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RENDERED: MARCH 14, 2024
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2022-SC-0506-MR
TYRONE RAEHME APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE KELLY M. EASTON, JUDGE
NO. 21-CR-00927
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Shortly after midnight on September 16, 2021, Tyrone Raehme drove the
wrong way down a divided highway and crashed head-on into another vehicle,
killing Tonya Kelly. A Hardin Circuit Court jury convicted Raehme of wanton
murder, wanton endangerment, trafficking in synthetic drugs, driving under
the influence (DUI), and driving without insurance. The trial court sentenced
Raehme to a total of twenty years in prison in accordance with the jury’s
recommendation. Raehme now appeals as a matter of right, raising several
issues. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Hardin Circuit
Court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Tyrone Raehme drove the wrong way on Dixie Highway, a divided
highway which he claimed to know well because he grew up in the area, drove
on the highway often, and often took it to get to work. Raehme turned onto the
southbound lanes of Dixie Highway instead of the northbound ones. He drove
the wrong way for about one mile and claimed he did not notice any of the
indicators that could have alerted him he was driving the wrong way, such as
the backward facing signs, buildings being farther away than normal, or the
traffic lights. At trial, other drivers testified to flashing their lights and honking
their horn at Raehme in an attempt to alert him to what he was doing.
Two cars going the correct way in the southbound lanes approached
Raehme’s car. The driver in the first car, Lorie Stone, saw Raehme’s car
coming towards her and pulled into a turning lane. The second car, driven by
Tonya Kelly, was traveling behind Stone. Kelly sped up and switched lanes to
pass Stone and Raehme collided with her head on.
When an officer arrived on the scene, Kelly was trapped in her car but
alive. The officer observed Raehme trying to find his driver’s license,
stumbling, and possibly slurring some of his words. At first, Raehme told the
officer he had not had anything to drink that night or taken any drugs. Plus,
Raehme believed he was driving in the northbound lanes before he lost control
of his car and crossed over the grass median into the southbound lanes. A
little later, Raehme changed his story and stated he drank one beer that night.
A breathalyzer was not performed at the scene, in part because the officers and
2
emergency medical personnel were concerned for the safety of everyone
involved, but the officer testified that there was a weak smell of alcohol from
Raehme. Additionally, an EMT testified similarly and noted the smell of alcohol
was stronger in the confined space of the ambulance while he transported
Raehme to the hospital.
The officer attempted to locate Raehme’s driver’s license and proof of
insurance. In doing so, the officer found trash, including beer cans and empty
vodka bottles, $400 in cash, and what turned out to be 184 grams of synthetic
marijuana. The officer arrested Raehme at the hospital as he tried to check
himself out against medical advice. Given the various indications that Raehme
was driving under the influence, the officer ordered a blood draw which was
performed a little under three hours after the collision. The blood testing
revealed a blood alcohol level of 0.074 plus or minus 0.005 and that Raehme
had marijuana and synthetic marijuana in his system.
At trial, the Commonwealth presented an expert witness, Dr. Gregory
Davis, who back extrapolated the data to offer some possibilities of what
Raehme’s blood alcohol level was at the time of the collision. Dr. Davis opined
that Raehme’s assertion that he only had one beer was medically impossible
given his blood alcohol level at the time of the blood draw. To get a blood
alcohol level of 0.069 (the lowest level possible at the time of the blood draw),
Raehme would have had to drink about two and two-thirds bottles of beer. But
his blood alcohol level would have likely been higher almost three hours earlier.
Dr. Davis also presented hypotheticals, in which he estimated Raehme’s blood
3
alcohol content at the time of the collision could have been between 0.089 and
0.109. Ultimately, Dr. Davis could not state how intoxicated Raehme was
when he collided with Kelly but opined that at the time of the collision Raehme
was intoxicated to some degree by a combination of alcohol, marijuana, and
synthetic marijuana.
Raehme testified in his own defense and did not dispute much of the
Commonwealth’s case. Raehme admitted to smoking marijuana the morning of
September 15 but denied smoking synthetic marijuana that day. He also
admitted that at the time of the September 16 incident, he was under a court
order prohibiting him from driving. In addition, he admitted to not wearing his
glasses at the time of the collision despite his driver’s license requiring him to
do so.
A jury convicted Raehme of wanton murder, wanton endangerment,
trafficking in synthetic drugs, DUI, and driving without insurance. The jury
sentenced him to twenty years for wanton murder, one year for wanton
endangerment, one year for trafficking, ninety days for no insurance, and four
days for DUI, all to run concurrently for a total sentence of twenty years in
prison. This was the minimum sentence available. Further facts will be
discussed as necessary.
Raehme appeals as a matter of right, raising seven issues for our review:
whether (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of
pending charges for wanton endangerment and driving under the influence; (2)
the trial court erred in joining the trafficking charge with the remaining
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charges; (3) the trial court improperly excluded his mental health expert from
testifying about his autism spectrum disorder diagnosis, or, in the alternative,
erred by refusing to grant a continuance; (4) the Commonwealth committed
discovery violations; (5) the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed
verdict; (6) the trial court impermissibly allowed witnesses to testify remotely in
violation of the Confrontation Clause, and (7) the trial court erred by refusing
to exclude all mention of Tonya Kelly’s father’s status as a retired Kentucky
State Police trooper. After careful review, we find no error.
ANALYSIS
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing pending
charges into evidence.
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a notice pursuant to Kentucky
Rule of Evidence (KRE) 404(b) of its intent to introduce evidence of Raehme’s
pending charges in Jefferson County for DUI and wanton endangerment from
an April 2021 incident. The Commonwealth also sought to introduce evidence
of the bond condition from that Jefferson County case which prohibited
Raehme from driving and from using any illegal drugs or alcohol.
In the Jefferson County case, Raehme drove his car for several miles in
the wrong direction on I-65. The Commonwealth sought to introduce evidence
pertaining to the pending Jefferson County charges to demonstrate that
Raehme’s conduct in the Hardin County case included the necessary state of
mind to support the wanton murder charge. Because he was on bond in
Jefferson County for two of the same types of offenses he was charged with in
5
the present case, the Commonwealth argued he was more aware than most
individuals of the dangers he posed to others by operating a vehicle under the
influence and driving in the wrong direction.
Raehme objected to the introduction of this evidence, arguing that the
pending charges were neither relevant nor probative and that the evidence
would be unduly prejudicial. Additionally, Raehme noted that the Jefferson
County charges were pending and he was not convicted of anything at the time
the Commonwealth sought to introduce the charges.
The trial court determined the pending Jefferson County charges were
probative, citing United States v. Merritt, 961 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2020). The
trial court also reasoned the evidence could be relevant to any claim of accident
or mistake offered to counter the claim of wanton behavior. Additionally, the
trial court recognized the potential prejudicial impact of the evidence but
reasoned that such danger could be adequately addressed with a proper
instruction to the jury. The trial court allowed the Commonwealth to introduce
the evidence of the Jefferson County charges and prior to its introduction
Raehme renewed his objection. Therefore, this issue is preserved. We review a
trial court’s decision to admit KRE 404(b) evidence for an abuse of discretion.
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007). The test for
abuse of discretion is “whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
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During trial, the Commonwealth called two police officers to testify about
the Jefferson County incident. The first officer’s testimony was minimal. He
stated that he received a call around 3:00 a.m. on April 25, 2021 because a
driver was driving the wrong way on the interstate. The officer located the
vehicle and followed it with his sirens on, primarily to alert other drivers of the
dangerous situation. The officer had no interaction with Raehme during the
incident. The Commonwealth played the officer’s body camera footage for the
jury, which merely showed the officer’s pursuit of Raehme.
A second officer testified that he also received a call about someone
driving the wrong way on the interstate. The officer observed another police
officer attempt to stop Raehme, but Raehme disregarded the officer and almost
hit him. The officer also saw Raehme pass numerous cars while traveling the
wrong direction. Eventually, an off-duty police officer was able to stop Raehme.
The second officer interacted with Raehme, who explained to the officer
that he just left the Jeffersonville, Indiana area and was headed home to
Radcliff. The officer informed Raehme that he was traveling the wrong
direction and Raehme blamed his GPS for the mistake. The officer asked
whether he had anything to drink. While Raehme originally denied having
anything to drink, he eventually admitted to consuming one beer. During his
testimony, the officer also noted that Raehme was not wearing corrective
lenses. The officer charged Raehme with driving under the influence and first-
degree wanton endangerment for almost colliding with one of the officers that
7
attempted to stop him. 1 This testimony was minimal, lasting approximately six
minutes, and was appropriate because the Jefferson County incident involved
pending charges, not convictions.
The Commonwealth played videos of the second officer’s interactions
with Raehme for the jury, during which Raehme was in the back of the police
car and stated he did not know how he ended up driving the wrong direction.
The officer explained to Raehme that many people drive on that interstate and
stated that if Raehme had collided with someone head on, it would have likely
been one of the worst accidents the officer had ever seen. The officer also
implied that had there been a collision, it likely would have resulted in
Raehme’s death. The officer further explained to Raehme that a GPS does not
inform a driver if they are traveling the wrong direction on an interstate.
Finally, the officer also explained that one of Raehme’s bond conditions from
the Jefferson County case was that he was prohibited from driving. The video
clips lasted for approximately two minutes.
On cross-examination, Raehme’s counsel elicited information about the
signs of impairment that Raehme displayed during the Jefferson County
incident. The officer confirmed that Raehme failed several field sobriety tests,
that his eyes were glossed over, and that when Raehme exited his vehicle he
struggled to maintain his balance. The cross-examination lasted approximately
seven minutes. Additionally, during closing argument, the Commonwealth
1 After this statement in the officer’s testimony, he continued to state that
Raehme probably should have been charged with more. Raehme objected, and the
trial court sustained the objection.
8
argued Raehme’s conduct in the present case was aggravated wantonness
because he had been told five months earlier that he was driving the wrong
way on I-65.
After the testimony about the Jefferson County incident concluded, the
trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction. The trial court explained that
the Jefferson County charges could not be used as evidence that Raehme was
impaired in the Hardin County case but could be used for assessing his state of
mind. The instruction specifically stated that
[e]vidence of a prior event may not be considered as evidence to
prove guilt of a similar event happening on a later date. . . . In this
case, the defendant’s state of mind on September 16th of 2021 is a
question you jurors will determine. If you chose to do so, you may
consider the Defendant’s knowledge of the events on April 25th of
2021 and the conditions of his bond with respect to any charges
relating to that event only for the purpose of assessing his state of
mind on September 16th of 2021 and for no other purpose.
Raehme argues this KRE 404(b) evidence was unduly prejudicial. KRE
404(b) provides that, generally, evidence of other crimes or wrongs is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show conformity
therewith. However, such evidence may be admissible “[i]f offered for some
other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident[.]” KRE 404(b)(1). KRE
404(b) is “exclusionary in nature” and the exceptions “should be closely
watched and strictly enforced” given their “dangerous quality and prejudicial
consequences.” Graves v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 144, 147-48 (Ky. 2012)
(quoting Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 96 (Ky. 2007)).
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To determine whether evidence of other bad acts is admissible under
KRE 404(b), the Court must consider relevance, probative value, and prejudice.
Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Ky. 1994). First, the Jefferson
County incident was relevant. “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” KRE 401. In this case, Raehme was charged with
wanton murder, which means the Commonwealth had to prove that he “acted
wantonly and with extreme indifference to human life[.]” Pozo-Illas v.
Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 118, 136 (Ky. 2023). “A person acts wantonly . . .
when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists.” Id. (quoting
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 501.020(3)). Because of these statutory
requirements, Raehme’s state of mind was critical, and evidence of the
Jefferson County incident supported the contention that Raehme had
knowledge of the dangerousness of his conduct in Hardin County on
September 16th.
The Commonwealth offered evidence of the Jefferson County incident to
show Raehme’s state of mind on September 16th. That evidence indicated that
Raehme was explicitly warned that he could have gotten into a terrible accident
because of his behavior—one that would have likely resulted in death.
Raehme’s state of mind was the critical issue in the case, given he did not
dispute many of the facts of the incident. He never disputed that he was
10
driving the car during the September 16th incident, but rather admitted that
he used his GPS and inadvertently turned left on what he believed was a two-
way road. He admitted to driving the wrong way and striking Tonya Kelly’s
vehicle. He also admitted that he knew Dixie Highway well and admitted in
retrospect that there were several indicators that he was going the wrong way.
He also admitted he was under a court order prohibiting him from driving and
that he was not wearing his glasses.
The critical issue in the case was Raehme’s state of mind and it was the
Commonwealth’s burden to introduce evidence to support the charged
conduct. The evidence that, a mere five months prior to the charged incident,
Raehme engaged in similar conduct and was explicitly warned of the dangers
that conduct posed undoubtedly made it more probable that he knew of and
consciously disregarded the substantial risks of driving under the influence in
the wrong direction on a busy highway, and that such conduct constituted an
extreme indifference to human life.
Next, the evidence of the Jefferson County incident was probative.
“[E]vidence of other bad acts is sufficiently probative if ‘the jury could
reasonably infer that the prior bad acts occurred and that [the defendant]
committed such acts.’” Howard v. Commonwealth, 595 S.W.3d 462, 476 (Ky.
2020) (quoting Parker v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 209, 217 (Ky. 1997)).
There was ample evidence presented to allow the jury to reasonably infer that
the Jefferson County incident occurred and that Raehme drove the wrong way
down a busy interstate for several miles. Both officers provided sworn
11
testimony about the incident, explained the multiple attempts to stop him, and
how he failed field sobriety tests and exhibited behavior indicating he was
intoxicated. Additionally, the jury could see some of the prior acts directly
through the officers’ body camera footage. Again, we note that the officers’
testimony was appropriate given that the Jefferson County incident involved
charges, not convictions, and because Raehme’s interactions with the second
officer demonstrated that Raehme was explicitly warned of the dangers this
type of conduct posed.
Finally, we must weigh the prejudicial nature of the evidence against its
probative value. Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 889. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is “inherently and highly prejudicial to a defendant” because “[i]t is very
difficult for jurors to sift and separate such damaging information to avoid the
natural inclination to view it as evidence of a defendant’s criminal disposition.”
Id. at 890. We must consider “the probative worth of the evidence, the
probability that the evidence [caused] undue prejudice, and whether the
harmful effects substantially outweigh[ed] the probative worth.” Yates v.
Commonwealth, 430 S.W.3d 883, 897 (Ky. 2014) (citing Barnett v.
Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Ky. 1998)).
The Jefferson County incident evidence was undoubtedly prejudicial.
But we must determine whether that prejudice was “unnecessary and
unreasonable.” Price v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Ky. 2000). At
trial, the Commonwealth presented a considerable amount of evidence
demonstrating that Raehme committed the crimes for which he was charged in
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Hardin County, and that he did so with the requisite state of mind to constitute
wanton murder. Driving the wrong way down a highway, even if not driving
while impaired, creates a significant and unjustifiable risk to other drivers on
the road. The Jefferson County evidence showed that in the present case
Raehme decided to drive under the influence the wrong way despite being
under a court order not to drive. Simply put, evidence that Raehme engaged in
the same conduct months prior and was explicitly warned of its dangerousness
supported the Commonwealth’s assertion that he was aware of and consciously
disregarded the attendant risks during the Hardin County incident.
Additionally, the trial court provided a limiting instruction to “reduce the
possibility of prejudice to an acceptable level.” Leach v. Commonwealth, 571
S.W.3d 550, 557 (Ky. 2019).
In Merritt, which the trial court cited in its order allowing introduction of
the Jefferson County incident evidence, the defendant was intoxicated while
driving in the wrong lane in August 2016 and collided with another vehicle,
killing one of its passengers. 961 F.3d at 1108. He was charged with second-
degree murder and assault. Id. The government offered evidence of a DUI
conviction from two years prior and an arrest from four years prior for
intoxication and violation of applicable liquor laws, for which the defendant
ultimately pled guilty. Id. at 1111. The purpose of introducing evidence of
these prior incidents was to prove the defendant knew his conduct in the
incident before the court posed a serious risk of death or harm to himself or
others, but that he disregarded that risk. Id. at 1111-12.
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After concluding the evidence of the prior incidents was offered for a proper
purpose, the Court conducted a balancing test to weigh probative value against
unfair prejudice. Id. at 1115. While recognizing that the evidence was
undoubtedly prejudicial, the Court reasoned that the evidence was highly
probative of the defendant’s state of mind. Id. Ultimately, the Court upheld
the lower court’s admission of the evidence. Id. at 1116. The Court explained
that the defendant driving the wrong way down a busy highway could have
resulted in numerous deadly accidents, and the signs of intoxication the
defendant exhibited supported an inference that he was aware his ability to
operate a vehicle while drunk was gravely compromised. Id. Most importantly,
the evidence “support[s] the inference that although Merritt was cognizant his
drunk driving posed a significant risk of death to others, he simply did not care
because he drove in an intoxicated state once again in August 2016.” Id.
Further, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the
similarities between the two prior convictions and the August 2016 incident
“make it less probable that Mr. Merritt’s decision to drive while intoxicated in
this instance was unwitting or simply a one-off.” Id. at 1113.
This rationale from Merritt is directly applicable despite Raehme’s
attempt to distinguish it. Kentucky caselaw states that “[p]revious DUI
convictions do not fall within either the exceptions outlined by KRE 404(b) or
those recognized by this Court.” Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526,
528 (Ky. 1996) (introduction of a prior conviction for DUI was unduly
prejudicial). See also Commonwealth v. Pace, 82 S.W.3d 894 (Ky. 2002)
14
(introduction of prior DUI conviction was error, but not palpable error). But
these cases involved the introduction of prior DUI convictions in cases in which
the defendant was presently charged with DUI. Ramsey and Pace both
involved charges of DUI and driving with a suspended license, and Pace
involved additional charges pertaining to the use of an all-terrain vehicle.
While, in this instance, Raehme was charged with DUI in the Jefferson County
incident and was also charged with DUI in the present case, the purpose of
introducing the evidence in the present case was for the wanton murder
charge, not the DUI charge. Raehme also emphasizes that the Jefferson
County incident involved pending charges and he had not been convicted of
any crime. However, “[a] conviction is not required for evidence of another
crime to be admissible.” Leach, 571 S.W.3d at 556.
As in Merritt, the evidence of other crimes or acts is not limited solely to
the fact of the existence of pending charges. “Indeed, if the government
had only been permitted to inform the jury of Merritt's record—stripped of any
details—the only inference that arises is an impermissible one: Merritt has a
propensity to drive while intoxicated, and he acted in accordance with this
character trait when he killed [the victim].” 961 F.3d at 1113. The evidence
demonstrates that Raehme was clearly aware of the dangers he posed to others
by driving the wrong direction on an interstate or highway. His choices, and
thus state of mind, exhibited precisely the kind of indifference that the
Commonwealth was tasked with proving to obtain a wanton murder conviction.
As such, although the evidence of the Jefferson County incident was prejudicial
15
to Raehme, that prejudice was not unnecessary nor unreasonable. Price, 31
S.W.3d at 888. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of the Jefferson County incident to allow the
Commonwealth to prove Raehme’s state of mind during the Hardin County
collision.
II. The trial court did not err by denying Raehme’s motion to sever
the trafficking charge from the remaining charges.
Next Raehme argues that the trial court erred in refusing to sever the
trafficking in synthetic drugs charge from the remaining charges. After officers
arrived on the scene, Raehme was stumbling and looking around in his car.
He told an officer he was trying to find his driver’s license. Raehme was
unsuccessful, so an officer looked in his car to find his license but instead
found 184 grams of synthetic marijuana and $400 cash.
Before trial, Raehme filed a motion to sever the trafficking charges from
the other charges and argued it was not related to the collision. The trial court
denied his motion, reasoning that “[t]he allegation of trafficking is related to
[Raehme’s] own use, and that alleged use is relevant to the DUI and to wanton
murder.” The trial court also noted the low bar for relevance and explained
that trafficking drugs would have “some tendency” to prove that someone “may
have used some of the trafficked substance that is in their car with them that
day.” Further, the trial court reasoned that even without the trafficking
charge, all the evidence relating to the synthetic marijuana would be
admissible for the other charges.
16
Because this issue is preserved, we review for an abuse of discretion.
Quisenberry v. Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 19, 26 (Ky. 2011). The test for
abuse of discretion is “whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” English, 993
S.W.2d at 945.
Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 6.18 allows joinder of charges in an
indictment if they are of like character, part of a common scheme, or if they
“are based on the same acts or transactions connected together[.]” Joinder is
proper if the evidence shows a sufficient “nexus” or “logical relationship”
between the crimes charged. Peacher v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 821, 837
(Ky. 2013). If the defendant will be prejudiced by joinder of offenses, RCr 8.31
mandates that the trial court “shall order separate trials of counts[.]” In
determining whether joinder resulted in undue prejudice, we consider “whether
evidence necessary to prove each offense would have been admissible in a
separate trial of the other.” Peacher, 391 S.W.3d at 838 (quoting Roark v.
Commonwealth, 90 S.W.3d 24, 28 (Ky. 2002)).
Here the synthetic marijuana was found in Raehme’s vehicle—the vehicle
he just used to drive the wrong way down a highway and the vehicle that was
involved in a fatal collision. Raehme exhibited signs of impairment according
to the assisting officer’s testimony, such as slurred speech and stumbling.
Raehme also changed his story, first stating he had not drunk anything or
taken any drugs, but eventually admitting to having one beer. In addition,
Raehme explained to the officer that he thought he lost control of his car and
17
crossed over the grass median into the southbound lanes, causing the
collision, when in fact he caused the collision by driving in the wrong direction
down the divided highway. The accident occurred on the wrong side of the
road and multiple people smelled alcohol on Raehme.
The trafficking charge stemmed from the same set of facts and
occurrence as the fatal collision, thus creating a sufficient nexus between the
trafficking evidence and evidence of the other crimes charged. The discovery of
the synthetic marijuana and cash in Raehme’s car occurred immediately after
the collision. In addition, during his trial testimony, Raehme admitted to
selling synthetic marijuana. The primary points Raehme contested at trial
were that he was driving while impaired and that he was speeding. Therefore,
the discovery of the synthetic marijuana was relevant to the other charges and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing all charges to be tried
together.
III. The trial court did not err by excluding Dr. Bundy’s mental
health testimony or by denying Raehme’s motion for a
continuance.
In November 2021 the trial court granted defense counsel’s motion for
funding to consult a mental health expert but defense counsel never actually
consulted an expert. On July 11, 2022, Raehme filed a motion for funds for a
mental health expert, Dr. Myra Bundy, to evaluate him for autism. Defense
counsel explained that during a meeting with Raehme, Raehme’s recently
appointed co-counsel observed behaviors she believed were indicators of
autism. In discussing the expert funds, defense counsel told the trial court
18
that obtaining the expert and evaluating Raehme would not jeopardize the trial
date, August 1, 2022. The trial court granted the funds on July 12, 2022, and
Dr. Bundy evaluated Raehme on July 19, 2022. On July 20, 2022, Raehme
filed a notice of intent to call Dr. Bundy as a witness to testify during the
penalty phase that Raehme is on the autism spectrum. In the notice, Raehme
stated that Dr. Bundy would be a penalty phase witness only. The
Commonwealth objected to the late disclosure of Dr. Bundy as a mental health
expert.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the issue on July 26, 2022 and
ultimately denied the motion, determining that Raehme failed to provide notice
of a mental health expert more than ninety days before the scheduled trial
pursuant to RCr 8.07. While that rule also permits a trial court, for good cause
shown, to allow a defendant to file a late mental health expert notice or grant a
continuance, the trial court concluded that Raehme had not shown good cause
to either allow the late filing or to grant a continuance given all the
surrounding circumstances.
Specifically, the trial court noted the defendant had not provided a
written report from Dr. Bundy, and that this was the first time the issue of
autism had been presented to the court. The trial court also reminded the
parties that in November 2021 the trial court granted defense counsel’s motion
for funding to consult a mental health expert but defense counsel never
actually consulted an expert. Additionally, the trial court considered the work
done in preparing for trial, preserving witness testimony, and ensuring witness
19
availability, anticipating that allowing Dr. Bundy to testify would delay the
trial.
Raehme moved the trial court to reconsider both the exclusion of Dr.
Bundy’s testimony and the denial of a continuance, this time providing a report
from Dr. Bundy, but also stating that her testimony would be used for both the
guilt and penalty phases. On the morning of the start of the trial, the trial
court again denied the motion, reiterating its prior holdings but adding
concerns over inserting the word “autism” into the case and noting Dr. Bundy’s
report was broader than originally explained. Additionally, the trial court noted
that defense counsel originally stated Dr. Bundy’s opinion would only be used
during the penalty phase but now requested to introduce her testimony during
the guilt phase as well.
As to the request to grant a continuance, the trial court noted the delay
due to this new expert testimony would likely take months because the
Commonwealth would have to obtain an expert for its own evaluations. The
trial court did not believe the delay would be purposeful or caused by Raehme.
However, although the case was not overly complex, there were a lot of
witnesses and toxicological issues. Additionally, the court noted how many
witnesses would be affected, the expense to witnesses in travel arrangements,
and the mental preparation in getting ready to try the case, which the court
opined was extremely difficult for a number of people. After balancing these
considerations, the trial court denied the renewed motion for a continuance.
20
The trial court allowed Dr. Bundy’s testimony by avowal. Dr. Bundy
testified she saw Raehme twice and diagnosed him as being at a level one on
the autism spectrum, which is the lowest level and has the “mildest impact.”
She also noted that, even within level one, there was a spectrum and certain
facts, such as Raehme having friends, maintaining employment, and being able
to drive, suggested he was mildly impacted by this diagnosis. Dr. Bundy was
also clear that her diagnosis did not affect any determination of Raehme’s
criminal responsibility. She acknowledged that drug and alcohol use would
exacerbate the symptoms of autism spectrum disorder.
Dr. Bundy further opined that Raehme’s low visual and motor processing
skills would be crucial information given the facts surrounding the September
2021 incident. However, the trial court specifically noted that Raehme was not
wearing glasses, for which he has a prescription, when he took the tests before
Dr. Bundy. Dr. Bundy acknowledged the need for tests with proper eyewear.
Finally, Dr. Bundy concluded that while Raehme’s mental defects would not
absolve him of criminal responsibility, they had played a role in his life history
including events leading up to his criminal behavior.
After this testimony, the trial court noted it would have been hard
pressed to find that the probative value of the diagnosis outweighed the risk of
undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or waste of time. The trial court
opined that, at most, Dr. Bundy’s testimony may have been admissible in the
penalty phase because it went more toward mitigation. We also note that after
the trial ended, the trial court conducted a hearing to give parties an
21
opportunity to present further evidence and preserve the record on various
issues. In a subsequent order, the trial court again opined that, if anything,
the autism diagnosis may have played a role in mitigation of penalty, but
highlighted that Raehme received the minimum possible sentence from the
jury.
On appeal, Raehme argues the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding Dr. Bundy’s testimony. We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings
for an abuse of discretion and must determine whether the trial court’s
decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Ward v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.3d 312, 332 (Ky. 2019) (quoting
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000)).
Part of the trial court’s reasoning in excluding Dr. Bundy’s testimony was
that the trial court authorized expert funding in November 2021. The trial
court theorized that, had that evaluation been performed, any conditions
affecting mitigation may have been discovered. We agree. Raehme had the
funds, time, and opportunity to consult an expert in November 2021 but failed
to do so. Raehme argues that the reasons that led defense counsel to request
funding for a psychological evaluation in November 2021 had resolved, so there
was no reason to pursue an evaluation. Defense counsel also argued that they
did not realize they should evaluate for autism until June 2022 because autism
was not on their radar back in November. But this is of no consequence.
Neither of these reasons change the fact that there was ample time and
sufficient funding to have the evaluation done well before the ninety-day time
22
requirement outlined in RCr 8.07. The trial court properly supported its
decision to exclude Dr. Bundy as a witness and it was not arbitrary, unfair, or
unreasonable. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Raehme also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
grant a continuance. This issue is preserved because Raehme moved for a
continuance and that motion was denied by the trial court. We review a trial
court’s denial of a motion for a continuance for an abuse of discretion. Slone v.
Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 851, 856 (Ky. 2012). Therefore, this Court must
determine whether the trial court’s decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” English, 993 S.W.2d at 945.
A trial court has “wide discretion when deciding whether to grant a
motion for a continuance.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 730, 735 (Ky.
2020). In reviewing a motion for a continuance, the trial court is tasked with
considering the following factors: (1) length of delay; (2) any previous
continuances; (3) inconvenience to the parties, witnesses, and counsel; (4)
complexity of the case; (5) availability of other competent counsel; (6) whether
the movant caused the need for a continuance; and (7) whether denial of the
continuance would lead to identifiable prejudice. Snodgrass v. Commonwealth,
814 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Ky. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Lawson v.
Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 534 (Ky. 2001).
In his motion for a continuance, Raehme argued the delay would be
minimal – a few weeks or a couple months. Defense counsel admitted it
wanted time to allow Dr. Bundy to furnish a more detailed analysis and have
23
Raehme further evaluated and tested. Once Dr. Bundy’s evaluations and
conclusions were complete, the Commonwealth would have then needed time
to find its own expert to independently evaluate Raehme, review Dr. Bundy’s
report, and prepare to testify. Raehme asserts that the trial court merely
speculated that the delay would be many months, but the trial court was likely
correct. While the underlying criminal conduct occurred in September 2021
and the trial began in August 2022, less than a year after the incident,
imposing a several month-long delay just days before trial would have been
considerable.
Even though there were no prior continuances in the case, granting a
continuance would have inconvenienced many witnesses, attorneys, and
victims. There were several out-of-state witnesses who made travel
arrangements and were preparing for trial, and the trial court was grappling
with this issue a mere two weeks before the trial’s scheduled start date.
Additionally, the case was not particularly complex. The availability of other
counsel was not at issue here. Further, the defense was at least partially to
blame for the delay because, as the trial court pointed out, expert funds were
granted in November 2021, approximately eight months before trial. The
defense had the time and the funds to have Raehme evaluated months before
the ninety-day deadline.
Finally, for the last factor, Raehme argues that the autism diagnosis
would have provided a narrative to counter the Commonwealth’s introduction
of the Jefferson County incident and help the jury understand why Raehme
24
was more concerned with finding his driver’s license than worrying about the
victim after the collision. While a defendant is certainly entitled to counter the
Commonwealth’s proof, those efforts must be made in a timely and reasonable
manner. It also bears noting that Raehme received the minimum possible
sentence and has not shown prejudice from the denial of a continuance. As a
result, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Raehme’s motion for a continuance.
IV. The Commonwealth did not commit any discovery violations.
Raehme argues the Commonwealth committed discovery violations that
substantially prejudiced him and deprived him of due process and a fair trial.
First, he argues the Commonwealth failed to produce the basis of two expert
witnesses’ testimony about blood tests, and second, he argues the
Commonwealth failed to produce a surveillance video showing the collision.
These issues are preserved, and we review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for
an abuse of discretion. Ward, 587 S.W.3d at 332. We must determine whether
the trial court’s decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported
by sound legal principles.”
The trial court entered a generalized discovery order requiring the
Commonwealth to identify its experts and, among other things, the basis or
grounds for each expert’s opinion. On the first day of trial, Raehme filed a
motion to exclude the testimony of the Commonwealth’s experts, Deena
Fletcher and Alycia Wilson, both forensic scientists with the Kentucky State
Police who were expected to testify about the blood collected from Raehme and
25
the lab tests performed. Raehme objected to their testimony and argued the
basis or grounds for the test results were not provided, which would inhibit his
ability to effectively cross-examine them. The Commonwealth had merely given
defense counsel a page of results. However, the Commonwealth noted that one
of the results pages indicated that the testing method was “gas
chromatography.” The trial court deemed the reports sufficient.
The Commonwealth called Fletcher, who tested Raehme’s blood for
alcohol, as a witness and the trial court admitted the one-page report over
defense counsel’s objection. On cross-examination, Raehme inquired about
gas chromatography, which is a separation technique. Fletcher explained that
the testing produced chromatograms, or graphs, and those graphs had to be
analyzed. When Fletcher pulled out one of the graphs, defense counsel asked
to approach the bench and informed the trial court that this was precisely the
information they sought in discovery. Ultimately, the blood test results were
not excluded. This same scenario occurred with Wilson’s testimony. Wilson
was another Kentucky State Police scientist who tested Raehme’s blood for the
presence of drugs.
The Commonwealth also called Dr. Greg Davis who testified about the
back extrapolation used to approximate Raehme’s blood alcohol level at the
time of the collision. A breathalyzer test was not performed at the scene of the
collision because officers were concerned with the safety of everyone involved.
Because the Commonwealth failed to turn over the graphs of the lab experts,
the defense moved to exclude Dr. Davis’s testimony as well.
26
RCr 7.24(1)(c) specifically states
upon written request by the defense, the attorney for the
Commonwealth shall furnish to the defendant a written summary
of any expert testimony that the Commonwealth intends to
introduce at trial. This summary must identify the witness and
describe the witness's opinions, the bases and reasons for those
opinions, and the witness's qualifications.
“[I]t is imperative that the Commonwealth provide full and timely discovery
pursuant to RCr 7.24 . . . .” Roberts v. Commonwealth, 896 S.W.2d 4, 6-7 (Ky.
1995). Discovery allows a defendant the reasonable opportunity to inspect
discovery materials. Wright v. Commonwealth, 637 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Ky.
1982). Raehme argues if he had been timely informed of the basis of the
expert’s opinions, he could have consulted with his own expert to examine the
basis of the opinions, to assist in cross-examination of the Commonwealth’s
experts, and generally strengthen his defense.
The Commonwealth filed supplemental discovery on December 29, 2021
and that discovery included the Kentucky State Police lab report from the blood
test for drugs. The report specifically includes that the drugs in Raehme’s
system were “detected by ELISA” and “confirmed by LC-MS/MS.” A quick
internet search reveals that ELISA stands for Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent
Assay, a screening technique widely utilized by toxicologists to screen
specimens for drugs, 2 and that LC-MS/MS stands for liquid chromatography-
2 ELISA, CLEVELAND CLINIC, https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/articles/
24990-elisa (last updated May 15, 2023).
27
tandem mass spectrometry. 3 Therefore the results of the drug test turned over
by the Commonwealth included the type of testing performed. While the report
showing the blood alcohol test results is not in the record, during a hearing the
Commonwealth stated that report was given to Raehme prior to the drug test
results being turned over, and explicitly stated that the report included that the
methodology was gas chromatography. In addition, defense counsel
specifically cross-examined Fletcher about gas chromatography.
Raehme also criticizes the fact that he had not seen the raw data the
reports were based on. But the Commonwealth did not deliberately withhold
the information from the defense because the Commonwealth was not in
possession of this raw data. Here we cannot find a discovery violation for the
Commonwealth failing to turn over documents it did not have. 4 The
Commonwealth turned over the blood testing results which included a
sufficient basis for the experts’ testimony. Even if the Commonwealth failed to
turn over required information pursuant to the trial court’s discovery order,
Raehme has failed to show a “reasonable probability that had the evidence
been disclosed the result at trial would have been different.” Stieritz v.
Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 353, 368 (Ky. 2023) (citation omitted).
3 Hayk Snkhchyan and Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New ‘Gold Standard’:
LC/MS-MS Analysis in Driving under the Influence of Cannabinoid Cases, Forensic
Science Commentary, 57 No. 2 Crim. Law Bulletin ART 4 (Spring 2021).
4 See Slone v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-SC-000446, 2014 WL 5410289, *6 (Ky.
Oct. 23, 2014) (“The rules for discovery in criminal cases do not require the
Commonwealth to disclose information it does not have.”).
28
Based on the requirements of the trial court’s discovery order, which was
largely based on RCr 7.24(1)(c), we conclude that the Commonwealth did not
commit a discovery violation as to the blood testing results. Because there was
no discovery violation, the trial court did not err in allowing these experts to
testify or admitting the reports.
Raehme also argues the Commonwealth committed a discovery violation
for failing to turn over a surveillance video from a local business located near
the collision, All About Kids. Raehme learned about this video after reviewing
an officer’s report that mentioned reviewing the video and recording it on his
body cam. After jury selection, defense counsel realized the officer was not on
the witness list and that it did not have the recording of the video. The parties
discussed the issue with the trial court.
The Commonwealth explained that it did not have the video and was
unsure as to why the video was not available. The Commonwealth learned that
All About Kids still had the video and the next day, after a full day of witness
testimony, obtained a copy and provided it to defense counsel. Raehme asserts
that after viewing the video, he learned it was partially exculpatory because it
showed the victim sped up and started to pass the vehicle in front of her, which
is when Raehme collided with her. Raehme requested a mistrial and argued
the Commonwealth should have exercised due diligence in obtaining the video.
The Commonwealth volunteered not to use the video given the
circumstances of its late disclosure. Raehme’s counsel chose to use the video,
29
in part because it showed the actions of another car near the collision which fit
within the argument defense counsel wanted to make
The trial court acknowledged the evidence was likely mishandled but did
not believe a discovery violation occurred because there was no evidence that
the Commonwealth actually had the video in its possession. A proper sanction
for events that transpired would have been to exclude the Commonwealth from
using the video given its late disclosure. This was ultimately accomplished
here because the Commonwealth voluntarily offered to not use the video. In a
hearing conducted after the trial, the parties and the trial court learned more
about what occurred. An officer used his body camera to record the All About
Kids video from an iPad or similar device. That officer went to the police
station and thought he successfully downloaded the video. The police records
custodian later determined the video either did not download or was routinely
erased after a standard period of time.
Raehme argues that because of the late disclosure of the video, he had to
change strategies midstream, particularly in regard to the cross-examination of
Detective Brian Washer. According to Raehme, Detective Washer, the accident
reconstructionist, had not considered the actions of the third vehicle in his
report. Defense counsel argued the third car likely affected Raehme’s response
or explained why he did not swerve to avoid the victim. Of course, Detective
Washer stated he did not factor the surveillance video into his report because
he had not seen it. Because Raehme moved for a mistrial, we review this issue
30
for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Padgett, 563 S.W.3d 639, 645
(Ky. 2018).
Raehme introduced the video during the testimony of Detective Brian
Washer, the accident reconstructionist. Raehme received the video on August
3, 2022 and Detective Washer testified on August 5, 2022. Raehme argued
that defense counsel did not have a reasonable opportunity to prepare. But
Raehme was able to cross-examine Detective Washer and highlight any
inconsistencies between what the video showed and what his report stated.
The defense tried to attack the accident reconstruction report because it did
not rely on the surveillance video, and during closing argument defense
counsel tried to characterize the Commonwealth as hiding something by not
showing the video to the jury itself. Raehme took advantage of being able to
use the video and highlighting that the Commonwealth chose not to use the
video.
Additionally, although Raehme asserts the surveillance video showed
Tonya Kelly accelerating to pass the car in front of her, at which point she
collided with Raehme, it does not affect the fact that Raehme was driving the
wrong way down the divided highway or his state of mind. To the extent that
the video was exculpatory, the jury viewed this evidence first-hand. There was
no discovery violation.
31
V. The trial court properly denied Raehme’s motion for directed
verdict on the wanton endangerment charge.
At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, Raehme moved for a directed
verdict on the wanton murder charge, among other charges. The trial court
denied his motion, and Raehme now argues the Commonwealth did not provide
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that he acted wantonly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.
Raehme argues that this error is preserved for review. In Ray v.
Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 250, 266 (Ky. 2020), this Court explicitly
delineated the requirements for preserving a directed verdict issue for appeal:
[W]e now hold that in order to preserve an alleged directed verdict
issue for appeal, criminal defendants must: (1) move for a directed
verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's evidence; (2) renew the
same directed verdict motion at the close of all the evidence, unless
the defendant does not present any evidence; and identify the
particular charge the Commonwealth failed to prove, and must
identify the particular elements of that charge the
Commonwealth failed to prove. Criminal defendants may move
for directed verdict on one count of a multiple count indictment
without rendering the alleged error unpreserved; defendants are
not required to move for directed verdict on any lesser included
offenses to a particular charge in order to preserve the issue; and,
nor are they required to object to instructing the jury on that
particular charge to preserve the alleged directed verdict error.
(Emphasis added).
Here, Raehme moved for a directed verdict at the close of the
Commonwealth’s case and at the close of all evidence, as required. However,
Raehme merely stated that there was not “enough” to move forward to the jury
on the wanton murder charge, among other charges. At the close of all
evidence, Raehme simply renewed his motion. Raehme did not provide any
32
further detail or explanation as to which specific elements the Commonwealth
failed to prove. As such, and based on the clear and concise rule set forth in
Ray, Raehme’s motion for directed verdict was insufficient to preserve this
issue for appellate review.
Because this alleged error is unpreserved, we will only review for
palpable error. “A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party
may be considered . . . by an appellate court on appeal, even though
insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be
granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the
error.” RCr 10.26. The error must be “so manifest, fundamental and
unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process.” Martin v.
Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006). “A palpable error must be so
grave that, if uncorrected, it would seriously affect the fairness of the
proceedings.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 16, 30 (Ky. 2021) (citing
Ernst v. Commonwealth, 160 S.W.3d 744, 758 (Ky. 2005)).
When presented with a motion for a directed verdict,
the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from
the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is
sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict
should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the
trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth
is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and
weight to be given to such testimony.
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). On appeal, we
must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
33
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Woods,
657 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Ky. 2022) (quoting Potts v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d
345, 349 (Ky. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Despite not having made this argument before the trial court, Raehme
argues to this Court that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of
proving that Raehme acted wantonly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life. According to KRS 501.020(3), “[a] person acts
wantonly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute
defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the
circumstance exists.”
A directed verdict is appropriate where the Commonwealth produces “no
more than a mere scintilla” of such evidence. Beaumont v. Commonwealth, 295
S.W.3d 60, 68 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 188). Here, the
Commonwealth produced more than a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the
wanton murder charge. Raehme admitted to smoking marijuana the morning
of the collision and eventually admitted to having more than one beer.
Additionally, his blood alcohol level ranged between 0.69 and 0.74 nearly three
hours after the collision and lab results revealed he had synthetic marijuana in
his system. The Commonwealth also introduced the medical opinion of Dr.
Davis, who opined that Raehme was intoxicated to some degree by the
combination of marijuana and alcohol at the time of the collision. Multiple
34
officers and medical personnel smelled alcohol on Raehme and officers found
drugs in his vehicle. In addition, he was driving the wrong way on a divided
highway for about one mile– a highway he claimed he drove on often. Raehme
also was not wearing his glasses, despite his driver’s license stating he was
required to do so. This constitutes more than a mere scintilla of evidence
sufficient to submit the wanton murder charge to the jury.
Raehme points to cases in which he asserts the Court used a
“drunkenness-plus” framework to resolve wanton murder cases, such as Cook
v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351 (Ky. 2004), in which the Court determined
there was sufficient evidence for a jury to determine whether aggravated
wantonness existed in a case involving evidence of both intoxication and
excessive speed. In Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1977),
there was evidence that the defendant operated a motor vehicle while
intoxicated, drove with excessive speed, and ran a red light, and in Walden v.
Commonwealth, 805 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. 1991), overruled on other grounds by
Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 811 (Ky. 1996), the defendant
operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated at a high rate of speed and crossed
the center line. In both Hamilton and Walden, the Court found the defendants’
conduct sufficient to support wanton murder convictions.
Raehme argues that evidence of impairment was not overwhelming
because no tests were conducted at the crime scene, he did not exhibit obvious
signs of impairment, and his blood alcohol level was not tested until several
hours after the collision. But the evidence of impairment need not be
35
overwhelming to overcome a motion for directed verdict. Here, there was
evidence that suggested intoxication and Raehme was clearly driving the wrong
way on a divided highway. The Commonwealth also presented evidence that
Raehme was speeding. The driver of another car testified that Raehme passed
their vehicle while they were traveling at or just over the speed limit. All this
evidence satisfies the requirements for overcoming a motion for directed verdict
on the wanton murder charge. As such, the trial court did not err in denying
Raehme’s motion for directed verdict.
VI. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a witness
to testify via Zoom.
Raehme next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
a witness to testify via a pre-recorded Zoom session. The Commonwealth made
a motion to prerecord testimony from witnesses then show those recordings to
the jury. First, the Commonwealth sought to record the testimony of Dr. Keith
Miller, the victim’s treating surgeon, because Dr. Miller had a pre-planned
family vacation and was unable to attend the trial. Second, the
Commonwealth sought to allow Nicole Day, an employee of the laboratory that
tested Raehme’s blood and a chain-of-custody witness, to testify via Zoom
because she had COVID and her physician restricted her from traveling by
plane.
On July 19, 2022, defense counsel objected to both motions, arguing
that Raehme was facing a life sentence and had the right to cross-examine and
confront any witnesses. Approximately one week later, the topic of pre-
36
recorded and Zoom testimony was again presented to the trial court. Defense
counsel explicitly stated that she had no objection to Day’s testimony being
taken by deposition and played for the jury and expressly suggested that in the
interest of judicial economy, these witnesses could testify remotely. Right
before Day testified, Raehme again objected to the remote testimony. When the
Commonwealth pointed out that defense counsel previously represented she
assented to the remote testimony, defense counsel withdrew her objection.
In any event, the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection for
public policy reasons because Day was infected with COVID. Public policy
supported keeping her out of the court room and having the potential to infect
others.
Although this is likely an issue of invited error, since defense counsel
agreed to Day’s remote testimony given that she was a chain-of-custody
witness, we nonetheless find no error in the trial court admitting her remote
testimony. In Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857-58 (1990), the Supreme
Court held that the right to face-to-face confrontation “may be abridged only
where there is a ‘case-specific finding of necessity.’” A defendant’s
Confrontation Clause rights may be satisfied without face-to-face confrontation
“only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important
public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise
assured.” Id. at 850.
Raehme cites Campbell v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Ky.
2023), in which this Court reversed a first-degree assault conviction because
37
the trial court allowed the treating physician to testify via Zoom. The doctor
was served with a subpoena one day prior to his scheduled testimony, and his
testimony was imperative because whether the victim suffered a serious
physical injury was an essential element to the first-degree assault charge. Id.
The Court concluded that the need to testify remotely amounted to a
scheduling conflict, not a compelling need. Id. at 161.
In this case, Day was a chain of custody witness. While her testimony
was valuable, it does not rise to the level of importance of the physician’s
testimony in Campbell. Further, Day did not testify in person due to COVID
and travel restrictions imposed by her physician. This is a prime example of a
public policy reason sufficient to justify a lack of face-to-face confrontation.
While Raehme notes that Day’s isolation period had ended, this does not
necessarily mean it was safe or permissible for Day to travel interstate from
Pennsylvania to Kentucky. Here, the testimony was pre-recorded for the jury
and taken via Zoom. Raehme was able to cross-examine Day and had the
ability to question her as to whether the lab she worked for is licensed in
Kentucky, a fact that he now argues gave him serious concerns. Therefore, no
confrontation violation occurred, and the trial court did not err by allowing Day
to testify remotely and pre-record her testimony to play for the jury. 5
5 In the relevant facts section of his brief, Raehme also includes information
about the trial court allowing Heidi Schimmelbusch and Dr. Miller to testify via in-
person depositions conducted prior to trial. However, the argument section of his brief
is entirely devoted to discussing Day’s testimony. Therefore, we decline to address any
perceived error in allowing Schimmelbusch and Dr. Miller to testify in this manner.
38
VII. The trial court properly allowed witnesses to testify as to the
victim’s father’s former position with Kentucky State Police.
The victim’s father, Dewan Kelly, is a retired Kentucky State Police
trooper who served over twenty years. Prior to trial, Raehme filed a motion in
limine to limit Mr. Kelly’s testimony to leave out information about his
occupation. The defense reasoned that the jury’s knowledge of Mr. Kelly being
a retired trooper could cause the jury to automatically trust Mr. Kelly, thereby
causing undue prejudice against Raehme. The defense also noted the value of
such evidence was insignificant. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning
that introductory information about a witness is well-established and common
practice.
This issue is properly preserved for our review and we review this
admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Mason v. Commonwealth, 559
S.W.3d 337, 339 (Ky. 2018). During the guilt phase, the victim’s sister testified
that her dad is a retired trooper. During the penalty phase, Mr. Kelly
discussed his twenty years of service as a state trooper and mentioned his
experience as a state police officer two other times during his testimony.
The Commonwealth argues that Mr. Kelly’s position as a retired state
trooper constitutes background information about the victim, and that
background evidence about a victim is generally admissible. Ward v.
Commonwealth, 568 S.W.3d 824, 834 (Ky. 2019). We agree. The
Commonwealth introduced evidence in the guilt phase that identifies a victim
“as a living person rather than a simple statistic.” Ernst, 160 S.W.3d at 763
39
(citing McQueen v. Commonwealth, 669 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Ky. 1984)). Such
evidence does not become unduly prejudicial unless the victim is glorified or
enlarged, or the evidence is used to arouse sympathy, Ward, 568 S.W.3d at
834, neither of which were done here. As a result, the trial court did not err in
allowing witnesses to identify Mr. Kelly as a retired State Trooper.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Hardin Circuit
Court.
All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell,
JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky
Daniel J. Grabowski
Assistant Solicitor General
40
Tyrone Raehme v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Combined Opinion