USCA11 Case: 23-12662 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2024 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-12662
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER E. HOFFMAN,
Defendant- Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:21-cr-00065-MCR-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12662
Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Earl Hoffman appeals his conviction after a
bench trial and sentence for engaging in a child exploitation enter-
prise (“CEE”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g). He argues that
the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Hoffman also
argues that his life sentence is substantively unreasonable because
the district court relied on impermissible factors and balanced per-
missible factors unreasonably.
I.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. United
States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009).
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a reasonable
trier of fact could find that the evidence established the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1284-85. It is not enough
for a defendant to put forth a reasonable hypothesis of innocence,
because the issue is not whether the district court reasonably could
have acquitted, but whether it reasonably could have found the de-
fendant guilty. Id. at 1285. Although the evidence need not ex-
clude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, a conviction will
not be affirmed if it is based on “conjecture.” United States v. Toler,
144 F.3d 1423, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998). The test for sufficiency is the
same, whether or not the evidence is direct or circumstantial, but
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23-12662 Opinion of the Court 3
where the government relied on circumstantial evidence, reasona-
ble inferences must support the conviction. United States v. Martin,
803 F.3d 581, 587 (11th Cir. 2015).
To support a CEE conviction, the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant committed three
separate predicate offenses involving the sexual exploitation of a
minor; (2) the offenses involve more than one victim; and (3) the
defendant committed the offenses in concert with three or more
persons. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(g); United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d
1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 2010).
Receiving child pornography is a qualifying predicate of-
fense. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a), (g). “A person knowingly receives
child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) when he inten-
tionally views, acquires, or accepts child pornography on a com-
puter from an outside source.” United States v. Pruitt, 638 F.3d 763,
766 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
Here, the government’s evidence is sufficient to support a
reasonable trier of fact’s conclusion that Hoffman viewed child por-
nography posted to the group chat, establishing a third predicate
offense to support his CEE conviction.1 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2); see
Martin, 803 F.3d at 587; see also Jiminez, 564 F.3d at 1284-85. Alt-
hough the government’s witnesses could not say with certainty
1 Hoffman conceded that that there was sufficient evidence that he had posted
two videos to the Kik groups so there were two of the required three predi-
cates.
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whether Hoffman viewed the illicit videos and images, the evi-
dence showed that 6 videos discovered on Hoffman’s phone visu-
ally matched videos posted to the group chat. See Martin, 803 F.3d
at 587; see also Jiminez, 564 F.3d at 1284-85. This evidence is partic-
ularly damaging, considering that Hoffman failed to present any
evidence showing that he acquired child pornography from
sources other than Kik.
The evidence further showed that, on May 25, Hoffman
posted two messages to the private group chat—an informal greet-
ing and a perceived threat of sexual abuse—and that, in between
those two messages, other group members posted child pornogra-
phy to the chat. As the district court explained, Hoffman’s second
message about “teaching” his daughter and “introduce[ing]” her to
new things only makes sense if Hoffman had viewed the child por-
nography posted after he made his initial greeting. This is all the
more true, considering the private group’s primary reason for be-
ing was the sharing of child pornography. Even if this Court con-
siders Hoffman’s hypothesis that he was away from his computer
when the child pornography was posted, and that he somehow did
not see any of the previous posts when he posted his second mes-
sage, that would still not be enough to reverse the district court’s
reasonable finding of guilt on this issue. Although the govern-
ment’s evidence is circumstantial, the district court’s finding that
Hoffman viewed child pornography posted in the group chat is
based on reasonable inferences, not conjecture. See Martin, 803
F.3d at 587; see also Toler, 144 F.3d at 1433.
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23-12662 Opinion of the Court 5
There is also sufficient evidence to support a finding that
Hoffman acted in concert with 3 or more persons to commit his
crimes. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(g); Jiminez, 564 F.3d at 1284-85. First,
the evidence showed that over 60 users belonged to the Kik groups
while Hoffman was a member. Second, although Officer Reid was
able to circumvent the group’s vetting process, that does not ne-
gate the fact that Hoffman adhered to the group’s rules by sharing
2 child pornography videos to gain membership in the group. Fi-
nally, although Hoffman argues that like-minded individuals often
behave similarly, without prior coordination, that is not the sce-
nario presented here. The evidence showed that whenever a vigi-
lante infiltrated the private group, shutting it down, the group’s ad-
ministrator would create a new group chat, inviting any vetted
members to migrate to the new group. During the investigation,
Hoffman migrated to several different child pornography group
chats. Thus, from the time that he was first admitted into the pri-
vate group, and through his multiple migrations to new private
groups, it would have been impossible for him to share, and view,
child pornography without acting in concert with the group’s ad-
ministrators and other members. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(g); see
Jiminez, 564 F.3d at 1284-85.
II.
When reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness,
we consider the totality of the circumstances under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The party challenging a sentence bears the burden of
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-12662
proving that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record, the
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the substantial deference
afforded sentencing courts. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d
1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
The district court abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to
afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant
weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac-
tor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the
proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). The proper factors are
set out in § 3553(a) and include the criminal history of the defend-
ant, the seriousness of the crime, the promotion of respect for the
law, just punishment, and adequate deterrence. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).
The weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is commit-
ted to the sound discretion of the district court, and we will not
substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant factors.
Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. Given the deferential nature of ap-
pellate review, there “is an expectation of reasonableness when a
district court imposes a sentence within the applicable Guidelines
range.” Wayerski, 624 F.3d at 1353.
For purposes of sentencing, the district court’s factual find-
ings may be based on undisputed statements in the probation of-
ficer’s presentence investigation report. United States v. Oudomsine,
57 F.4th 1262, 1265 n.1 (11th Cir. 2023).
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Finally, in its sentencing analysis, the district court may con-
sider aggravating conduct that is unconnected to the instant of-
fense when it is “directly germane” to the § 3553(a) factors. United
States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 637 (11th Cir. 2013).
Here, Hoffman’s within-guideline-range sentence is sub-
stantively reasonable. See Wayerski, 624 F.3d at 1353. Hoffman’s
argument—that the district court sentenced him to life imprison-
ment to prevent his stepdaughter from having to testify in a state
court proceeding—is not supported by the record. Although the
district court stated that it had a “judicial duty” to take notice of
Hoffman’s pending state charges, it emphasized that “[t]he state
court [would] see fit to do what the state court elect[ed] to do with
the state charge.” A careful review of the district court’s sentencing
analysis shows that the district court based its sentence on Hoff-
man’s admissions2 to the underlying conduct in his pending state
case: Hoffman’s ongoing, hands-on, sexual abuse of his minor, au-
tistic stepdaughter. Because Hoffman failed to object to these ad-
missions, which were in the presentence investigation report, the
district court properly relied on these factual findings for sentenc-
ing.3 Oudomsine, 57 F.4th at 1265 n.1.
2 These admissions were made during the investigation of this federal case, as
reported in the PSI ¶ 61.
3 Indeed, Hoffman’s brief on appeal concedes that the district court was per-
mitted to consider the conduct underlying the pending state charge as one of
the § 3553 factors. See Appellant Brief at 47.
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Hoffman’s argument that the district court gave undue
weight to his hands-on abuse of his minor, autistic stepdaughter is
also unpersuasive because the weight given to any factor is com-
mitted to the sound discretion of the district court. Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d at 1254. Further, although Hoffman’s abuse admissions
were not necessary to prove his CEE offense, the district court
could still consider that aggravating conduct because it was “di-
rectly germane” to several § 3553(a) factors. Overstreet, 713 F.3d
627, 637.
Moreover, the court also did not place undue weight on this
factor. The fact that Hoffman molested his minor, autistic step-
daughter not only casts a very negative light on his character, but
also demonstrates the need for a long sentence to protect the public
from the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Further, Hoffman’s
crime was especially heinous considering that his stepdaughter’s
autism made her particularly vulnerable, the abuse was ongoing,
and he essentially blamed the victim for his actions. See id. Hoff-
man’s conduct showed a complete disregard for the welfare and
safety of children, which made his participation in a child exploita-
tion enterprise all the more troubling. See id.; see also Overstreet, 713
F.3d at 637.
The district court’s determination warrants deference, even
if we would not have reached the same conclusion. Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d at 1256; Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. Moreover, because Hoff-
man’s sentence is within the guidelines range, there is an expecta-
tion of reasonableness. Wayerski, 624 F.3d at 1353. Thus, Hoffman
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has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
weighing the § 3553(a) factors.
AFFIRMED.