People v. Munoz-Garcia CA1/1

Filed 3/13/24 P. v. Munoz-Garcia CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A165868

v. (Contra Costa County
JUAN ALBERTO MUNOZ-GARCIA, Super. Ct. No. 04-200408-3)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Juan Alberto Munoz-Garcia appeals from noneconomic
restitution orders imposed after he pleaded guilty to sexual offenses involving
his niece (Jane Doe 1) and his stepdaughter (Jane Doe 2). Munoz-Garcia
contends that the trial court erred in awarding noneconomic damages of
$100,000 to each victim without a jury trial. He also argues that the
noneconomic restitution award with respect to Jane Doe 2 must be stricken
because there was insufficient evidence that she suffered psychological harm.
Finally, he maintains that the trial court should not have imposed a $1,000
restitution fine without determining his ability to pay. We reverse the
noneconomic damages award with respect to Jane Doe 2, but otherwise
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 28, 2021, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed the
operative information in this case charging Munoz-Garcia, as relevant here,
with six felony counts of child sexual abuse. With respect to Jane Doe 1, the
information alleged that Munoz-Garcia committed sexual intercourse or
sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code,1 § 288.7, subd. (a);
count 1); lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (a);
count 2); and forcible lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 (§ 288,
subd. (b)(1); count 3). With respect to Jane Doe 2, the information alleged
that Munoz-Garcia committed lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14
(§ 288, subd. (a); count 4) and two counts of oral copulation or sexual
penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 5
and 6).
A. Underlying Facts
The following facts were presented at the preliminary hearing in this
matter:
1. Allegations Involving Jane Doe 1
In 2015, when Jane Doe 1 was 11 years old, she disclosed that Munoz-
Garcia, her uncle, had sexually assaulted her when she was nine or 10 years
old. The incident occurred when Jane Doe 1 was spending the night at her
aunt’s house after attending a family barbecue. She awoke in the middle of
the night to find Munoz-Garcia putting her on the floor and pulling down her
pants. She tried to pull them back up, but he prevented her. Munoz-Garcia
then inserted his penis into her anus, pushing back and forth for about two
minutes. He continued even after Jane Doe 1 told him to stop. She indicated
“it hurt.” He finally stopped after she told him she needed to use the
bathroom. On other occasions, when she was 10, Munoz-Garcia would grab
Jane Doe 1 by the wrist when she was trying to leave the room and place her
hand on his private area.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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 2. Allegations Involving Jane Doe 2
Jane Doe 2, Munoz-Garcia’s stepdaughter, reported being assaulted by
Munoz-Garcia on August 30, 2020. She was asleep in her bedroom when she
woke up to find Munoz-Garcia touching her pants. She then felt him reach
inside her pants and touch her private parts, which she used for peeing and
called her “ ‘puka.’ ” She reported being scared and nervous and that it hurt.
Munoz-Garcia then rolled her over and began touching inside her butt. He
then spread her buttocks open and licked inside of her butt. He continued to
touch her until he eventually left. At that point, Jane Doe 2 got up and
reported the assault to her mother. When confronted, Munoz-Garcia initially
denied the abuse but later stated he was still drunk, apologized, and said it
would never happen again.
B. Plea and Sentencing
On April 4, 2022, after advisement of his rights, Munoz-Garcia pleaded
guilty to counts 3 and 4. In exchange for the guilty plea, the parties agreed to
a 16-year prison term and dismissal of the remaining counts. The trial court
then proceeded immediately to sentencing and heard a victim impact
statement from Jane Doe 1. She stated that, although significant time had
passed since Munoz-Garcia sexually assaulted her, she was still
psychologically scarred by it. She blamed herself and still “remember[ed]
everything” about the assault, despite trying to forget. She recalled that
Munoz-Garcia had turned her family against her and that she had lost hope
anyone would ever believe her. She cried for years “on the bedroom floor
trying not to kill [herself].” Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court
sentenced Munoz-Garcia—who was in his mid-30’s at the time—to 16 years
in prison and imposed various fines and fees, including a $1,000 restitution
fine.

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 On July 28, 2022, the court held a hearing under section 1202.4,
subdivision (f)(3)(F) regarding victim restitution for noneconomic losses. The
prosecution requested noneconomic restitution of $100,000 for each victim.
Defense counsel objected to the requested noneconomic damages for Jane
Doe 2, arguing that there was no factual basis. In rejecting this argument
and awarding the requested noneconomic restitution to both victims, the
court reasoned: “Anyone who has any kind of life experience, especially
judges who have seen the results of these things following years afterwards,
knows that kind of assault causes damage. It causes physical damage. It
causes emotional damage. And it causes rippling, reverberating problems
throughout life.” It further concluded that it could “use the record that was
established as to Jane Doe 1 in supporting an order for Jane [Doe] 2 because
they were victimized in very similar ways.” Munoz-Garcia timely appealed
from the order for noneconomic restitution.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Noneconomic Restitution
Munoz-Garcia argues that the noneconomic damages awarded in this
case must be stricken as unauthorized. First, he asserts that he was entitled
under the state and federal Constitutions to a jury trial on the amount of any
such damage award. Second, he maintains that the award of noneconomic
damages to Jane Doe 2 must be stricken due to insufficient evidence that she
suffered psychological harm. We address each contention in turn.
1. Statutory Framework and Standard of Review
“Pursuant to the California Constitution, victims of crime have a right
to restitution from criminal defendants: ‘Restitution shall be ordered from
the convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the sentence or
disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss.’ (Cal. Const.,

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art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(B).) To [satisfy] this constitutional requirement, the
Legislature enacted section 1202.4, which requires the trial court to order a
defendant to pay victim restitution ‘in an amount established by court order,
based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim . . . or any other showing to
the court.’ (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)” (People v. Lehman (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
795, 800 (Lehman).)
“With one exception, restitution orders are limited to the victim’s
economic damages.” (People v. Smith (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 415, 431
(Smith).) The exception provides that restitution may be ordered for
“[n]oneconomic losses, including, but not limited to, psychological harm, for
felony violations of Section 288, 288.5, or 288.7.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F).)
“Noneconomic damages are ‘subjective, non-monetary losses including, but
not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional
distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to
reputation and humiliation.’ (Civ. Code, § 1431.2, subd. (b)(2).)” (Smith, at
p. 431.)
In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), the United
States Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 490.) “[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of
the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” (Blakely
v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303 (Blakely), italics omitted.) The
principle of Apprendi applies to criminal fines. (Southern Union Co. v.
United States (2012) 567 U.S. 343, 346 [fines for violating federal
environmental statutes].)

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 In the context of economic restitution awarded pursuant to
section 1202.4, numerous appellate courts have concluded that there is no
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Apprendi and its progeny
because direct victim restitution is not a criminal penalty. (People v. Pangan
(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 574, 585 (Pangan), citing U.S. v. Behrman (7th Cir.
2000) 235 F.3d 1049, 1054 [“direct victim restitution is a substitute for a civil
remedy so that victims of crime do not need to file separate civil suits. It is
not increased ‘punishment’ ”]; People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
1159, 1183–1184 (Chappelone) [rejecting argument that victim restitution
under § 1202.4 is increased punishment for a crime; instead, “ ‘ “the primary
purpose of victim restitution is to provide monetary compensation to an
individual injured by crime” ’ ”]; accord, People v. Millard (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 7, 35–36 (Millard); see also § 1202.4, subd. (a)(3)(B) [a victim
restitution award “shall be enforceable as if the order were a civil
judgment”].)
In Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 415, the Third Appellate District
concluded by analogy that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial with
respect to a restitution order for noneconomic damages awarded pursuant to
section 1202.4. (Smith, at p. 433.) Specifically, Smith reasoned: “[T]here is
no basis for distinguishing jury trial rights, or lack thereof, for restitution
orders for economic damages and restitution orders for noneconomic
damages. In both cases, the trial court is performing a task that, in a civil
case, a jury would perform.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘ “A restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not
be reversed unless it is arbitrary or capricious. [Citation.] No abuse of
discretion will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the
amount of restitution ordered.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The court “must demonstrate a

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rational basis for its award, and ensure that the record is sufficient to permit
meaningful review. The burden is on the party seeking restitution to provide
an adequate factual basis for the claim.” ’ ” (People v. Gomez (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 111, 116 (Gomez); accord, People v. Giordano (2007)
42 Cal.4th 644, 655.) “However, a restitution order ‘resting upon a
“ ‘demonstrable error of law’ ” constitutes an abuse of the court’s discretion.’ ”
(Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.)
2. No Right to a Jury Trial on Noneconomic Restitution
As mentioned above, the trial court here awarded noneconomic
restitution of $100,000 to each victim. (See § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F).) Munoz-
Garcia contends these awards were improper because he was entitled to a
jury trial to determine the amount of these noneconomic losses based on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.2 Acknowledging the case law to the contrary set
forth above, Munoz-Garcia maintains that Smith was wrongly decided. And
he attempts to distinguish the other cases by arguing they involved economic
rather than noneconomic restitution. Munoz-Garcia then asserts a string of
reasons why noneconomic restitution should be treated differently than
economic restitution with respect to jury trial rights, none of which we find
persuasive.
To begin with, we disagree with Munoz-Garcia’s general premise—that
noneconomic restitution constitutes increased punishment, while economic
restitution does not. Both are forms of direct victim restitution under
section 1202.4, the primary purpose of which “ ‘ “is to provide monetary
compensation to an individual injured by crime” ’ ” (Chappelone, supra,

2 The Attorney General argues in passing that Munoz-Garcia has

forfeited this claim by failing to request a jury trial with respect to restitution
in the trial court. Because we conclude that no such right exists, we do not
reach the issue.

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183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184; see Pangan, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 585
[“direct victim restitution is a substitute for a civil remedy so that victims of
crime do not need to file separate civil suits”].) Moreover, “[t]o the extent a
victim restitution order has the secondary purposes of rehabilitation of a
defendant and/or deterrence of the defendant and others from committing
future crimes, those purposes do not constitute increased punishment of
the defendant.” (Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 35–36.)
Munoz-Garcia nevertheless argues that noneconomic restitution must
be viewed as primarily punitive because subdivision (f)(3)(F) of
section 1202.4—the provision authorizing noneconomic restitution—applies
only to defendants convicted of certain sexual offenses against children,
singling them out for disparate treatment. To the contrary, the legislative
history underlying the adoption of this provision reflects an entirely
nonpunitive purpose. In 1991, the Supreme Court held that insurers under
general liability policies “are not required to indemnify their insureds for
damages caused by an insured’s sexual molestation of a child.” (J. C. Penney
Casualty Ins. Co. v. M. K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1014 (J.C. Penney).) The
case dealt specifically with a felony conviction under section 288 and
“foreclosed the use of liability insurance proceeds as compensation” for
victims of such abuse. (People v. Montiel (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 312, 333 (dis.
opn. of Banke, J.).) The Legislature responded by adopting legislation
focused “on providing the minor child victims of molesters with additional
sources of compensation. The Senate Committee on Judiciary report
explained: ‘In lieu of making insurance benefits available to victims of an
insured’s criminal conduct, proponents instead propose several other ideas to
compensate the victim for the injuries.’ [Citation.] These were:
(1) ‘[i]nvading the homestead exemption of the defendant’; (2) ‘[i]ncreasing

8
State assistance to child victims of sexual abuse’; and (3) ‘[i]ncreasing
restitution payments to the child molestation victim to also cover
psychological damages and noneconomic losses.’ ” (Id. at pp. 333–334, italics
omitted.) The Legislature’s aim, in other words, was not to punish child sex
offenders, but to create a substitute for a civil remedy so that these particular
victims of crime need not file separate civil suits.
Munoz-Garcia additionally contends that noneconomic restitution is
punitive because the amount of restitution “necessarily” turns on factors such
as the duration or severity of the crime. Munoz-Garcia provides no authority
for the proposition that a restitution award based on such factors is
necessarily punitive. To the contrary, to the extent the duration and severity
of the crime corroborate a victim’s claim of psychological harm, their
consideration fully comports with the compensatory nature of the award.
Munoz-Garcia also complains there is “literally no limit” to the amount
of noneconomic restitution a trial court may impose. We acknowledge that
the task of translating nonpecuniary injuries into dollars and cents is
“difficult” and “ ‘not a process of measurement.’ ” (Beagle v. Vasold (1966)
65 Cal.2d 166, 172.) But the subjective nature of this determination does not
change the compensatory nature of noneconomic restitution. (See
Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1332 [noneconomic
damages “compensate” injured plaintiff for nonpecuniary injuries such as
pain and suffering].) Nor does it mean that noneconomic restitution does not
compensate a victim for his or her actual loss. And it is simply incorrect to
say there is no limiting principle to awards of noneconomic restitution. As
stated above, case law cautions that a court must have a rational and factual
basis for the noneconomic restitution ordered and it may not be arbitrary or
capricious. (Gomez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.)

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 Finally, citing People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas),
Munoz-Garcia contends that the noneconomic restitution award is punitive
because he does not have the ability to pay it. However, Dueñas is of no
assistance to Munoz-Garcia. There, the court held that an indigent
defendant has a due process right to a determination of ability to pay before
the imposition of court operations assessments (§ 1465.8) and court facilities
assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373) and the execution of restitution fines
(§ 1202.4, subd. (b)). (Dueñas, at pp. 1164, 1169.) Dueñas expressly did not
address direct victim restitution (id. at pp. 1169–1170), and several courts
have since held that the Dueñas rule does not apply to victim restitution (see,
e.g., People v. Pack-Ramirez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 851, 860; People v.
Abrahamian (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 314, 338; People v. Evans (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 771, 776–777). Thus, Dueñas does not suggest that
noneconomic victim restitution constitutes increased punishment for
purposes of Apprendi simply because a defendant does not have the ability to
pay it.
3. Insufficient Evidence Supporting Restitution Award for
Jane Doe 2
Munoz-Garcia next challenges the award of noneconomic restitution to
Jane Doe 2 as not supported by the record because no evidence was presented
that she suffered psychological harm. The Attorney General disagrees,
contending that the $100,000 award was supported by the parties’ stipulation
that Jane Doe 2 was particularly vulnerable, caselaw describing the
psychological harm generally suffered by victims of child abuse, Jane Doe 2’s
statement when initially interviewed that Munoz-Garcia “hurt” her and she
was “scared and nervous” during the abuse, and the court’s conclusion that
because both victims suffered similar “horrific and violent” assaults, similar

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restitution awards were appropriate. We conclude Munoz-Garcia has the
better argument.3
Section 1202.4 requires the trial court to order a defendant to pay
victim restitution “in an amount established by court order, based on the
amount of loss claimed by the victim . . . or any other showing to the court.”
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f), italics added.) Thus, we agree with the Attorney General
that the statute “does not require any particular kind of proof to establish a
victim’s losses.” (Lehman, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 803.) For instance, a
court may consider the trial testimony of the victims, statements made at the
sentencing hearing, and the contents of the probation report. (Id. at pp. 801,
803.) But while there is no specific type of proof required, some showing of
noneconomic loss related to the actual victim must still be made to the court
to justify the damages award.
It is no doubt true that the nature of the sexual crimes committed by
Munoz-Garcia renders it very likely that Jane Doe 2 was psychologically
harmed. (See J.C. Penney, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1026 [“Some acts are so
inherently harmful that the intent to commit the act and the intent to harm

3 Smith and Lehman applied the standard of review from the civil

damages context in reviewing the amount of a restitution award for
noneconomic damages under section 1202.4, holding: “ ‘An appellate court
can interfere on the ground that the judgment is excessive only on the ground
that the verdict is so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience and
suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury.’ ” (Smith,
supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 436; accord, Lehman, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at
p. 801.) However, because Munoz-Garcia’s challenge is not that the award is
excessive, but rather that it lacks an adequate factual basis, the shocks-the-
conscience standard is inapplicable here. (See Gomez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th
at p. 116, fn. 4.) We will thus apply the traditional abuse of discretion
standard.

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are one and the same. The act is the harm. Child molestation is not the kind
of act that results in emotional and psychological harm only occasionally.” ].)
However, as our colleagues in Division Five of this District recently
explained: “ ‘[A] crime victim may recover only for losses personally incurred
by that victim.’ (People v. Runyan (2012) 54 Cal.4th 849, 859; see also Cal.
Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A) [‘all persons who suffer losses as a result
of criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure restitution from
the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer’ (italics
added)].) In other words, it is insufficient that the average victim would
suffer injury from a particular type of crime, or that generally victims of such
crimes suffer injury.” (Gomez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 118; see also
People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1182–1184 [noneconomic
restitution awards reversed where no facts or reliable evidence supported
them], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Brooks
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 932, 946 & fn. 17.)
In this case, Jane Doe 2 did not testify at the preliminary hearing or
sentencing hearing, and no statement was provided by any knowledgeable
party regarding the impact of Munoz-Garcia’s crimes on her. Rather, the
only evidence even arguably relevant to the claim that Jane Doe 2 suffered
psychological damage or other noneconomic losses as the result of the abuse
was a statement from her forensic interview that she felt “scared and
nervous” at the time of the molestation when Munoz-Garcia “hurt” her, and a
stipulation by the parties (in order to allow imposition of an aggravated term)
that Jane Doe 2 was a “particularly vulnerable” victim.
We agree with the Gomez court that the “evidentiary bar is a low one”
in this context. (Gomez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 119.) We also
acknowledge the difficulty in this case in providing such evidence because the

12
victim is a minor and her mother was not cooperative and did not want to
pursue a restitution request. However, the prosecution could have attempted
to obtain statements or testimony from others with personal knowledge of the
impact on the victim, such as her biological father or a treating physician or
therapist. Instead, there is no evidence of the impact of Munoz-Garcia’s
crimes on Jane Doe 2, and the trial court relied exclusively on its experience
and common sense regarding similar incidents in awarding restitution.
Under such circumstances, the trial court’s restitution award to Jane Doe 2
was an abuse of discretion.4 We will therefore reverse the award and issue a
limited remand. On remand, the prosecution may again, if desired, seek
noneconomic restitution for Jane Doe 2 based on more robust evidence.
B. Restitution Fine
As part of his plea agreement, Munoz-Garcia acknowledged in writing
that he would be required to pay a restitution fine of not less than $200 or
more than $10,000 and gave up his right to appeal his sentence in exchange
for the negotiated disposition. At sentencing on April 4, 2022, defense
counsel asked to address fines and fees under Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th
1157. After the trial court allowed him to do so, counsel argued that Munoz-
Garcia did not have the ability to pay the fines and fees because he was
embarking on a lengthy prison sentence, had no assets, and would not be
employed in prison. The court questioned how defense counsel knew that
Munoz-Garcia would not be employed in prison. Counsel then changed
tactics, asserting that any “meager income” he would receive in prison would
likely go to direct victim restitution. The prosecutor argued that Munoz-

4 Because Munoz-Garcia does not contest the factual basis for the

noneconomic restitution award to Jane Doe 1 and we reverse the award to
Jane Doe 2, we need not determine the adequacy of any waiver pursuant to
People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 made in this case.

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Garcia had the ability to pay the restitution fine given his long prison
sentence. Determining it could not find an inability to pay on the record
before it, the court imposed the $1,000 restitution fine but agreed to suspend
the court operations and criminal conviction assessments.
Citing Dueñas and its progeny, Munoz-Garcia finally argues on appeal
that imposing the restitution fine without a hearing on his ability to pay
violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, equal
protection, and protection from excessive fines. It appears that the court
conducted a hearing and simply found insufficient evidence to stay the fine.
However, we do not reach this issue on its merits because we have no
jurisdiction to do so. “ ‘In a criminal case, judgment is rendered when the
trial court orally pronounces sentence.’ ” (People v. Montes (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 35, 47, quoting People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344,
fn. 9.) Here, judgment was rendered on April 4, 2022, and Munoz-Garcia did
not timely appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a) [notice of appeal must
be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment].) Rather, his
notice of appeal in this case was from the July 28, 2022 victim restitution
order and was filed that same day.
“ ‘A timely notice of appeal, as a general matter, is “essential to
appellate jurisdiction.” ’ [Citation.] ‘An untimely notice of appeal is “wholly
ineffectual: The delay cannot be waived, it cannot be cured by nunc pro tunc
order, and the appellate court has no power to give relief, but must dismiss
the appeal on motion or on its own motion.” [Citation.] The purpose of the
requirement of a timely notice of appeal is, self-evidently, to further the
finality of judgments by causing the [party] to take an appeal expeditiously or
not at all.’ [Citation.] As a consequence, ‘ “ ‘an unappealed [judgment] is
final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later

14
appealable order.’ ” ’ ” (In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1127.) Because
Munoz-Garcia’s notice of appeal cannot be deemed timely with respect to the
imposition of the restitution fine, we cannot consider its propriety.
III. DISPOSITION
The $100,000 award of noneconomic restitution to Jane Doe 2 is
reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings regarding
whether Munoz-Garcia owes noneconomic restitution to Jane Doe 2. The
judgment is otherwise affirmed.

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 CASTRO, J.*

WE CONCUR:

BANKE, ACTING P. J.

LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

A165868
People v. Munoz-Garcia

* Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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