co-defendants were indicted by a grand jury, with
two of the co-defendants, Tony Thomas (“Mr. Thomas”) and Laronda Turner (“Ms.
Turner”), proceeding in a joint trial in 2019. The other co-defendant, Demarco Hawkins
(“Mr. Hawkins”), had his case severed from that of Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner and
testified at their trial as part of the State’s proof. In this appeal, we address the case of Mr.
Thomas and Ms. Turner (collectively, the “Defendants”).

Terry Jennings (“Mr. Jennings”) called 9-1-1 at 1:31 a.m. on September 26, 2015.
Mr. Jennings, who lived next to the Duplex, had been sitting on his couch when he
overheard a hostile conversation next door. Mr. Jennings heard one man utter the words
“[d]on’t shoot me,” to which another responded “[y]ou done messed up.” A series of
gunshots ensued. Mr. Jennings looked out his window and saw two men walking away
from the Duplex. The two men walked to a maroon-colored car parked on the opposite
side of the street. Once the car drove away, Mr. Jennings placed the 9-1-1 call. Mr.

2
We will address the facts and procedural background necessary to resolve the issues in this appeal.
For a full recitation of the facts and procedural history, see the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion in this
case. State v. Thomas, No. W2019-01202-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 5015255 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 28,
2021), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Apr. 14, 2022).

-2-
Jennings recognized one person leaving the Duplex as someone he had seen at that
residence previously.3

Sergeant Brad Webb (“Sergeant Webb”) of the Memphis Police Department was
the initial case coordinator on the crime scene. Sergeant Webb described the actions his
unit took at the crime scene:

We viewed the scene inside to see if there—what kind of evidence
would be there. [We] [d]irected other members of the homicide office—we
started doing a neighborhood canvas, which at that time of morning there
wasn’t a lot of people that we could talk to. [We] [h]ad Crime Scene come
to the scene and did some review of the evidence there and asked them to
collect certain items.

Sergeant Webb did not recall whether he had entered the Duplex with the other officers
that morning.

Detective Nick Dandridge (“Detective Dandridge”) replaced Sergeant Webb as case
coordinator shortly after the investigation started. According to Detective Dandridge,
officers entered the Duplex through a side door on the south side of the Duplex because a
large body lying near the front door prevented them from using that entrance. Upon
entering, the officers found Anthony Isom’s (“Anthony”)4 body wedged between the side
of a bed and the front door. Detective Dandridge testified that Anthony had been shot
multiple times. Officers would go on to find two more deceased individuals in the Duplex.
They found Chastity Springfield (“Ms. Springfield”) with “one foot out the window . . .
hanging lifeless[ly] with several gunshot wounds.” Officers believed that Ms. Springfield
had tried to escape the Duplex when she first heard shots by pushing an air conditioner out
of the window so that she could exit the house. However, according to Detective
Dandridge, she was “ambushed from the back” and “shot multiple times,” killing her before
she could escape. After discovering Ms. Springfield’s body, officers found Michael
Glover’s (“Mr. Glover”) body lying in a closet.

3
In the 9-1-1 call, Mr. Jennings stated that he did not recognize either of the assailants. At trial,
Mr. Jennings testified that that information was inaccurate.
4
Both the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion and the State’s brief use first names of members of
the Isom family because Anthony Isom shares the same last name with several key witnesses in this case.
See Thomas, 2021 WL 5015255, at *1 n.3. We choose to do the same for purposes of clarity, and, like the
State and the Court of Criminal Appeals, we intend no disrespect in doing so. See id.

-3-
 Detective Dandridge further testified that, inside the Duplex, officers uncovered a
“gang journal” and several firearms.5 A photograph taken inside the Duplex after the
killings shows the words “RiP Ralph Sep[.] 2, 2015” written on an interior wall of the
duplex.6 Another photograph shows a bill from Memphis Light, Gas and Water, addressed
to a man named James Brannon, attached to a wall inside the Duplex with a thumb tack.7
Across the street from the Duplex, officers found a broken glass jar and some small baggies
of marijuana near the street curb where the car had been parked.

Shortly after the killings occurred, Mr. Jennings went to the police station and
discussed what he had witnessed with Detective Dandridge. At that meeting officers took
a formal, written statement from Mr. Jennings, although Mr. Jennings stated at trial that he
only recognized “some of” the statement. Nevertheless, Mr. Jennings confirmed that he
recognized the signature on the last page of the statement and the initials at the bottom of
each page as his own. The statement described one assailant as a “light-skinned” man,
standing about five-feet nine-inches tall and “slim,” and described the other assailant as
“real dark, [five-feet eight-inches tall], not fat but a little heavy, [with a] round face . . . no
shirt on . . . he might have had dreads.”8 The police report further indicated that Mr.
Jennings described the two men as “around [age] 23, under [age] 30.”9

At the police station, Mr. Jennings was shown two photograph lineups of males
fitting Mr. Jennings’ description of the assailants.10 One of the photographs included in
the first lineup was of Mr. Thomas, whom Mr. Jennings did not identify when he was
shown the pictures. That photograph lineup, identified as spread “A,” was later admitted
into evidence at trial. Detective Dandridge testified that another lineup admitted into
evidence at trial, labeled as spread “B,” was also shown to Mr. Jennings at the police

5
In Sergeant Webb’s trial testimony, he stated that he did not recall whether officers had recovered
any handguns from the Duplex, but he did remember officers recovering ammunition cases.
6
The name “Ralph” is presumed to be a reference to Ralph Martin, a former Vicelord who died in
a drug deal gone wrong on September 2, 2015.
7
Detective Dandridge testified at trial that, although James Brannon was initially considered an
important person in the case, he was cleared of any wrongdoing by Sergeant Webb early in the investigation.
However, Sergeant Webb stated in his testimony that he did not recall James Brannon as the name of a
suspect.
8
In his trial testimony, Mr. Jennings described one person leaving the house as “about [six-feet]
tall” and “light-skinned,” and described the other as having “a lot of hair on his head,” “dark-skinned,” and
under six feet tall.
9
Mr. Jennings testified at trial that he did not recall providing an estimate of the ages of the men
leaving the Duplex to the police.
10
Because Mr. Jennings had told officers that he had not seen any women leaving the Duplex after
the murders, he was not shown any lineups including photographs of women.

-4-
station. Mr. Jennings testified that he did not identify either of the men leaving the Duplex
in the photographic lineups, but claimed that he believed he had a clear enough view of the
men that he would have been able to identify them had they been pictured in the lineups.
Although the two men were walking away from Mr. Jennings when he looked out his
window, Mr. Jennings testified that he “could see the side of their faces” and was aided by
“a light from the light pole” in front of his house.

Detective Dandridge testified that officers used surveillance footage near the
Duplex to identify a maroon-colored car leaving Lake Grove Street around the time the 9-
1-1 call was placed. Officers later determined that Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner were
known to drive a large, maroon-colored car of an older model, closely matching the
characteristics of the car seen in the surveillance footage and identified through a still shot
of the footage. Officers brought Mr. Thomas into the police station on September 28, 2015,
to discuss the situation. Mr. Thomas was shown the still shot image of the car and
identified the car as belonging to himself and Ms. Turner, circling the vehicle and writing
“[t]his is our car,” on the image. Ms. Turner also recognized the car in the still shot image,
writing “[t]his is my car. I have the same car,” on the copy of the image presented to her.
Detective Dandridge testified that he did not tell Mr. Thomas or Ms. Turner what date and
time the photo was taken before asking if they could identify the car. Officers ultimately
obtained a warrant and searched the car, a 1997 Mercury Grand Marquis. Paperwork and
latex gloves were the only items found by officers in the car upon the search.

Consistent with the “gang journal”11 uncovered by police at Anthony’s residence
following the killings, trial testimony paints the picture that the Duplex was a hotbed for
gang-related activities. According to one of Anthony’s younger brothers, Jeremiah Isom
(“Jeremiah”), Anthony had been a member of the Vicelords and was referred to as “Big
Fella,” “Big Fine,” and “Hoppo” by members of their sect of the gang. Jeremiah testified
that Mr. Glover, nicknamed “Killa,” was also a member of the Vicelords who sometimes
stayed the night at the Duplex. Anthony ranked just below Mr. Thomas, also known as
“Little Tony,” and the gang’s other leader, Ralph Martin (“Mr. Martin”), also known as
“Big Ralph,” who, according to Jeremiah, also had previously resided at the Duplex.12

Mr. Martin had been killed on September 2, 2015, mere weeks before Anthony, Ms.
Springfield, and Mr. Glover died. Jeremiah confirmed that he was at the scene of Mr.

11
Anthony’s brother and fellow former Vicelords gang member Jeremiah Isom testified that the
notebook was also commonly referred to as an “account sheet” or an “account book” by gang members and
was used to keep record of meetings conducted by the Vicelords.
12
Mr. Hawkins, who was also a Vicelord and a friend of Mr. Martin’s, characterized the gang’s
hierarchy differently. He described Mr. Martin as being in charge of Mr. Thomas in the gang’s hierarchy,
and further described Mr. Thomas as being “underneath” Anthony. Further conflicting testimony from
Vicelord Courtney Hankins alleged that Mr. Thomas did not hold any rank or lead any gang-related
meetings.

-5-
Martin’s death and testified that some of his fellow gang members claimed, after the killing
took place, that it had been his duty to provide security for Mr. Martin. Jeremiah testified
that he was unaware that he had been designated to provide security for Mr. Martin and
instead claimed that Mr. Martin had “just told me to get to the spot” on the day Mr. Martin
was killed.

According to Jeremiah, the Vicelords abide by a policy requiring that a gang
member who fails to provide adequate security for a high-ranking member be punished.
Mr. Hawkins also testified as to this policy within the Vicelords, testifying that “[when]
[s]omeone get[s] killed in the top rank, that’s top rank. That mean[s] the next person [has]
got to get it, basically.” According to Mr. Hawkins, because of Anthony’s rank within the
Vicelords gang, it would have been his responsibility to ensure Mr. Martin did not go out
without adequate security. Jeremiah testified that Mr. Thomas wanted to inflict a “five and
out” punishment13 towards Jeremiah as retribution for Mr. Martin’s death. However,
Jeremiah claimed that Anthony “stood up for” him in response to the suggested
punishments. Jeremiah further testified that “[Anthony] and [Mr. Glover] [were] the only
one[s] in my corner.”

According to Jeremiah, by September 25, 2015, the day before Anthony, Ms.
Springfield, and Mr. Glover were killed, he was no longer affiliated with the Vicelords.
Although he had been expelled from the gang, Jeremiah testified that he visited the Duplex
on September 25th around five o’clock in the afternoon to “kick it with my brother for a
little minute.” Roughly two hours after Jeremiah’s arrival, Mr. Thomas arrived at the
Duplex with Ms. Turner, another Vicelord. Jeremiah stated that, although “[e]verything
was cool,” he avoided Mr. Thomas because Mr. Thomas had sought to have him punished.
Nevertheless, Jeremiah stayed around the Duplex in the company of several other people,
including Ms. Springfield and Mr. Glover, until he left to grab some food for Anthony,
which he later brought back to the Duplex. Around nine o’clock that night, Jeremiah left
the Duplex again and did not return. Jeremiah did not witness any drama during his time
at the Duplex that day. When asked whether anybody had a firearm at the Duplex that day,
Jeremiah responded, “they [are] Vicelords. So, of course they [are] [going to] have guns,”
and testified that Anthony, Mr. Glover, and Mr. Thomas had all been armed at the
gathering. Nevertheless, Jeremiah stated that he had no concerns for his brother’s safety
when he left the Duplex.

By contrast, Jerrico Isom (“Jerrico”), another one of Anthony’s brothers, testified
that he overheard a conversation at the Duplex that day that led him to believe Anthony
may be in danger. Jerrico further testified that he overheard Mr. Thomas tell Courtney
Hankins (“Mr. Hankins”), also known as “Little Solid,” and one other unidentified man

13
Jeremiah testified that a “five and out” punishment is Vicelord nomenclature for a punishment
in which a gang member is beaten for five minutes and then banished from the gang.

-6-
that Anthony was “in the way.”14 Jerrico then warned Anthony about the conversation he
had overheard, telling Anthony that he had overheard Mr. Thomas “talking about hurting
[Anthony].” However, Jerrico further stated that, at the time, he did not believe Mr.
Thomas’ comments indicated that Anthony’s life was at risk. According to Jerrico,
Anthony appeared unconcerned about the conversation and any potential threats, telling
Jerrico to “forget [those] guys, I’m not worried about them.” Jerrico admitted that he did
not reveal the details of what he overheard to the police in 2015, and also did not reveal
said details to the prosecution until 2019.

However, according to testimony, Jeremiah and Jerrico were not the last of
Anthony’s family members to encounter Anthony and the other victims before their deaths.
Rather, Anthony’s father, Elesha Malone (“Mr. Malone”), testified that he was walking the
streets late at night on September 25, 2015, “getting high” and had been using crack cocaine
throughout the day when he stopped at the residence of “Larry,” Anthony’s next-door
neighbor. Mr. Malone had sought to purchase additional drugs from Larry. Mr. Malone
did not have the money necessary to purchase any drugs at Larry’s residence, but would
go on to talk to Larry for about an hour to an hour and a half in the yard.

Mr. Malone testified that he saw Anthony, Mr. Thomas, and Ms. Springfield on
Anthony’s porch at the Duplex that night. Mr. Malone did not see Ms. Turner on
Anthony’s porch that evening but had seen her “once or twice” in the past. Mr. Malone’s
encounter with the group of people on Anthony’s porch was brief. Mr. Malone testified
that someone on the porch pointed a gun with a red laser beam in his direction and said,
“Pop, I see you walking,” to which Mr. Malone responded, “don’t be doing that.” Mr.
Thomas responded “all right, Pop,” and Mr. Thomas continued to stare at Mr. Malone as
he walked away. Mr. Malone saw the Defendants’ car parked across the street from the
Duplex while he was there around midnight. Mr. Malone went to his wife’s home on
nearby Sydney Street after his encounter with the group of people on Anthony’s porch.
According to Mr. Malone, someone came to the door of his wife’s house and notified him
of the killings about thirty minutes after he had arrived there. After that, Mr. Malone and
some other family members went to the Duplex where they saw police at the residence.

In November of 2015, Mr. Hawkins was identified as a suspect when officers were
alerted that Mr. Hawkins had been boasting to a woman named Jasmine Dorris (“Ms.
Dorris”) on a digital messaging application that he had killed Anthony.15 Ms. Dorris
asserted that she and Mr. Hawkins were in an “intimate” relationship and that Mr. Hawkins

14
At trial, Mr. Hankins denied visiting the Duplex on September 25, 2015, and further denied
engaging in the conversations Jerrico allegedly overheard.
15
Specifically, Mr. Hawkins’ message to Ms. Dorris read, “[t]he last time you talk all that s*** by
listening to a fat M[other]F[*****]. But guess what, I murked that n****.”

-7-
was her “boyfriend.”16 Ms. Dorris testified that Mr. Hawkins sent the incriminating
message after she had declined his proposals to reconcile their alleged relationship.
Detective Dandridge interviewed Ms. Dorris on November 23, 2015. Officers took
photocopies of the incriminating messages at the meeting and later requested Mr. Hawkins’
phone records from AT&T to determine who Mr. Hawkins had communicated with around
the time of the homicides. Because officers sought to build a case against Mr. Hawkins,
they did not arrest him immediately following the interview.

Mr. Hawkins was eventually arrested around 3 p.m. on May 10, 2016, at his then-
place of employment, the Peabody Hotel. Detective Dandridge questioned Mr. Hawkins
at the Memphis Homicide Bureau’s office after his arrest. Once the police were ready to
take a statement from Mr. Hawkins, they brought in a transcriber to document the questions
and Mr. Hawkins’ answers.17 After the transcription of Mr. Hawkins’ statement was
finished, the transcriber printed a copy of the eight-page statement for Mr. Hawkins to
review, initial, and sign. After he signed the statement, Mr. Hawkins was charged with the
murders of Anthony, Ms. Springfield, and Mr. Glover. Detective Dandridge testified that,
although officers “could have” charged Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner at the same time as
Mr. Hawkins, they were not arrested until after Mr. Hawkins had been indicted.

Although Mr. Hawkins ultimately confessed to the murders on the date of his arrest,
Mr. Hawkins testified on cross-examination that he had initially lied to officers and claimed
that he was not involved in the murders. Mr. Hawkins admitted that, even after he had
confessed his involvement to law enforcement, the story he gave in the police statement
was riddled with falsehoods.18 According to Mr. Hawkins, after “a couple [of] hours [of
questioning]” he decided to “[tell] them the truth[,] or half of the truth anyway.” Yet, in
phone calls made to a girlfriend and his mother shortly after Mr. Hawkins’ statement was
finalized, Mr. Hawkins maintained his innocence and alleged that Detective Dandridge had
coerced him into confessing to the murders. Mr. Hawkins testified that he did not come
clean to his mother about the murders until a visitation he had with her that took place just
a few days before the Defendants’ trial.

Mr. Hawkins testified that he became a Vicelord at the age of fifteen when his good
friend, Mr. Martin, helped get him involved with the gang. He became involved in the plot
to kill Anthony when he attended a brief, fifteen to thirty-minute Vicelord meeting at the
residence of Mr. Hankins in Binghampton, Memphis, on September 25, 2015, at around

16
In his testimony, Mr. Hawkins denied the existence of an intimate relationship between himself
and Ms. Dorris.
17
Detective Dandridge testified that Mr. Hawkins’ statement was also recorded on an audio
recorder.
18
Mr. Hawkins testified that, in addition to making false statements to the police in his initial
statement, he lied to prosecutors on subsequent occasions.

-8-
4:30 p.m.19 Mr. Hawkins was out buying cigars when he ran into Timothy Jones (“Mr.
Jones”), a fellow member of the Vicelords, who invited him to attend the meeting.

Mr. Hawkins further testified that he and Mr. Jones were driven to the meeting by
his friend Deshun Dye (“Mr. Dye”), who did not attend the meeting because Mr. Dye was
not a member of the Vicelords. Mr. Hawkins listed himself, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Jones, Ms.
Turner, Mr. Hankins, Cory Hankins (also known as “Big Five”), and “one more person”
as attendees of the Binghampton meeting.20 Mr. Hawkins claimed that, when Mr. Thomas
proposed killing Anthony in retribution for Mr. Martin’s death, the meeting attendees were
“shock[ed]” by the suggestion.21 After the meeting had concluded and no one had initially
volunteered to assist Mr. Thomas with the planned murder, Mr. Thomas pulled Mr.
Hawkins aside and requested his assistance in killing Anthony. Mr. Hawkins agreed to do
so.

Mr. Hawkins insisted that, although he had a contentious relationship with Anthony,
he “didn’t want to [kill Anthony], but it was either [Anthony] or me.” Mr. Hawkins’
relationship with Anthony had deteriorated after Mr. Hawkins was badly beaten in a fist
fight by another Vicelord. A video of the fight circulated, leading many, particularly
Anthony, to poke fun at Mr. Hawkins over his defeat.22

Mr. Hawkins further testified that, following the alleged meeting at Mr. Hankins’
house, he and Mr. Jones were picked up by Mr. Dye on Nathan Street and driven to Zena’s
Market. Mr. Hawkins informed Mr. Jones that Mr. Thomas had asked him to help kill
Anthony. Mr. Jones attempted to discourage Mr. Thomas from participating in the plan,
but Mr. Hawkins maintained his intent to help Mr. Thomas kill Anthony. Mr. Hawkins
testified that he spent the rest of the day “[w]alk[ing] around [the] neighborhood, smok[ing]
[marijuana] blunts . . . then . . . calling females up . . . [un]til probably about [ten] or [eleven
o’clock] at night.”

According to his trial testimony, an unarmed Mr. Hawkins, clothed in a black shirt
and black jean shorts with gloves on his hands, walked from his house to a Grizzly Mart

19
At trial, Mr. Hankins denied any acquaintance with Mr. Hawkins and denied that any meeting
took place at his residence on September 25, 2015.
20
Mr. Hawkins admitted that he had initially lied to Detective Dandridge by alleging that there
were thirteen people at the meeting.
21
Mr. Hawkins’ statement to police had claimed that, rather than solely targeting Anthony, the plan
was to walk into the Duplex and shoot the first person in sight.
22
According to Mr. Hawkins, Anthony was also responsible for showing Ms. Dorris the video,
leading Ms. Dorris to mock Mr. Hawkins and brag about the video.

-9-
gas station around 11:30 p.m.23 At the gas station, he met up with Mr. Dye and asked Mr.
Dye for a ride. Mr. Hawkins lied to Mr. Dye, telling Mr. Dye that he needed to go to his
“cousin[’s] house . . . [o]ff of Warford and Chelsea.” Mr. Dye obliged, driving him to the
requested destination in what Mr. Hawkins described as a “white [two-door] Toyota” and
dropping him off around midnight.24 Mr. Hawkins claimed that he initially had concealed
Mr. Dye’s involvement so that Mr. Dye “wouldn’t get in trouble.”

After Mr. Hawkins was dropped off by Mr. Dye, he walked through a field until he
reached a house that neighbored Anthony’s. Mr. Hawkins heard Mr. Thomas, wearing a
red “Richlord” shirt and a hat, call out Mr. Hawkins’ nickname, “D-Money,” at which point
Mr. Hawkins entered the back seat of Mr. Thomas’ vehicle. Ms. Turner was in the front
passenger seat of Mr. Thomas’ car. Mr. Hawkins described the car as “burgundy, red.
Something like that.”

Mr. Hawkins further testified that, after he took a seat in the car, Mr. Thomas asked
Mr. Hawkins if he was “ready to handle a little business.” Mr. Hawkins responded in the
affirmative and grabbed a nine-millimeter handgun from underneath his seat upon Mr.
Thomas’ request. Mr. Hawkins approached Anthony’s door with Mr. Thomas. Mr.
Thomas knocked on the door and, after Anthony opened the door, Mr. Thomas shot
Anthony with a Glock 17 semi-automatic pistol. Shortly after Mr. Thomas fired the first
shot, Mr. Hawkins also shot Anthony, knocking him to the ground. Mr. Thomas fired an
additional shot at Anthony after he fell.

After Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Thomas shot Anthony, Mr. Glover ran to the back of
the Duplex in an effort to escape the situation. Mr. Thomas chased after Mr. Glover and
fired two shots. Mr. Hawkins, following closely behind Mr. Thomas, also fired a shot at
Mr. Glover. Mr. Hawkins stated that he then saw a woman, later identified as Ms.
Springfield, attempt to jump out of the window and fired shots in her direction, leading her
to fall to the floor. Mr. Hawkins stood by for a moment, at which point Ms. Turner entered
the room.

Mr. Hawkins testified as to Ms. Turner’s alleged involvement in the crimes:

Q: What happens when [Ms. Turner] comes in?
A: She comes in, she see[s] [Anthony is] laying down, she see[s] [Mr. Glover
is] laying down, [and] she see[s] her laying down, [Ms. Springfield].
Q: Did she come in the back room?

23
In his initial statement to police, Mr. Hawkins alleged that the murders took place around nine
or ten in the evening.
24
In his initial statement to police, Mr. Hawkins stated that he rode to the Duplex in Ms. Turner’s
vehicle.

- 10 -
 A: Yes, sir.
...
Q: What happens [then]?
A: She asked [whether Ms. Springfield was] dead. I said [“]I guess so,[”] so
she asked [if she] could see the gun, my gun. I gave it to her, [and] she fired
a shot at [Ms. Springfield].25

Mr. Hawkins testified that, as Ms. Turner shot Ms. Springfield, Mr. Thomas stole guns and
money from the duplex. Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Thomas exited the Duplex together and
entered the car, with Mr. Hawkins entering the back seat of the vehicle on the driver’s side
and Mr. Thomas going to the driver’s seat. Ms. Turner entered the front passenger seat
shortly thereafter, holding some marijuana in her hand that she had stolen from the Duplex.
At trial, Mr. Hawkins commented, “I guess she dropped the jar [holding the marijuana]
because I heard some glass break. So, I guess that was the weed jar that hit the ground.
We got in the car and left.”

Mr. Hawkins testified that once he, Mr. Thomas, and Ms. Turner entered the car to
leave the scene of the killings, they “[t]urn[ed] left, went down Warford, and then they
dropped [Mr. Hawkins] off . . . on National and Macon.” After he was dropped off, he
threw his gloves away in a nearby garbage can and returned home. Mr. Hawkins claimed
he had no further communication about the homicides until he sent the incriminating
message to Ms. Dorris that ultimately led to his arrest.

Dr. Marco Ross (“Dr. Ross”) was called to testify at trial by the State and was
certified by the trial court as an expert in forensic pathology. Dr. Ross testified that
Anthony was shot three times in the head, nine times in the torso, once in his right buttock,
and once in his left arm, totaling fourteen gunshot wounds. Anthony had an additional
graze wound from a bullet on his shoulder. Dr. Ross classified Anthony’s cause of death
as “[m]ultiple gunshot wounds” and Anthony’s manner of death was certified as a
homicide. Ms. Springfield sustained three gunshot wounds, one with an entrance on the
left side of her face that went into her skull, one underneath the chin that went through her
mouth region, and one to the right wrist region of her body. Dr. Ross classified Ms.
Springfield’s manner of death as a homicide.

Like the other victims, Mr. Glover had been shot multiple times:

[Mr. Glover] had a gunshot wound to the left eyebrow region, he had a
gunshot entrance wound on the . . . left side of his neck, gunshot entrance

25
In his initial police statement, Mr. Hawkins claimed that Mr. Thomas had first shot Anthony,
then Ms. Springfield, and lastly Mr. Glover, contrasting his trial testimony in which Mr. Hawkins claimed
that only he and Ms. Turner had shot Ms. Springfield. Mr. Hawkins’ statement to police did not implicate
Ms. Turner in the killings at all.

- 11 -
 wound there. He had another gunshot wound to the top of the right shoulder,
and a gunshot wound to his back, and a gunshot wound to his left hip, and
. . . two gunshot wounds to the, sort of, right buttock, right thigh region.
And then two graze gunshot wounds on his abdomen and two graze gunshot
wounds on his back.

Dr. Ross classified Mr. Glover’s cause of death as “[m]ultiple gunshot wounds” and stated
that Mr. Glover’s death was also a homicide.

The Defendants called Kasia Lynch (“Ms. Lynch”), a firearms examiner employed
by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and assigned to the Memphis Crime Lab, as an
expert witness to testify about the weapons that were recovered from the Duplex. Ms.
Lynch became involved with the case after her department received a request for analysis
on the evidence associated with the case. Ms. Lynch stated that she works with “anything
related to guns. Guns, bullets, and cartridge cases.” Ms. Lynch described her work,
testifying that, “I look at cartridge cases and bullets . . . to determine if they have been fired
in a specific firearm or not . . . . by using a comparison microscope . . . [that] allows me to
look at two items of evidence under the same magnification and compare them side by
side.”

Ms. Lynch testified that, in this case, she “received a total of [twelve] bullets or
bullet fragments as well as [twenty-one] nine[-]millimeter caliber cartridge cases[,] . . . one
.380 auto cartridge case, . . . and [forty] .22 caliber cartridge cases.” She explained that
she compares “like calibers” to one another:

I was able to determine that [ten] of them had been fired in one nine[-
]millimeter gun, one of them had been fired in a second nine[-]millimeter
gun, and then another [ten] of them had been fired in a third nine[-]millimeter
gun. The .380 caliber cartridge case is a different caliber, so that was fired
in a separate gun, and then all [forty] of the .22 long rifle caliber cartridge
cases were fired in the same gun as one another. In examining the bullets
and bullet fragments, I was able to determine that two of them could have
been fired in the same gun as one another, but there wasn’t quite enough there
for me to say that they were certainly fired the same as one another. But I
was able to determine that eight of them had been fired in a different gun
than the first two, but those ones, again, I wasn’t able to determine if they
were fired in the same gun as one another just because the marks that I’m
looking [at] weren’t sufficient enough for me to determine for sure that they
were fired in one gun. But I can tell that there were two different guns based
on the bullets that I have.

The State called Reuben Ramirez (“Mr. Ramirez”), a law enforcement officer
working in the inmate phone monitoring department of the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office,

- 12 -
to testify. During Mr. Ramirez’ testimony, a joint stipulation of fact was entered into the
record, indicating that an audio recording played for the jury at trial “fairly and accurately
reflects content from a telephone call made from the Shelby County Jail on September 20,
2017.” In that phone call, made by Mr. Thomas to Deangelo Leachman (“Mr. Leachman”),
a cousin of Ms. Turner, Mr. Thomas asked Mr. Leachman to tell Ms. Turner not to accept
a probation offer she had been provided. Mr. Thomas said in the call that accepting the
probation offer would be “like a sign of guilt” and that Ms. Turner needed to “stick to the
script” rather than be “tricked” into taking the probation offer. Additionally, they discussed
their view that the State’s case was a weak one, given a perceived lack of evidence placing
the Defendants at the Duplex during the murders and Mr. Hawkins’ testimony, which they
considered unreliable and inconsistent.

Following deliberations, the jury convicted both Defendants of three counts of first-
degree premeditated murder. The trial judge sentenced each defendant to life in prison on
each count.

The Defendants subsequently filed motions for a new trial on several grounds. The
Defendants first alleged that the State had violated Tennessee Rule of Professional Conduct
3.8(d), which requires “timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense,” as well as the Brady disclosure rule, which, for due process purposes, requires
the prosecution to provide a defendant with favorable evidence that is material to guilt or
punishment. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 3.8(d); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Prior to trial, the trial judge ordered the State to disclose inconsistent statements when “the
witness is asked something in your proffer sessions [and] the answer . . . should have
included the original detail and did not give it and then later upon further . . . review shared
[the detail] . . . that common sense would say they should have.” The Defendants argued
in their motions for a new trial that the State failed to disclose all inconsistent statements
made by Mr. Hawkins at proffer sessions. According to the Defendants, disclosure of the
requested statements was not made until trial, when the Defendants could no longer “make
use of the information disclosed.”

The Defendants also argued that the evidence was insufficient to support their
convictions and that Mr. Hawkins’ testimony was not reliable nor sufficiently corroborated.
Counsel for Mr. Thomas contended that, although “Mr. Hawkins’ testimony in part was
corroborated by other elements of the evidence. . . . [I]n larger part it did not accord with
the evidence.” Accordingly, the Defendants requested that the trial court utilize its power
under Rule 33(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure to “grant a new trial
following a verdict of guilty if it disagrees with the jury about the weight of the evidence.”
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(d).

The Defendants’ motions for a new trial ultimately were denied by the trial court.
Subsequently, the Defendants timely appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals of

- 13 -
Tennessee at Jackson. State v. Thomas, No. W2019-01202-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL
5015255, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 2021), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Apr. 14,
2022). The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed five issues raised by the Defendants on
appeal. Id. A majority of the intermediate appellate court affirmed that the evidence was
sufficient to support the convictions of both Defendants, citing “adequate corroboration,
however slight.” Id. at *16. Additionally, the majority did not find a Brady violation,
instead stating in its opinion that “disclosure of the proffer statements would not have
affected the Defendants’ trial strategy or preparation of their cases” and that “the State’s
failure to disclose favorable information in this case does not undermine our confidence in
the outcome of this trial.” Id. at *28. The intermediate appellate court unanimously sided
with the State on the other three issues. Id. at *20–21, *30, *32. Accordingly, the Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgments of the trial court. Id. at *32.

Judge Camille R. McMullen (“Judge McMullen”) dissented, noting her
disagreement with the majority’s conclusions that the evidence was sufficient to sustain
Ms. Turner’s convictions and that the State did not commit a Brady violation based on its
failure to disclose Mr. Hawkins’ inconsistent statements. Id. (McMullen, J., dissenting).
In Judge McMullen’s view, the record did not reflect sufficient corroboration with regard
to Ms. Turner’s three convictions for first degree premeditated murder. Id. Judge
McMullen would have reversed Ms. Turner’s convictions and dismissed the charges. Id.
Judge McMullen further opined that the record demonstrated a Brady violation on the part
of the State and that, as a result, the Defendants should have had their motions for a new
trial granted. Id.

The Defendants appealed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in
accordance with Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court
granted the appeal on a limited basis on April 14, 2022, and heard oral arguments on April
5, 2023, in Jackson, Tennessee.

II. ANALYSIS

In this appeal, although the Defendants both raised several issues in their respective
Rule 11 applications, the Court only agreed to consider whether the evidence was sufficient
to support Ms. Turner’s convictions for first-degree murder and whether, as to both
Defendants, the prosecution breached its obligations under Brady by failing to produce
statements made by Mr. Hawkins in proffer conferences that were inconsistent with Mr.
Hawkins’ formal statement to law enforcement. Because we conclude that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain Ms. Turner’s convictions, it is unnecessary to address the Brady issue
raised by Ms. Turner.

- 14 -
 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The State encourages us to abolish the court-made rule requiring accomplice
corroboration to sustain a conviction. This argument directly impacts the sufficiency of
the evidence issue with regard to the conviction of Ms. Turner. As a result, we find it
necessary to address this issue at the beginning of our analysis. This is a proper
consideration for our Court, as we do not “hesitate[] to abolish obsolete common-law
doctrines,” especially when “it is the Court, rather than the Legislature, which has
recognized and nurtured the action.” Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tenn. 1991)
(quoting Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tenn. 1991)). Given that another state
jurisdiction repealed a similar judicially-created rule just five years ago, see State v. Jones,
216 A.3d 907 (Md. 2019), leaving Tennessee as the sole state still utilizing such a rule on
a common-law basis, we find it worthwhile to consider the State’s proposition as part of
our analysis. After we decide the status of this rule, we will address whether the evidence
is sufficient to support Ms. Turner’s first-degree murder convictions in this case.

i. The Accomplice-Corroboration Rule

It has long been a common law rule in our state that “evidence is insufficient to
sustain a conviction” when the conviction is “solely based upon the uncorroborated
testimony of one or more accomplices.” State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 894 (Tenn.
2013) (citing State v. Little, 402 S.W.3d 202, 211–12 (Tenn. 2013)); see also Clapp v.
State, 30 S.W. 214, 216–17 (Tenn. 1895). “An accomplice is one who knowingly,
voluntarily, and with common intent participates with the principal offender in the
commission of a crime.” State v. Bough, 152 S.W.3d 453, 464 (Tenn. 2004) (citing State
v. Lewis, 36 S.W.3d 88, 94 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000); Conner v. State, 531 S.W.2d 119,
123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975)). A witness qualifies as an accomplice if that witness “could
be indicted for the same offense charged against the defendant.” Collier, 411 S.W.3d at
894 (quoting Monts v. State, 379 S.W.2d 34, 43 (Tenn. 1964)). Our Court has described
the accomplice-corroboration rule as follows:

[T]here must be some fact testified to, entirely independent of the
accomplice’s testimony, which, taken by itself, leads to the inference, not
only that a crime has been committed, but also that the defendant is
implicated in it; and this independent corroborative testimony must also
include some fact establishing the defendant’s identity. This corroborative
evidence may be direct or entirely circumstantial, and it need not be adequate,
in and of itself, to support a conviction; it is sufficient to meet the
requirements of the rule if it fairly and legitimately tends to connect the
defendant with the commission of the crime charged. It is not necessary that
the corroboration extend to every part of the accomplice’s evidence. The
corroboration need not be conclusive, but it is sufficient if this evidence, of
itself, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense,

- 15 -
 although the evidence is slight and entitled, when standing alone, to but little
consideration.

State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994) (alteration in original) (first citing State
v. Gaylor, 862 S.W.2d 546, 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); then quoting Hawkins v. State,
469 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971)). The State heavily criticizes the accomplice-
corroboration rule in its brief. The State implores our Court to “abandon the rule,” which
the State claims is “out of step with the principles underlying sufficiency analysis . . . [and]
is also out of step with the clear majority of jurisdictions.”

Tennessee’s accomplice-corroboration rule, like comparable rules in other
jurisdictions, is justified by the theory that accomplice testimony is unique and must be
considered with a different degree of scrutiny than other testimony. See, e.g., Christine J.
Saverda, Accomplices in Fed. Ct.: A Case for Increased Evidentiary Standards, 100 Yale
L.J. 785, 786 (1990). Because accomplices often have an incentive to shape their testimony
in a manner that could help them curry favor with the prosecution and the police, and
because an accomplice’s status as a guilty party with inside knowledge of the situation can
make the jury more susceptible to believe his testimony, proponents of accomplice-
corroboration rules see such rules as a necessary safeguard for criminal defendants. See
id. at 786–87; see also Jones, 216 A.3d at 916. The contrary view is that, although valid
concerns regarding the credibility of accomplice testimony certainly exist, accomplice-
corroboration rules unduly interfere with the jury’s factfinding role and the role of the jury
to evaluate witness credibility. See, e.g., Jones, 216 A.3d at 919. The overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions, including thirty-three state jurisdictions,26 the District of

26
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-302; Davis v. People, 490 P.2d 948, 950 (Colo. 1971); State v.
Johnson, 179 A.3d 780, 786 (Conn. 2017) (citing State v. Heno, 174 A. 181, 182 (1934)); Brooks v. State,
40 A.3d 346, 350 (Del. 2012); Smith v. State, 507 So. 2d 788, 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v.
Carvelo, 361 P.2d 45, 59 (Haw. 1961); People v. Williams, 166 N.E.2d 568, 571 (Ill. 1960) (citing People
v. Hermens, 125 N.E.2d 500, 504 (Ill. 1955)); Smith v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1139, 1141 (Ind. 1985) (citing
Smith v. State, 455 N.E.2d 346, 350 (Ind. 1983)); State v. Shepherd, 516 P.2d 945, 952 (Kan. 1973) (quoting
State v. McIntyre, 294 P. 865 (Kan. 1931)); Martin v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d 340, 344 n.1 (Ky. 2013);
State v. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d 603, 634 (La. 2011) (citing State v. Matthews, 450 So. 2d 644, 647 (La. 1984);
State v. Hopkins, 897 So. 2d 854, 892 (La. Ct. App. 2005)); State v. Jewell, 285 A.2d 847, 851 (Me. 1972);
Jones, 216 A.3d at 919; Commonwealth v. DeBrosky, 297 N.E.2d 496, 504 (Mass. 1973) (citing
Commonwealth v. Taber, 213 N.E.2d 868 (Mass. 1966)); People v. Barron, 163 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Mich.
1968); Ballenger v. State, 667 So. 2d 1242, 1253 (Miss. 1995) (quoting Mason v. State, 429 So. 2d 569,
571 (Miss. 1983)); State v. Tressler, 503 S.W.2d 13, 17 (Mo. 1973); State v. Oglesby, 195 N.W.2d 754,
755 (Neb. 1972) (citing Jungclaus v. State, 104 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Neb. 1960)); State v. Fraser, 411 A.2d
1125, 1128 (N.H. 1980); State v. Begyn, 167 A.2d 161, 171 (N.J. 1961) (citing State v. Hyer, 39 N.J.L 598,
602 (N.J. 1877)); State v. Gutierrez, 408 P.2d 503, 505 (N.M. 1965); State v. Tilley, 79 S.E.2d 473, 476
(N.C. 1954); State v. O’Dell, 543 N.E.2d 1220, 1225 (Ohio 1989); Commonwealth v. Mikell, 729 A.2d
566, 570 (Pa. 1999); State v. DeMasi, 413 A.2d 99, 100 (R.I. 1980) (citing State v. Pella, 220 A.2d 226,
230 (R.I. 1966)); State v. Givens, 225 S.E.2d 867, 869 (S.C.L. 1976) (citing State v. Brown, 34 S.C.L. 508
(S.C. 1849)); Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(1); State v. Briggs, 568 A.2d 779, 783 (Vt. 1989); Blount v.
Commonwealth, 195 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Va. 1973) (citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 158 S.E.2d 663, 666

- 16 -
Columbia,27 three federal territorial jurisdictions,28 twelve federal circuit courts of
appeal,29/30 and the United States Supreme Court,31 have either declined to adopt an
accomplice-corroboration rule or have repealed such a rule. While certainly not bound by
the decisions and statutes of these other jurisdictions, we find it helpful to consider them
when we re-evaluate our common law rule. See, e.g., Collier, 411 S.W.3d at 897–98
(considering the “preferable course” of action taken by the majority of state courts with

(Va. 1968)); State v. Johnson, 462 P.2d 933, 943 (Wash. 1969) (citing State v. Badda, 385 P.2d 859, 862
(Wash. 1963); State v. Eichman, 418 P.2d 418, 420 (Wash. 1966)); State v. Vance, 262 S.E.2d 423, 426
(W. Va. 1980); Linse v. State, 286 N.W.2d 554, 558 (Wis. 1980) (citing Kutchera v. State, 230 N.W.2d
750, 758 (Wis. 1975)); Vlahos v. State, 75 P.3d 628, 636 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351,
360 (Wyo. 1996)).
27
See Mathis v. United States, 513 A.2d 1344, 1350 (D.C. 1986).
28
See 8 Guam Code Ann. § 95.10; 5 V.I. Code Ann. § 740; Pueblo v. Baez Figueroa, No.
DOP2009G0092, 2012 WL 6931128, at *10 (P.R. Cir. Dec. 21, 2012).
29
See United States v. Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d 136, 140 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Parker,
903 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 791 (2d Cir. 1976)); United
States v. De Larosa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1060 (3d Cir. 1971) (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
495 (1917)) (additional citations omitted); United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 392 (4th Cir. 1984)
(citing United States v. Figurski, 545 F.2d 389, 392 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Clark, 541 F.2d 1016,
1018 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Miller, 451 F.2d 1306, 1307 (4th Cir. 1971)); United States v. Perry,
35 F.4th 293, 317 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Villegas-Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 224, 228 (5th Cir.
1999)); United States v. Haynes, 403 F.2d 54, 55 (6th Cir. 1968) (citing Cont’l Baking Co. v. United States,
281 F.2d 137, 155 (6th Cir. 1960)); United States v. Platt, 156 F.2d 326, 327 (7th Cir. 1946) (citing United
States v. Glasser, 116 F.2d 690, 703 (7th Cir. 1940); United States v. Riedel, 126 F.2d 81, 82 (7th Cir.
1942)); United States v. Cole, 449 F.2d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1971); Williams v. United States, 308 F.2d 664,
666 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861, 869 (10th Cir. 1976) (citing United States v.
Downen, 496 F.2d 314, 318 (10th Cir. 1974); Johns v. United States, 227 F.2d 374, 375 (10th Cir. 1955));
United States v. Broadwell, 870 F.2d 594, 601 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Trevino, 565 F.2d
1317, 1319 (5th Cir. 1978)); United States v. Lee, 506 F.2d 111, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
30
The only federal circuit court of appeal that has not formally declined to adopt an accomplice
corroboration rule is the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This anomaly can likely be attributed to
the fact that the Federal Circuit is a court of limited jurisdiction that does not hear criminal cases. See, e.g.,
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, USA.gov, https://www.usa.gov/agencies/court-of-appeals-for-the-
federal-circuit (last visited Feb. 27, 2024).

With a national jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit hears appeals on
patent and certain civil cases from courts such as the U.S. Court of International Trade and
the Court of Federal Claims, among others. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
may also review the administrative rulings of the Patent and Trademark Office, the
Secretary of Commerce and other agencies.
31
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917) (“[T]here is no absolute rule of law
preventing convictions on the testimony of accomplices if juries believe them.”).

- 17 -
regard to corroboration requirements for child sexual offenses). Just sixteen other states
continue to utilize an accomplice-corroboration rule, and all sixteen do so by statute or
procedural rule.32 Today, we adopt the majority view and abolish the accomplice-
corroboration rule, but we do so only on a prospective basis.

Our State’s accomplice-corroboration rule can be traced back to the late nineteenth
century. See, e.g., Shelley v. State, 31 S.W. 492 (Tenn. 1895); see also Clapp, 30 S.W.
214; Robinson v. State, 84 Tenn. 146 (Tenn. 1885); Hall v. State, 71 Tenn. 552 (Tenn.
1879). In subsequent years, the accomplice-corroboration rule remained staunchly intact,
with our Court going so far as to create an exception to the rule that required that “a child
as an accomplice should be corroborated,” Sherrill v. State, 321 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tenn.
1959), “even where the accomplice is a child of such tender years as to be incapable of
consenting to such crime.” Scott v. State, 338 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tenn. 1960) (citing
Sherrill, 321 S.W.2d at 814–16). While under the normal accomplice corroboration
standard one must be subject to indictment, that exception applied to minors legally
incapable of being charged with sex crimes because of their age. Collier, 411 S.W.3d at
895–96 (citing Monts, 379 S.W.2d at 43).

In 1991, the General Assembly limited that policy, mandating that victims less than
thirteen years of age, “regardless of consent, [shall] not be considered to be an accomplice
to sexual penetration or sexual contact, and no corroboration of the alleged victim’s
testimony shall be required to secure a conviction if corroboration is necessary solely
because the alleged victim consented.” Act of Apr. 29, 1991, ch. 719, § 1, 1991 Tenn. Pub.
Acts 430 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-17-121). In 2013, our Court extended the
changes made by the General Assembly to minors aged thirteen through seventeen,
“join[ing] the vast majority of states that have addressed the issue by rejecting the
application of the accomplice[-]corroboration rule to victims of statutory rape.” Collier,
411 S.W.3d at 891, 898. Despite noting our Court’s typical hesitancy in overruling
previous decisions, the Collier Court concluded that there was not a valid basis to maintain
a minority view “which needlessly and improperly frustrates the prosecution of sex
offenses involving minor victims,” and recognized that there was “no reason to impose a
more demanding standard for other sex offenses, such as statutory rape, where minor
victims are by definition excluded from being charged.” Id. at 899.

Today, we abolish Tennessee’s court-made accomplice-corroboration rule in its
entirety. State v. Jones, a similar case decided by the Supreme Court of Maryland in

32
See Ala. Code § 12-21-222; Alaska Stat. § 12.45.020; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-111(e); Cal. Penal
Code § 1111; Ga. Code Ann. § 24-14-8; Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2117; Iowa R. Crim. Proc. 2.21(3); Minn.
Stat. § 634.04; Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-213; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.291; N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.22;
N.D. Cent. Code § 29-21-14; Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 742; Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.440; S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-
22-8; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14.

- 18 -
2019,33 aids in our reasoning for abolishing the common law rule. 216 A.3d 907. In Jones,
a man died after he was shot several times and left lying next to his vehicle. Id. at 909.
Investigation of the killing ultimately led the police to identify several suspects, one of
whom “was implicated solely by the accounts of” the other suspects. Id. The defendant
who was identified only by his accomplices was ultimately convicted of conspiracy to
commit armed carjacking. Id. at 911. The defendant then moved for a new trial on the
basis that “the accomplices’ testimony lacked the requisite independent corroboration”
required under Maryland’s common law accomplice-corroboration rule. Id.

A three-judge panel of the Appellate Court of Maryland34 reversed the judgment,
holding that the testimony of the accomplices was not independently corroborated by
further evidence and the remaining evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the
conviction. Jones v. State, No. 03-K-15-005488, 2018 WL 3770206, at *6 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. Aug. 8, 2018), perm. app. granted, (Md. Aug. 28, 2019). In its opinion, the
intermediate appellate court proposed that the Supreme Court of Maryland may be inclined
to reconsider the state’s accomplice-corroboration rule in its then-current form, with Judge
Matthew J. Fader writing that “we are skeptical that the accomplice[-]corroboration rule
strikes the best balance between the potential dangers of accomplice testimony and its
potential value.” Id. (citing Turner v. State, 452 A.2d 416, 417 (Md. 1982)).

Ultimately, the State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court
of Maryland granted. Jones, 216 A.3d at 911. The State raised two questions, one
challenging whether sufficient evidence was provided to corroborate the accomplice
testimony and the other asking, in the alternative, whether the state’s accomplice-
corroboration rule should be “replaced or revised” altogether. Id. The Supreme Court of
Maryland affirmed the judgment of the intermediate appellate court reversing the
defendant’s conviction with regard to the first question, holding that “the State failed to
corroborate the accomplices’ testimony.” Id. at 915.

Next, the Supreme Court of Maryland considered the proposed abrogation of the
state’s accomplice-corroboration rule. Id. at 915–20. The majority of the Supreme Court
of Maryland endorsed criticisms directed towards accomplice-corroboration rules. Id. The
court criticized the rule for “operat[ing] indiscriminately regardless of the apparent
credibility of the accomplices.” Id. at 917. Under the accomplice-corroboration rule, “a

33
In 2019, Maryland’s highest appellate court was named the Maryland Court of Appeals. In 2022,
Maryland voters approved a constitutional amendment renaming its highest court the Supreme Court of
Maryland. Maryland Government Relations and Public Affairs, Voter-approved constitutional change
renames high courts to Supreme and Appellate Court of Maryland, (Dec. 14, 2022),
https://www.courts.state.md.us/media/news/2022/pr20221214.
34
The 2022 constitutional amendment that renamed the highest court of the state also changed the
name of the state’s intermediate appellate court from the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to the
Appellate Court of Maryland. Id.

- 19 -
factfinder’s consideration of evidence she or he might conclude is highly reliable can be
forbidden in one case, while in a different case the same factfinder may be permitted to
weigh a much lesser quantum of much more suspect evidence.” Id. (quoting Jones, 2018
WL 3770206, at *7). The court further opined that “[t]he arbitrariness of the accomplice[-
]corroboration rule is amplified when one considers that there is no similar rule for other
interested witnesses,” such as jailhouse informants, accessories after-the-fact, and expert
witnesses paid to testify. Id. The court further criticized the accomplice-corroboration
rule’s tendency to arbitrarily show preference towards bystander testimony over
accomplice testimony, and the tendency of the rule to undermine the “fundamental
principle . . . that, in a criminal case tried before a jury, assessing a witness’s credibility is
a matter solely for the jury.” Id. at 917–18 (quoting Devincentz v. State, 191 A.3d 373,
379 (Md. 2018)).

Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Maryland concluded that “a blanket rule requiring
corroboration for accomplices intrudes too far into the jury’s constitutional role as
factfinder and unnecessarily and arbitrarily deprives the jury of the opportunity to assess
and decide the credibility of potentially highly relevant evidence.” Id. at 919. The Supreme
Court of Maryland held that:

Procedurally, the trial court no longer needs to determine on the front end
. . . whether, as a matter of law, the State has provided corroborative
evidence to send the case to the jury. Instead, after accomplice testimony is
presented, the court only needs to issue a cautionary jury instruction. Once
that instruction is issued, the weight and credibility of the accomplice
testimony is left entirely to the jury to decide.

Id. at 919 n.9. The court held that, “in criminal jury trials, the courts should disturb as little
as possible the jury’s role of factfinder . . . . This deference to the jury restores the balance
between the concerns underlying accomplice testimony and its potential benefits. Id. at
920.

Although “[t]he power of this Court to overrule former decisions is very sparingly
exercised and only when the reason is compelling,” Collier, 411 S.W.3d at 899 (quoting In
re Estate of McFarland, 167 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tenn. 2005)) (internal quotations omitted),
we will do so when “there is no valid basis to uphold the minority view.” Id. For example,
in State v. Rogers, our Court abolished the common law year-and-a-day rule, characterizing
the rule as “obsolete.” 992 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Tenn. 1999). In that case, our Court
considered the modern status of the common law rule in general, as well as the modern
status of the rule in Tennessee, to determine whether the rule should be abolished. Id. at
397–401. Regarding the modern status of the rule, our Court wrote that, “[d]espite its early
common law recognition and near universal acceptance, the [year-and-a-day] rule has
fallen into disfavor and has been legislatively or judicially abrogated by the vast majority
of jurisdictions which have recently considered the issue.” Id. at 397. In Rogers, we cited

- 20 -
advances in medical science, improved trial procedure, and sentencing reform as reasons
that most courts had come to describe the rule as “outmoded,” “obsolete,” and an
“anachronism,” and used those same justifications for abrogating the rule in Tennessee.
Id. at 397, 401.

We do not view this case as directly analogous to Rogers because, unlike the
“obsolete” common law year-and-a-day rule, (1) valid concerns regarding the reliability of
accomplice testimony still exist and (2) sixteen state jurisdictions still observe a rule similar
to the one we choose to abolish today, albeit all do so by statute or by rule of criminal
procedure. Nevertheless, Rogers is helpful to our analysis because the common law rule
we are tasked with considering abolishing today “has been . . . judicially abrogated . . .
recently” by the highest court of the only other state that had maintained such a rule on a
common law basis. See id. at 397; see also Jones, 216 A.3d at 919–20. Although we do
not consider the accomplice-corroboration rule to be “obsolete” as a statutory or procedural
rule, we conclude that the rule is now effectively “obsolete” in a common law context and
that the General Assembly is better suited to decide whether such a rule need be effectuated
in our state.

It is further necessary to explain why we choose to apply this change to the common
law on a prospective basis only. The State acknowledges that, when a change to a common
law rule is “unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed
prior to the conduct in issue,” changes to such rules in criminal cases need be applied on a
prospective-only basis so as to avoid violation of due process protections. Rogers v.
Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 462 (2001) (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347,
354 (1964)). However, the State argues that it would not be unfair to apply the rule change
to this case “because Tennessee is the last State in the country that requires corroboration
as a common-law rule . . . [a]nd this Court has retroactively applied similar sufficiency
standards when it has abandoned a long-standing rule.”

Just because a court can do something, does not necessarily mean that it should. In
Jones, the Supreme Court of Maryland noted that the United States Supreme Court had
considered retroactive application of a Texas statute repealing corroboration requirements
as “grossly unfair” because it would have “lowered the quantum of evidence required” to
secure a conviction. 216 A.3d at 920–21 (citing Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 532, 544–
47 (2000)) (internal quotation omitted). The Supreme Court of Maryland chose to apply
its rule change prospectively only, so as to avoid “holding that a conviction can be sustained
based on what was at the time of trial legally insufficient evidence.” Id. at 921. “Doing so
would be . . . ultimately unfair, because it would allow the State . . . to satisfy an evidentiary
hurdle on appeal that it could not at trial.” Id. Additionally, the Supreme Court of
Maryland wrote that “[h]ad defense counsel known then that the rule might change post
hoc, a different course, including the possibility of a plea bargain, likely would have been
charted.” Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland opted to abide by the elevated
Ex Post Facto Clause standard, although it was not required to, because “the general

- 21 -
principles enunciated there appl[ied]” to the Jones case. Id. We ultimately agree with the
Supreme Court of Maryland’s approach and hold that, in the interest of fairness, we will
apply the common law accomplice-corroboration rule to Ms. Turner’s case, but the rule
will be abolished in its current form going forward and that change shall be applied to all
trials commencing after the date of the mandate.35 See id. at 924.

Justice Campbell’s separate opinion expresses disagreement with our approach on
this point, and argues that the abrogation of the accomplice corroboration rule should be
applied retroactively to change the holding in this case and other pending cases that have
not yet reached final judgment. According to Justice Campbell:

First, retroactivity has long been a hallmark of judicial decisionmaking.
Second, our precedents consistently have applied overruling decisions in
criminal cases retroactively even when they disadvantage the defendant.
Third, prospective overruling gives the Court too much discretion and poses
a significant threat to stare decisis.

We do not question or deny that the consideration of retroactive application holds
an important place in judicial decisionmaking. Yet, we decline to apply retroactivity as an
absolute rule at the expense of fundamental fairness. Justice Campbell readily
acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court allows courts wide discretion with
regard to retroactive application in most circumstances. Thus, the primary argument we
glean from Justice Campbell’s separate opinion is that Tennessee traditionally has followed
a stringent approach of retroactive application, and that applying today’s holding
prospectively would deviate from that perceived precedent. We disagree with this
interpretation of the caselaw, and it is our view that the same cases cited by Justice
Campbell actually support our position that our Court has never fully abdicated its
discretion to apply holdings either retroactively or prospectively.

First, Justice Campbell cites our Court’s ruling in the aforementioned Collier case.
411 S.W.3d 886. It is Justice Campbell’s position that “this Court [in Collier] partially
abrogated the exact same accomplice-corroboration rule that is at issue here.” We disagree
with that characterization. The Collier Court sought to abrogate an exception to the
accomplice corroboration rule, not a part of the rule itself. Id. at 899 (“[W]e overrule all
prior Tennessee decisions recognizing the exception that requires corroboration of the
testimony of a minor victim of a sex offense despite the fact that the minor could not be
charged with the offense.” (emphasis added)). The Court’s primary justification for
abrogation of that exception was that “a minor victim of a sex offense . . . could not be
charged with the offense.” Id. The Collier Court viewed the exception at issue as

35
See Tenn. R. App. P. 42(a) (“The clerk of the Supreme Court shall transmit to the clerk of the
trial court the mandate of the Supreme Court, with notice to the parties, 11 days after entry of the judgment
unless the court orders otherwise.”).

- 22 -
inconsistent with the accomplice-corroboration rule altogether because a minor victim of a
sex-related crime was not, by definition, an “accomplice.”

According to Justice Campbell, “Collier implicated precisely the same fairness and
reliance concerns that the majority and separate opinions fixate on today, yet we had no
problem applying our holding retroactively in that case. It is hard to see why the case
currently before us should be treated any differently.” We do not disagree with the Collier
Court’s decision to apply that holding retroactively. From the date it was first applied, the
exception abrogated in that case was inconsistent with the accomplice-corroboration rule.
However, abrogating an exception that is on its face inconsistent with a court-made rule is
vastly different from abrogating a rule itself, and that distinction should garner
consideration as we seek to balance our duty to correct the law while also prioritizing
fundamental fairness towards the defendant. Accordingly, we do not conclude that Collier
set precedent that deprives us of the discretion to choose whether retroactive or prospective
application is the proper approach on a case-by-case basis.

Next, Justice Campbell cites State v. Dorantes, in which our Court retroactively
adopted a federal rule requiring that “direct and circumstantial evidence . . . be treated the
same when weighing the sufficiency of such evidence.” 331 S.W.3d 370, 381 (Tenn.
2011). The Dorantes Court wrote that that case was one of the “rare instances where the
application of the federal and state standards could result in a different outcome” and that,
in practice, the distinction between the new and old language “rarely made a difference.”
Id. The Court elaborated that, because “the distinction . . . ha[d] rarely made a difference
. . . there ha[d] been little reason to refine [the Court’s] standard of review by voicing
disapproval of much of the terminology used in [State v.] Crawford, [470 S.W.2d 610
(Tenn. 1971)].” Id.

Abrogation of the accomplice-corroboration rule is a vastly different situation from
that of Dorantes. It is not an incremental change that will “rarely ma[ke] a difference.”
See id., 331 S.W.3d at 381. Rather, we are quite certain that returning this aspect of
factfinding and evaluation of witness credibility to its proper place before the jury will
result in a number of outcomes going forward that would have been different with an
accomplice-corroboration rule in place. Yet, applying our holding retroactively would not
grant the jury the role we intend to convey with this decision. In this case, we are not just
refining a standard of review, we are abrogating a common law rule altogether. In our
view, treating these two cases as synonymous is an “apples and oranges” style comparison.

Likewise, we disagree with Justice Campbell’s view that State v. Rogers supports
retroactive application in this case. 992 S.W.2d 393. In Rogers, the Court wrote that,
“[o]ur research indicates that the [year-and-a-day] rule has never served as the ground of
decision in any Tennessee case,” that “abolition of the rule does not allow the State to
obtain a conviction upon less proof,” and that, prior to Rogers, “[T]he Court of Criminal
Appeals [had] opined that the year-and-a-day rule had been abolished by passage of the

- 23 -
[Criminal Sentencing Reform] Act [of 1989].” Id. at 402. While we no longer see a place
for the accomplice-corroboration rule in our state, it cannot be denied that its existence and
history has been consequential to Tennessee’s criminal law jurisprudence, that abolition of
this rule retroactively would allow the State to obtain a conviction upon less proof that
could very well lead to a conviction, and that no court of appeal in our state has viewed the
accomplice-corroboration rule as abolished by an act of the General Assembly. As a result,
in our view, the case before us is quite distinguishable from Rogers.

For the reasons set forth above, we do not agree with Justice Campbell’s
characterizations of retroactive application as a “longstanding and unbroken practice” and
a “traditional rule” in Tennessee. Additionally, we disagree with the proposition that this
decision produces a threat to the principle of stare decisis.36 Justice Scalia himself, cited
by Justice Campbell to support the idea that our holding “should concern anyone who cares
about stare decisis,” lambasted the concept of retroactive application of changes to the
common law in criminal cases in his dissent in Rogers v. Tennessee.37

While bright-line rules often are helpful, and sometimes preferable, we do not
hesitate to reject such an approach when we deem it improper. See, e.g., State v. Talley,
307 S.W.3d 723, 730, 734 (Tenn. 2010) (rejecting the defendant’s urges for the Court to
adopt a bright-line rule and instead maintaining a totality-of-the-circumstances test). We
are not prepared to limit this Court’s discretion with regard to retroactive and prospective
application in criminal cases. Instead, this case provides a prime example of why such
discretion is needed.

Like the Supreme Court of Maryland, we conclude that a trial court need only issue
a cautionary jury instruction after accomplice testimony is presented. See Jones, 216 A.3d
at 919–20 n.9. Until such time as the Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions (criminal) of
the Tennessee Judicial Conference adopts a permanent instruction on this issue, the trial

36
Indeed, we respectfully disagree that this Court’s exercise of discretion, well-within the confines
of existing law in this case, creates any type of legitimate threat to stare decisis.
37
“According to Bouie[, 378 U.S. 347], not just ‘unexpected and indefensible’ retroactive changes
in the common law of crimes are bad, but all retroactive changes. . . . It follows from the analysis of Bouie
that ‘fair warning’ of impending change cannot insulate retroactive judicial criminalization . . . .” Rogers,
532 U.S. at 470–71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

[W]hy not . . . count in petitioner’s favor (rather than against him) those jurisdictions that
have abolished the rule . . . through prospective rather than retroactive judicial rulings[?]
. . . That is to say, even if it was predictable that the rule would be changed, it was not
predictable that it would be changed retroactively, rather than in the prospective manner to
which legislatures are restricted by the Ex Post Facto Clause, or in the prospective manner
that most other courts have employed.

Id. at 479.

- 24 -
courts of our state should utilize the following temporary jury instruction in cases involving
accomplice testimony:

The prosecution has presented a witness who claims to have been a
participant with the defendant in the crime charged. While you may convict
upon this testimony alone, you should act upon it with great caution. Give it
careful examination in the light of other evidence in the case. You are not to
convict upon this testimony alone, unless you are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that it is true.

This temporary instruction is similar to the instruction used in trial courts in the State of
Colorado. Model Criminal Jury Instruction Committee of the Colorado Supreme Court,
Colorado Jury Instructions Criminal 2022, Aug. 8, 2019, at 186,
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/Committees
/Criminal_Jury_Instructions/2022/COLJI-Crim%202022%20-%20Final.pdf.

ii. Ms. Turner’s Murder Convictions

Ms. Turner was convicted of three counts of first-degree premeditated murder under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202(a)(1). That portion of the statute defines
first-degree murder as “[a] premeditated and intentional killing of another.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2018 & Supp. 2023). “[P]remeditation is an act done after the
exercise of reflection and judgment. Premeditation means that the intent to kill must have
been formed prior to the act itself.” Id. § -202(e) (internal quotations omitted). “It is not
necessary that the purpose to kill preexist in the mind of the accused for any definite period
of time.” Id. Still, “[t]he mental state of the accused at the time the accused allegedly
decided to kill must be carefully considered in order to determine whether the accused was
sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation.” Id.
Additionally, a person may be found “criminally responsible as a party to an offense, if the
offense is committed by the person’s own conduct, by the conduct of another for which the
person is criminally responsible, or by both.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-401(a) (2018).
One may be found criminally responsible for another’s conduct if:

(1) Acting with the culpability of the offense, the person causes or aids
an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited
by the definition of the offense;
(2) Acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense,
or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, the person
solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the
offense; or
(3) Having a duty imposed by law or voluntarily undertaken to prevent
commission of the offense and acting with intent to benefit in the
proceeds or results of the offense, or to promote or assist its

- 25 -
 commission, the person fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent
commission of the offense.

Id. § -402. The Defendants were prosecuted both under the theory that they were active
participants in the murders and the theory that they were “criminally responsible” for the
actions of one another.

In order to address whether the evidence is sufficient to support Ms. Turner’s
murder convictions, we must determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Parker, 350
S.W.3d 883, 903 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
When making that determination, the prosecution is afforded “the strongest legitimate view
of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn
therefrom.” State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Tenn. 2010) (citing State v. Bland, 958
S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997)). “Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the
weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the
evidence are resolved by the trier of fact.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. Typically, we cannot
and will not attempt to re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247,
277 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659). A guilty verdict “removes the
presumption of innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt.” State v. Carruthers,
35 S.W.3d 516, 557–58 (Tenn. 2000) (citing State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 569 (Tenn.
1993)). Therefore, on appeal, the defendant is burdened with proving why the evidence is
insufficient to support the jury verdict. Id.

In accordance with the holding in the previous subsection of this opinion, to sustain
Ms. Turner’s murder convictions, the convictions must not be “solely based upon the
uncorroborated testimony of one or more accomplices.” Supra, sect. (II)(a)(i) (quoting
Collier, 411 S.W.3d at 894). For additional evidence to be considered adequately
corroborative, there need be “some fact testified to, entirely independent of the
accomplice’s testimony, which, taken by itself, leads to the inference . . . that a crime has
been committed [and] that the defendant is implicated in it.” State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411,
419 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 803). Corroborative testimony can be
either direct or circumstantial, but “must . . . include some fact establishing the defendant’s
identity.” Id. The testimony itself does not need to be “adequate, in and of itself, to support
a conviction.” Id. Rather, “it is sufficient to meet the requirements of the rule if
[corroborative evidence] fairly and legitimately tends to connect the defendant with the
commission of the crime charged.” Id. (emphasis removed). Corroboration does not need
to “extend to every part of the accomplice’s evidence.” Id. “In short, the evidence must
confirm in some manner that (a) a crime has been committed and (b) the accused committed
the crime.” State v. Griffis, 964 S.W.2d 577, 589 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), perm. app.
denied, (Tenn. Dec. 22, 1997). “Evidence which merely casts a suspicion on the accused
or establishes he or she had an opportunity to commit the crime in question is inadequate
to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony.” Id. Additionally, “evidence that the accused

- 26 -
was present at the situs of the crime and had the opportunity to commit the crime is not
sufficient.” Id.

Because Mr. Hawkins was indicted for the same homicides that are at issue in this
case, he clearly meets the definition of an “accomplice.” Collier, 411 S.W.3d at 894
(quoting Monts, 379 S.W.2d at 43) (identifying the normal test for qualification as an
accomplice as “whether the alleged accomplice could be indicted for the same offense
charged against the defendant”). The State argues that Mr. Hawkins’ testimony is
corroborated by the following evidence:

1. Testimony by Jeremiah that Ms. Turner was a Vicelord who regularly
attended gang meetings.
2. Testimony by Jeremiah that Ms. Turner was present at the Duplex hours
before the murders.
3. Testimony by Mr. Malone that Ms. Turner’s car was parked across the
street from the Duplex and Ms. Turner’s admission that she owned the
car in question.
4. Police discovery of broken glass fragments and marijuana near the part
of the street in which Ms. Turner’s vehicle had been parked.
5. Evidence of the phone call in which Mr. Thomas called Mr. Leachman
and asked him to tell Ms. Turner to “stick to the script,” and not to accept
an offer of probation because it would be “like a sign of guilt.”

Ms. Turner disagrees, arguing that Mr. Hawkins’ story “fails to match the eyewitness
account of events that transpired just before and just after the shooting.” Unlike the
majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to
corroborate the testimony of Mr. Hawkins.

First, we conclude that testimony alleging that Ms. Turner is a member of the
Vicelords and regularly attended gang meetings does not sufficiently corroborate Mr.
Hawkins’ testimony regarding her alleged participation in the murders at the Duplex. For
evidence to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, that evidence must relate to the
identity of the defendant as a criminal actor. State v. Boxley, 76 S.W.3d 381, 387 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2001), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Apr. 1, 2002). Evidence of mere membership
in a gang cannot prove, in itself, that a person committed a crime. Rather, gang-affiliation
in a presumably gang-related crime is more akin to “[e]vidence which merely casts a
suspicion on the accused.” Griffis, 964 S.W.2d at 589.

Additionally, we do not find that Jeremiah’s testimony placing Ms. Turner at the
Duplex hours before the murders adequately corroborates Mr. Hawkins’ testimony. We
note again that “evidence that the accused was present at the situs of the crime” is
insufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony. Id. Furthermore, that testimony does
not even aid the State’s case that Ms. Turner was present at the scene of the crime when it

- 27 -
was committed. Rather, Jeremiah testified that he left the Duplex around nine o’clock at
night, several hours before the killings presumably occurred. We do not find that this
evidence helps affirm Ms. Turner’s participation in the murders, whether through her own
acts or through the acts of another for whom she was criminally responsible.

For similar reasons, Mr. Malone’s testimony that Ms. Turner’s car was parked
across the street from the Duplex and Ms. Turner’s identification of the car as her own do
not sufficiently corroborate Mr. Hawkins’ testimony. Notably, Mr. Malone testified that
he did not see Ms. Turner on the Duplex porch at the time he saw the car. Further, the
weight of the evidence indicates that Ms. Turner shared ownership of the car with Mr.
Thomas. Ownership of a car parked near the scene of the crime cannot “confirm . . . that
. . . a crime has been committed,” especially under circumstances in which the accused is
not the sole owner of the vehicle. Id. Rather, it is equally plausible that someone else used
the car to drive to and from the crime scene without Ms. Turner’s knowledge. Accordingly,
this evidence falls well short of placing her at the Duplex at the time of the murders
altogether and, likewise, fails to confirm that Ms. Turner participated in the murders or is
criminally responsible for the conduct of the other defendants.

Next, we address the broken glass and marijuana discovered by police near the part
of the street in which the maroon-colored car had been parked. We conclude that this
evidence is also insufficient to corroborate Mr. Hawkins’ testimony. We decline to hold
that police recovering broken glass and marijuana near the part of the street where the car
was parked “fairly and legitimately tends to connect the defendant with the commission of
the crime charged.” Bane, 57 S.W.3d at 419 (quoting Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 803)
(emphasis removed). As previously explained, for additional evidence to be considered
adequately corroborated, there need be “some fact testified to, entirely independent of the
accomplice’s testimony, which, taken by itself, leads to the inference . . . that a crime has
been committed [and] that the defendant is implicated in it.” Id. Corroborative testimony
can be either direct or circumstantial, but must “include some fact establishing the
defendant’s identity.” Id. Here, the evidence of the broken glass and marijuana does not
create any inference that Ms. Turner committed or was criminally responsible for the
murders. For example, the record does not indicate that her fingerprints were found on the
glass or contain any other indication that the glass and marijuana are linked to Ms. Turner.
In other words, when viewing this evidence “entirely independent of the accomplice’s
testimony,” id. (quoting Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 803), it does not establish Ms. Turner’s
identity in any way. Indeed, based on the record, it is equally conceivable that Mr. Hawkins
dropped the marijuana himself. As a result, this evidence also falls short of providing
adequate corroboration.

We are further unpersuaded by the State’s argument that Mr. Thomas’ phone call to
Mr. Leachman, which included suggestions by Mr. Thomas that Ms. Turner “stick to the
script” and avoid taking a probation offer because it would be “like a sign of guilt,”
corroborates Mr. Hawkins’ testimony that Ms. Turner participated in the homicides. As

- 28 -
Judge McMullen pointed out in her dissent, “accomplices may not corroborate each other.”
Thomas, 2021 WL 5015255, at *34 (McMullen, J., dissenting); see also Boxley, 76 S.W.3d
at 386 (citing State v. Green, 915 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)). The State
argues that, because other states allow accomplices to corroborate each other, we should
as well. Given that we are abolishing the accomplice-corroboration rule going forward, it
would make little sense for us to change our State’s policy on permitting accomplices to
corroborate one another for the circumstances of this one case. Additionally, from a
practical perspective, we do not consider Mr. Thomas’ efforts to cover for himself as
evidence that Ms. Turner has committed a crime.

We agree with Judge McMullen that the evidence the State cites as corroborative of
Mr. Hawkins’ testimony falls short of confirming that Ms. Turner committed the crimes
she has been convicted of, whether “through her own acts or through the acts of another
for whom she was criminally responsible.” Thomas, 2021 WL 5015255, at *34
(McMullen, J., dissenting). Accordingly, we reverse all three of Ms. Turner’s convictions
and dismiss the charges against her. For these reasons, we conclude our analysis with
regard to Ms. Turner here and find that we need reach the Brady issue for Mr. Thomas
only.

B. Alleged Brady Violation–The State’s Failure to Disclose All of Mr. Hawkins’ Proffer
Session Statements

First, we will briefly discuss the origins and history of the Brady disclosure rule.
After that, we will address whether, based on the rule itself and the record before us, Mr.
Thomas’ rights were violated because of the State’s failure to disclose, prior to trial, all
inconsistent statements made by Mr. Hawkins at proffer sessions.

i. The Brady Disclosure Rule

The Brady disclosure rule stems from the landmark United States Supreme Court
case, Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83. In that case, the defendant’s counsel asked the
prosecution to let him examine a criminal companion’s extrajudicial statements before
trial. Id. at 84. Although most such extrajudicial statements were provided, one statement
in which the defendant’s criminal companion admitted to committing the homicide at issue
was withheld by the prosecution. Id. The defendant was not made aware of that
extrajudicial statement until after he had already been tried and convicted and had his
conviction affirmed. Id. The defendant sought a new trial based on the evidence
suppressed by the prosecution, but his appeal from a denial of that motion was dismissed
by the Supreme Court of Maryland under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act.
Id. at 84–85 (citing Brady v. State, 160 A.2d 912 (Md. 1960)). After the trial court
dismissed the defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief, the Supreme Court of
Maryland held that suppression of the evidence by the prosecution denied the defendant

- 29 -
due process of the law and remanded the case for a retrial on the question of punishment,
but not the question of guilt. Id. at 85 (citing Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167 (Md. 1961)).

The Supreme Court of the United States subsequently granted certiorari to answer
the question of “whether [the defendant] was denied a federal right when the [Supreme
Court of Maryland] restricted the new trial to the question of punishment.” Id. The Court
held that suppression of the confession violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Id. at 86. “[T]he suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request,” said the Court, “violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87. In subsequent cases the Supreme
Court held that, in addition to exculpatory evidence, impeachment evidence falls within
the confines of Brady. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); see also Giglio
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (“[E]vidence of any understanding or
agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant to [a witness’] credibility and the
jury [is] entitled to know of it.”). The purpose of the Brady rule “is not to displace the
adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a
miscarriage of justice does not occur.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.

ii. Brady as Applied to Mr. Thomas

To show that a Brady violation has occurred a defendant need demonstrate that: “(1)
the defendant requested the information or that it was obviously exculpatory; (2) the State
suppressed evidence in its possession; (3) the information was favorable to the accused;
and (4) the information was material.” Waterford v. Washburn, 455 F. Supp. 3d 579, 608
(M.D. Tenn. 2020) (citing State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 594 (Tenn. 2014)). Mr.
Thomas argues that he requested information regarding Mr. Hawkins’ contradictive
statements and statements including new facts or details, the State failed to disclose such
statements to Mr. Thomas’ counsel before trial, the information would have been favorable
to Mr. Thomas, and the information was material. The dispute in this case primarily
revolves around whether the proffer statements were “material.”

We review the lower court’s “findings of fact, such as whether the defendant
requested the information or whether the state withheld the information . . . de novo with a
presumption that the findings are correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.”
Cauthern v. State, 145 S.W.3d 571, 599 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004). “[C]onclusions of law,
however, such as whether the information was favorable or material, are reviewed under a
purely de novo standard with no presumption of correctness.” Id. Mr. Thomas is required
to “prov[e] a constitutional violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Edgin,
902 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tenn. 1995) (citing State v. Spurlock, 874 S.W.2d 602, 610 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1993)). To “prov[e] a constitutional violation is to show that the omission [of
the proffer statements] is of such significance as to deny the defendant the right to a fair
trial.” Id. (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976)).

- 30 -
 We find no reason to call into question whether Mr. Thomas requested the
information at issue. Mr. Thomas’ motion for pretrial disclosure clearly requested the
information and that request was reiterated by counsel for Mr. Thomas at the hearing on
the motion. And, although the motion was ultimately denied, the trial judge ordered that
if Mr. Hawkins was to be “asked something in . . . proffer sessions that the answer to that
should have included the original detail and did not give it and then later upon further . . .
review shared this that they—that common sense would say they should have,” such
statements needed to be provided to counsel for the Defendants.

With regard to the failure to disclose portion of the analysis, instead of disputing
Mr. Thomas’ claims that it failed to disclose the statements made in proffer sessions before
trial, the State admits that it did not disclose the statements before trial, but argues in its
brief that “this is a case of delayed disclosure.” “Brady generally does not apply to delayed
disclosure of exculpatory information, but only to a complete failure to disclose.” United
States v. Bencs, 28 F.3d 555, 560–61 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Ward, 806
F.2d 658, 665 (6th Cir. 1986)). “Delay only violates Brady when the delay itself causes
prejudice.” Id. (quoting United States v. Patrick, 965 F.2d 1390, 1400 (6th Cir. 1992)).
Deciding in this case whether delayed disclosure causes prejudice is closely related to the
question of whether the information is material. As such, our materiality analysis will
address the effect of the delayed disclosure.

We next consider whether the suppressed evidence was “favorable” to Mr. Thomas.
According to our Court, “[e]vidence is favorable under Brady if it provides grounds for the
defense to attack the reliability, thoroughness, and good faith of the police investigation,
to impeach the credibility of the state’s witnesses, or to bolster the defense case against
prosecutorial attacks.” Nunley v. State, 552 S.W.3d 800, 818 (Tenn. 2018) (quoting Jordan
v. State, 343 S.W.3d 84, 96 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011)). Mr. Thomas argues in his brief that
the favorability element of Brady is satisfied because he was denied “valuable
impeachment material against the State’s main witness” and “absolved . . . of direct
responsibility for the shooting of Ms. Springfield.” Additionally, Mr. Thomas contends
that “[h]ad counsel for Mr. Thomas known that [Mr.] Hawkins would testify that [Ms.
Turner] shot [Ms. Springfield], they would not have advised Mr. Thomas to waive any
objection to an apparent conflict of interest with Ms. Turner, but would have been free to
explore the possibility of cooperation with the State.” Mr. Thomas also asserts that he
“would not have waived the right to DNA testing on some hairs found in the back room in
[Mr.] Glover’s hands” and “might have changed trial strategy by challenging the notion
that Mr. Thomas was criminally responsible for the actions of Ms. Turner and Mr.
Hawkins.” The State counters by arguing that the evidence is “merely cumulative of the
impeachment evidence drawn out before the jury trial when [Mr.] Thomas’s counsel
pointed out that [Mr.] Hawkins had told a different story in his written statement to police,”
and that evidence that Mr. Hawkins had provided consistent stories during proffer sessions
“would likely have bolstered his credibility.”

- 31 -
 We agree with Mr. Thomas on this portion of the analysis. The fact that the evidence
may have been “cumulative” does not override its favorability towards Mr. Thomas,
because evidence still may be considered “favorable” in the Brady context under these
circumstances. See Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 818 (“[S]o long as the evidence qualifies as
favorable to the accused, the Brady duty of disclosure applies, irrespective of the
admissibility of the evidence at trial.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Jackson, 444
S.W.3d at 593–94 (Tenn. 2014)). The undisclosed statements made in proffer sessions
“provide[] grounds for the defense . . . to impeach the credibility” of Mr. Hawkins, and
accordingly fall within the impeachment category of favorable evidence. See id. (quoting
Jordan, 343 S.W.3d at 96).

We now turn to the crux of our analysis on this issue, the “materiality” element.
Although the Brady decision itself does not define the standard for materiality, the Supreme
Court of the United States has sought to define what types of evidence are “material . . . to
guilt or to punishment” in subsequent decisions. The standard has changed over time, but
the current requirement for undisclosed evidence to be considered “material” is that the
nondisclosure of evidence must be “so serious” that it creates “a reasonable probability that
the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).

Although Mr. Thomas’ brief provides several arguments regarding how his trial
strategy may have differed had his trial court counsel been made aware of the proffer
session statements earlier, it does not provide much of an argument regarding why he
believes there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome would have been different in
this case had the proffer statements been disclosed earlier.38 Meanwhile, the State argues
that Mr. Thomas “has [not] made a compelling case that [he was] prejudiced by the delay.”
The State reiterates its position that this case is one of delayed disclosure, rather than an
outright failure to disclose, and notes that Mr. Thomas thus “faces a higher hurdle” in
proving a Brady violation occurred. United States v. Todd, 825 F. App’x 313, 319 (6th
Cir. 2020) (citing Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 472 (6th Cir. 2006)).

We agree with the State’s argument that the case before us is one of “delayed
disclosure.” When there is a delayed disclosure of evidence, we must decide whether that
delay prevented defense counsel from “using the disclosed material effectively in preparing
and presenting the defendant’s case.” State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 548 (Tenn.
1993) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408 (1st Cir.
1986)). Only when a delayed disclosure “prevents material exculpatory evidence from
effectively being used at trial is there a due process violation.” Id.

38
Instead, Mr. Thomas’ brief pivots to an attack on Mr. Hawkins’ credibility and attempts to re-
litigate issues decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals which we specifically declined to grant review of
in our order granting the Rule 11 Application on a limited basis.

- 32 -
 Counsel for Mr. Thomas admitted at oral argument that Mr. Thomas was charged
under the “criminal responsibility” theory. That admission severely undercuts Mr.
Thomas’ contention that earlier access to the statements alleging that Ms. Turner, rather
than Mr. Thomas, shot Ms. Springfield would generate the “reasonable probability” of a
different outcome at trial. Based on the charges, which defendant pulled the trigger as to
which victim is inconsequential. Instead, mere participation in a concerted effort to commit
the murders was sufficient for the jury to find Mr. Thomas guilty of the charges. We also
do not find that Mr. Thomas was deprived of the opportunity to make effective use of this
information at trial based on the delayed disclosure. Rather, Mr. Thomas had access to the
evidence prior to cross-examination at trial, providing Mr. Thomas’ counsel with ample
opportunities to impeach Mr. Hawkins’ credibility. While it would have been preferable
for the State to provide Mr. Thomas’ counsel with this information earlier, we are
unpersuaded that a lack of earlier access undermines the confidence of the jury verdict.

Other arguments put forward by Mr. Thomas in favor of materiality are that he
“would not have waived the right to DNA testing on some hairs found in the back room in
[Mr.] Glover’s hands,” might have changed trial strategy, and might not have waived an
objection to an apparent conflict of interest with Ms. Turner. Mr. Thomas claims that he
was denied “valuable impeachment material against the primary prosecution witness [a]nd
denied . . . possible avenues of investigation and possible defenses.” We find each of these
arguments unpersuasive and, in many instances, merely speculative.

With regard to the DNA testing of hairs, Mr. Thomas was in no way forced to waive
the right to DNA testing because of the delayed disclosure. Rather, he voluntarily chose
to do so. Had the statements made in proffer sessions been disclosed earlier, he would
have had that same choice. Speculation that he would have done differently is insufficient
in a delayed disclosure case, because the lack of access to statements made in proffer
sessions did not in any way impact his ability to request DNA testing. Accordingly, we
agree with the State that Mr. Thomas’ “speculation about these hairs does not undermine
the confidence in the verdict.”

For similar reasons, we disagree with Mr. Thomas’ contentions that a hypothetical
change in trial strategy and a hypothetical change to a waiver of an apparent conflict of
interest undermines our confidence in the verdict. As we specified earlier, the burden is
on Mr. Thomas to show that there is a “reasonable probability” that a different trial strategy
or waiver of conflict of interest would lead to a different outcome in the trial court. See
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281. Yet, Mr. Thomas fails to offer a more detailed argument than
the vaguely worded contention in his brief that he was “denied . . . possible avenues of
investigation and possible defenses.” No attempt is made to articulate just what avenues
of investigation or defenses these would be. We simply cannot conclude that Mr. Thomas
meets his burden of proof on the “materiality” element given that the gist of his argument

- 33 -
is that, had his counsel had access to the statements made by Mr. Hawkins at proffer
sessions earlier, he likely would have done some things differently.

Accordingly, we find no violation of Brady. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals on this issue. Mr. Thomas’ convictions are upheld.

III. CONCLUSION

With regard to Ms. Turner’s murder convictions, for the reasons stated earlier in this
opinion, we hold that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. Accordingly,
we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals and dismiss these charges against Ms. Turner.
Because Ms. Turner’s convictions are overturned on other grounds, we declined to reach
the Brady issue with regard to Ms. Turner. Costs of Ms. Turner’s appeal are assessed
against the State.

As to Mr. Thomas’ murder convictions, for the reasons set forth earlier in this
opinion, we conclude that he has not satisfied his burden of proving a violation of the Brady
rule on the part of the State. On this issue we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. As a result, we affirm Mr. Thomas’ convictions. Because Mr. Thomas appears
to be indigent, the costs of his appeal are taxed to the State.

Additionally, for the reasons articulated in Section II(A)(i) of this opinion, we
prospectively abrogate Tennessee’s common law accomplice-corroboration rule.
Commencing with the date of the mandate, this shall be applied to all trials going forward.

_____________________________
JEFFREY S. BIVINS, JUSTICE

- 34 -