People v. Cereda CA1/1

Filed 3/8/24 P. v. Cereda CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A164330

v. (Napa County
SAMUEL J. CEREDA, Super. Ct. No. 19CR002640)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Samuel J. Cereda appeals from a sentence of 690 years to
life, imposed after a jury found him guilty of 50 counts of sexual offenses
against his stepdaughters, Jane Does One and Two. On appeal, Cereda
asserts that there was insufficient evidence of force or duress supporting 46
of the 48 counts involving Jane Doe One. He additionally contends that his
two convictions with respect to Jane Doe Two must be reversed because they
were obtained in violation of the corpus delicti rule. Cereda also argues that
the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony regarding Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) at trial. And he challenges the
related jury instruction as unconstitutional. Next, Cereda claims that his
sentence of 690 years to life violates both state and federal constitutional
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, he maintains
that the trial court erred in awarding noneconomic damages to Jane Doe One

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($750,000), Jane Doe Two ($25,000), and the girls’ mother, R.M. ($50,000)
without a jury trial and without sufficient proof of psychological harm. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Information
On February 13, 2020, the Napa County District Attorney filed the
operative information in this case, charging Cereda with 50 felony counts of
child sexual abuse. Counts one through forty-eight involved offenses against
his stepdaughter, Jane Doe One, and were split into timeframes
corresponding to Jane Doe One’s grade in school. Thus, the information
alleged that between August 16, 2017 and August 14, 2018 (6th grade)
Cereda committed two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under
14—rape (Pen. Code,1 §§ 261, subd. (a)(2) & (6), 269, subd. (a)(1), counts one
and three); four counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14—oral
copulation (§§ 269, subd. (a)(4), 287, subds. (c)(2)-(3) & (d), counts five, seven,
nine, and eleven); and two counts of forcible lewd and lascivious acts on a
child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1), counts thirteen and fourteen).
The information further alleged that between August 15, 2018 and
August 13, 2019 (7th grade) Cereda committed two counts of aggravated
sexual assault of a child under 14—rape (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2) & (6), 269, subd.
(a)(1), counts fifteen and seventeen); four counts of aggravated sexual assault
of a child under 14—oral copulation (§§ 269, subd. (a)(4), 287, subds. (c)(2)-(3)
& (d), counts nineteen, twenty-one, twenty-three, and twenty-five); and two
counts of forcible lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 (§ 288, subd.
(b)(1), counts twenty-seven and twenty-eight).

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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 Next, the information alleged that on or about July 21, 2019 (shortly
before 8th grade), Cereda committed one count of aggravated sexual assault
of a child under 14—rape (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2) & (6), 269, subd. (a)(1), count
twenty-nine). Then, between August 14, 2019 and September 16, 2019 (8th
grade), the information charged Cereda with two counts of aggravated sexual
assault of a child under 14—rape (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2) & (6), 269, subd. (a)(1),
counts thirty-one and thirty-three); four counts of aggravated sexual assault
of a child under 14—oral copulation (§§ 269, subd. (a)(4), 287, subds. (c)(2)-(3)
& (d), counts thirty-five, thirty-seven, thirty-nine, and forty-one); and two
counts of forcible lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 (§ 288, subd.
(b)(1), counts forty-three and forty-four). Finally, for the entire period
between August 16, 2017 and September 16, 2019, the information charged
with respect to Jane Doe One two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a
child under 14—sexual penetration (§§ 269, subd. (a)(5), 289, subd. (a), counts
forty-five and forty-seven).2 With respect to his other stepdaughter, Jane Doe
Two, the information alleged two counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child
under 14 (§ 288, subd. (a), counts forty-nine and fifty) between January 12,
2009 and June 30, 2011.
As to counts two, four, six, eight, ten, twelve, thirteen, fourteen,
sixteen, eighteen, twenty, twenty-two, twenty-four, twenty-six, twenty-seven,
twenty-eight, thirty, thirty-two, thirty-four, thirty-six, thirty-eight, forty,

2 The information alternatively charged the conduct encompassed by

counts one, three, five, seven, nine, eleven, fifteen, seventeen, nineteen,
twenty-one, twenty-three, twenty-five, twenty-nine, thirty-one, thirty-three,
thirty-five, thirty-seven, thirty-nine, forty-one, forty-five, and forty-seven as
21 counts of forcible lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 (§ 288, subd.
(b)(1), counts two, four, six, eight, ten, twelve, sixteen, eighteen, twenty,
twenty-two, twenty-four, twenty-six, thirty, thirty-two, thirty-four, thirty-six,
thirty-eight, forty, forty-two, forty-six, and forty-eight).

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forty-two, forty-three, forty-four, forty-six, and forty-eight, enhancements
were alleged pursuant to section 667.61 (the One Strike law), subdivision
(j)(2) that the crimes were committed against a child under the age of 14 and
that Cereda was convicted in the present case of qualifying offenses against
more than one victim. Thus, upon conviction, each of these counts would be
subject to a mandatory consecutive sentence of 25 years to life. (§ 667.61,
subds. (i), (j)(2).) If convicted of the remaining 21 counts involving Jane Doe
One, Cereda faced the possibility of mandatory consecutive sentences of 15
years to life. (Id., subds. (b), (c) & (i).)3
As to counts forty-nine and fifty involving Jane Doe Two,
enhancements were alleged pursuant to section 667.61, subdivision (b) and
(e) that the qualifying convictions committed by Cereda involved more than
one victim. Thus, under the One Strike Law, conviction under either of these
counts would carry mandatory sentencing of 15 years to life. (§ 667.61,
subds. (b) & (e)(4).)
B. Trial Evidence
Trial was held before a jury over seven days beginning October 20,
2021. The following was among the evidence adduced at trial:
1. Allegations Involving Jane Doe One
Jane Doe One was 16 and in the 10th grade when she testified at trial.
She and Jane Doe Two lived with their mother (R.M.), Cereda, and two
younger half-brothers in Napa during the relevant portion of Doe One’s
childhood. R.M. had married Cereda when Jane Doe One was three years
old, and she had considered him her father.

3 All 48 counts involving Jane Doe One were ineligible for probation,

suspension of sentence, or modification pursuant to section 1385. (§§ 667.61,
subds. (g) & (h), 1203.05, subd. (a), 1203.066, subd. (a)(1), (7) & (8).)

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 Jane Doe One testified she was in 6th grade and 11 or 12 years old
when Cereda first touched her inappropriately. After taking a shower one
evening while R.M. was at work, Cereda had her bend over his lap before she
got dressed. He then touched the exterior and interior of Doe One’s vagina,
telling her R.M. said he needed to make sure she was “cleaned.” Jane Doe
One told him no, but he responded he needed to check it. She felt weird and
like it was not right. Cereda finished, declared her clean, and instructed her
not to wear underwear when she was sleeping. She thought this was odd, but
agreed because he was her dad. According to Jane Doe One, when she was in
the 6th grade, Cereda touched her vagina in this way “a lot,” more than two
times. He also touched her breasts with his hands “a lot,” more than two
times, both over and under her clothing. Specifically, Cereda would have her
come into his bedroom, tell her to take off her clothes, and have her lay on the
bed. He would then touch her breasts and her vagina.
During this timeframe, Cereda also put his penis in her vagina and
moved it in and out “a lot,” on more than two occasions. He said he wanted to
make her feel good. She remembered telling him repeatedly the first time
that it hurt, but he stated that was normal and continued anyway. When
Doe One asked Cereda why he was doing this, he stated it was because he
loved her, and told her it was normal. She felt uneasy but believed him.
Cereda additionally had Jane Doe One put his penis in her mouth and “suck
it like a popsicle” more than two times during 6th grade. And he put his
mouth on her vagina and licked more than two times. When doing so, she
would lay on the bed, Cereda would hold her legs up, and then he would put
his face between her legs. Jane Doe One also remembered Cereda giving her
a wine bottle “to make herself feel good” when he was not around.

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 After the first incident, Jane Doe One reported to R.M. that Cereda had
told her to sleep without underwear. When R.M. confronted him, Cereda told
her that he had learned to do this from his grandmother for air circulation.
Doe One did not report anything else to her mother at that time because she
“thought it was a normal thing.” Cereda later complained to her that he had
told her not to tell her mom. Moreover, Cereda would tell her from time to
time not to tell anyone because he would go away, and R.M. would be very
sad. This made Jane Doe One scared and sad because she loved him as a
father at that time, did not want him to go away, and did not want her mom
to be sad.
Cereda molested Jane Doe One in a similar way when she was in the
7th grade. Specifically, Cereda put his penis in Doe One’s mouth, touched
her breasts, licked her vagina, touched her vagina inside and outside with his
fingers, and inserted his penis into her vagina—each more than two times.
However, during the 7th grade, Jane Doe One took a sex education class and
learned about consent and “rules against having sex and all that.” She began
to think Cereda was mistaken, so she told him that she wanted him to “stop
doing those things” to her because they were wrong. Cereda told her she was
wrong, that it was “very normal” for dads to do that to their kids because they
love them. He also told her that priests did it to altar boys. Although that
did not sound right to her, she thought maybe she was the one who was
wrong. The molestations continued.
Cereda also informed Jane Doe One that if she told anybody he would
go to jail and get beaten up and raped by other inmates. Jane Doe One did
not want that to happen to him at that point. Nevertheless, she took an
opportunity when she was alone in the car with R.M. to tell her what had
been going on because it was wrong, and she wanted it to stop. Her mother

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got angry, yelled at her, and told her she should not say things like that, or
her grandfather might kill Cereda. Her mother got so angry that Jane Doe
One said she was sorry and recanted her accusations. R.M.’s response made
her feel sad and regretful. She felt that she “was wrong for what [she] was
feeling. Just all so many [] emotions that were basically saying [she]
shouldn’t have told her.”
During the summer between 7th and 8th grades, Jane Doe One “just
couldn’t handle it anymore” and told her partner about the sexual abuse. The
partner encouraged Jane Doe One to make a recording of a molestation to
obtain evidence against Cereda. Jane Doe One tried multiple times to bring
her cellphone into the bedroom to make a recording, but Cereda would not
allow it. Then one day he told her to bring her phone into the room in case
R.M. called. Jane Doe One surreptitiously started an audio recording while
Cereda undressed and placed the phone on the bed. She recorded him while
he touched her breasts and put his penis in her vagina.
Both the original recording and a digitally enhanced version were
played for the jury. R.M. confirmed that the voices on the recording were
Cereda and Jane Doe One. In the recording, Cereda can be heard saying
things such as: “Is it good?”; “Does it feel good now?”; “I’m fucking you.”; “It’s
supposed to make you come.”; and “I got to get a finger inside you.” The
comments can be heard above background sounds like heavy breathing,
rhythmic rubbing sounds, wet kissing, sucking sounds, and Jane Doe One
whimpering and crying. When Jane Doe One protested—repeatedly saying
“No” and “I don’t want to do that”—Cereda replied with “I don’t care,” “Kiss
me,” and “It’s not wrong,” while continuing to abuse her.
Once 8th grade began, Cereda continued to molest Jane Doe One in a
similar way, putting his penis in Doe One’s mouth, touching her breasts,

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licking her vagina, touching her vagina inside and outside with his fingers,
and inserting his penis in her vagina—each more than two times. During
these incidents, Cereda’s penis was erect, and he sometimes ejaculated into
her mouth and vagina. When Cereda put his penis in Jane Doe One’s vagina,
she laid on the bed and he stood, holding her legs on either side of his waist.
She could move a little bit, but she could not leave. During one incident,
Jane Doe One said no to Cereda and tried to leave the room, but he grabbed
her roughly by the arm and tossed her onto the bed. Another time, she told
Cereda: “This is wrong, stop.” She felt like there was nothing she could do to
make it stop. Cereda also gave Jane Doe One a silicone penis “to make
herself feel good” when he was not around. Cereda sometimes put the sex toy
inside Jane Doe One’s vagina himself. He occasionally used a spray bottle of
lubricant that was located in his side table drawer during the molestations.4
Towards the end of September 2019, Jane Doe One took the recording
she had made to a school counselor and explained what had been happening
between her and Cereda. The school counselor called the police. That same
day, R.M. spoke with the police and agreed to make a pretext phone call with
Cereda, a copy of which was played for the jury. During that call, Cereda
gradually admitted to sexually assaulting Jane Doe One. Cereda reported
that it started when Jane Doe One walked in on him when he was getting in
the shower “and it just went out of control from there.” He admitted that she
gave him a blow job twice, stating that he was “teaching” her. And he
acknowledged he “went down” on Jane Doe One “maybe a dozen” times. He
stated that it had been going on for about a year and that Jane Doe One

4The police subsequently searched the family home and found a bottle

of lubricant in a bedside table in the master bedroom.

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would probably say the last time they had sex was the previous week. R.M.
testified that Cereda weighed approximately 350-375 pounds in late 2019.
2. Allegations Involving Jane Doe Two
Jane Doe Two was 20 years old when she testified at trial. She was
seven years old when her mother became romantically involved with Cereda.
She considered him a stepfather, as she also had a relationship with her
biological father. Jane Doe Two “vaguely” remembered living in San
Bernardino when she was younger, sometime after Cereda and R.M. got
married. It was before she moved to Germany for a year with her biological
father where she turned 12. When asked whether Cereda ever did anything
that made her uncomfortable or upset when they lived together, Jane Doe
Two testified: “There were times when he would pinch my butt and poke my
sides.” This touching upset her and even when she would repeatedly tell him
to stop, that it was uncomfortable for her, he did not. He had been doing this
as long as she could remember. She did not remember much about when she
was younger, but she could recall it happening when she was around 13 or
14.
An investigator from the District Attorney’s Office who was trained in
conducting interviews of victims of sexual abuse interviewed Jane Doe Two
on the day Jane Doe One reported Cereda’s abuse. Initially, Jane Doe Two
was chatty. When the investigator asked her about Cereda she stated she
had never had a good relationship with him. “Very obviously she disliked
him.” When the investigator spoke with her about what had happened to her
younger sister, Jane Doe Two became “angry and upset.” She told the
investigator that, if she had known what was going on, she would have killed
Cereda. But she denied that Cereda had ever touched her in a sexual way.

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 When R.M. questioned Cereda in the pretext call as to whether he had
done anything with Jane Doe Two, he responded that he had done “some
educational stuff”—he “pointed and showed her things on [his] body and her
body.” Cereda reported it was when they lived in San Bernardino before
Jane Doe Two went to live with her dad, probably when she was 11 years old.
Later he admitted he touched her and made her feel good on her privates
probably 10 times. Jane Doe One testified that Cereda once told her he had
done the same thing to Jane Doe Two when she was younger all the way until
she was 16 years old. The two girls never mentioned the abuse to each other.
3. Cereda’s Testimony
Cereda took the stand in his own defense. He remembered a time when
R.M. told him that Jane Doe One had accused him of sexual misconduct. He
was extremely angry and threatened to move out. However, R.M. told him
that she had handled it and that Jane Doe One had admitted it was a lie.
According to Cereda, he walked in on Jane Doe One at one point when she
was masturbating with a selfie stick. Cereda was worried she would hurt
herself. He had previously purchased a dildo for R.M. but never gave it to
her, so he gave it to Jane Doe One along with a bottle of lubricant.
Cereda further testified that he was not telling the truth when he made
numerous admissions in the pretext call regarding sexual contact with Jane
Doe One. He was “kind of angry” since this was the second time this kind of
thing had come up, and he told R.M. “what she want[ed] to hear” so she
would get Jane Doe One into therapy. The man on the audio recording was
not him because he never had sex with Jane Doe One and it was “clearly not
[his] voice.” He also thought Jane Doe Two needed therapy as she had
returned from her time with her biological father “withdrawn and quiet . . .
[and] was pulling her hair out.” When R.M. asked him about Jane Doe Two

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on the pretext call, Cereda lied and said he did things with her. He
explained: “And at that point again I’m not a hundred percent thinking
logically, but I’m thinking, well, you know, here’s my chance. I can tell
[R.M.], yes, I touched her, and she’ll try to get Jane Doe Two into some
therapy too.” However, Cereda admitted he realized the police would likely
be involved at this point because the school had found the audio recording.
4. CSAAS Testimony
Dr. Blake Carmichael, a clinical psychologist with the University of
California Davis Children’s Hospital, testified as an expert in child sexual
abuse, suggestibility, and the effects of abuse on children. Dr. Carmichael
stated that CSAAS is a theory developed in the 1980’s to educate people and
dispel myths and misconceptions about the behavior of children who have
been sexually abused, a population “most people may not encounter or
experience.” He explained that “[e]ven with popular media accounts today,
that doesn’t accurately depict what we know about kids who have been
sexually abused.” Some of the common misconceptions include: (1) the idea
that children are mostly sexually abused by strangers; (2) the idea that
children ordinarily report sexual abuse immediately; and (3) the expectation
that children will describe such abuse consistently when questioned over
time. According to Dr. Carmichael, child abuse should be understood in the
context of a relationship. It is often committed by a loving, caring, attentive
adult that has sexual access to the child. It occurs between a bigger,
stronger, more sophisticated adult in a position of trust/authority and a
smaller, weaker, more vulnerable child. Moreover, there is no one way
children respond to the trauma of the abuse.
Dr. Carmichael then described the five components of CSAAS. First,
the relationship is controlled through secrecy. Thus, abusers will instruct the

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child not to tell and may threaten them with negative consequences if they do
tell. Despite such threats, many children continue to love their abusers.
Second, helplessness is inherent in the uneven power dynamic between the
adult abuser and the child, and it is enhanced when the abuser is responsible
for caring for the child. It makes the child feel powerless to control the
situation. The child may feel trapped by the negative consequences of
disclosure. Even with the greater community awareness about sexual abuse
over the last 40 years and children being educated to say no, run, and tell,
they still often do not fight back or disclose.
The third component, entrapment and accommodation, describes how
abused children cope. Children may make ineffective behavioral changes in
an attempt to avoid abuse, such as pretending to be asleep or avoiding parts
of the house. Emotionally, they may dissociate from the experience by
focusing on something else, which may make detailed recall difficult.
Children may respond by appearing unaffected when discussing the abuse.
Delayed, unconvincing, or conflicted disclosure, the fourth component, reflects
the fact that children may disclose a significant amount of time after the
abuse, and some may never tell at all. Moreover, children may have a harder
time describing the trajectory of the abuse because they have not yet
mastered abstract concepts like time, sequence, order, and duration. Or it
may have happened so many times they cannot recall specifics and may
provide conflicting information. They may provide more or different details
throughout the disclosure process. Finally, the fifth component, recantation,
notes that it is not uncommon for victims of sexual abuse to disclose and then
retract the disclosure out of guilt or because of the reaction of the person to
whom they disclosed. Current research shows that this continues to be
something abused children do.

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C. Verdicts and Sentencing
On October 29, 2021, the jury found Cereda guilty on all counts and
found true all special allegations. The prosecution recommended a term of
690 years to life at sentencing. Specifically, it noted that the 27 counts under
section 288, subdivision (b)(1) with respect to Jane Doe One (counts two, four,
six, eight, ten, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, sixteen, eighteen, twenty, twenty-
two, twenty-four, twenty-six, twenty-seven, twenty-eight, thirty, thirty-two,
thirty-four, thirty-six, thirty-eight, forty, forty-two, forty-three, forty-four,
forty-six, and forty-eight) were subject to mandatory consecutive sentencing
of 25 years to life (27 x 25 = 675). It recommended that the court use its
discretion to run one of the two counts involving Jane Doe Two concurrently
and sentence the other consecutively at the statutorily required 15 years to
life, for a total of 690 years to life. The prosecutor acknowledged that the
sentences with respect to the other 21 counts involving Jane Doe One should
be imposed and stayed pursuant to section 654 as they were based on the
same incidents as the convictions under section 288, subdivision (b)(1). Given
the well-documented long-term effects of child sexual abuse—which become
more acute when the abuse is more frequent, more severe, and/or of longer
duration—the prosecution additionally requested that the court award
noneconomic restitution of $750,000 to Jane Doe One, $25,000 to Jane Doe
Two, and $50,000 to R.M., the mother of the two direct victims.5
At the sentencing hearing on December 15, 2021, the trial court heard
a victim impact statement from R.M., who stated Cereda had ruined their
lives and they had not yet begun to heal because he had lied throughout the

5 Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(F) provides that victims may recover

“[n]oneconomic losses, including, but not limited to, psychological harm, for
felony violations of Section 288, 288.5, or 288.7.”

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trial. Defense counsel—suggesting that the anticipated sentence violated the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment—requested that the court
override the statutory scheme and impose one or two sentences of 25 years to
life. He also objected to the requested noneconomic damages, arguing that
the awards were arbitrary and that there was no factual basis for them.
Noting that it was considering the “horrific reality” Jane Doe One
endured for years, the court imposed the total term as recommended by the
prosecutor of 690 years to life. Pursuant to section 654, it imposed and
stayed sentences of 15 years to life for each of the remaining counts involving
Jane Doe One. The court additionally awarded noneconomic restitution to
Jane Doe One, Jane Doe Two, and R.M. as requested by the prosecution. In
doing so, the court disagreed with defense counsel that the awarded amounts
were arbitrary, opining: “I think the numbers requested by the People in this
case are reflective of the deep and enduring pain that Mr. Cereda inflicted on
the victims in this case.”
This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of Evidence of Duress With Respect to Jane Doe One
Cereda first asserts that 46 of his 48 convictions with respect to the
sexual offenses involving Jane Doe One must be reversed because there was
insufficient evidence that the sex acts underlying those convictions had been
accomplished through “force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate
and unlawful bodily injury.”6 Specifically, he argues that Jane Doe One’s
testimony “makes clear that she permitted the sexual activity that occurred

6 Unsurprisingly, Cereda does not challenge his convictions with

respect to counts 29 and 30 on this basis as they related to the July 2019
incident surreptitiously recorded by Jane Doe One and played for the jury as
detailed above.

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in this case because she loved [him] and she believed him when he told her
that what they were doing was ‘normal’ [citation] and not because of threats
or coercion, either physical or mental.” We are not persuaded, finding more
than ample evidence that Cereda’s repeated molestations of Jane Doe One
over the course of years were accomplished through duress.7
1. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
The convictions Cereda challenges were for aggravated sexual assault
of a child under 14 (rape, oral copulation, or sexual penetration) as well as
forcible lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14. All of these crimes can
be accomplished through use of duress. (See § 288, subd. (b)(1) [forcible lewd
act on a child under 14 defined as lewd act committed “by use of force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on
the victim or another person”]; § 261, subd. (a)(2) [defining rape as sexual
intercourse “accomplished against a person’s will by means of force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the
person or another”]; § 287, subd. (c)(2)(B) [criminalizing “an act of oral
copulation upon a person who is under 14 years of age, when the act is
accomplished against the victim’s will by means of force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or
another person”]; § 289, subd. (a)(1)(B) [criminalizing “act of sexual
penetration upon a child who is under 14 years of age, when the act is
accomplished against the victim’s will by means of force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or
another person”]; see also § 269, subd. (a)(1), (4) & (5) [aggravated sexual

7 Since we find substantial evidence of duress here, we do not consider

whether the record also supports a finding of force, violence, menace, and/or
fear of immediate or unlawful bodily injury.

15
assault of a child includes rape pursuant to § 261, subd. (a)(2), oral copulation
in violation of § 287, subd. (c)(2), and sexual penetration under § 289,
subd. (a).) While all of these crimes involve duress, the term has been
defined somewhat differently in different situations.
The rape statute specifically defines duress to mean “a direct or implied
threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to coerce a
reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act which
otherwise would not have been performed, or acquiesce in an act to which one
otherwise would not have submitted. The total circumstances, including the
age of the victim, and the victim’s relationship to the defendant, are factors to
consider in appraising the existence of duress.” (§ 261, subd. (b).) In
contrast, duress in the context of other sexual offenses involving minors has
consistently been defined somewhat more broadly by the courts to mean “ ‘a
direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship[,] or retribution
sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1)
perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed or, (2)
acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted.’ ”
(People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004 (Leal); accord, People v. Soto
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 246 (Soto).)
In Leal, the Supreme Court rejected the assertion that the arguably
less broad definition of duress amended into the rape statute in 1993 should
be read to apply outside of the context of that statute. (Leal, supra, 3 Cal.4th
at pp. 1006–1009.) As the Court explained: “The Legislature might well
have wished to apply a somewhat broader definition of ‘duress’ in cases
involving sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years. The Legislature
may have wished to protect children against lewd acts committed by threats
of hardship despite its determination that similar threats of hardship should

16
not provide the basis for the crime of rape or spousal rape against an adult.”
(Id. at p. 1008.)
Duress can take the “ ‘form of psychological coercion to get someone
else to do something.’ ” (Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 243; see People v.
Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 15 (Cochran), overruled on other grounds
in Soto, at p. 248, fn. 12.) The definition of duress is “objective in nature and
not dependent on the response exhibited by a particular victim.” (Soto,
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 246.) With respect to child sexual abuse in particular,
the Soto Court held that when the Legislature amended section 288,
subdivision (b) in 1981 to delete the requirement that the lewd acts “be
‘against the will of the victim,’ it effectively removed the concept of consent
from child molestation cases.” (Id. at p. 245.) In doing so, “the Legislature
kept the focus on the conduct of the assailant. It recognized that there is an
inherent imbalance of power in an encounter between a child and an adult
bent on sexual conduct. It acted to protect young children, who may make ill-
advised ‘choices’ when under the coercive influence of an overreaching adult.”
(Id. at pp. 245–246.) Thus, duress can be established by “a defendant’s
attempt to isolate the victim and increase or maintain [the victim’s]
vulnerability to his assaults.” (Cochran, at p. 15.) And, “[w]hen the victim is
young and is molested by her father in the family home, duress will be
present in all but the rarest cases.” (People v. Thomas (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
1063, 1072–1073, italics added.)
The framework undergirding our substantial evidence analysis is well
settled. “ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that
is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a

17
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence.
[Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] A
reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s
credibility.’ (People v. Linberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)” (People v.
Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890; accord, People v. Odom (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 237, 246.)
2. Substantial Evidence of Duress in Record
Here, with respect to all of the sexual assaults on Jane Doe One other
than those involving rape, it is relatively easy to find substantial evidence of
duress, specifically that Cereda employed direct threats of hardship—that
her mother would be sad, that he would leave the family home, that he would
be sent to jail and raped—to coerce Jane Doe One into acquiescing in or
performing acts she would not otherwise have submitted to or done. Cereda,
however, argues that these threats are insufficient to establish duress
because they were intended to discourage disclosure not to coerce Jane Doe
One into complying with his sexual wishes. We disagree. This argument
comes from People v. Hecker (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1238, 1251, fn.7,
overruled on other grounds in Soto, at p. 248, fn. 12, a decision of the Fourth
District, Division One, which that same court later specifically rejected as
overbroad, reasoning: “A threat to a child of adverse consequences, such as
suggesting the child will be breaking up the family or marriage if she reports
or fails to acquiesce in the molestation, may constitute a threat of retribution
and may be sufficient to establish duress, particularly if the child is young

18
and the defendant is her parent. We also note that such a threat also
represents a defendant’s attempt to isolate the victim and increase or
maintain her vulnerability to his assaults.” (See Cochran, supra, 103
Cal.App.4th at p. 15.) We agree that such threats are part and parcel of the
psychological control Cereda established over Jane Doe One in order to
gratify his sexual urges.
We also reject Cereda’s argument that Jane Doe One participated in
the sexual activity, not because she was coerced, but because she loved
Cereda and thought the sexual behavior was normal. Jane Doe One testified
that Cereda’s threats were effective because, among other reasons, at that
point she still loved him. But she testified that she listened to him when he
told her what to do because he was “her dad.” This was evidence, not of
affection, but of Cereda’s dominance and authority over her. Moreover,
although Cereda repeatedly told her the abuse was normal, she said “no” and
“don’t touch there” from the first incident, stating that she felt weird, and
that something was not right. Jane Doe One testified variously that the
situation made her feel sad, uneasy, scared, helpless, wrong for what she was
feeling, and like there was nothing she could do to make it stop. She
continued to question the idea that the abuse was normal as she grew older
and more sexually knowledgeable. And she acquiesced, though she knew it
was wrong even if priests did it. Finally, she pushed herself to make the
audio recording because she “couldn’t handle it anymore.” Thus, Jane Doe
One did not engage in the sexual activities because she truly believed they
were normal, she gave in because Cereda repeatedly counseled her not to
trust her own instincts, another form of psychological coercion.
Moreover, even if, at times, Jane Doe One convinced herself the abuse
was normal, this would not change our analysis. Since duress is measured by

19
a purely objective standard, a jury could find that Cereda used threats and
coercion to commit the molestations without ever resolving how Jane Doe
One subjectively perceived or responded to this behavior. As our high court
held in Soto: “A perpetrator may use duress, menace, or threats against a
victim even if this conduct does not ultimately influence the victim’s state of
mind. In the context of lewd acts with a child under 14, it is the defendant’s
menacing behavior that aggravates the crime and brings it under section
288(b).” (Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 243, some italics added.)
Finally, with respect to the rape counts, we question whether the
psychological coercion and threats in this case are insufficient to establish
duress when rape is charged in the context of the aggravated sexual assault
of a child under 14. (See § 269; People v. Figueroa (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 95,
98 [“ ‘[T]he Legislature intended [in section 269] to aggravate punishment for
forcible sexual offenses where the defendant’s culpability is increased by a
substantial age disparity.’ ”].) While the statutory definition of duress in the
context of rape deletes “hardship,” it also indicates that “[t]he total
circumstances, including the age of the victim, and the victim’s relationship
to the defendant, are factors to consider in appraising the existence of
duress.” (§ 261, subd. (b)(1).) And the Leal Court posited that the
Legislature, in removing hardship from the rape statute, “may have wished
to protect children against lewd acts committed by threats of hardship
despite its determination that similar threats of hardship should not provide
the basis for the crime of rape or spousal rape against an adult.” (Leal,
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1008.) Thus, at least arguably, duress should have the
more expansive meaning otherwise applied to child sexual abuse when rape
is charged as aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14.

20
 Even if it does not, however, we find substantial evidence of implied
threats of force in this case. Jane Doe One was a young child when the abuse
occurred, and Cereda was a 350-375 pound older man. Jane Doe One
testified that during the first rape, Cereda failed to stop despite her telling
him he was hurting her. When she orally copulated him, she was on her
knees while Cereda stood over her. When Cereda licked her vagina and
raped her, he had her lay on the bed and held her legs up on either side of his
body while he stood in the middle. While she could move around a little, she
could not escape him. During one incident, Jane Doe One said no to Cereda
and tried to leave the room, but he grabbed her roughly by the arm and
tossed her onto the bed. Given the size disparity between Cereda and Jane
Doe One, his failure to stop when she said no or it hurt, and his position of
dominance and authority over her—both generally and physically when he
engaged in sexual acts with her—it is a reasonable inference that Cereda was
using both psychological coercion and implied threats of force to bend Jane
Doe One to his will.
The following exchange captured on the audio recording played for the
jury (and which Cereda does not challenge for insufficient evidence of
aggravated rape of a child) is particularly telling:
Cereda: “Now, give it to me.”
Jane Doe One: “No. I don’t want to do that. I don’t want to do that.”
Cereda: “I don’t care. You need to feel good.”
Jane Doe One: “No.”
Cereda: “good.”
Jane Doe One: “No.”
Cereda: “Yes.”
Jane Doe One: (whimpers)

21
 Cereda: “There we go.”
Jane Doe One: “Uh huh.”
Cereda: “I don’t care anymore. Kiss me.”
Jane Doe One: “No.”
Cereda: “It’s not wrong. It’s not wrong.”
Jane Doe One: “[U]h huh.”
Cereda: “It’s not wrong.”
Jane Doe One: “Uh huh.”
Cereda: “It’s not wrong.”
Jane Doe One: “No.”
Cereda: “It’s okay. It’s okay.”
Jane Doe One: “No. I really don’t want to. I don’t want to do it.”
(Rubbing Sounds.)
Cereda: “Good?”
Jane Doe One: “Uh huh.”
(Reformatted and references to some background noises and unintelligible
portions omitted for purposes of clarity.) Given the other evidence in the
record, it is reasonable to assume that this physical aggression (or an implied
threat thereof) was typical of Cereda’s sexual interactions with Jane Doe
One. In sum, we reject all of Cereda’s substantial evidence challenges.
B. Corpus Delicti for the Two Convictions Involving Jane Doe Two
As stated above, Cereda was convicted in counts forty-nine and fifty of
lewd and lascivious conduct with Jane Doe Two in violation of section 288,
subdivision (a). Cereda maintains that since his admissions were the only
evidence that the alleged sexual acts occurred, his convictions for these
counts run afoul of the corpus delicti rule and must be reversed. We reach
the opposite conclusion.

22
 1. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
“In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti,
or the body of the crime itself—i.e., the fact of injury, loss, or harm, and the
existence of a criminal agency as its cause. In California, it has traditionally
been held, the prosecution cannot satisfy this burden by relying exclusively
upon the extrajudicial statements, confessions, or admissions of the
defendant. [Citations.] Though mandated by no statute, and never deemed a
constitutional guaranty, the rule requiring some independent proof of the
corpus delicti has roots in the common law. [Citation.] California decisions
have applied it at least since the 1860’s.” (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th
1161, 1168–1169 (Alvarez).) “The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to
assure that ‘the accused is not admitting to a crime that never occurred.’ ”
(People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301 (Jones).)
Evidence of the corpus delicti of a crime “may be circumstantial and
need not prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt but is sufficient if it
permits an inference of criminal conduct, even if a noncriminal explanation is
also plausible.” (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171.) “There is no
requirement of independent evidence ‘of every physical act constituting an
element of an offense,’ so long as there is some slight or prima facie showing
of injury, loss, or harm by a criminal agency.” (Ibid., quoting Jones, supra, 17
Cal.4th at p. 303.) As our Supreme Court has explained: “The amount of
independent proof of a crime required for this purpose is quite small; we have
described this quantum of evidence as ‘slight’ [citation] or ‘minimal’ [citation].
The People need make only a prima facie showing ‘ “permitting the
reasonable inference that a crime was committed.” ’ [Citation.] The
inference need not be ‘the only, or even the most compelling, one . . . [but
need only be] a reasonable one.” (Id. at pp. 301–302.) “In every case, once

23
the necessary quantum of independent evidence is present, the defendant’s
extrajudicial statements may then be considered for their full value to
strengthen the case on all issues.” (Alvarez, at p. 1171.)
Lewd and lascivious conduct as was alleged in counts forty-nine and
fifty is proven where “a person who willfully and lewdly commits any lewd or
lascivious act . . . upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a
child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing
to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the
child.” (§ 288, subd. (a).) It is undisputed that Jane Doe Two was under the
age of 14 when the family lived in San Bernardino. And the parties generally
agree on the direct evidence that was produced at trial relevant to these
counts. Moreover, it is indisputable that, if considered, Cereda’s admissions
provide substantial evidence supporting the challenged convictions. Under
these circumstances, we are faced only with the legal question of whether
there was sufficient other evidence to establish the corpus delicti of lewd and
lascivious acts by Cereda on Jane Doe Two. (See Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at
p. 302.) In other words, we must determine whether the trial evidence is
sufficient—apart from Cereda’s admissions on this point—to provide a slight
prima facie showing permitting a reasonable inference that Cereda touched
Jane Doe Two unlawfully within the meaning of section 288, subdivision (a)
when she lived in San Bernardino.
2. Sufficient Evidence of Corpus Delicti in this Case
We have little difficulty here finding that slight evidence. In denying
Cereda’s section 1118.1 motions as to counts forty-nine and fifty on these
same grounds, the trial court identified as slight evidence “of something, of
some harm” Jane Doe Two’s testimony that 13 or 14 years old was “the
earliest time that she remembers [Cereda] pinching her butt and poking her

24
sides. It was in a way that upset her. She doesn’t like to be touched. There
were numerous times that he pinched or poked her butt or sides.” We agree
that this is relevant evidence in establishing the corpus delicti for counts
forty-nine and fifty. Even Cereda concedes that it could be argued that the
poking and pinching was sexually motivated, but he dismisses its relevance
because it occurred in the wrong timeframe. However, given Jane Doe Two’s
inability to remember much about her childhood in San Bernardino, her clear
dislike of Cereda, her extreme reaction when she learned what Jane Doe One
had suffered at Cereda’s hands, and her decision to live abroad with her
biological father shortly after the family resided in San Bernardino, we
believe that the evidence is also relevant to whether Cereda harmed Jane
Doe Two in some way that made her uncomfortable at an earlier time. Put
another way, although a noncriminal explanation for all of these facts is
certainly possible, they provide some evidence permitting a reasonable
inference that Jane Doe Two had been harmed by Cereda in some way prior
to her exit from the family home to live with her biological father.
As to whether she was harmed in a criminal way during that
timeframe, we have here all of the direct testimony of Jane Doe One
regarding the continuous sexual abuse she suffered at Cereda’s hands when
she was of an age similar to Jane Doe Two’s age when Doe Two resided in
San Bernardino. Evidence Code section 1108 provides that “evidence of the
defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made
inadmissible” as propensity evidence under section 1101 “if the evidence is
not inadmissible” under [Evidence Code] section 352. (Evid. Code § 1108,
subd. (a).) Evidence Code section 1108 also authorizes juries to consider a
charged sexual offense that the jury has already determined that the
defendant committed to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit another

25
sexual offense charged in the same case. (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54
Cal.4th 1152, 1160-1161.) Given the similarity in age of the two sisters when
the alleged abuse occurred, Cereda’s propensity to commit such acts, and the
other evidence of unwanted touching of Jane Doe Two at Cereda’s hands as
described above, we conclude that the corpus delicti for the charged offenses
involving Jane Doe Two was established without reference to any of Cereda’s
own statements.8
C. CSAAS Issues
Cereda next claims that Dr. Carmichael’s testimony in this case with
respect to CSAAS was irrelevant and inadmissible because, as a general
matter, there are no longer misconceptions regarding child sexual abuse and,
specifically, the jury in this case indicated that it did not hold any such
misconceptions. In a related vein, Cereda argues that the pattern jury
instruction on CSAAS testimony, CALCRIM No. 1193, violated his
constitutional due process and jury trial rights by misleading jurors into

8 People v. Ramirez Ruiz (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 809, relied upon by

Cereda, is easily distinguishable. In that case, there was direct testimony
from the victim that the first time sexual abuse occurred was about “ ‘three
months before’ ” she disclosed being abused. The record established the
victim was 11 years old at the time of the disclosure and for the preceding
eight months, having been born in January 2016 and having disclosed in
September 2016. (Id. at p. 833.) Under these circumstances, Division Two of
this District concluded that the corpus delicti was not established for oral
copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or younger because
there was no other evidence besides a statement made by Ramirez Ruiz that
any sexual misconduct occurred when the victim was 10 years old or younger.
(Ibid.)

26
thinking that the expert testimony could be used as evidence supporting the
truth of the Does’ allegations. We find neither contention convincing.
1. Admissibility of CSAAS Testimony
i. Additional background
During motions in limine, defense counsel objected to the prosecution’s
proposed CSAAS testimony, arguing that times had changed and that jurors
no longer had misconceptions about child sexual abuse. While it
acknowledged that CSAAS testimony can be problematic if it is presented
without adequate “guardrails,” the trial court concluded that CSAAS
testimony was permissible under long-established precedent. The trial court
specifically found that Dr. Carmichael had training and experience that
would assist the trier of fact and stated it would be giving limiting
instructions.
During jury voir dire, the prosecutor questioned each panel generally
about several possible preconceived notions regarding sexually abused
children. It appears the jurors responded with hands or nods of the head.
The questions included: (1) whether jurors recognized that child molesters
come from “all walks of life”—including parents, teachers, and coaches; (2)
whether jurors understood that victims of child sexual abuse might respond
in a variety of ways; (3) whether jurors recognized that sexually abused
children might not report the abuse “right away or report the crime at all”;
and (4) whether jurors would expect child victims of sexual abuse to
remember all of the details of the crime. Not all of these questions were
asked during each panel. Sometimes the prosecutor asked panel members
whether they had any responses to questions she had asked prior panels.
After a jury was selected, defense counsel renewed his objection to Dr.
Carmichael’s testimony, arguing that, given the prosecutor’s thorough voir

27
dire, none of the 96 prospective jurors in the pool “have the slightest
misconception about victim behavior in the way that Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome evidence is meant to fix.” The trial court declined
to change its earlier ruling. It stated that it believed it had placed sufficient
guardrails on the testimony and that the probative value of the testimony
was not outweighed by any juror confusion or undue consumption of time.
ii. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial. (Evid. Code, § 350.)
Evidence Code section 210 defines relevant evidence as evidence “having any
tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action.” In other words, “[r]elevance
is a low bar.” (People v. Villa (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1052.) A trial
court’s conclusions with respect to relevancy are discretionary and reviewable
only for abuse. (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 821.) However,
under Evidence Code section 352, a trial court has “broad discretion . . . to
exclude even relevant evidence if it determines the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by its possible prejudicial effects.”
(People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 74.) Specifically, a trial court
“may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of
time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) Prejudice in this
context “ ‘is not synonymous with “damaging,” but refers instead to evidence
that “ ‘uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against [a] defendant’ ”
without regard to its relevance on material issues [citations].’ ” (People v.
Zepeda (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 25, 35.)

28
 Expert opinion testimony is admissible if it is “[r]elated to a subject
that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert
would assist the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) As our Supreme
Court has explained, “ ‘[t]he decisive consideration in determining the
admissibility of expert opinion evidence is whether the subject of inquiry is
one of such common knowledge that [people] of ordinary education could
reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness or whether, on the other
hand, the matter is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion
of an expert would assist the trier of fact.’ ” (People v. Chapple (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 540, 547, quoting People v. Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99, 103, italics
added.) Thus, “ ‘the admissibility of expert opinion is a question of degree.
The jury need not be wholly ignorant of the subject matter of the opinion in
order to justify its admission; if that were the test, little expert opinion
testimony would ever be heard. Instead, the statute declares that even if the
jury has some knowledge of the matter, expert opinion may be admitted
whenever it would ‘assist’ the jury. It will be excluded only when it would
add nothing at all to the jury’s common fund of information.’ ” (People v.
McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299–1300 (McAlpin).) “[T]he decision of a
trial court to admit expert testimony ‘will not be disturbed on appeal unless a
manifest abuse of discretion is shown.’ ” (Id. at p. 1299.)
Trial courts may admit CSAAS evidence to disabuse jurors of
commonly held myths or misconceptions about child sexual abuse. (McAlpin,
supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300–1301.) “While CSAAS evidence is not relevant
to prove the alleged sexual abuse occurred, it is well established in California
law CSAAS evidence is relevant for the limited purpose of evaluating the
credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse.” (People v. Lapenias
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 171 (Lapenias), citing cases; People v. Munch

29
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 468, 472–473 (Munch) [citing California cases
that “have long recognized the well-established relevance, necessity,
reliability, and importance of this evidence”].) “ ‘Such expert testimony is
needed . . . to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s
seemingly self-impeaching behavior.’ ” (McAlpin, at p. 1301.) “Admission of
evidence such as CSAAS is not error merely because it was introduced as
part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief rather than in rebuttal. The testimony
is pertinent and admissible if an issue has been raised as to the victim’s
credibility.” (People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1745.)
iii. No Abuse of Discretion in Admitting CSAAS Testimony
Although Cereda baldly asserts on appeal that the CSAAS testimony in
this case was inadmissible because there are no longer misconceptions
regarding child sexual abuse that need correcting, he provides no evidence or
analysis supporting this claim. We will therefore not consider it further.
(People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 482, fn. 2 [a reviewing court need
not discuss claims that are asserted perfunctorily and insufficiently
developed].) Suffice it to say that several courts have recently rejected this
assertion. (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 172; Munch, supra, 52
Cal.App.5th at p. 468.)
Cereda’s more meaty claim is that the prosecution’s voir dire of jury
members in this case established that they had no misconceptions about the
behavior of sexually abused children, and thus the CSAAS testimony was
inadmissible. This argument, however, misapprehends both the significance
of the voir dire in this case and the scope of the admissibility of expert
testimony.
That the prosecutor briefly mentioned several misconceptions to panels
of potential jurors during voir dire and no juror raised a specific objection

30
means, at most, that the jurors had no issues with what the prosecutor stated
in the abstract. At worst, potential jurors might have been embarrassed to
state their disagreement while everyone else nodded or might not have been
aware of the misconceptions they harbored. In addition, the prosecutor did
not discuss all of the possible misconceptions later testified to by Dr.
Carmichael, and certainly did not discuss them in depth, explaining the
underlying reasons and psychology behind them. As just one example, while
the prosecutor asked if potential jurors understood that molesters could be
family members, Dr. Carmichael testified at length about how child sexual
abuse must be understood in terms of the relationship between the abuser
and the abused and how the molestation’s relational nature impacted things
such as secrecy and delayed disclosure. He also explained how coping
mechanisms like dissociation and physical conditions such as brain
development might impact a child victim’s recall.
As stated above, a jury need not be wholly ignorant of the subject
matter of the opinion in order to justify its admission. (McAlpin, supra, 53
Cal.3d at p. 1299.) Rather, “ ‘ “[i]t will be excluded only when it would add
nothing at all to the jury’s common fund of information.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1300.)
The CSAAS testimony was clearly relevant in this case involving delayed
disclosure by one victim and no disclosure by the other, the dynamics of a
parent-child relationship, inconsistent disclosures, and a recantation. It was
not cumulative or prejudicial. Instead, it added to the jury’s common fund of
information with respect to child sexual abuse. We see no error in its
admission, and certainly no abuse of discretion.

31
 2. Constitutionality of CALCRIM No. 1193
i. Additional Background.
During his CSAAS testimony, Dr. Carmichael confirmed that he had no
specific information about the present case and that he was not providing an
opinion as to whether or not Jane Does One and Two had been sexually
abused. Moreover, he stressed that CSAAS is not a tool to determine
whether any specific child has been abused and that no existing measure or
tool can do that. Dr. Carmichael also testified that the creator of CSAAS has
since been critical about how the theory has sometimes been used in courts.
Specifically, “[h]e was critical of defense attorneys using it to say abuse did
not occur, and he was equally critical of prosecutors saying, using it to say
abuse did occur.”
The jury in this case was instructed three times with a modified version
of CALCRIM No. 1193—twice during Dr. Carmichael’s testimony and once
before deliberations. Specifically, the court instructed: “You have heard
testimony from Dr. Blake Carmichael regarding child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome. [¶] Dr. Blake Carmichael’s testimony regarding
child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the
defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him or any conduct
or crimes with which he was not charged. [¶] You may consider this
evidence only in deciding whether or not Jane Doe [One] and Jane Doe
[Two]’s conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has
been molested, and in evaluating the believability of their testimony. (Italics
added.)
ii. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
“We review a claim of instructional error de novo. [Citation.] The
challenged instruction is considered ‘in the context of the instructions as a

32
whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable
likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ”
(People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326.)
More specifically, the language of CALCRIM No. 1193 has been upheld
as accurately informing the jury of the limited use of CSAAS evidence (see
People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 815–816; Lapenias, supra, 67
Cal.App.5th at pp. 175–176; Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 473–474;
People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 503–504 (Gonzales).) We find
the analysis in Gonzales particularly instructive. There, the appellate court
opined: “A reasonable juror would understand CALCRIM No. 1193 to mean
that the jury can use [the CSAAS] testimony to conclude that [the alleged
victim’s] behavior does not mean she lied when she said she was abused. The
jury also would understand it cannot use [the CSAAS] testimony to conclude
[the alleged victim] was, in fact, molested. The CSAAS evidence simply
neutralizes the victim’s apparently self-impeaching behavior. Thus, under
CALCRIM No. 1193, a juror who believes [the CSAAS] testimony will find
both that [the alleged victim’s] apparently self-impeaching behavior does not
affect her believability one way or the other, and that the CSAAS evidence
does not show she had been molested. There is no conflict in the instruction.”
(Gonzales, at p. 504.)
iii. No Instructional Error.
Arguing that there is “no meaningful distinction” between using
CSAAS testimony to evaluate a complaining witness’s believability and using
it to determine whether that witness’s claim of molestation is true, Cereda
maintains that the last phrase of CALCRIM No. 1193 unconstitutionally tips
the balance in favor of the prosecution. Specifically, he contends that in this
case the instruction misled the jury into believing that it could use the

33
CSAAS testimony to bolster the Does’ credibility, thereby lessening the
prosecution’s burden of proof and violating his constitutional due process and
jury trial rights. We disagree.
As explained in Gonzales, cited above, there is no conflict in the
CALCRIM No. 1193 instruction in general, as it accurately informs the jury
of the limited use of CSAAS evidence. Moreover, there is little likelihood that
the jury here misunderstood its limited parameters given Dr. Carmichael’s
repeated testimony that he knew nothing about the present case and that
nothing (including CSAAS) can determine whether a particular victim has
been molested. Further, a modified version of CALCRIM No. 1193 was read
to the jury three times during the trial. The instruction expressly stated that
CSAAS “is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes
charged against him” and specifically instructed the jury that they “may
consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not Jane Doe [One] and
Jane Doe [Two]’s conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone
who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of their
testimony.” It is presumed that jurors will understand and follow the
instructions given by the court. (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662.)
There is nothing in this record that suggests otherwise.
Thus, when considering the specific language of CALCRIM No. 1193 in
the context of the trial record, it is not reasonably likely that the jury in this
case applied it in an impermissible manner. In short, we see no error.
D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Cereda next argues that the trial court’s sentence of 690 years to life
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California
Constitution. Specifically, Cereda asserts that the sentence—which is

34
impossible to complete in his lifetime—is not justified by the nature of the
conduct, past misconduct, harm to the victims, or danger to the public. While
the sentence in this case is severe, we are not persuaded it is
unconstitutional.
1. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
“California’s prohibition on ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ (Cal. Const.,
art. 1, § 17) has been read to bar any sentence ‘ “so disproportionate to the
crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends
fundamental notions of human dignity.” ’ ” (People v. Brewer (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 199, 213 (Brewer).)9 “Whether a particular punishment is
disproportionate to the offense is, of course, a question of degree. The choice
of fitting and proper penalties is not an exact science, but a legislative skill
involving an appraisal of the evils to be corrected, the weighing of practical
alternatives, consideration of relevant policy factors, and responsiveness to
the public will; in appropriate cases, some leeway for experimentation may
also be permissible. The judiciary, accordingly, should not interfere in this
process unless a statute prescribes a penalty ‘out of all proportion to the
offense’ [citations], i.e., so severe in relation to the crime as to violate the
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8
Cal.3d 410, 423–424 (Lynch), superseded by statute on other grounds as
explained in In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 974–975.)
“California courts examine three criteria in assessing
disproportionality: (1) the nature of the offense and offender, with emphasis
on [his or her] danger to society; (2) the penalty imposed compared with the

9 Since the federal Constitution affords no greater protection than the

state Constitution, we will analyze Cereda’s claim under California law. (See
People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1510.)

35
penalties for more serious crimes in California; and (3) the punishment for
the same offense in other jurisdictions.”10 (Brewer, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 213–214; accord, Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 425–427.) “In examining
the nature of the offense, we ‘ “look at the totality of the circumstances,
including motive, the way the crime was committed, the extent of the
defendant’s involvement, and the consequences of defendant’s acts.” ’
[Citation.] In examining the nature of the offender, we consider ‘ “whether
‘the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the defendant’s individual
culpability as shown by such factors as his age, prior criminality, personal
characteristics, and state of mind.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Gomez (2018) 30
Cal.App.5th 493, 500.)
“ ‘Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual is a question of law for
the appellate court, but the underlying disputed facts must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the judgment.’ ” (People v. Mantanez (2002) 98
Cal.App.4th 354, 358.)
2. Sentence not Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The sentence in this case is no doubt long. On the other side of the
scale, however, the sheer number of Cereda’s multiple sex offenses—
committed against two young, vulnerable victims over whom he occupied a
position of authority and trust—weighs heavily against him. Indeed, Jane
Doe One’s testimony at trial made clear that the incidents which formed the
basis for the myriad charges against him were an exceedingly small portion
of the totality of what occurred. Further, the manner in which Cereda
committed the offenses—through a web of isolation and psychological
coercion—evinced a high degree of cruelty and callousness. And as we

10 Cereda makes no argument under this third criterion, so our opinion

will focus on the other two.

36
discuss below, the consequences to both girls and their mother were
significant and ongoing. We see nothing in Cereda’s personal characteristics
that changes this calculus. Cereda, the sole culpable party, was an adult
when the crimes were committed. He expressed no remorse for his repeated
acts of molestation, instead dragging the family through an extended court
process where he essentially called Jane Doe One a liar. And, while Cereda
points to the probation officer’s assessment that he has a below average risk
of reoffending, this single favorable factor does not outweigh the other
factors. (Compare People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 725.)
Cereda acknowledges that other appellate courts have upheld de facto
sentences of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for multiple sex
offenses against a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. Nevertheless, he
contends that the penalty imposed here is disproportionate because it shocks
the conscience and serves no rational Legislative purpose. Implicit in
Cereda’s argument is the assumption that the multiple acts of sexual
molestation of which he was convicted are less serious than a single murder
conviction subject to an LWOP sentence. However, “[t]he penalties for single
offenses . . . cannot properly be compared to those for multiple offenses.”
(People v. Crooks (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 797, 807.) Rather, “[r]ecidivism in
the commission of multiple felonies poses a danger to society justifying the
imposition of longer sentences for subsequent offenses.” (People v. Cooper
(1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 815, 823–824.) Among the primary goals of recidivist
statutes are “to deter repeat offenders and, at some point in the life of one
who repeatedly commits criminal offenses serious enough to be punished as
felonies, to segregate that person from the rest of society for an extended
period of time.” (Id. at p. 824.) As the United States Supreme Court has
stated: “[W]e have repeatedly upheld recidivism statutes ‘against contentions

37
that they violate constitutional strictures dealing with . . . cruel and unusual
punishment.’ ” (Parke v. Raley (1992) 506 U.S. 20, 27.) That Cereda was
convicted of all of the offenses at the same time is irrelevant to the purposes
underlying recidivist concerns, as the timing of the discovery of the multiple
acts, and of the prosecutions and convictions, was pure happenstance.
Finally, “[t]here exists a strong public policy to protect children of
tender years.” (People v. Olson (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638, 646.) “[L]ewd conduct
on a child may not be the most grave of all offenses, but its seriousness is
considerable.” (People v. Christensen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 781, 806.)
Sexual offenses against minors “may have lifelong consequences to the well-
being of the child.” (Ibid.) Thus, the One Strike Law reflects the
Legislature’s “intolerance toward child sexual abuse.” (People v. Wutzke
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 923, 931.) Indeed, “persons convicted of sex crimes against
multiple victims within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivision [(e)(4)] ‘are
among the most dangerous’ from a legislative standpoint.” (Id. at pp. 930-
931.) Consequently, “[t]he One Strike scheme . . . contemplates a separate
life term for each victim attacked on each separate occasion.” (Id. at p. 931.)
Given these considerations, numerous courts have upheld sentences in
multiple child molestation cases that exceed the lifetime of the defendant and
thus amount to an LWOP sentence. (See, e.g., People v. Retanan (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 1219, 1222, 1231 [upholding sentence of 135 years to life for 16
felony offenses arising from the molestation of four children]; People v.
Bestelmeyer (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 532 [affirming 129 year sentence for
25 counts of sexual assault on his stepdaughter]; compare People v. Andrade
(2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1310 [195 years to life for seven counts of
forcible oral copulation and seven counts of forcible rape against five adult
victims]; People v. Cartwright (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1130, 1134–1137

38
[affirming sentence of 375 years to life plus 53 years based on third strike
conviction for 19 felonies involving the violent sexual assault of three
women].) As stated above, we should not interfere with the Legislature’s
choice of fitting and proper penalties “unless a statute prescribes a penalty
‘out of all proportion to the offense.’ ” (Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 423–
424.) We see nothing in Cereda’s extended and extensive sexual
victimization of his two young stepdaughters which causes us to second guess
the proportionality of the Legislature’s penalty determination. (See People v.
Byrd (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375–1376, 1383 [determinate sentence of
115 years, plus an indeterminate sentence of 444 to life for 12 counts of
robbery, mayhem, attempted murder, and possession of a firearm by a felon
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; sentence “serves valid
penological purposes: it unmistakably reflects society’s condemnation of
defendant’s conduct and it provides a strong psychological deterrent to those
who would consider engaging in that sort of conduct in the future”].)
E. Noneconomic Restitution
Cereda finally argues that the noneconomic damages awarded in this
case must be stricken as unauthorized. First, he asserts that he was entitled
under the state and federal constitutions to a jury trial on the amount of any
such damage award. Second, he maintains that the awards of noneconomic
damages to each of the three victims in this case must be stricken because
there was insufficient evidence in the record that any of them suffered
psychological harm. We address and reject each contention in turn.
1. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
“Pursuant to the California Constitution, victims of crime have a right
to restitution from criminal defendants: ‘Restitution shall be ordered from
the convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the sentence or

39
disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss.’ (Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(B).) To [implement] this constitutional requirement,
the Legislature enacted section 1202.4, which requires the trial court to order
a defendant to pay victim restitution ‘in an amount established by court
order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim . . . or any other
showing to the court.’ (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)” (People v. Lehman (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 795, 800 (Lehman).)
“With one exception, restitution orders are limited to the victim’s
economic damages.” (People v. Smith (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 415, 431
(Smith).) The exception provides that restitution may be ordered for
“[n]oneconomic losses, including, but not limited to, psychological harm, for
felony violations of Section 288, 288.5, or 288.7.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F).)
“Noneconomic damages are ‘subjective, non-monetary losses including, but
not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional
distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to
reputation and humiliation.’ (Civ. Code, § 1431.2, subd. (b)(2).)” (Smith, at
p. 431.)
In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), the United
States Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 490.) “[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of
the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” (Blakely
v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303, italics omitted.) The principle of
Apprendi applies to criminal fines. (Southern Union Company v. United

40
States (2012) 567 U.S. 343, 346 [fines for violating federal environmental
statutes].)
In the context of economic restitution awarded pursuant to section
1202.4, numerous appellate courts have concluded that there is no Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial under Apprendi and its progeny because
direct victim restitution is not a criminal penalty. (People v. Pangan (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 574, 585 (Pangan), citing U.S. v. Behrman (7th Cir. 2000)
235 F.3d 1049, 1054 [“[D]irect victim restitution is a substitute for a civil
remedy so that victims of crime do not need to file separate civil suits. It is
not increased ‘punishment.’ ”]; People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
1159, 1183–1184 (Chappelone) [rejecting argument that victim restitution
under section 1202.4 is increased punishment for a crime; instead, “ ‘ “the
primary purpose of victim restitution is to provide monetary compensation to
an individual injured by crime” ’ ”]; accord, People v. Millard (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 7, 35–36 (Millard); see also § 1202.4, subd. (a)(3)(B) [a victim
restitution award “shall be enforceable as if the order were a civil
judgment”].)
In Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 415, the Third District concluded by
analogy that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial with respect to a
restitution order for noneconomic damages awarded pursuant to section
1202.4. (Smith, at p. 433.) Specifically, Smith reasoned: “[T]here is no basis
for distinguishing jury trial rights, or lack thereof, for restitution orders for
economic damages and restitution orders for noneconomic damages. In both
cases, the trial court is performing a task that, in a civil case, a jury would
perform.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘ “A restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not
be reversed unless it is arbitrary or capricious. [Citation.] No abuse of

41
discretion will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the
amount of restitution ordered.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The court “must demonstrate a
rational basis for its award[] and ensure that the record is sufficient to permit
meaningful review. The burden is on the party seeking restitution to provide
an adequate factual basis for the claim.” ’ ” (People v. Gomez (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 111, 116 (Gomez); accord, People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th
644, 655.) “However, a restitution order ‘resting upon a “ ‘demonstrable error
of law’ ” constitutes an abuse of the court’s discretion.’ ” (Millard, supra, 175
Cal.App.4th at p. 26.)
2. No Right to a Jury Trial on Noneconomic Restitution
As mentioned above, the trial court here awarded noneconomic
restitution of $750,000 to Jane Doe One, $25,000 to Jane Doe Two, and
$50,000 to R.M., the mother of the Does. (See § 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(F).)
Cereda contends these awards were improper because he was entitled to a
jury trial to determine the amount of any noneconomic losses based on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.11 Acknowledging the case law to the contrary set
forth above, Cereda maintains that Smith was wrongly decided. And he
attempts to distinguish the other cases by arguing they involved economic
rather than noneconomic restitution. Cereda then asserts a laundry list of
reasons why noneconomic restitution should be treated differently than
economic restitution with respect to jury trial rights, none of which we find
persuasive.

11 The Attorney General argues in passing that Cereda has forfeited

this claim by failing to request a jury trial with respect to restitution in the
trial court. We are skeptical that, should a constitutional jury trial right
exist in this context, it would be subject to forfeiture. However, as we
conclude that no such right exists, we do not reach the issue.

42
 To begin with, we disagree with Cereda’s general premise—that
noneconomic restitution constitutes increased punishment, while economic
restitution does not. Both are forms of direct victim restitution under section
1202.4, the primary purpose of which “ ‘ “is to provide monetary
compensation to an individual injured by crime” ’ ” (Chappelone, supra, 183
Cal.App.4th at p. 1184; see Pangan, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 585
[“[D]irect victim restitution is a substitute for a civil remedy so that victims
of crime do not need to file separate civil suits.].) Moreover, “[t]o the extent a
victim restitution order has the secondary purposes of rehabilitation of a
defendant and/or deterrence of the defendant and others from committing
future crimes, those purposes do not constitute increased punishment of the
defendant.” (Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 35–36.)
Cereda nevertheless argues that noneconomic restitution must be
viewed as primarily punitive because subdivision (f)(3)(F) of section 1202.4—
the provision authorizing noneconomic restitution—applies only to
defendants convicted of certain sexual offenses against children, singling
them out for disparate treatment. To the contrary, the legislative history
underlying the adoption of this provision reflects an entirely nonpunitive
purpose. In 1991, the Supreme Court held that insurers under general
liability policies “are not required to indemnify their insureds for damages
caused by an insured’s sexual molestation of a child.” (J.C. Penny Casualty
Ins. Co. v. M.K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1014 (J.C. Penny).) The case dealt
specifically with a felony conviction under section 288 and “foreclosed the use
of liability insurance proceeds as compensation” for victims of such abuse.
(People v. Montiel (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 312, 333 (dis. opn. of Banke, J.).)
The Legislature responded by adopting legislation focused “on providing the
minor child victims of molesters with additional sources of compensation.

43
The Senate Committee on Judiciary report explained: ‘In lieu of making
insurance benefits available to victims of an insured’s criminal conduct,
proponents instead propose several other ideas to compensate the victim for
the injuries.’ [Citation.] These were: (1) ‘[i]nvading the homestead
exemption of the defendant’; (2) ‘[i]ncreasing State assistance to child victims
of sexual abuse’; and (3) ‘[i]ncreasing restitution payments to the child
molestation victim to also cover psychological damages and noneconomic
losses.’ ” (Id. at pp. 333–334, some italics added.) In other words, the
Legislature was not trying to punish child sex offenders when it created a
substitute for a civil remedy so that these particular victims of crime need not
file separate civil suits.
Cereda additionally contends that noneconomic restitution is punitive
because the amount of restitution ‘necessarily’ turns on factors such as the
duration or severity of the crime. Cereda provides no authority for the
proposition that a restitution award based on such factors is necessarily
punitive. To the contrary, to the extent the duration and severity of the
crime corroborate a victim’s claim of psychological harm or other
noneconomic losses, their consideration fully comports with the compensatory
nature of the award.
Cereda also complains there is “literally no limit” to the amount of
noneconomic restitution a trial court may impose. It is no doubt true that the
task of translating nonpecuniary injuries into dollars and cents is “difficult”
and “not a process of measurement.” (Beagle v. Vasold (1966) 65 Cal.2d 166,
172.) But the subjective nature of this determination does not change the
compensatory nature of noneconomic restitution. (See Corenbaum v.
Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1332 [noneconomic damages
“compensate” injured plaintiff for nonpecuniary injuries such as pain and

44
suffering].) Nor does it mean that noneconomic restitution does not
compensate a victim for his or her actual loss. And it is simply incorrect to
say there is no limiting principle to awards of noneconomic restitution. As
stated above, case law cautions that a court must have a rational and factual
basis for the restitution ordered and it may not be arbitrary or capricious.
(Gomez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.)
Finally, citing People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas),
Cereda contends that the noneconomic restitution award is punitive because
he does not have the ability to pay it. However, Dueñas is of no assistance to
Cereda. There, the court held that an indigent defendant has a due process
right to a determination of ability to pay before the imposition of court
operations assessments (§ 1465.8) and court facilities assessments (Gov.
Code, § 70373) and the execution of restitution fines (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)).
(Dueñas, at pp. 1164, 1169.) Dueñas expressly did not address direct victim
restitution (id. at pp. 1169-1170), and several courts have since held that the
Dueñas rule does not apply to victim restitution (see, e.g., People v. Pack-
Ramirez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 851, 860; People v. Abrahamian (2020) 45
Cal.App.5th 314, 338; People v. Evans (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 771, 776–777).
Thus, Dueñas does not suggest that noneconomic victim restitution
constitutes increased punishment for purposes of Apprendi simply because a
defendant does not have the ability to pay it.
In sum, none of Cereda’s myriad arguments convince us that a jury
trial is constitutionally required in this context.
3. Restitution Awards Adequately Supported by the Record
Cereda next challenges the awards of noneconomic restitution to Jane
Doe One, Jane Doe Two, and R.M. as not supported by the record.

45
Specifically, he asserts there is no evidence in the record that any of these
individuals suffered psychological harm. We disagree.12
Section 1202.4 requires the trial court to order a defendant to pay
victim restitution “in an amount established by court order, based on the
amount of loss claimed by the victim . . . or any other showing to the court.”
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f), italics added.) Thus, the statute “does not require any
particular kind of proof to establish a victim’s losses.” (Lehman, supra, 247
Cal.App.4th at p. 803.) Specifically, a court may consider the trial testimony
of the victims, statements made at the sentencing hearing, and the contents
of the probation report. (Id. at pp. 801, 803.) As stated above, noneconomic
damages are “subjective, non-monetary losses including, but not limited to,
pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of
society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and
humiliation.” (Civ. Code, § 1431.2, subd. (b)(2).) Thus, the question before us
is whether the record provides substantial evidence that Jane Doe One, Jane
Doe Two, and R.M. suffered psychological harm and/or other noneconomic
losses.

12 Smith and Lehman have applied the standard of review from the civil
damages context in reviewing the amount of a restitution award for
noneconomic damages under section 1202.4, holding: “ ‘An appellate court
can interfere on the ground that the judgment is excessive only on the ground
that the verdict is so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience and
suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury.’ ” (Smith,
supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 436; accord, Lehman, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at
p. 801.) Cereda argues vociferously that this standard for reviewing civil
judgments should not apply in the context of criminal restitution orders.
However, because Cereda’s challenge is not that the award is excessive, but
rather that it lacks an adequate factual basis, the shocks-the-conscience
standard is inapplicable here. (See Gomez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 116,
fn. 4.) Rather, we will apply the traditional abuse of discretion standard.

46
 Preliminarily, we agree with Cereda that some evidence of harm to
these specific victims must be present in the record to justify an award for
noneconomic damages. It is no doubt true that the nature of egregious crimes
such as Cereda’s renders it very likely that his victims were psychologically
harmed. (See People v. Martinez (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 298, 305 [“ ‘It is well
recognized that “ ‘child sexual abuse results in long-term emotional and
psychological damage to the child victim if left untreated.’ ’’ ’ ”].) However, as
our colleagues in Division Five of this District recently explained: “ ‘[A] crime
victim may recover only for losses personally incurred by that victim.’ (People
v. Runyan (2012) 54 Cal.4th 849, 859; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd.
(b)(13)(A) [‘all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall
have the right to seek and secure restitution from the persons convicted of
the crimes causing the losses they suffer,’ (italics added)].) In other words, it
is insufficient that the average victim would suffer injury from a particular
type of crime, or that generally victims of such crimes suffer injury.” (Gomez,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 118.)
Here, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in finding
that all three victims had suffered non-monetary losses. First, as stated
above, it is very likely that such harm did occur. (See J.C. Penny, supra, 52
Cal.3d at p. 1026 [“Some acts are so inherently harmful that the intent to
commit the act and the intent to harm are one and the same. The act is the
harm. Child molestation is not the kind of act that results in emotional and
psychological harm only occasionally.”] Second, in awarding noneconomic
damages in this case, the trial court was clear that it was basing its decision
on the specific facts before it, stating that “the numbers [were]. . . reflective of
the deep and enduring pain that Mr. Cereda inflicted on the victims.”

47
Presumably, then, the court based its decision on the testimony it had heard
at trial, the probation report, and statements presented at sentencing.
R.M. provided the following statement to the trial court at sentencing:
“[Cereda], you have ruined our lives and I am ready to put this and you
behind us. We will somehow move on past the chaos you created. You are an
ugly and evil human being and still have not taken responsibility for what
you have done. You lied, you lied on the stand, you lied to us, you have lied to
everyone. The worst part is that we haven’t been able to begin healing
because you have drug us through the mud to protect your lies. Do you even
know what the truth is anymore?? You know what, though, we will win this
battle, and one day very soon you won’t even be a memory. [¶] Judge, [¶]
Please allow [Cereda] to enjoy a long and tortured life in prison with no
chance of parole. I want [Cereda] to suffer each day realizing all the pain his
lies created. Please grant me and my children the 10-year criminal
restraining order so that we don’t have to keep reopening our wounds.” R.M.
also reported to the probation officer that both Jane Doe One and Jane Doe
Two had endured emotional injuries from Cereda’s conduct and that Jane
Doe One had sought mental health treatment. And she disclosed that
Cereda’s conduct had caused her family to relocate, leaving behind their
family, friends, and their support system.
These facts, along with R.M.’s testimony at trial, provide more than
substantial evidence that she suffered psychological harm/noneconomic losses
as a result of Cereda’s criminal activity. R.M. stated that she had known
Cereda since she was 16 and did not think such abuse was something he
could ever do. When the police told her about Cereda’s molestation of Jane
Doe One and that there was an audio recording, she was “shocked” and felt
“numb.” When she testified about conducting the pretext call, the prosecutor

48
had to stop questioning her at one point to ask if she was okay. R.M. stated it
was a very upsetting call to make. She also reported that she had been told
not to talk to her daughters about the abuse while the criminal trial was
pending, so they had been unable to heal through talking with each other.
She felt “[a]wful” for having put her daughters in a situation where they were
abused. She did not have any contact with Cereda after the day of the
pretext call and did not intend to contact him in the future. She divorced him
in 2020 after 11 years of marriage. On cross-examination, R.M. admitted she
could not refresh her recollection about Jane Doe One’s initial disclosure to
her because, even though she could read her police interview and recalled the
conversation she had about it, it was “not something [her] brain [was] letting
[her] remember right now.” She went on: “You know it’s called therapy that
I have to deal with.” On re-direct, R.M. stated she felt “[l]ike a fool” for
putting her trust in Cereda over Jane Doe One during the initial disclosure.
With respect to Jane Doe Two, the jury convicted Cereda of—and
Cereda admitted to—significant sexual abuse she could not recall enduring.
According to the probation report, after Jane Does One and Two were
initially interviewed separately regarding Cereda’s sexual abuse, the two
were left in the interview room together. Jane Doe Two told her sister that
she did not remember being abused by Cereda, but she might have blocked it
out. She told both the probation officer and her mother that she believed she
might have repressed memories. At trial, Jane Doe Two testified that she
had very few memories from when she was younger. In addition, as a result
of the abuse on Jane Doe One, she was “heart broken” and separated from
her family, with R.M., Jane Doe One, and her two half-brothers moving out of
state, while she remained in Napa with her grandparents where she had
made a life for herself. While there is no evidence that Jane Doe Two had yet

49
engaged in therapy, it is reasonable to infer on this record that she suffered
psychological harm—i.e., that she was so traumatized by the sexual abuse
that she had repressed it and that, as R.M. reported, she was currently
suffering pain, loss of companionship, and her life was “ruined” as a result of
Cereda’s crimes. Not only was she unable to protect her sister from similar
abuse, but her entire family was torn apart as a result.
As stated above, R.M. similarly reported that Jane Doe One was
suffering pain as a result of Cereda’s abuse and continued lies, that her life
had been “ruined,” and that she had already begun therapy. Jane Doe One
testified at length at trial regarding the extensive abuse she suffered as a
young child at the hands of the man she considered her father. During that
testimony, the prosecutor repeatedly asked her if she was okay. Even
defense counsel acknowledged to Jane Doe One that she was “kind of having
a hard time” testifying. And Jane Doe One, herself, also needed to ask for a
break at one point. It is reasonable to infer that the trial court observed Jane
Doe One’s emotional distress throughout her testimony. These facts, as well
as the duration and severity of the abuse and the psychological duress
described above that Cereda used to control Jane Doe One, provide
substantial evidence supporting her award of noneconomic damages.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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 LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

BANKE, ACTING P.J.

CASTRO, J.

A164330


Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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