RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3099-21
IN THE MATTER OF L.C.
________________________
Submitted January 30, 2024 – Decided March 8, 2024
Before Judges Mayer and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Docket No.
0258-XTR-2022-1.
Faugno Weis Katcher Duarte, LLC, attorneys for
appellant (Tamra Dawn Katcher, of counsel and on the
brief).
Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent State of New Jersey (K. Charles Deutsch,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
L.C.1 appeals from a May 6, 2022 order granting the State's petition for a
1
We use initials because "[a]ll records related to proceedings for [Final Extreme
Protective Orders] are confidential and may not be disclosed to anyone other
than the respondent . . . except if good cause is found by the court to release
Final Extreme Risk Protection Order (FERPO) entered under the Extreme Risk
Protective Order Act of 2018 (Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:58-20 to -32. We affirm.
I.
We glean the following facts from the record. On February 10, 2022, the
Saddle River Police Department (SRPD) responded to a call regarding an
altercation between L.C. and his roommate, D.C. The call was made by an
individual who reported that D.C. came to his home, claimed he was just
physically assaulted, and asked to use the phone.
The SRPD immediately met with D.C. and observed visible signs of his
injuries, including a laceration on D.C.'s forehead and cuts on his hands. D.C.
told the police that when he returned home that night, L.C. took D.C.'s phone
away from him, threw it on the lawn, and punched D.C. in the face and head.
D.C. stated he was able to leave the scene once L.C.'s girlfriend broke up the
fight.
D.C. also told the police he believed L.C. initiated the fight because L.C.
suspected D.C. "made a complaint to the [SRPD] . . . regarding commercial
vehicles being parked" at their residence. D.C. further stated he was "unsure if
such records." Admin. Off. of the Cts., Admin. Directive #19-19, Guidelines
for Extreme Risk Protective Orders, 9 (Aug. 12, 2019) (AOC Directive).
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[L.C.] suffer[ed] from . . . PTSD symptoms."
L.C.'s girlfriend informed the police she knew nothing about the
altercation. She also stated "she was unsure if [L.C.] regularly t[ook] any
medication that he . . . need[ed]."
The SRPD repeatedly tried to contact L.C. after learning he fled the scene.
When their attempts failed, the police "determined a [w]elfare [c]heck needed
to be conducted . . . to ensure [L.C.] was okay[,] based on what [D.C.] and [L.C.'s
girlfriend] stated." Using a canine unit, the SRPD found L.C. at a neighbor's
residence. The police then determined the fight between L.C. and D.C. was a
domestic violence incident. They arrested L.C. and charged him with simple
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1).2
The next day, Detective Michael Cooper applied for and obtained a
Temporary Extreme Risk Protective Order (TERPO) from a municipal court
judge. Pursuant to the February 11, 2022 TERPO, officers seized and removed
over thirty items from L.C.'s home, including firearms and ammunition.
The FERPO hearing proceeded on May 6. The State called Detective
Cooper to testify. L.C. called his former direct supervisor, a Staff Sergeant from
2
The charge was subsequently dismissed due to D.C.'s failure to appear in court.
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the United States Marine Corps (USMC), to testify.
In describing the February 10 incident, Detective Cooper acknowledged
he "was not one of the officers that responded" to the scene, but because he "was
the on-call detective that night," he "became involved in the case" "to review
the criminal complaint[] as well as speak with [L.C.]." Cooper testified that
after his review of "all the reports . . . dating back . . . many years," "it was
determined . . . [the SRPD] should file for the TERPO."
Cooper stated that according to police records, L.C. contacted the SRPD
in November 2014 to report his ex-girlfriend falsely accused him of physically
assaulting her. According to Cooper, based on a "command investigation" into
these allegations, a USMC corporal submitted recordings to the SRPD from
L.C.'s ex-girlfriend wherein she stated L.C. "would commit mass murder and
murder-suicide."
Cooper also testified that in August 2018, the SRPD responded to L.C.'s
home regarding a dispute between L.C. and his sister. L.C.'s sister reportedly
had mental health issues and told the police that L.C. stole her medication and
locked it in his gun safe. The police investigated the allegation and found L.C.'s
gun safe did not contain his sister's medication. Approximately two days later,
L.C. requested a temporary restraining order (TRO) against his sister, and
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Cooper assisted L.C. in obtaining the TRO.
Next, Detective Cooper testified that in December 2018, he and other
SRPD officers responded to L.C.'s home after L.C.'s girlfriend reported L.C. was
"having a potential anxiety attack." When Cooper arrived, he observed L.C.
"was shaking and . . . extremely anxious," and appeared to be experiencing a
"very, very aggressive panic attack." Cooper stated L.C.'s "girlfriend . . . was
rubbing the bottom of [L.C.'s] feet and . . . telling [Cooper that L.C.] . . . suffered
from some PTSD from his time in the service." According to Cooper, L.C.
experienced "everything that would constitute a full[-]blown panic attack"
before L.C. was voluntarily transported to a local hospital.
Next, Cooper testified that in August 2021, he spoke with L.C. after an
anonymous caller "reached out to [Cooper] to advise . . . that [L.C.] was seeing
drones flying around" his home. When Cooper contacted L.C. about the
reported drones, L.C. told Cooper "he believed that people were watching . . .
him specifically, and that he s[aw the drones] often." L.C. also provided the
detective with video footage "of what he believed was a drone . . . flying over
his home," but Cooper saw no drones in the video.
L.C.'s witness testified he was L.C.'s supervisor in the USMC between
2012 and 2014 or 2015. The Staff Sergeant also stated he had no knowledge of
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any investigations related to L.C.'s alleged misconduct during that period.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Foti orally granted the
State's petition for a FERPO and issued a conforming order. On June 16, 2022,
following L.C.'s appeal from the May 6 FERPO, Judge Foti issued a written
amplification of her decision, pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(b).
In her cogent oral opinion, Judge Foti aptly noted that in deciding whether
a FERPO should issue, she was "required to consider eight factors[,] and if [she
found] any of the eight factors[, she] c[ould] also consider the mental health
factors . . . enumerated in the law." Next, the judge explained:
the rules governing admissibility of evidence at
trial . . . [do] not apply to the presentation and
consideration of information at the FERPO hearing.
Notwithstanding hearsay rules, the court may consider
affidavits or documents submitted in support of a
petition and may consider any information provided by
the county prosecutor or designee.
The judge also recognized her decision could "not be based on hearsay alone,"
and there had to "be a residuum of legal and competent evidence in the record
to support" the issuance of a FERPO.
Additionally, the judge assessed the credibility of the parties' witnesses,
finding Detective Cooper provided "credible testimony" and that L.C.'s witness
"testified credibly that he was not aware of" a report of L.C.'s alleged
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misconduct in 2014. But the judge also stated she was "not sure . . . [the Staff
Sergeant's testimony was] dispositive of the fact that [such a] report was[ not]
made."
Similarly, in her amplification letter, the judge credited Cooper's
testimony, finding he "spoke clearly and answered all of counsel's questions
directly and without hesitation," and "maintained good eye contact throughout
his testimony." But the judge further stated that while L.C.'s witness "also
testified clearly and answered all of counsel's questions," he "seemed to lack
knowledge of certain incidents involving [L.C.] and [the] police." She explained
the Staff Sergeant
seemed to be unaware of incidents involving [L.C.]'s
ex-girlfriend's reports to the [USMC] that [L.C.]
physically assaulted her[,] and [of] threats emanating
from [L.C.] that [he] would commit "mass murder" and
"murder-suicide." [] [The Staff Sergeant] could not
testify concerning these events, nor could he testify
about any follow-up investigation of these allegations.
Next, Judge Foti found the following factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f)
supported the issuance of a FERPO: one ("history of threats or acts of
violence . . . directed toward self or others"), two ("history of use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force"), and five ("prior arrests, pending
charges, or convictions for a violent indictable crime or disorderly persons,"
A-3099-21
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stalking, or domestic violence offenses). In finding factor one, Judge Foti
referenced the February 10, 2022 incident, following which D.C. reported to the
police that L.C. "physically assaulted him by punching him in the face and
head." She noted the State produced exhibits documenting D.C.'s "visible signs
of injury" from the altercation.
The judge also stated in her amplification letter that other facts militated
in favor of finding factor one, including L.C.'s "history of troubling encounters
with [the] police." Such encounters included the 2014 incident when L.C.'s ex-
girlfriend reported he physically assaulted her and would commit "mass murder"
and "murder-suicide." Further, the judge credited Detective Cooper's testimony
regarding: (1) the August 2018 dispute between L.C. and his sister; (2) the
December 2018 incident when the SRPD went to L.C.'s home following a report
he might be suffering from an anxiety attack; and (3) the August 2021 incident
when L.C. reported "multiple drones were flying over his home," yet "there were
no drones visible to [the] police" on the video footage he supplied to Detective
Cooper as proof of the incident.
Next, in finding factor two, the judge confirmed in her oral and written
opinions that she "relied on the same findings of fact set forth in factor one to
find factor two," noting L.C.'s "history of concerning and threatening behavior[]
A-3099-21
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culminat[ed] in violence against [his] roommate," as evidenced by "the
photographs of [D.C.'s] injuries" the State produced at trial.
Finally, Judge Foti found factor five, explaining L.C. was previously
arrested "for a violent disorderly persons/domestic violence offense" based on
the February 10 assault. The judge acknowledged "[o]ne event on its own
m[ight] cause . . . some hesitation, but when . . . view[ing] the totality of the
circumstances," the State "met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence
that [L.C.] pose[d] a danger to others by owning or possessing firearms." She
further clarified in her amplified opinion that the State "sustained its burden" in
establishing L.C. "pose[d] a significant danger of bodily injury to [him]self or
others by owning or possessing a firearm," and thus, the FERPO was warranted.
II.
On appeal, L.C. raises the following arguments:
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY RELYING ON
HEARSAY THAT WAS UNSUPPORTED BY A
RESIDUUM OF LEGAL AND COMPETENT
EVIDENCE.
A-3099-21
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY RELIED ON
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
GRANTING THE FERPO AGAINST [L.C.].
POINT III
THE STATE FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN TO
ESTABLISH THAT [L.C.] POSES A SIGNIFICANT
DANGER OF BODILY INJURY TO HIMSELF OR
OTHERS BY HAVING WEAPONS.
"The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding function is
limited." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). We are bound by the trial
court's findings "when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."
Id. at 411-12. When evidence is testimonial, as in this case, and involves
credibility questions, deference is "especially appropriate" because the trial
judge observed the witnesses first-hand. Id. at 412.
The Act, also known as the "red flag law," "permits the emergent removal
of weapons from any person who poses a danger to self or others." In re D.L.B.,
468 N.J. Super. 397, 400-01 (App. Div. 2021). The Act was intended to address
the growing number of mass shootings by removing firearms from those who
have shown "red flags" indicative of future violence. Id. at 400-02.
Pursuant to its authority under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-31, our Supreme Court
promulgated the AOC Directive to effectuate the purposes of the Act. See AOC
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Directive at 1. In addition, based on its authority under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-32, the
Office of the Attorney General adopted Attorney General Law Enforcement
Directive No. 2019-2 to implement the law. See Off. of Att'y Gen., Law Enf't
Directive No. 2019-2, Directive Pursuant to the Extreme Risk Protective Order
Act of 2018 (Aug. 15, 2019) (the Directive).
In considering whether to grant a FERPO, a court must consider eight
factors namely, whether an individual:
(1) has any history of threats or acts of violence . . .
directed toward self or others;
(2) has any history of use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force . . . against another person;
(3) is the subject of a temporary or final restraining
order or has violated a temporary or final restraining
order issued pursuant to the "Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act of 1991[]" . . . ;
(4) is the subject of a temporary or final protective order
or has violated a temporary or final protective order
issued pursuant to the "Victim's Assistance and
Survivor Protection Act[]". . . ;
(5) has any prior arrests, pending charges, or
convictions for a violent indictable crime or disorderly
persons offense, stalking offense pursuant to section 1
of [N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10], or domestic violence offense
enumerated in section 3 of [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19];
(6) has any prior arrests, pending charges, or
convictions for any offense involving cruelty to animals
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or any history of acts involving cruelty to animals;
(7) has any history of drug or alcohol abuse and
recovery from this abuse; or
(8) has recently acquired a firearm, ammunition, or
other deadly weapon.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f).]
Prior to issuing a FERPO, however, the court must also consider "all
relevant evidence," including if the individual: "has recklessly used, displayed,
or brandished a firearm;" "has an existing or previous extreme risk protective
order issued against [them];" and "has previously violated an extreme risk
protective order issued against [them]." AOC Directive, attach. 1, Guideline
3(d)(9) to (11).
If a court finds at least one of the eleven "behavioral" factors, it may then
consider four mental health factors, specifically whether the subject of the
hearing:
(12) has any prior involuntary commitment in a hospital
or treatment facility for persons with psychiatric
disabilities;
(13) has received or is receiving mental health
treatment;
(14) has complied or has failed to comply with any
mental health treatment; and
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(15) has received a diagnosis of a mental health
disorder.
[D.L.B., 468 N.J. Super. at 404 (citing AOC Directive,
attach. 1, Guidelines 3(d), 5(d)) (regarding TERPOs
and FERPOs, respectively).]
No single factor is determinative. Rather, after weighing the appropriate
factors, "[t]he court shall issue the FERPO . . . if it finds 'by a preponderance of
the evidence at the hearing that the [individual] poses a significant danger of
bodily injury to the [individual's] self or others' by possessing a firearm." Id. at
406-07 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:58-24(b)).
"[T]he rules governing admissibility of evidence at trial shall not apply to
the presentation and consideration of information at the [FERPO] hearing." Id.
at 406 (second alteration in original) (quoting AOC Directive, attach. 1,
Guideline 5(c)). In fact, when determining whether to grant a FERPO, the court
must not only consider the N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f) factors "as well as any other
relevant evidence," N.J.S.A. 2C:58-24(c), but Guideline 5(d) requires the court
to "consider all relevant evidence, including the factors referenced in Guideline
3(d)(1) to (11)," AOC Directive, attach. 1, Guideline 5(d), and "'information
obtained through the performance of [the State's] responsibilities' under the
Act," D.L.B., 468 N.J. Super. at 419 (quoting AOC Directive, attach. 1,
Guideline 5(e)). However, a FERPO "order 'cannot be based on hearsay alone'
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and 'there must be a residuum of legal and competent evidence in the record to
support' the court's order." D.L.B., 468 N.J. Super. at 406 (quoting Weston v.
State, 60 N.J. 36, 51 (1972)).
Applying these principles, we affirm the challenged FERPO substantially
for the reasons set forth in Judge Foti's well-reasoned and comprehensive oral
and written opinions. Not only are her factual and credibility findings entitled
to our deference, as they are amply supported in the record, but we are convinced
she properly applied the factors under the Act and the AOC Directive.
Lastly, we reject L.C.'s argument that the judge impermissibly relied on
hearsay in issuing the FERPO. Indeed, the record reflects the judge did not
exclusively rely on hearsay evidence, but instead, properly
considered hearsay evidence, documentary evidence (including pictures of
D.C.'s injuries), and Detective Cooper's credible testimony regarding his direct
interactions with L.C. as grounds supporting the entry of the FERPO.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of L.C.'s remaining
arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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