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HINE BUILDERS, LLC v. ALEX
GLASSCOCK ET AL.
(AC 46298)
Moll, Cradle and Bear, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff filed an application to compel arbitration pursuant to an agree-
ment entered into by the parties. Following a remote status conference,
the trial court issued an order directing the parties to commence arbitra-
tion within thirty days, and the defendants appealed to this court. The
trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to terminate the automatic
appellate stay pursuant to the rules of practice (§ 61-11), and the defen-
dants did not file a motion for review of that decision. During oral
argument before this court, the parties represented that arbitration pro-
ceedings were ongoing, including, inter alia, that a demand for arbitration
had been filed and acknowledged and that an answer, counterclaim and
special defenses had been filed, but shared the position that the appeal
was not moot. Held that the appeal was dismissed as it had been rendered
moot and, therefore, this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain the defendants’ claims; when the arbitration proceedings com-
menced following the termination of the appellate stay, there was no
practical relief that this court could afford the defendants because the
trial court’s judgment from which they appealed, ordering the parties
to commence arbitration proceedings, had been executed and could not
now be undone.
Argued November 7, 2023—officially released March 12, 2024
Procedural History
Application to compel arbitration, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Nor-
walk, where the court, Hon. Taggart D. Adams, judge
trial referee, rendered judgment granting the plaintiff’s
application, from which the defendants appealed to this
court; thereafter, the court, Hon. Taggart D. Adams,
judge trial referee, granted the plaintiff’s motion to ter-
minate the automatic appellate stay. Appeal dismissed.
Arash Beral, pro hac vice, with whom was Alina
Levi, for the appellants (defendants).
Scott T. Garosshen, with whom were William S. Wil-
son II, and, on the brief, Linda L. Morkan and Ileana
Polanco-Cavazos, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
MOLL, J. The defendants, Alex Glasscock and Susan
Glasscock, appeal from the judgment of the trial court
granting the application to compel arbitration filed by
the plaintiff, Hine Builders, LLC. On appeal, the defen-
dants claim that the court (1) committed plain error
in granting the application to compel arbitration (a)
following a remote status conference that was not tran-
scribed or recorded by a court reporter or court
recording monitor and (b) without providing the parties
with an opportunity to brief the issues in connection
with the application, (2) failed to review an agreement
executed by the parties, pursuant to which the plaintiff
sought to compel arbitration, before granting the appli-
cation, and (3) improperly granted the application when
the prerequisites to arbitration, as set forth in the par-
ties’ agreement, had not been satisfied. We do not reach
the merits of the defendants’ claims because, during
the pendency of this appeal and following the termina-
tion of the appellate stay, arbitration proceedings com-
menced as ordered by the trial court, and, accordingly,
we dismiss this appeal as moot.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. In January, 2023, the plaintiff
filed with the Superior Court an application for an order
to compel arbitration pursuant to the parties’ agree-
ment.1 See General Statutes § 52-410.2 On February 7,
2023, the defendants filed an answer. On February 14,
2023, following a remote status conference, the trial
court, Hon. Taggart D. Adams, judge trial referee,
issued an order directing ‘‘the parties to commence
arbitration within [thirty] days.’’3 On March 2, 2023, the
defendants filed this appeal.
On March 14, 2023, pursuant to Practice Book § 61-
11 (d) and (e), the plaintiff filed a motion to terminate
the automatic appellate stay of § 61-11 (a)4 (motion to
terminate stay). On March 21, 2023, the defendants filed
an opposition to the motion to terminate stay. On
August 16, 2023, following a hearing held on May 8,
2023,5 the court granted the motion to terminate stay.
The defendants did not file a motion for review of the
August 16, 2023 decision. See Practice Book § 61-14.6
On November 1, 2023, prior to oral argument, we
ordered, sua sponte, the parties’ respective counsel to
‘‘be prepared to address at oral argument whether the
trial court’s August 16, 2023 granting of the plaintiff-
appellee’s motion to terminate appellate stay, and/or
any subsequent activity occurring on the basis thereof,
render moot the appeal.’’ During oral argument before
this court on November 7, 2023, the parties’ respective
counsel (1) represented that arbitration proceedings
were ongoing and (2) shared the position that this
appeal was not moot. Thereafter, on November 15, 2023,
we ordered, sua sponte, the parties to file supplemental
briefs further addressing whether this appeal has been
rendered moot following the grant of the motion to
terminate stay.7 On November 30, 2023, the parties filed
supplemental briefs in accordance with our order.
In their respective supplemental briefs, the parties
maintain that this appeal has not been rendered moot
following the commencement of the arbitration pro-
ceedings, which, per their representations, remain
ongoing.8 The defendants argue that this court ‘‘still
has the ability to grant ‘practical relief,’ which would
effectively suspend the arbitration and require the par-
ties to exhaust their [alternative dispute resolution]
remedies under the governing contract documents.’’9
The plaintiff argues that the commencement of the arbi-
tration proceedings did not render this appeal moot,
reasoning that ‘‘implementing the [trial court’s] Febru-
ary 14, 2023 order [compelling arbitration] while the
appeal is pending preserves [the] [d]efendants’ ability
to obtain effective relief on appeal because they can
raise nonarbitrability in a motion to vacate whatever
arbitration award is made.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) The plaintiff further argues that this appeal
would become moot if either (1) the arbitrator enters
an award or (2) the defendants ‘‘subject themselves to
a default award in the arbitration,’’ as, in either scenario,
the arbitration proceedings will have been completed.
Notwithstanding the parties’ current, mutual stance that
this appeal is not moot, we conclude that this appeal
is moot and that, therefore, we lack subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain the defendants’ claims.
‘‘Mootness implicates [this] court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to
resolve. . . . It is a [well settled] general rule that the
existence of an actual controversy is an essential requi-
site to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of
appellate courts to decide moot questions, discon-
nected from the granting of actual relief or from the
determination of which no practical relief can follow.
. . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the
time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pen-
dency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency
of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an
appellate court from granting any practical relief
through its disposition of the merits, a case has become
moot. . . . [A] subject matter jurisdictional defect may
not be waived . . . [or jurisdiction] conferred by the
parties, explicitly or implicitly. . . . [T]he question of
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . .
and, once raised, either by a party or by the court itself,
the question must be answered before the court may
decide the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Brookstone Homes, LLC v. Merco Holdings, LLC, 208
Conn. App. 789, 798–99, 266 A.3d 921 (2021).
We conclude that this appeal has been rendered moot
by the commencement of the arbitration proceedings
following the termination of the appellate stay. In grant-
ing the plaintiff’s application to compel arbitration, the
court ordered the parties to commence arbitration pro-
ceedings. After the court’s grant of the motion to termi-
nate stay, of which decision the defendants did not
seek appellate review by filing a motion for review, the
parties moved forward with arbitration proceedings.
Simply put, there is no practical relief that we may
afford the defendants because the court’s judgment
from which they have appealed—ordering the parties to
commence arbitration proceedings—has been executed
and cannot now be undone.10
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
1
The parties do not dispute that (1) on January 18, 2022, they executed
‘‘a written agreement . . . for the plaintiff to provide certain demolition,
renovation and site improvements at a residence owned by the defendants
. . . in Norwalk,’’ and (2) the agreement contains various provisions con-
cerning arbitration.
2
General Statutes § 52-410 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A party to a
written agreement for arbitration claiming the neglect or refusal of another
to proceed with an arbitration thereunder may make application to the
superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides
or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the
land is situated or, when the court is not in session, to any judge thereof,
for an order directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in compli-
ance with their agreement. The application shall be by writ of summons
and complaint, served in the manner provided by law. . . .
‘‘(c) The parties shall be considered as at issue on the allegations of the
complaint unless the defendant files answer thereto within five days from
the return day, and the court or judge shall hear the matter either at a short
calendar session, or as a privileged case, or otherwise, in order to dispose
of the case with the least possible delay, and shall either grant the order
or deny the application, according to the rights of the parties.’’
3
On March 21, 2023, in response to a Practice Book § 64-1 notice filed
by the defendants, the court issued a memorandum of decision as to its
February 14, 2023 judgment. The court stated in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he
defendants . . . admit there was an agreement with the plaintiff . . . to
arbitrate or mediate disputes between them. At the status conference this
court ordered the parties to arbitrate their dispute, and this memorandum
serves as the written record and order to that effect.’’
4
‘‘It is axiomatic that, with limited exceptions, an appellate stay of execu-
tion arises from the time a judgment is rendered until the time to file an
appeal has expired. Practice Book § 61-11 (a). If an appeal is filed, any
appellate stay of execution in place during the pendency of the appeal period
continues until there is a final disposition of the appeal or the stay is
terminated. Practice Book § 61-11 (a) and (e).’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Wachovia Mortgage, FSB v. Toczek, 189 Conn. App. 812, 816 n.3,
209 A.3d 725, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 914, 216 A.3d 650 (2019).
5
At the conclusion of the May 8, 2023 hearing, the court ordered the
parties to file supplemental briefs further addressing the issues attendant to
the motion to terminate stay. The parties filed their respective supplemental
briefs on May 18, 2023.
6
Practice Book § 61-14 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The sole remedy of any
party desiring the court to review an order concerning a stay of execution
shall be by motion for review under Section 66-6. Execution of an order of
the court terminating a stay of execution shall be stayed for ten days from
the issuance of notice of the order, and if a motion for review is filed within
that period, the order shall be stayed pending decision of the motion, unless
the court having appellate jurisdiction rules otherwise. Any stay of proceed-
ings that was in effect during the pendency of the motion for review shall
continue, unless the court having appellate jurisdiction rules otherwise, until
the time for filing a motion for reconsideration under Section 71-5 has
expired. If such a timely motion for reconsideration is filed, any stay that
was in effect shall continue until its disposition and, if it is granted, until
the matter is finally determined. . . .’’
7
The supplemental briefing order provided: ‘‘The parties are hereby
ordered, sua sponte, to file simultaneous supplemental briefs, of no more
than 2000 words, on or before December 1, 2023, addressing whether the
trial court’s August 16, 2023 granting of the plaintiff-appellee’s motion to
terminate appellate stay, and/or any subsequent activity occurring on the
basis thereof, render the appeal moot. In such supplemental briefs, the
parties are also ordered, inter alia, to set forth the following information:
1. the date of the claimant’s demand for arbitration; 2. the date of the letter
or email from the American Arbitration Association (AAA) notifying the
parties that the case had been filed; and 3. the date, if filed, of the respondent’s
answer to the claimant’s demand for arbitration, or, if not filed, the date
that such answer currently is due.’’
8
Specifically, the parties represent that (1) on September 7, 2023, the
plaintiff filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Associ-
ation (AAA), (2) on September 13, 2023, AAA acknowledged the plaintiff’s
filing, and (3) on October 10, 2023, the defendants filed an answer accompa-
nied by a counterclaim, as well as, according to the plaintiff, special defenses.
The plaintiff further represents, inter alia, that, on October 30, 2023, AAA
selected an arbitrator, to whom the defendants did not object, and ‘‘[t]he
next step is the initial scheduling conference between the parties and the
arbitrator. At that conference, the arbitrator also will consider [the] [d]efen-
dants’ argument that the matter cannot yet be arbitrated. On November 27,
[the] [d]efendants asked AAA to delay that conference.’’ The defendants
further represent, inter alia, that ‘‘[i]n the arbitration, the arbitrator’s appoint-
ment is still being considered and subject to potential objections, and no
hearings have been scheduled. Essentially, nothing meaningful has tran-
spired in the arbitration and the parties are still in the pleading stage.’’
9
Notably, in their opposition to the motion to terminate stay, during the
May 8, 2023 hearing on the motion, and in their supplemental brief filed
with the trial court; see footnote 5 of this opinion; the defendants took the
position that terminating the stay would render this appeal moot.
10
None of the substantive case law cited in the parties’ respective supple-
mental briefs filed with this court advances the position that this appeal is
not moot. See MSO, LLC v. DeSimone, 313 Conn. 54, 59–60 n.6, 94 A.3d
1189 (2014) (appeal from this court’s judgment affirming trial court’s decision
to stay action pending arbitration not rendered moot on account of arbitra-
tion judgment rendered in defendants’ favor); Private Healthcare Systems,
Inc. v. Torres, 278 Conn. 291, 300–302, 898 A.2d 768 (2006) (appeal from
this court’s judgment reversing trial court’s judgment vacating arbitration
award that reinstated defendant, a surgeon, to roster of plaintiff’s preferred
provider network rendered moot following defendant’s resignation from
network); A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, 192 Conn.
App. 245, 250–51, 217 A.3d 996 (2019) (appeal from trial court’s judgment
dismissing plaintiff’s application to vacate arbitration award and granting
defendants’ application to confirm arbitration award not rendered moot as
result of plaintiff’s failure to file opposition to defendants’ application to
confirm and to address application to confirm on appeal), aff’d, 338 Conn.
651, 258 A.3d 1244 (2021); Saad v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 32 Conn. App.
190, 193, 628 A.2d 623 (1993) (appeal from trial court’s judgment granting
motion to compel arbitration and prohibiting discovery proceedings ren-
dered moot in light of plaintiff’s agreement to submit to examination under
oath ‘‘and because nothing in the trial court’s decision can be interpreted
to affect the issue of coverage to be decided in the upcoming arbitration
proceeding’’).