Westminster Management v. Smith

Westminster Management, LLC, et al. v. Tenae Smith, et al., No. 4, September Term, 2023.

LANDLORD-TENANT LAW – RESIDENTIAL LEASES – REAL PROPERTY
§ 8-401 – MEANING OF RENT
Real Property Article § 8-401 allows a landlord to pursue the summary ejectment of a
tenant from the leased premises upon a tenant’s failure to pay “rent.” The term “rent” as
used in § 8-401 and applied to residential tenants means the fixed, periodic payments a
residential tenant must pay for use or occupancy of a rented premises.

LANDLORD-TENANT LAW – RESIDENTIAL LEASES – REAL PROPERTY
§§ 8-208(d)(2) AND 8-401 – PAYMENT ALLOCATION CLAUSES
Real Property Article § 8-208(d)(2) prohibits clauses in residential leases in which a tenant
waives or foregoes any right or remedy provided by applicable law. Inclusion in a
residential lease of a “payment allocation clause” that permits the landlord to allocate
payments of “rent” to other obligations, and thereby subject a tenant to summary ejectment
proceedings based on the failure to pay “rent,” violates § 8-208(d)(2).

LANDLORD-TENANT LAW – RESIDENTIAL LEASES – REAL PROPERTY
§ 8-208(d)(3)(i) – LATE FEES
Real Property Article § 8-208(d)(3)(i) prohibits provisions in residential leases that provide
for a penalty for the late payment of rent “in excess of 5% of the rent due for the rental
period in which the payment was delinquent.” The 5% late fee is inclusive of any costs
incurred to collect rent other than court costs actually awarded by the court.

CIVIL PROCEDURE – CLASS ACTIONS – MD. RULE 2-231 – SUBSEQUENT
MOTIONS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
In addressing a motion to certify or de-certify a class after a court has ruled on a prior
certification motion, a court must determine whether there has been a material change in
circumstances, which may include a change in the claims, defendants, evidence, or class
definition when those changes materially alter the relevant considerations for class
certification. If there has been a material change in circumstances, the court should address
the merits of the subsequent motion unless that motion is deficient for other reasons.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-17-004797
Argued: November 6, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 4

September Term, 2023

______________________________________

WESTMINSTER MANAGEMENT, LLC, et
al.

v.

TENAE SMITH, et al.

______________________________________

Fader, C.J.,
Watts,
Hotten,
Booth,
Gould,
Eaves,
Harrell, Glenn T., Jr. (Senior
Justice, Specially Assigned),

JJ.
______________________________________
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Opinion by Fader, C.J.
Government Article) this document is authentic. Gould and Harrell, JJ., concur and dissent.
2024.03.25
______________________________________
'00'04- 13:25:02

Gregory Hilton, Clerk
Filed: March 25, 2024
 Maryland statutory law provides a process by which a landlord may obtain an order

to evict tenants from leased property if the tenants fail to timely pay their “rent.” This

process, known as summary ejectment, is unlike any other litigation procedure in Maryland

due to the combination of its speed (trial must be held within six days of filing absent

unanimous agreement to postpone further), the absence of a requirement of personal

service, the lack of opportunity for pretrial discovery, the allowance for one side to be

represented in court by non-lawyers, and the short window for appeal (four days), among

other factors. As a result, the grounds for invoking the process and the relief available

through it are circumscribed. Particularly relevant here, the summary ejectment process:

(1) may be invoked only when “the tenant or tenants fail to pay the rent when due and

payable,” Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. Art. § 8-401(a) (2023 Repl.); and (2) with respect to

residential tenancies, may be used only (i) to regain possession of the rented premises and

(ii) if (and only if) personal service is made, to recover rent due and unpaid, late fees, and

court costs, id. § 8-401(a), (e)(2), (e)(3), (f)(1)(i).

The first question presented in this appeal is what constitutes “rent,” such that a

residential tenant’s failure to pay it when due provides grounds for initiating a summary

ejectment proceeding. The petitioners, Westminster Management, LLC and its

predecessor, JK2 Westminster, LLC (collectively, “Westminster”), contend that the term

“rent,” as used in the summary ejectment statute, Real Property § 8-401, encompasses

whatever a written lease says it encompasses. Here, Westminster’s form leases define

“rent” as “[a]ll payments from Tenant to Landlord required under the terms of this Lease.”

Such payments could presumably include, among others: (1) the fixed amount the tenant
is obligated to pay for use or occupancy of the leased premises on a periodic basis;

(2) additional fixed periodic charges (e.g., trash collection); (3) additional variable periodic

charges (e.g., utility fees); (4) fees charged for late payments or other lease violations;

(5) fees paid to a third party agent to initiate summary ejectment proceedings; and (6) filing

fees and other court costs.

The respondents, former tenants at residential properties managed by Westminster

(“Tenants”),1 contend that “rent,” as used in the summary ejectment statute, is more

specific and limited. The Appellate Court of Maryland mostly agreed with the Tenants, as

do we. We hold that in the context of residential leases, “rent,” for purposes of § 8-401 of

the Real Property Article, means the fixed, periodic payments a tenant is obligated to pay

for use or occupancy of the leased premises. Provisions of residential leases that purport

to expand the definition of “rent” are ineffective for purposes of § 8-401.

The second question before us is the legality of a provision in Westminster leases

that permits Westminster to allocate all tenant payments, including those expressly

designated as “rent,” to other, non-“rent” obligations. We hold that such an allocation

provision violates the prohibition in Real Property § 8-208(d)(2) against requiring a tenant

“to waive or to forego any right or remedy provided by applicable law,” because it

effectively allows a landlord to bring a summary ejectment proceeding based on allegedly

overdue “rent” that the tenant has already paid.

1
The Tenants are Tenae Smith, Howard Smith, Simone Ryer, Dechonne McBride,
and Louvinia Sneed.
2
 Third, we hold that the “penalty” or “late fee” a landlord may charge a tenant for

late payment of rent, which is capped at 5% of the monthly amount of rent due, Real

Property § 8-208(d)(3)(i), is inclusive of any costs of collection other than court-awarded

costs. Accordingly, § 8-208(d)(3)(i) precludes a landlord from charging a 5% late fee and

also imposing additional charges incurred due to the late payment of rent, other than court

costs when awarded by a court.

Fourth, we hold that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City erred in declining to review

the merits of the Tenants’ second renewed motion for class certification. A circuit court

may, in the exercise of its discretion, deny a subsequent motion for class certification—or

a motion to decertify a certified class—because, among other reasons, it does not represent

a material change from a prior motion. Here, however, the new motion and the amended

complaint on which it was based addressed all or nearly all of the grounds on which the

court had rejected the prior motion. The court therefore erred in declining to review the

merits of the motion on that basis.

Finally, we hold that the Appellate Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to

rule on the Tenants’ unpreserved contention that the circuit court erred by not granting their

motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.

3
 BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Background

We begin by exploring the two statutory provisions that are most relevant to the

issues before us, §§ 8-401 and 8-208 of the Real Property Article.

1. Real Property § 8-401

Section 8-401 provides a process by which a landlord can obtain an order for the

summary ejectment of a tenant who has fallen behind on rent. Summary ejectment “is a

powerful tool” that allows a landlord to repossess a leased premises as well as “collect

unpaid rent in an efficient and expedient manner.” Assanah-Carroll v. Law Offs. of Edward

J. Maher, P.C., 480 Md. 394, 431 (2022).

In Brown v. Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County, 350 Md.

570 (1998), this Court reviewed the development of the statutory right of summary

ejectment. As the Court explained, the common law action of (non-summary) ejectment

originally developed as a mechanism to provide an ousted tenant with a cause of action to

recover possession of leased property. Id. at 578. The action was eventually extended to

permit landlords “to recover possession from their tenants.” Id. Ejectment allowed a

landlord with a lease that provided a right of reentry for non-payment of rent to bring an

action to recover possession of the premises “whenever a half-year’s rent was in arrears.”

Id. at 581 (discussing 1872 Md. Laws, ch. 346).

The General Assembly first approved summary ejectment in cases of a tenant’s

non-payment of rent through Chapter 529 of the 1937 Laws of Maryland, which provided

4
landlords with the right to repossess leased premises “whenever a tenant under any rental

agreement failed to pay the rent provided for in the agreement.”2 Id. at 581. Under Chapter

529, a landlord—or an attorney or “duly qualified agent” on the landlord’s behalf—could

initiate a summary ejectment action by filing “a simple complaint describing the property

in general terms and stating the name of the tenant and the amount of rent due.” Id. Trial

was to be held on the second day after the complaint was filed, and a prevailing landlord

could recover possession of the premises as well as a “judgment for the amount of rent due

and costs.” 1937 Md. Laws, ch. 529. However, if a tenant tendered the amount of rent due

and costs of the suit at trial or the adjournment of trial, the complaint was deemed

“satisfied” and the proceedings complete. Id. If the landlord prevailed at trial, a justice of

the peace was to order the tenant to yield possession of the leased premises within two

days. Id. A tenant who did not do so could be removed by force if necessary. Id.

The current § 8-401 includes many of the elements of the summary ejectment

process the General Assembly first adopted in 1937. A landlord may initiate a summary

ejectment action “[w]henever the tenant or tenants fail to pay the rent when due and

payable.”3 Real Prop. § 8-401(a). A landlord does so by filing a complaint in the District

2
Summary ejectment has been available to landlords for another purpose—
recovering possession from holdover tenants—since 1793. Brown, 350 Md. at 580
(discussing 1793 Md. Laws, ch. 43).
3
In 2021, the General Assembly: (1) amended § 8-401 to require landlords to
provide residential tenants with written notice of an intent to file a summary ejectment
action if the outstanding rent is not paid within ten days; and (2) established a right to
counsel for tenants in summary ejectment proceedings. 2021 Md. Laws, ch. 746. Because

5
Court of Maryland describing the property, naming the tenants, “[s]tating the amount of

rent and any late fees due and unpaid,”4 and requesting to repossess the premises. Id.

§ 8-401(b)(2). The complaint may also request “a judgment for the amount of rent due,

costs, and any late fees.” Id. § 8-401(b)(2)(iv). The landlord, who may be represented in

the proceeding by a non-lawyer, Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. Art. § 10-206(b)(1)

(2018 Repl.; 2023 Supp.), also must “specify the amount of rent due for each rental period

under the lease, the day that the rent is due for each rental period, and any late fees for

overdue rent payments,” Real Prop. § 8-401(b)(3).

Personal service of the complaint and summons is required if the landlord seeks, in

addition to repossession of the property, a judgment for unpaid rent from a residential

tenant. Id. § 8-401(b)(5), (e)(2)(iv). Otherwise, service may be made by first-class mail

and by “affix[ing] an attested copy of the summons conspicuously upon the property.” Id.

§ 8-401(b)(4), (5). In either case, the summons directs the tenant to appear for a “trial to

be held on the fifth day after the filing of the complaint.” Id. § 8-401(b)(4)(i). The court

both changes post-date the events relevant to the complaint in this action, we will not
address them further.
4
Section 8-401 requires the landlord to state the amount of unpaid rent and late fees
“less the amount of any utility bills, fees, or security deposits paid by a tenant under § 7-309
of the Public Utilities Article” and requires that such amounts also be deducted from any
award made. Real Prop. § 8-401(b)(2)(iii)-(iv). Section 7-309 of the Public Utilities
Article applies to tenants who are subject to leases pursuant to which landlords are required
to pay utilities. Under that provision, if a landlord fails to pay the utilities, under certain
circumstances the tenants may arrange to pay the utility company directly and deduct any
such payments from their rent. Because the provisions of § 7-309 are not relevant to the
issues presented here, we will not address them further.
6
may adjourn trial for one additional day to enable either party to procure necessary

witnesses, but not for a longer period without unanimous consent. Id. § 8-401(e)(1).

Pretrial discovery is not permitted. Md. Rule 3-711.

At trial, the tenant must “show cause” as to why the landlord should not prevail.

Real Prop. § 8-401(b)(4)(ii). If the court determines “that the rent, or any part of the rent

and late fees are actually due and unpaid,” the court must: (1) determine the amount of

rent and late fees due at the time the complaint was filed; 5 (2) if the tenant was personally

served, enter a judgment in the amount of overdue rent and late fees, along with court

costs;6 and (3) “order that possession of the premises be given to the landlord . . . within 4

days after the trial.” Id. § 8-401(e)(2), (3). However, if at the trial or at the adjournment

of the trial, the tenant tenders to the landlord the rent and late fees due, along with the costs

of suit, the court must enter the complaint “as being satisfied.” Id. § 8-401(e)(5). Any

appeal from the court’s judgment must be taken within four days. Id. § 8-401(h)(1).

If the tenant does not comply with the court’s order awarding possession to the

landlord within four days, the landlord may request, and the court must issue, a warrant of

restitution directing a qualified county official to deliver possession of the property to the

5
If trial does not occur within the timeframe permitted by the statute, the court must
also include rent accruing after the complaint was filed. Real Prop. § 8-401(e)(2)(iii).
6
Because this case concerns only residential leases, our discussion of the applicable
law is limited to provisions related to residential leases unless otherwise specified. Section
8-401(e) treats non-residential tenancies differently from residential tenancies in several
respects, including with respect to the type of service required to obtain a monetary
judgment and the ability to recover attorney’s fees.
7
landlord, including by removing the tenant’s belongings from the property, “by force if

necessary.” Id. § 8-401(f)(1)(i).7 However, “at any time before actual execution of the

eviction order,” the tenant maintains a statutory right to redeem the premises by tendering

to the landlord “all past due amounts” plus court awarded costs and fees.8 Id. § 8-401(g)(1);

Velicky v. Copycat Bldg. LLC, 476 Md. 435, 454 (2021).

The summary ejectment process set forth in § 8-401 reflects the following

legislative judgments: (1) the bargain between a landlord and a tenant is that the tenant is

entitled to possession of the leased premises only for so long as the tenant is current on the

obligation to pay rent; (2) once the tenant is not current on that obligation, the landlord has

the right to regain possession unless the tenant becomes current on the obligation before

the landlord actually takes possession; and (3) because determining who has the superior

right to possession depends only on whether the tenant is current on the obligation to pay

rent, it is susceptible to proof through an expedited process that is “substantively and

procedurally limited, precluding complexity.” McDaniel v. Baranowski, 419 Md. 560, 585

(2011); see also id. at 578 (“It is obvious that, in this truncated process, the landlord’s

7
The landlord has 60 days from the date of judgment to request the warrant, and 60
days from the date the warrant is issued to act on it, or the judgment of possession is
stricken. Real Prop. § 8-401(f)(1)(ii)-(iii).
8
The tenant loses the statutory right of redemption if three judgments of possession
have been entered against the tenant in the prior twelve months, Real Prop. § 8-401(g)(3),
or if four such judgments are entered in that timeframe in Baltimore City, Code of Public
Local Laws of Baltimore City § 9-5(b)(2) (2023).
8
entitlement to enforcement of his superior interest in the premises is a given, once the

failure to pay rent is proven and appropriate notice is provided.”).

2. Real Property § 8-208

Section 8-208 of the Real Property Article requires a landlord who offers five or

more dwellings for rent in Maryland to use a written lease, and establishes requirements

for what such leases must and must not contain. As relevant here, § 8-208(d) provides:

A landlord may not use a lease or form of lease containing any provision that:

...

(2) Has the tenant agree to waive or to forego any right or remedy provided
by applicable law; [or]

(3)(i) Provides for a penalty for the late payment of rent in excess of 5% of
the amount of rent due for the rental period for which the payment was
delinquent[.]

Any such provisions in a residential lease are unenforceable by the landlord. Real Prop.

§ 8-208(g)(1). A tenant may recover actual damages and reasonable attorney’s fees

incurred when a landlord includes a prohibited provision in a lease or attempts to enforce

a prohibited provision. Id. § 8-208(g)(2). We discuss the history of this provision more

fully in Section I.D below.

B. Factual Background

The Tenants are five former tenants at four residential properties managed by

Westminster in Baltimore City and Baltimore County. Each of the Tenants signed a

standard form lease, which Westminster offers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis at its Maryland

properties. Each lease contains the following provisions relevant to our analysis:

9
 • A specified term during which the landlord leases the identified premises to
the tenant for a specified “rental” amount, payable in advance in equal
monthly installments without demand on the first day of each month;
• A “Definition of Rent” provision stating: “All payments from Tenant to
Landlord required under the terms of this Lease, including, but not limited
to, Court costs, shall be deemed rent”;
• A provision imposing an administrative fee in the amount of 10% of “current
monthly rental” and obligating tenants to pay attorney’s fees, in the event
they or specified other individuals violate the lease;
• A provision stating that if the landlord employs an agent to institute
proceedings to collect rent or repossess the premises, the tenant must pay the
reasonable costs incurred for the agent’s services if the rent was due and
payable when the proceedings were initiated;
• A “Late Charge” provision obligating the tenant to pay, “as additional rent,”
a charge of 5% of the monthly rental if the tenant fails to pay any installment
of rent by 4:30 p.m. on the fourth day beyond the due date;
• An “Application of Payments” provision stating: “All payments from Tenant
to Landlord may, at Landlord’s option, be applied in the following order to
debts owed by Tenant to Landlord: late charges, agent’s fees, attorney’s fees,
court costs, obligations other than rent (if any) due Landlord, other past due
rent other than monthly rent, past due monthly rent, current monthly rent”;
and
• A provision for automatic renewal of the lease absent three months’ advance
written notice by tenant or landlord of an intent not to renew.

Whenever any of its tenants fail to pay monthly rent by the fifth day of the month,

Westminster promptly: (1) charges a 5% late fee on or about the sixth day of the month;

(2) submits information about the delinquent tenants to its agent, eWrit, which then files

summary ejectment actions against those tenants; and (3) charges each tenant, sometimes

before a complaint is filed, both a “summons fee” of at least $20 and an “agent fee” or

“filing fee” of $10. The “summons fee” is reimbursement for the amount the District Court

charges to file the complaint, which varies by jurisdiction. The “agent fee” or “filing fee”

10
is reimbursement for the amount Westminster pays eWrit to prepare and file summary

ejectment complaints. Each of the Tenants was charged one or more of those fees on one

or more occasions after being late with their rent.

Westminster charges a second set of fees if it proceeds further toward eviction. If

the District Court enters judgment for Westminster in a summary ejectment action, and if

the tenant has not paid in full by midmonth, Westminster, through eWrit, files for a warrant

of restitution authorizing the sheriff to carry out an eviction. Upon taking that step,

Westminster charges tenants a “writ fee” of up to $50, depending on the jurisdiction.

Through January 2018, Westminster charged tenants at Baltimore City properties a “writ

fee” of $80 even though the court fee at that time was only $50.9 Westminster also charged

tenants an additional $12 “agent” or “writ agent” fee when eWrit filed for a warrant of

restitution, even though eWrit did not charge Westminster any additional fee for that

service. After this litigation began, Westminster credited the $12 agent fees and the $30

overcharge for the Baltimore City writ fees to the accounts of then-current tenants who had

been charged those fees, including two of the named plaintiffs. The credits did not include

interest, nor were any reimbursements made to former tenants.

Westminster at times sent notices to tenants stating that they may be evicted if they

did not pay “rent” in full, including agent and summons fees. Westminster typically sent

9
In Baltimore City, there is a $10 filing fee and a $40 service fee for warrants of
restitution. District Court of Maryland Cost Schedule, available at
https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/court-forms/dca109.pdf (last accessed
Feb. 13, 2024), archived at https://perma.cc/92BJ-7AQB.
11
these notices to tenants around the second week of the month, after it charged agent and

summons fees (and thus, presumably, after it filed a failure to pay rent complaint), but

before it filed for a warrant of restitution.

C. Procedural Background

1. The Complaint

The Tenants filed their initial complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in

2017. Smith v. Westminster Mgmt., LLC, Case No. 24-C-17-004797. The operative

complaint now is the third amended complaint, filed in May 2019. In Count One, the

Tenants allege, on behalf of themselves and a putative class of current and former

Westminster tenants, that Westminster has violated and continues to violate two of the

statutory lease prohibitions in Real Property § 8-208.

First, the Tenants contend that Westminster violates the prohibition in Real Property

§ 8-208(d)(3)(i) against penalties for late payment of rent in excess of 5% of the amount of

rent due for the rental period at issue. The Tenants claim that this is so because, upon the

nonpayment of rent, Westminster charges them “agent fees,” “summons fees,” and “writ

fees,” in addition to a 5% late fee.

Second, the Tenants contend that Westminster violates the prohibition in Real

Property § 8-208(d)(2) against requiring a tenant “to waive or to forego any right or remedy

provided by applicable law” by (1) defining “rent” in the lease to include all amounts owed

to the landlord and (2) providing that the landlord may allocate all payments from the tenant

to non-“rent” charges before allocating such payments to “rent.” The Tenants contend that

12
those provisions of the lease operate to waive their statutory right to face summary eviction

under Real Property § 8-401 only for the failure to pay “rent.”

In Counts Two and Three, respectively, the Tenants allege violations of the

Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. In

Count Four, the Tenants allege that Westminster breached the leases by, among other

things, utilizing an overly broad definition of rent and charging excessive late fees. In

Count Five, the Tenants allege that Westminster breached the leases by charging agent fees

it never incurred. Counts Two through Five are not directly at issue here, so we will not

discuss them further.

In Count Six, the Tenants seek a declaration, individually and on behalf of the

putative class, that (1) Westminster may not charge fees in excess of the 5% late fee limit

for failure to pay rent; (2) Westminster may not charge an “agent fee” or other fees it has

not incurred related to filing a warrant of restitution; (3) the 5% late fee may be based only

on base monthly rent actually due and owing in the relevant period; and (4) Westminster’s

lease provision defining “rent” and the payment allocation provision are illegal and

unenforceable. The Tenants further request that the circuit court either enjoin Westminster

from collecting excessive fees or, in the alternative, issue a declaration that Westminster is

not entitled to enforce collection of those fees.

2. Class Certification

The Tenants filed an initial motion for class certification in November 2018. In

January 2019, before that motion was decided, the Tenants filed a second amended

13
complaint and, with it, a revised motion for class certification. The circuit court denied the

revised motion for class certification in April 2019 on grounds that we discuss in detail

below. The Tenants then filed a third amended complaint in May 2019, along with a second

revised motion for class certification. In July 2019, the court, treating the second revised

motion as a motion for reconsideration, declined to reconsider its ruling. The court

concluded that there was no compelling reason for it to do so, that no “materially changed

or clarified circumstances” supported reconsideration, and that the third amended

complaint did “not materially change the circumstances of the case to convince the court

to reconsider or alter” its prior order.

3. Summary Judgment

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment in October 2019. In January

2020, in a one-sentence order, the circuit court granted Westminster’s motion as to all

counts of the third amended complaint “for reasons outlined in [Westminster’s motion] and

those which [Westminster] made during argument in open Court,” and denied the Tenants’

motion for summary judgment.10 Despite the request for entry of declaratory relief in

Count Six, the court did not enter a declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties.

See Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 608 (2007) (“This Court, on numerous

occasions, has reiterated that ‘whether a declaratory judgment action is decided for or

against the plaintiff, there should be a declaration in the judgment or decree defining the

10
Different judges ruled on the summary judgment motions and the class
certification motions.
14
rights of the parties under the issues made.’” (quoting Case v. Comptroller, 219 Md. 282,

288 (1959))).

The Appellate Court reversed in a thorough and thoughtful opinion. Smith

v. Westminster Mgmt., LLC, 257 Md. App. 336, 420 (2023). As relevant here, the

Appellate Court held that “rent” for purposes of Real Property § 8-401, with respect to

residential tenants, means “the periodic charge for use or occupancy of the premises, but

not the various other payments that the tenant may owe to the landlord from time to time,

even if the lease characterizes them as ‘deemed rent’ or ‘additional rent.’” Id. at 372

(quoting Lockett v. Blue Ocean Bristol, LLC, 446 Md. 397, 425 (2016)). The court also

concluded that a residential landlord in a summary ejectment action may recover, in

addition to the rent due, only late fees and court costs as awarded by the court, and that the

Tenants had therefore asserted a viable claim that Westminster exceeds the statutory late

fee cap when it charges agent and summons fees in addition to late fees upon late payment

of rent. Id. at 373-75. The court also impliedly rejected Westminster’s arguments that the

allocation provision of its leases does not, as a matter of law, violate Real Property

§ 8-208(d). Id. at 391, 393, 394, 403.11 The intermediate appellate court thus held that the

circuit court erred in granting Westminster’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 420.

The court declined to review the circuit court’s denial of the Tenants’ motion for summary

11
In rulings not challenged by Westminster in this Court, the Appellate Court also
revived the Tenants’ claims under the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act and the
Maryland Consumer Protection Act, and for breach of contract. Smith, 257 Md. App. at
392-402.
15
judgment, concluding that the Tenants had not raised or meaningfully argued that issue in

their briefs. Id. at 380 n.38, 386 n.44.

Finally, with respect to class certification, the Appellate Court concluded that “[t]o

the extent that the circuit court viewed the [Tenants’] second motion for class certification

as simply a motion for reconsideration, the court erred.” Id. at 418. Relying on this Court’s

recent decision in Chavis v. Blibaum & Associates, P.A., 476 Md. 534 (2021), the court

held that, given its conclusion “that appellants presented viable claims,” the Tenants should

be permitted to file a new motion for class certification on remand. Smith, 257 Md. App.

at 419-20.

Westminster filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the Tenants filed a

cross-petition. This Court granted both. Westminster Mgmt., LLC v. Smith, 483 Md. 571

(2023).

DISCUSSION

I. REAL PROPERTY §§ 8-208 AND 8-401 CONTENTIONS

A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment without deference.

Bd. of County Comm’rs of St. Mary’s County v. Aiken, 483 Md. 590, 616 (2023). The

Court undertakes “an independent review of the record to determine whether a genuine

dispute of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Md. Cas. Co. v. Blackstone Int’l Ltd., 442 Md. 685, 694 (2015).

16
 B. “Rent” Defined

Westminster and the Tenants propose different interpretations of the term “rent” as

used in Real Property § 8-401 and applied to residential leases. Westminster, citing

precedent from this Court interpreting § 8-401 in the commercial lease context (Shum

v. Gaudreau, 317 Md. 49 (1989) and University Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Garcia,

279 Md. 61 (1977)), contends that “rent” can mean whatever the parties agree it means in

the lease, as long as the landlord is not shown to have engaged in overreaching or coercion.

The Tenants, citing precedent from this Court interpreting a sister provision of the Real

Property Article in the context of a residential lease (Lockett v. Blue Ocean Bristol, LLC,

446 Md. 397 (2016)), contend that the Appellate Court correctly defined “rent” for a

residential lease more narrowly. We agree with the Tenants and the Appellate Court.

As this Court observed more than 30 years ago, “[t]he primary significance in

classifying various monetary obligations as rent is to give the landlord the benefit of special

landlord remedies in the event of default, such as summary dispossession of the tenant[.]”

Shum, 317 Md. at 63 n.9 (quoting R. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant

§ 5:35 at 338 (1980)). In effect, the broader the scope of what constitutes “rent,” the

broader the scope of unpaid obligations that can serve as a basis on which a landlord may

initiate a summary ejectment action under Real Property § 8-401.

We pause at the outset to emphasize that what hangs in the balance of our decision

concerning the scope of “rent” for purposes of § 8-401 is not whether a landlord can enforce

any particular payment obligation owed by a tenant. Instead, the issue is whether a landlord

17
can enforce any such obligation through the mechanism of a summary ejectment action.12

Given the efficiencies involved in the expedited summary ejectment process, as well as the

substantial leverage it provides to landlords, it is understandable that landlords would

prefer to use summary ejectment to enforce as many tenant obligations as possible. But

the General Assembly has made it available only to enforce the obligation to pay “rent.”

Our task is, therefore, to determine the scope of tenant payment obligations encompassed

by the General Assembly’s use of that term, and whether it was the General Assembly’s

intent to permit landlords and tenants to expand that scope by defining other obligations as

“rent.”

1. Prior Caselaw

We are not writing on an entirely blank slate. On three prior occasions, this Court

has wrestled with the meaning of “rent” under a provision of Title 8 of the Real Property

Article. Although none of those cases concerned a summary ejectment proceeding

involving a residential lease, their analyses are instructive.

First, in Garcia, 279 Md. 61, we considered the meaning of “rent” in Real Property

§ 8-401 in the context of a commercial lease. A lease for a grocery store required the tenant

to pay as “additional rent,” among other things, “all other sums of money or charges

12
In addition to a common law action for breach of contract, the Real Property
Article provides landlords with causes of action that can be used in different circumstances,
including an action for distress for rent, Real Prop. §§ 8-302–8-332; a tenant hold over
action, id. § 8-402; and an action for breach of lease, id. § 8-402.1. See generally Ben-
Davies v. Blibaum & Assocs., P.A., 457 Md. 228, 252-58 (2018); see also Velicky, 476 Md.
at 453-60 (summarizing landlord statutory remedies for repossession of property).
18
required to be paid by Tenant under this lease.” Id. at 63. When the tenant failed to pay

certain construction costs, the landlord brought a summary ejectment action. Id. at 64.

One of the tenant’s defenses was that the construction costs were not “rent.” Id. In

rejecting that argument, the Court found “substantial agreement” among courts “that ‘rent’,

in its legal connotations, is the compensation paid by a tenant for the use of land,” id. at

65-66, and held that “charges which may be definitely ascertained, paid by the tenant, and

going to [the tenant’s] use, possession and enjoyment of rental commercial premises, are

rent if such was the intention of the parties,” id. at 67. Applying that standard, the Court

held that the construction charges at issue were “rent” under the lease and that the tenant’s

failure to pay them was ground for a summary ejectment action.13 Id. at 68.

Notably for our purposes, in arriving at its holding, the Court emphasized that its

decision was limited “to premises leased for commercial purposes as distinguished from

residential use.” Id. at 67. The Court observed that the terms of commercial leases defining

“rent” broadly could be expected to “fairly represent the actual intention of the parties”

because in such leases “there is little likelihood of successful overreaching on the part of

the landlord and of coerced adhesion on the part of the tenant.” Id. The same could not be

13
Before concluding that the construction charges at issue qualified as “rent,” the
Court observed that the fact that “the charges went to Tenant’s use, possession and
enjoyment of the demised premises is so clear as not to require discussion.” Garcia, 279
Md. at 68. It thus appears that our predecessors did not embrace the full breadth of the
definition of “rent” in the lease, but were willing to apply it to charges going to the tenant’s
use, possession, and enjoyment of the premises. While costs for construction intended to
make the property useful to the tenant plainly meet that standard, it is less clear that costs
incurred to sue the tenant for rent owed—such as those at issue here—would.
19
said in the residential context. Id. In dicta, the Court stated that whether certain charges

are included in “rent” in a residential lease was “best left for determination on a case to

case basis, depending upon the provisions of the lease, express or implied, verbal or

written, and, where appropriate, the attendant circumstances.” Id.

Second, in Shum, 317 Md. 49, we applied our ruling in Garcia in the context of

another commercial lease.14 At issue in Shum was the landlord’s attempt to recover from

the tenant damages due to property damage and for costs incurred to adapt the premises to

the tenant’s permitted use. Id. at 53, 61. As part of its analysis, the Court explored whether

such contract damages could have been recoverable as “rent” in an earlier summary

ejectment action.15 Id. at 61-63. The Court ultimately concluded that those damages were

recoverable as “rent” to the extent they were incurred before the tenant vacated the

property. Id. at 65-67.

Notably, our discussion in Shum emphasized that the holding in Garcia was limited

to commercial leases and “expressly le[ft] open, for determination on a case-by-case basis,

14
Although the property at issue in Shum was a residential property, it was
undisputed that it was used for commercial purposes. 317 Md. at 63-64. The Court
therefore treated the lease as commercial. Id.
15
The issue addressed in Shum was whether the breach of contract action was
precluded in whole or in part by res judicata due to the prior summary ejectment
proceeding. 317 Md. at 53. The landlord had neither sought nor recovered the contract
damages at issue in the summary ejectment proceeding. Id. at 52. The issue for res judicata
purposes, however, was whether the landlord could have made a claim for such damages
in the earlier proceeding. Id. at 59. In that context, the Court explored what contract
damages could have been recovered as “rent” in the summary ejectment proceeding. Id. at
61-66.
20
‘the question whether similar charges under a lease of residential property would be rent.’”

Shum, 317 Md. at 62-63 (quoting Garcia, 279 Md. at 67). We further observed that in

addition to the concern expressed in Garcia about the uneven bargaining power between

landlords and residential tenants, “there may be other policies that would not allow free

rein in the definition of rent to the parties to a residential lease.” Id. at 63 n.9.

Third, in Lockett, 446 Md. 397, we considered the meaning of rent as used in Real

Property § 8-208.1, which prohibits a landlord from taking certain retaliatory actions

against a residential tenant. The issue in Lockett was whether the tenant was eligible for

relief under § 8-208.1 for one of two instances of retaliation found by the circuit court. Id.

at 415. That issue, in turn, depended on whether the tenant was “current on the rent” at the

time the landlord engaged in the retaliatory conduct. Id. Although the parties agreed that

the tenant “had fully paid the fixed monthly amount specified as the ‘rent’” in her lease,

they disputed whether she had paid “other charges, such as utility charges and other fees

that varied from month-to-month and that the lease ‘deemed rent.’” Id. at 404.

Notwithstanding their treatment in the lease, we determined that such charges were not

“rent” for purposes of § 8-208.1. Id. at 425. Our analysis is instructive.

As an initial matter, we rejected the landlord’s argument that Garcia and Shum

controlled the outcome. Id. at 419-20. Observing that the holdings in those cases were

expressly limited to commercial leases, which are likely to be the product of negotiations

between the parties, we stated that “[r]esidential leases are more likely to be provided on a

take-it-or-leave-it basis and, as here, to be provided after the tenant has already agreed to

21
lease the premises and to be signed by the tenant without being read.” Id. at 419-20.

Moreover, we observed, “deferring to the lease’s definition of ‘rent’ would incentivize

landlords to characterize all possible debts from the tenant to the landlord as ‘rent[.]’” Id.

at 420.

After noting that the lease at issue in Lockett was itself internally inconsistent in

how it referred to “rent,” we turned to our “normal tools of statutory construction for

guidance.” Id. at 420-21. Beginning with the plain text, we observed that dictionary

definitions of rent generally defined it as “the periodic sum paid for the use or occupancy

of property.” Id. at 421. We further observed that the statutory context also supported an

interpretation of rent as “the periodic amount paid by a tenant for use or occupancy.” Id.

at 422. That context included other uses of “rent” in § 8-208.1, as well as references to the

term elsewhere in subtitle 2 of Title 8, all of which suggested a readily ascertainable fixed

sum payable on a periodic basis. Id. at 422-23.

Turning to legislative purpose, we recognized that § 8-208.1 was a remedial statute

that is to “be liberally construed . . . in order to effectuate [its] broad remedial purpose,” id.

at 424 (quoting Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 326 (2003)), and for which exemptions “must

be narrowly construed,” id. at 424 (quoting State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Billhimer,

314 Md. 46, 64 (1988)). We therefore concluded that “the gas charges, late fees, and court

filing fee” in dispute were not “rent” for purposes of § 8-208.1 and so were irrelevant to

the determination of whether the tenant was “current on the rent.” Id. at 425.

22
 Westminster contends that Garcia and Shum are dispositive here, standing for the

proposition that “additional rent charges” are rent if the parties have so agreed unless, on a

case-by-case basis, the landlord is shown to have engaged in overreaching or coercion. We

disagree. The holdings of both cases were expressly limited to the commercial context,

and both identified the difference in bargaining power in the residential context as a reason

why a different rule may apply there. Shum, 317 Md. at 62-63, 63 n.9; Garcia, 279 Md. at

67. That same concern is further reflected in our related discussion in Lockett. 446 Md. at

419-20.

Although Garcia and Shum each include dicta suggesting that the enforceability of

broad definitions of “rent” in residential leases might be determined on a case-by-case

basis, Garcia, 279 Md. at 67; Shum, 317 Md. at 62-63, doing so in the summary ejectment

context is not feasible. As discussed in Shum, the General Assembly “limited a summary

ejectment action to repossession of premises and rent actually due,” because the

determination of rent due is generally “a relatively straightforward calculation, and its

recovery is not inconsistent with simple and speedy adjudication.” 317 Md. at 60.

However, introducing issues involving “possible complexities of proof” “would be

contrary to the purpose of the summary ejectment statutory scheme.” Id. As Westminster

admitted during oral argument, an investigation into the facts and circumstances

surrounding the negotiation of a lease to determine whether the landlord had overreached

or exercised coercion is incompatible with the discovery-free, high-volume, expedited

23
summary ejectment process.16 In effect, Westminster’s position is that when it brings a

summary ejectment action against a tenant, the tenant is bound by whatever definition of

“rent” is in the lease unless the tenant succeeds in proving a claim that cannot be proven in

a summary ejectment proceeding. We find that contention untenable.

In sum, Garcia and Shum are not dispositive. Lockett, which was limited to

determining the definition of “rent” in § 8-208.1, is persuasive but also not dispositive. We

therefore turn to our normal tools of statutory construction.

2. Statutory Interpretation Principles

“The goal of statutory construction is to discern and carry out the intent of the

Legislature.” Blue v. Prince George’s County, 434 Md. 681, 689 (2013). Our search for

legislative intent begins with the text of the provision we are interpreting, viewed not in

isolation but “within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs.” Nationstar

Mortg. LLC v. Kemp, 476 Md. 149, 169 (2021). Our review of the text is wholistic, seeking

to give effect to all of what the General Assembly included and not to add anything that

16
As Maryland Legal Aid and others note in their amicus brief, 211,509 summary
ejectment cases were filed in the first six months of 2023, an average of 35,251 per month.
District Court of Maryland, 2023 Statistics, at 9, 18, 27, 36, 45, 54 available at
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/district/Calendar_2023.pdf (last accessed
Feb. 6, 2024), archived at https://perma.cc/8P93-KSVQ. A 2016 report on Rent Court
proceedings in the District Court in Baltimore City found that there were three Rent Court
dockets daily with room for up to 1,100 cases per day. District Court of Maryland for
Baltimore City, Rent Court Summer Work Group Report, at 3 (Dec. 8, 2016), available at
https://www.ubalt.edu/academics/prelaw/Rent%20Court%20Summer%20Work%20Grou
p%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (last accessed Feb. 6, 2024), archived at
https://perma.cc/M2NN-TW3H.
24
the General Assembly omitted. In our analysis of statutory text, we therefore take the

language as we find it, neither adding to nor deleting from it; we avoid “forced or subtle

interpretations”; and we avoid constructions that would negate portions of the language or

render them meaningless. Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 377 (2021); see also

Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275 (2010); Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14,

25-26 (2013). When statutory terms are undefined, we often look to dictionary definitions

as a starting point, to identify the “ordinary and popular meaning” of the terms,

Comptroller v. FC-GEN Operations Invs. LLC, 482 Md. 343, 390 (2022), before

broadening our analysis to consider the other language of the provisions in which the terms

appear and the statutory scheme as a whole, including any legislative purpose that is

discernible from the statutory text. Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275-76. Presuming the General

Assembly “intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body

of law,” we also “seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent

possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.” Wheeling, 473 Md. at 377 (quoting

Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275-76).

After exhausting the tools available for our textual analysis, viewed in context of

the statutory scheme and in light of apparent legislative purpose, we determine whether the

statute is ambiguous. Ambiguity can arise in two different ways: “Where the words of a

statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the

words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when

read as part of a larger statutory scheme.” Bennett v. Harford County, 485 Md. 461, 485-86

25
(2023) (quoting FC-GEN Operations, 482 Md. at 380). If neither applies, “our inquiry

generally ceases at that point and we apply the statute as written.”17 Williams v. Morgan

State Univ., 484 Md. 534, 546 (2023) (quoting Thornton Mellon, LLC v. Adrianne Dennis

Exempt Tr., 478 Md. 280, 313-14 (2022)). If, however, the statute is ambiguous, we seek

to “resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the

history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative

process.” Bennett, 485 Md. at 486 (quoting FC-GEN Operations, 482 Md. at 380). Such

sources include “the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by

authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to

it.” Boffen v. State, 372 Md. 724, 737 (2003) (quoting Goldberg v. Miller, 371 Md. 591,

602 (2002)); see also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 189 (1982) (“the history of the

passage of the law, the reports of committees and commissions, the introduction of

amendments and testimony given before legislative committees” aid in examining

legislative intent).

Finally, “[i]n every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not

one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.” FC-GEN Operations,

482 Md. at 380 (quoting Wheeling, 473 Md. at 377). When one interpretation of statutory

17
Even when we determine that a statute’s plain language is unambiguous, we may,
in our discretion, decide to consult legislative history to confirm our interpretation of the
statute’s plain language. Doe v. Catholic Relief Servs., 484 Md. 640, 652 (2023) (citing
Rowe v. Md. Comm’n on Civ. Rts., 483 Md. 329, 343 (2023) and Wheeling, 473 Md. at
384-85 n.9).
26
language would produce such a result, we will reject that interpretation in favor of another

that does not suffer the same flaw. Bell v. Chance, 460 Md. 28, 53 (2018); see also

Nationstar, 476 Md. at 170 (explaining that “it is important to consider the consequences

of alternative interpretations of the statute, in order to avoid constructions that are illogical

or nonsensical, or that render a statute meaningless” (internal quotations and citations

omitted)).

3. Statutory Construction of “Rent”

The term “rent” is not defined in Title 8 of the Real Property Article. Lockett, 446

Md. at 418. Turning to dictionary definitions to begin our textual analysis, Merriam-

Webster defines “rent” as “a usu[al] fixed periodical return made by a tenant or occupant

of property to the owner for the possession and use thereof; esp[ecially]: an agreed sum

paid at fixed intervals by a tenant to the landlord.” Rent, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate

Dictionary 1054 (11th ed. 2014). The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “rent” as

“a tenant’s regular payment to a landlord for the use of property or land.” Rent, New Oxford

American Dictionary 1478 (3d ed. 2010). And Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines

“rent” as “[c]onsideration paid, usu[ally] periodically, for the use or occupancy of property

(esp[ecially] real property).” Rent, Black’s Law Dictionary 1551 (11th ed. 2019). We thus

begin with an understanding that the usual and ordinary meaning of “rent” is a tenant’s

fixed, periodic payments to a landlord for the use or possession of property.

As in Lockett, the statutory context further supports that interpretation. Section

8-401 refers to “rent” several times in circumstances suggesting its ordinary meaning. For

27
example, § 8-401(b)(3) requires a landlord, for purposes of assisting the court’s ultimate

determination of “the amount of rent and late fees due,” Real Prop. § 8-401(e)(2)(ii), to

specify “the amount of rent due for each rental period under the lease” and, separately,

“any late fees for overdue rent payments.” If “rent” encompassed those late fees, it would

not be necessary to separately identify them. And if “rent” encompassed other amounts

beyond “the amount of rent due for each rental period,” landlords would presumably be

required to specify those other charges as well. The same provision also requires a landlord

to specify “the day that the rent is due for each rental period.” Id. § 8-401(b)(3) (emphasis

added). And several provisions of § 8-401 identify “rent” separately from “late fees” and

“costs of suit.”18 See, e.g., id. § 8-401(b)(2)(iii) & (iv), (e)(2)(iv), (e)(5), (g)(1).

In Lockett, we noted other provisions in subtitle 2 of Title 8 of the Real Property

Article that supported our conclusion there that the General Assembly used “rent” “in a

way that appears to exclude . . . variable charges.” Lockett, 446 Md. at 423; see Real Prop.

§ 8-203(b) (limiting security deposits to two months’ rent); id. § 8-203(i)(3)(i) (limiting

the amount of a surety bond to two months’ rent); id. § 8-212.3 (allowing utility payments

18
Other provisions in subtitle 4 similarly delineate these terms separately. See Real
Prop. § 8-402(a)(2), (a)(3)(ii) (in tenant holdover statute, damages for landlord must exceed
“apportioned rent for the period of holdover at the rate under the lease” and court may give
judgment for “damages determined to be due together with costs of the suit”);
§ 8-402.1(b)(2) (in breach of lease proceeding, tenant may retain possession through appeal
if tenant, among other requirements, “pays all rent in arrears” and “all court costs”);
§ 8-402.1(c)(2) (in breach of lease proceeding, providing that tenant payments accepted by
landlord after notice of breach of lease but before eviction “shall be first applied to the
rent” and “then to court costs, including court awarded damages and legal fees”).
28
to be deducted from rent under certain circumstances). And in the Appellate Court’s

decision in this case, in a ruling Westminster did not challenge, the intermediate appellate

court held that “rent” as used in Real Property § 8-208 means the periodic charge for use

or occupancy of the premises. Smith v. Westminster Mgmt., LLC, 257 Md. App. 336, 372

(2023). The context of the broader statutory scheme thus provides strong support for

interpreting “rent” consistent with its ordinary meaning as a tenant’s fixed, periodic

payments to a landlord for the use or possession of property.

The apparent purpose of the summary ejectment statute is to allow landlords to

repossess a rented premises upon nonpayment of rent quickly and efficiently, subject to the

right of tenants to become current on their rent obligation (plus late fees and any awarded

court costs) at any time before eviction.19 As discussed above, summary ejectment is

rooted in the superior right of a landlord to possession of a rented premises once the tenant

has ceased paying rent. See McDaniel v. Baranowski, 419 Md. 560, 586 (2011) (“The

summary ejectment procedure itself is mired in the superior title of the landlord to the

leased premises, once nonpayment occurs[.]”). Nothing in the statute supports

19
At oral argument, counsel for Westminster, in discussing Lockett, stated that Real
Property § 8-401 is a remedial statute intended to benefit landlords, and that it must
therefore be construed liberally for the benefit of landlords. For two reasons, we disagree.
First, the benefits provided to landlords are limited to circumstances in which “the tenant
or tenants fail to pay the rent when due and payable.” Real Prop. § 8-401(a). The definition
of “rent” is thus critical to determining when the statute is implicated at all. Because the
remedial purpose of the statute is limited to addressing matters properly within the scope
of the statute, it would be inappropriate to invoke that remedial purpose as part of an inquiry
into the scope itself. Second, the protections for tenants built into § 8-401 paint a more
complicated picture of the purpose of the statute as a whole.
29
Westminster’s position that the General Assembly intended to make summary ejectment

available to landlords as a mechanism to collect any and all fees, costs, and other

obligations residential tenants may owe in addition to “rent.” We decline to expand the

scope of a mechanism the General Assembly made available for a limited purpose.

We therefore conclude that when applied to residential leases, “rent,” for purposes

of Real Property § 8-401, means the fixed, periodic payments a tenant owes for use or

occupancy of a rented premises.20

Westminster’s other arguments in opposition to this interpretation lack merit. First,

Westminster contends that reliance on Lockett is inconsistent with this Court’s holding in

Ben-Davies v. Blibaum & Associates, P.A., 457 Md. 228, 270 (2018). We see no conflict.

In Ben-Davies, the parties disputed the meaning of the phrase “money judgment for rent of

residential premises,” as used in § 11-107(b) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.

Id. at 231. The appellee asserted that the analysis in Lockett showed that the definition of

20
Even were we to look exclusively to the leases for the definition of “rent,” the
Westminster form lease is internally inconsistent, just as the lease was in Lockett. For
example, although the “Definition of Rent” provision defines all payments due from the
tenant to the landlord as “rent,” the “Application of Payments” provision permits
Westminster to allocate tenant payments to “late charges,” “agent’s fees,” “attorney’s
fees,” “court costs,” and “obligations other than rent (if any) due Landlord,” before
allocating such payments to “monthly rent.” The lease further requires a “late charge” of
5% of the “monthly rental” be paid as “additional rent” when the tenant fails to pay “an
installment of the rent” on time. Furthermore, a paragraph addressing early termination of
the lease requires a payment of “two [] additional mont[hs’] rent” and a paragraph
regarding military tenants who receive change of station orders limits the liability of such
tenants “for rent” in part to “[t]hirty days’ rent.” Many of these provisions make sense
only if “rent” is limited to the fixed sum payable on a periodic basis for use and occupancy
of the premises.
30
“rent” applied only “to money judgments entered in summary ejectment actions pursuant

to [Real Property] § 8-401.” Ben-Davies, 457 Md. at 270. We disagreed and held that

Lockett did not control the analysis of the separate statutory scheme in the Courts & Judicial

Proceedings Article. Ben-Davies, 457 Md. at 270-71. Nothing about our decision in Ben-

Davies precludes the result we reach today or our reliance on the persuasiveness of the

statutory interpretation analysis in Lockett.

Second, Westminster contends that we should not follow Lockett because “rent”

would then have two different meanings under § 8-401, one applicable to residential leases

and the other to commercial leases. But Westminster’s preferred definition also leads to

inconsistencies, as a residential tenant who was up-to-date on base monthly rent but not on

other charged fees would have “fail[ed] to pay the rent” under § 8-401(a) and yet be

“current on the rent” under § 8-208.1(d). The interpretation we adopt provides consistency

in the treatment of residential leases.

Third, Westminster argues that if a landlord cannot recover all of a tenant’s payment

obligations through summary ejectment, the landlord will have to bring both a summary

ejectment action and a separate action against the tenant for breach of contract to recover

non-“rent” obligations. The implication of Westminster’s argument is that, for a tenant,

facing one lawsuit is better than facing two. But that is a policy decision for the General

Assembly to make. As it stands, the General Assembly has limited recovery in a summary

31
ejectment action involving a residential lease only to “rent,” late fees, and court costs.21

Real Prop. § 8-401(e)(2)(iv). Westminster may not expand the scope of this special

statutory remedy through the terms of leases it imposes on tenants.

Fourth, Westminster contends that the General Assembly indicated its support for

Westminster’s preferred definition of “rent” when the General Assembly considered, but

failed to pass, several bills that would have enshrined the interpretation of “rent” that we

adopt. See H.B. 1346, 2017 General Assembly Regular Session; S.B. 941/H.B. 473, 2019

General Assembly Regular Session. But, as the Tenants point out, the General Assembly

also considered but failed to pass bills to codify Westminster’s interpretation of “rent.” See

S.B. 493/H.B. 472, 2018 General Assembly Regular Session; S.B. 366/H.B. 558, 2019

General Assembly Regular Session. And even if we could discern a legislative preference

from that mixed record, “legislative rejection is not an infallible indicator of legislative

intent.” City of Baltimore Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 395 Md. 299, 329 (2006)

(quotation omitted). The General Assembly could have rejected those competing bills for

any or multiple reasons, making its failure to pass them “a rather weak reed upon which to

21
The General Assembly also specifically permitted landlords of commercial
tenants (but not landlords of residential tenants) to recover reasonable attorney’s fees in
summary ejectment, if authorized in the lease, after the Appellate Court held that attorney’s
fees were not “rent.” See Real Prop. § 8-401(e)(2)(v)(3); 2007 Md. Laws, ch. 236; H.B.
377, Fiscal Note (2007); Law Offs. of Taiwo Agbaje, P.C. v. JLH Props., II, LLC, 169 Md.
App. 355, 370 (2006) (“Although Lessor may be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s
fees incurred in connection with the Lessee’s alleged breach of its contractual obligation
to pay rent, if any, in a breach of contract proceeding, such fees are not ‘rent’ and, therefore,
are not recoverable in a [Real Property] § 8-401 summary ejectment proceeding.”).
32
lean in ascertaining legislative intent.” Id. (quoting Automobile Trade Ass’n v. Ins.

Comm’r, 292 Md. 15, 24 (1981)).

In sum, Westminster’s additional arguments do not cause us to deviate from our

interpretation of the statutory text. We therefore hold that “rent” as used in Real Property

§ 8-401 regarding a residential lease means the fixed, periodic payments that a tenant

makes for the use or occupancy of the premises.22

C. The Allocation Clause

Each Westminster lease contains the following “Application of Payments”

provision:

All payments from Tenant to Landlord may, at Landlord’s option, be applied
in the following order to debts owed by Tenant to Landlord: late charges,
agent’s fees, attorney’s fees, court costs, obligations other than rent (if any)
due Landlord, other past due rent other than monthly rent, past due monthly
rent, current monthly rent.

The Tenants contend that this allocation clause violates Real Property

§ 8-208(d)(2)’s prohibition on lease provisions requiring tenants to waive or forego rights

under law. According to the Tenants, the clause allows Westminster to allocate payments

intended for “rent” to other obligations, forcing the Tenants to waive their right to be

22
In its brief and at oral argument, Westminster identified confusion among litigants
and courts concerning whether obligations delineated separately from a monthly
installment of an annual rent obligation might fall within this definition. We do not purport
to pre-judge any future dispute concerning any specific obligation. However, for guidance,
our analysis does not preclude a charge other than a monthly installment of an annual rental
amount from falling within the definition of “rent” if the charge is fixed, periodic, and
mandatory for all tenants occupying similar units. Our analysis does preclude such charges
if they are variable, assessed based only on a breach of the lease, or optional.
33
subject to summary ejectment only for a failure to pay “rent.” Westminster counters that

the provision is a permissible contractual agreement that relieves tenants of the

responsibility of “properly allocat[ing] their payment each month,” and that it “affords

complete predictability” about payments, allowing tenants to “forecast exactly how their

payments will be allocated.” We agree with the Tenants.

As explained above, the summary ejectment statute permits a landlord to initiate

expedited proceedings to evict a tenant when, and only when, the tenant fails to “pay the

rent when due and payable.” Real Prop. § 8-401(a). The General Assembly’s statutory

scheme does not subject tenants to summary ejectment proceedings for failure to pay

non-“rent” obligations. Yet the allocation clause purports to allow Westminster to do just

that: Westminster can apply a tenant’s payment of “rent” to other obligations, claim that

“rent” remains unpaid, and file a summary ejectment action on that basis. Thus,

Westminster’s residential tenants may pay their “rent” but, failing to pay other obligations,

still find themselves facing summary ejectment. The allocation clause therefore results in

a waiver of a tenant’s right to be subject to summary ejectment only for failure to pay

“rent,” in violation of Real Property § 8-208(d)(2).

Our reasoning is consistent with that of the United States District Court for the

District of Maryland in Sager v. Housing Commission of Anne Arundel County, 957

F. Supp. 2d 627 (D. Md. 2013). The court in Sager correctly determined that under

Maryland law, “a tenant has the right not to be summarily evicted except for failure to pay

rent.” Id. at 636. On the other hand, “if a tenant fails to pay other properly imposed

34
charges, such as maintenance fees, [the tenant] may be subject to eviction under state law,

but only after a more fulsome proceeding and a finding that the failure to pay the fees is a

‘substantial’ breach of [the tenant’s] lease that warrants an eviction.” Id. at 633 (citing

Real Prop. § 8-402.1). As a result, the court concluded that an allocation clause like the

one in the Westminster leases violates Real Property § 8-208(d) because it waives the

tenant’s right to be subjected to the expedited and procedurally limited summary ejectment

process only for failure to pay “rent.”23 Id. at 636-37.

Westminster’s contention that the allocation clause provides predictability in how a

tenant’s payments will be allocated is both irrelevant and incorrect. It is irrelevant because

predictability in allocation is not an exception to the prohibition in Real Property

§ 8-208(d)(2) against lease provisions requiring tenants to waive or forego legal rights or

remedies. Westminster’s contention is incorrect because its clause does not mandate any

particular method of allocating payments. Instead, it permits Westminster to allocate

payments in the order stated “at [Westminster’s] option.” The record suggests that

Westminster does not always exercise that option, if it exercises it at all. According to the

testimony of a Westminster corporate representative, Westminster allocates payments in

three different ways: (1) it allows tenants who pay their bills online to choose how to

23
Westminster argues that Sager is inapplicable to this case because it concerned a
public housing tenant and relied on federal law. However, although there are differences
between the circumstances present in Sager and those here, we nonetheless agree with the
persuasive analysis of the court in Sager: allocation clauses may not be used to allocate
payments of “rent” to non-“rent” obligations and thereby provide the basis for the initiation
of a summary ejectment proceeding. See id. at 634-37.
35
allocate their payments; (2) it posts other payments by tenants at all but two of its properties

“to the oldest balance possible”; and (3) at those two other properties, it allocates payments

that tenants identify as rent to rent.24 The tenant ledgers in the record reflect payments

applied to balances chronologically, not by category.

Westminster’s other arguments are equally unpersuasive. It argues that its

allocation clause should be permissible because otherwise, it will need to maintain two

distinct ledgers—one for “rent” and one for non-“rent” obligations. As an initial matter,

Westminster does not explain, and it is not readily apparent, why it would be more onerous

to allocate payments first to “rent” and then to non-“rent” obligations, as opposed to first

to non-“rent” obligations and then to “rent,” as the allocation clause permits. Moreover,

the corporate representative’s testimony described above suggests that Westminster

already applies payments identified for “rent” to “rent” at two of its Maryland properties,

and that it allows tenants at other properties who pay their bills online to allocate those

payments as they wish. In any event, the administrative burden of complying with the law

is also not an exception to Real Property § 8-208(d)(2).

Finally, Westminster claims that the Tenants lack standing to argue that the

allocation clause waived their rights in violation of Real Property § 8-208(d)(2) because

all of them were delinquent in their rent regardless of the operation of the allocation clause,

24
According to the Westminster representative, the different treatment of tenants at
the two specific properties is because “[w]e have a very strong judge there that will say no,
no, no, if you write rent you have to put it towards rent, so we try to make sure we don’t
have any issues at those two properties, we do apply it to their rent.”
36
and so would have faced summary ejectment anyway. But the Tenants are not challenging

the basis for their evictions in Count One of the third amended complaint; their claim is

that Westminster violated § 8-208(d)(2) by including an impermissible provision in their

leases. Whether the Tenants are able to prove damages resulting from the presence of the

allocation clause in their leases is not before us.

D. “Hard Costs” in Summary Ejectment

The third issue presented in this appeal is the Tenants’ contention that Westminster

violated Real Property § 8-208(d)(3)(i), which prohibits including in a residential lease any

provision that “[p]rovides for a penalty for the late payment of rent in excess of 5% of the

amount of rent due for the rental period for which the payment was delinquent.” The

Tenants contend that Westminster violates § 8-208(d)(3)(i) by automatically charging

tenants who are more than five days delinquent a 5% late fee plus: (1) “agent fees” for the

initiation of summary ejectment proceedings; and (2) “summons fees” before they are

awarded by the court.25 Westminster responds that § 8-208(d)(3)(i) does not limit its ability

to contract to recoup “hard costs” that it actually incurs in pursuing summary ejectment,

25
The Tenants do not contend that § 8-208(d)(3)(i) precludes Westminster from
recovering “summons fees” and similar expenses if a court ultimately awards them as court
costs. Indeed, § 8-401 expressly contemplates an award of court costs to a landlord in a
summary ejectment proceeding, and mandates that a tenant pay such costs to exercise the
right of redemption. Real Prop. § 8-401(e)(2)(iv), (g)(1). The Tenants’ position, however,
is that when a landlord automatically charges such fees to a tenant upon the tenant’s failure
to pay rent when due, along with the 5% late fee authorized in the lease and permitted by
statute, the additional fees function as impermissible late fees exceeding the statutory 5%
limit, not as permissible court costs.
37
including “agent fees” and “summons fees.” According to Westminster, § 8-208(d)(3)(i)

limits only the amount it can charge as a punitive “penalty” in addition to such “hard costs.”

We turn once again to our ordinary tools of statutory construction. At the outset,

we observe that although § 8-208(d)(3)(i) speaks in terms of a “penalty” for late payment,

§ 8-401 consistently refers to the same amount as “late fees.” See Real Prop.

§ 8-401(b)(2)(iii) & (iv), (b)(3), (e)(2)(ii), (iii) & (iv), (e)(5) (all referring to “late fees”).26

We will therefore look to the ordinary meaning of both “penalty” and “late fees.”

Some dictionaries define “penalty” as the equivalent of punishment. See Penalty,

New Oxford American Dictionary 1295 (3d ed. 2010) (defining “penalty” as “[p]unishment

imposed for breaking a law, rule, or contract; a disadvantage or unpleasant experience

suffered as the result of an action or circumstance”); Penalty, Black’s Law Dictionary 1368

(11th ed. 2019) (defining “penalty” as “[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer, usu[ally]

in the form of imprisonment or fine; esp[ecially], a sum of money exacted as punishment

for either a wrong to the state or a civil wrong (as distinguished from compensation for the

injured party’s loss)”). Another dictionary defines the term more specifically as a forfeiture

upon wrongdoing. See Penalty, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 915 (11th ed.

2014) (defining “penalty” as the “suffering or the sum to be forfeited to which a person

agrees to be subjected in case of nonfulfillment of stipulations”). Still others include

26
Although there is no express statutory link between the “penalty” provision of
§ 8-208(d)(3)(i) and the references to “late fees” throughout § 8-401, context suggests they
are the same, the parties treat them as the same, and the legislative history discussed below
at pages 41-44 also connects them.
38
elements of both punishment and forfeiture. See Penalty, Webster’s II New College

Dictionary 812 (1999) (defining “penalty” as “[a] punishment established by law or

authority for a crime or offense” and “[a] forfeit, esp[ecially] a sum of money, required for

an offense”); Penalty, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1298

(4th ed. 2006) (defining “penalty” as “[a] punishment established by law or authority for a

crime or offense” and “[s]omething, especially a sum of money, required as a forfeit for an

offense”).

Dictionaries generally define a “fee,” as relevant here, as “a fixed charge” or “a sum

paid or charged for a service.” Fee, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 459 (11th

ed. 2014); see also Fee, New Oxford American Dictionary 634 (3d ed. 2010) (defining

“fee” as “a payment made to a professional person or to a professional or public body in

exchange for advice or services”); Fee, Black’s Law Dictionary 758 (11th ed. 2019)

(defining “fee” as “[a] charge or payment for labor or services, esp[ecially] professional

services”). A “late fee” is thus a fixed charge incurred when a payment is late.

Dictionary definitions of “penalty” and “fees” all generally support Westminster’s

contention that the 5% penalty referred to in § 8-208(d)(3)(i), referred to elsewhere as a

late fee, may be charged automatically upon a tenant’s failure to pay rent when due, without

regard to actual harm. That “penalty” is sometimes equated to “punishment” also supports

Westminster’s contention that the amount is intended to be punitive, and so should be

chargeable to a tenant in addition to any costs a landlord incurs because of a tenant’s failure

to timely pay rent. But definitions equating “penalty” with a forfeiture and “fee” generally

39
with fixed charges beg the question of whether such amounts are intended to be separate

from, or instead to be a substitute for, any amounts actually incurred because of a tenant’s

late payment. Nothing in the broader context of the statutory scheme helps resolve that

question. We therefore turn to legislative purpose as reflected in statutory text.

The apparent legislative purpose underlying § 8-208 is to regulate leases for

residential property in Maryland for the protection of tenants. It does so by, among other

things: (1) mandating that landlords who lease five or more dwellings use written leases,

Real Prop. § 8-208(a); (2) mandating that proposed leases be made available upon request,

id. § 8-208(b); (3) mandating that leases include certain statements concerning the

habitability and safety of the premises, and the landlord’s and tenant’s respective

obligations concerning utilities and repair, id. § 8-208(c); and (4) mandating transparency

concerning automatic renewal provisions, permitting local jurisdictions to enact broader

rights and remedies, and rendering prohibited terms “unenforceable by the landlord,” id.

§ 8-208(e), (f), & (g). Each of these provisions protects tenants.

Consistent with these other provisions of § 8-208, subsection (d) protects tenants in

residential properties by identifying ten types of provisions landlords are prohibited from

including in leases. As such, we construe it liberally to further its protective purpose.

Consequently, when choosing between the Tenants’ proposed interpretation of

§ 8-208(d)(3)(i)—which limits the total amount of fees that a landlord can recover for a

tenant’s late payment of rent—and Westminster’s proposed interpretation—which permits

a landlord to recover both a fee as punishment for late payment and uncapped additional

40
amounts the landlord may incur—the apparent legislative purpose favors the former.

Indeed, to adopt Westminster’s proposed interpretation of § 8-208(d)(3)(i), we would need

to accept that the General Assembly intended to authorize provisions in residential leases

that permit landlords to: (1) be made whole for any direct losses by recouping all fees and

costs expended in pursuing collection; and, on top of that full recovery, (2) impose an

additional penalty, not associated with any loss to the landlords, to punish tenants. Nothing

in the statutory scheme supports that punitive interpretation of § 8-208(d)(3)(i).

Our consideration of apparent legislative purpose thus favors the Tenants’

interpretation of § 8-208(d)(3)(i). However, the General Assembly’s use of the term

“penalty,” and that term’s use in referring to purely punitive measures in some contexts,

causes us to conclude that there is at least some ambiguity in the statutory language. We

therefore turn to legislative history in search of indicia that may resolve that ambiguity.

Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 377 (2021). As we will see, the scant legislative

history that exists also favors the Tenants’ interpretation.

The General Assembly enacted Real Property § 8-208 in 1974 “in response to the

recommendations of the Governor’s Landlord-Tenant Laws Study Commission.”

McDaniel v. Baranowski, 419 Md. 560, 579 (2011). The stated purpose was to “prohibit[]

certain types of provisions in residential leases, such as . . . penalties for late payments[.]”

1974 Md. Laws, ch. 375. As originally enacted, § 8-208(a)(3), the predecessor to the

current § 8-208(d)(3), prohibited:

41
 A provision providing for a penalty for the late payment of rent in excess of
5% of the amount of rent due for the rental period for which the payment was
delinquent. In the case of leases under which the rent is paid in weekly rental
installments a penalty of $5 may be charged for the late payment of rent.
However, such late penalties shall constitute, in the aggregate, no more than
$10 per month.

1974 Md. Laws, ch. 375.

Although the first sentence of the 1974 law has remained unchanged, an early

amendment altering the remainder of the provision is informative. In 1979, the Study

Commission recommended an amendment to (1) eliminate the $10 aggregate cap on “late

penalties” and (2) decrease the amount of the penalty that could be charged with respect to

each late payment on a weekly tenancy. The “Explanation and Justification” the Study

Commission identified for the change is telling:

At present, section 8-208(a)(3) provides that a landlord can charge a week to
week tenant a $5 penalty for late payment of rent and can charge all other
tenants a late payment penalty of 5% of the rent due for the rental period for
which the payment was delinquent. The section however, specifies that $10
is the maximum aggregate amount of late payment penalties that a landlord
can charge a tenant in one month. The Commission proposes repeal of this
limitation on the amount of late payment penalties that a landlord can charge
a tenant per month because the Commission was advised that the landlord’s
costs in collecting rent that is past due in most cases exceeds the amount of
late payment penalties permitted to be charged by section 8-208(a)(3) per
month.

42
Letter from Steven G. Davidson, Reporter of Governor’s Landlord-Tenant Laws Study

Commission, to Judson P. Garrett, Jr., Chief Legislative Officer, and attached materials,

(Sept. 13, 1979) (on file with the Maryland State Law Library) (italics added).27

The following year, upon considering the Study Commission’s recommendations,

the General Assembly: (1) eliminated the $10 per month aggregate cap on all late payment

penalties; (2) with respect to monthly tenancies, left in place the maximum 5% penalty that

could be charged for late payments on monthly tenancies; and (3) with respect to weekly

tenancies, lowered the maximum late payment penalty to $3, subject to a new aggregate

monthly cap of $12 applicable only to weekly tenancies. 1980 Md. Laws, ch. 65. The

Study Commission’s 1979 proposal is one of the few items in the bill file for the House

bill that amended the statute. Bill File for H.B. 336, 1980 Leg. (1980).

In sum, with respect to monthly tenancies, the Study Commission proposed that the

General Assembly amend the statute by eliminating the $10 cap on the 5% penalty for the

express purpose of better reflecting the costs incurred by landlords in collecting rent. In

response to the Study Commission’s report, the General Assembly did just that. Lacking

any other insight from the legislative history, this episode provides persuasive support for

27
The Study Commission proceeded to address a concern specific to week-to-week
tenancies, which was the need to strike a balance between, on one hand, a landlord’s high
costs of collecting rent that might be late as many as four or five times a month, and, on
the other hand, the effect of imposing those costs on week-to-week tenants, most of whom
“have low and undependable incomes and tight budgets[.]” Id. The Study Commission
recommended a compromise position of reducing the amount of penalty that could be
charged such tenants on a weekly basis to $3, which would effectively impose a monthly
cap of $12 or $15, depending on how many times rent came due that month. Id.
43
the Tenants’ proposed interpretation of § 8-208(d)(3)(i) as encompassing a landlord’s costs

of collection.

Westminster maintains that this interpretation of § 8-208(d)(3)(i) is unreasonable

because it would prevent Westminster and other landlords from recovering all of their hard

costs in pursuing summary ejectment, which can, in some cases, exceed 5% of the monthly

rent. For several reasons, we disagree with Westminster. First, a landlord is not required

to incur hard costs to pursue summary ejectment every time a tenant is late paying rent,

and our interpretation of the statute is not influenced by Westminster’s decision to do so.

Indeed, in cases in which a landlord charges a fee for a late payment but does not hire an

agent to pursue summary ejectment before the tenant becomes current on rent, the landlord

comes out ahead under our interpretation of § 8-208(d)(3)(i). Second, in arguing that its

hard costs may exceed 5% of monthly rent, Westminster includes hard costs that would

qualify as court costs that a court may ultimately award it under Real Property

§ 8-401(e)(2)(iv). Third, Westminster has not pointed to any authority that restricts the

General Assembly from limiting a landlord’s ability to fully recover its costs in pursuing

summary ejectment. Fourth, Westminster can call upon the General Assembly to increase

the amount of the permitted penalty/late fee or, if it believes we have misinterpreted the

General Assembly’s intent, to clarify that § 8-208(d)(3)(i) does not prohibit landlords from

recovering both a 5% penalty and costs of collection.

In sum, Real Property § 8-208(d)(3)(i) precludes a landlord from including

provisions in a lease permitting it to charge late penalties or fees greater than 5% of the

44
rent due for the period at issue. When a lease provides for a 5% late penalty/fee, the lease

may not also permit the landlord to charge additional fees triggered by late payment.

Section 8-208(d)(3)(i) does not, however, preclude a landlord who prevails in a summary

ejectment proceeding from recovering fees properly awarded as court costs, as provided in

Real Property § 8-401(e).

II. CLASS CERTIFICATION

A. Standard of Review and Legal Framework

A trial court’s decision regarding certification of a class action is ordinarily

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Creveling v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 376 Md. 72, 90

(2003). “However, whether the trial court used a correct legal standard in determining

whether to grant or deny class certification is a question of law,” which we review without

deference. Id.

Maryland Rule 2-231 governs class action lawsuits. Because the Rule is similar to

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we consider interpretations of the federal

rule to be helpful to our analysis. Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 724 (2000).

Like its federal analogue, Rule 2-231(b) establishes four prerequisites to the maintenance

of any class action, which we have previously summarized as:

numerosity (the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable); commonality (there are questions
of law or fact common to the class); typicality (the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class); and adequacy of representation (the
representative parties and counsel will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class).

45
Angeletti, 358 Md. at 727. In addition to those prerequisites, a proposed class must also

satisfy one of three subsections of Rule 2-231(c), two of which are relevant here:

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. . . .

Md. Rule 2-231(c)(2), (3).

Rule 2-231(d) requires a court to “determine by order as soon as practicable after

commencement of the action whether it is to be maintained as a class action.” 28 It further

mandates that the court hold a hearing on the issue if requested by any party and explain in

its order resolving the motion its “findings and reasons for certifying or refusing to certify

the action as a class action.” Id. Any such order may be conditional and, in any event,

“may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.” Id.

B. Procedural Background

The Tenants contend that the circuit court erred in refusing to consider the merits of

their second revised motion for class certification and abused its discretion in denying the

motion. Getting to the merits of that contention requires further procedural background.

28
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 once mirrored this language in Rule
2-231(d), the federal rule now requires certification “[a]t an early practicable time” after
suit is initiated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A); 3 Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions
§ 7:33 (6th ed. 2022).
46
 The Tenants filed three motions for class certification in the circuit court. The court

did not rule on the original motion before it was rendered moot by the filing of the Tenants’

second amended complaint. The Tenants then filed a revised motion for class certification

(the “First Class Motion”) in which they sought certification under Rule 2-231(c)(3). The

Appellate Court aptly summarized the defendants and claims in the second amended

complaint as follows:

The defendants named in the complaint were Westminster and the owners of
the apartment and townhouse properties where the plaintiffs resided, i.e.,
Carroll Park Holdings, LLC, Dutch Village, LLC, Pleasantview, LLC,
Whispering Woods #299 Limited Partnership, and Whispering Woods #250
Limited Partnership. [Tenants] alleged that Westminster was the property
manager for each development.

The second amended complaint contained seven counts, setting out
the following claims with each count directed to all the defendants:

1. damages for the defendants’ alleged violations of Real Prop. § 8-208;

2. damages for the defendants’ alleged violations of the Maryland
Consumer Debt Collection Act by:

(a) attempting to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does
not exist, in violation of Com[mercial] Law § 14-202(8); and

(b) communicating with debtors “with the frequency, at the unusual
hours, or in any other manner as reasonably can be expected to abuse
or harass the debtor” in violation of Com[mercial] Law § 14-202(8);

3. damages for the defendants’ alleged violations of the Maryland
Consumer Protection Act by:

(a) engaging in unfair and deceptive trade practices (in violation of
Com[mercial] Law § 13-303(6))[;] and

(b) violating the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act, which is a
per se violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, see
Com[mercial] Law § 13-301(14)(iii);
47
 4. unjust enrichment and restitution claims against each defendant;

5. damages for breach of contract by improperly charging the 5% late fee
and other fees;

6. a separate breach of contract claim regarding charging the $12 agent’s
fee; and

7. declaratory and injunctive relief.

Smith v. Westminster Mgmt., LLC, 257 Md. App. 336, 412-13 (2023).

Although the second amended complaint named seven defendants, the Tenants

sought class certification against only the two Westminster entities. The Tenants’ proposed

class definition at the time the court considered their motion was:

All persons who are or were tenants in a residential rental
property in Maryland managed by Westminster Management,
LLC and/or JK2 Westminster, LLC, and who, since September
27, 2014, have been charged one or more of the following fees
by Westminster and/or JK2 Westminster: agent fee, summons
fee, writ fee, warrant fee, legal fee, court fee, and/or filing fee.

The Tenants excluded from this definition employees of the defendants and their relatives

and certain individuals granted bankruptcy discharges.

In April 2019, the court denied the Tenants’ First Class Motion in a thorough

18-page written order. Although the court found that the Tenants had satisfied the

requirements of numerosity, commonality, and adequacy of representation by counsel, it

concluded that they had not satisfied the “implicit requirement” of “pleading a sufficiently

definite class,” and did not satisfy typicality, adequacy of representation by the named

plaintiffs, predominance of common questions over individual questions, or superiority.

48
The court specifically identified the following as the reasons for denying the First Class

Motion:

• The Tenants’ proposed class definition was not definite and ascertainable
because determining class membership would require individual mini-trials
to inquire into (1) whether fees were charged in connection with failure to
pay rent actions or other types of actions; (2) whether individual tenants paid
the fees (which the court found particularly relevant to the Tenants’ unjust
enrichment claim); and (3) whether the practices Westminster was alleged to
have engaged in were used at all Westminster properties;
• There was insufficient proof that Westminster’s alleged practices were
applied to all 17 of its Maryland properties and therefore no showing that the
Tenants’ claims were typical of those of the class;
• The five defendants as to whom the Tenants did not seek class certification
might raise unique defenses that would likely be a major focus of the case;
• In their Consumer Debt Collection Act claim, the Tenants’ allegations that
Westminster attempted to collect debts using threats and communicated with
debtors in a harassing manner could not be proven on a class-wide basis;
• The Tenants’ unjust enrichment claim would require individualized
assessments of whether each tenant paid the charged fees and when the
alleged benefits were conferred;
• The Tenants’ claims for consequential damages would need to be assessed
individually through complex expert testimony;
• The common questions the Tenants identified concerning whether
Westminster charged illegal fees, misallocated rent payments, and
improperly threatened evictions would require individualized evidence and
fact-finding;
• The class included public housing tenants who are not charged a late fee and
are subject to other federal rules; and
• Due to the proliferation of individual issues, the Tenants had not shown that
a class action would be manageable.

In response to the court’s denial of their First Class Motion, the Tenants filed a third

amended complaint and second revised motion for class certification (the “Second Class

49
Motion”).29 As explained in the motion, the Tenants made a number of changes to their

claims and proposed class definition that specifically addressed the stated bases upon

which the court denied their prior motion. The Tenants narrowed their proposed class

definition to: (1) embrace only disputed fees related to the late payment or non-payment

of rent; (2) include only tenants who paid such fees; (3) exclude tenants relying on housing

assistance; and (4) exclude tenants who had released or waived all claims against

Westminster. The Tenants also dropped from the third amended complaint: (1) all

defendants other than Westminster; (2) their unjust enrichment count; (3) their request for

consequential damages; and (4) the basis for liability under the Consumer Debt Collection

Act relying on Westminster’s alleged use of threats and harassing communications. The

Tenants also added factual support for their contention that Westminster’s alleged practices

were uniform across their Maryland properties in the form of deposition testimony of two

Westminster corporate deponents.30

29
Westminster moved to strike the third amended complaint on the ground that it
was untimely, but the circuit court denied that request. The circuit court did not identify
the timeliness of the Tenants’ third amended complaint or the associated Second Class
Motion as reasons for denying the motion.
30
In their briefing on class certification, the parties disputed the proper
characterization of the testimony of these witnesses. The Tenants emphasized the
witnesses’ testimony concerning Westminster’s use of form leases and a common
management system to generate leases, Westminster’s ability to identify tenants who had
paid agent fees and writ fees it had refunded, general testimony that Westminster charges
the fees at issue to all tenants who are late paying rent, and the deponents’ inability to
identify differences relevant to the Tenants’ claims. Westminster emphasized the
deponents’ repeated, non-specific testimony that leases are different and can be
individualized, that they could not answer general questions without consulting individual

50
 The circuit court, treating the Second Class Motion as a motion for reconsideration,

denied the motion without a hearing in a one-and-a-half-page order that did not address the

merits of the motion. Instead, the court denied the motion on the grounds that (1) the

Tenants had not identified any compelling reason to reconsider the prior ruling; (2) the new

deposition testimony, although it bolstered the Tenants’ arguments, did not warrant

reconsideration of class certification; and (3) the third amended complaint “does not

materially change the circumstances of the case.”

The Appellate Court held that the circuit court erred in applying a reconsideration

standard because “[Tenants] made several changes to the way that they framed their causes

of action and their proposed class definition to address several of the concerns identified

by the circuit court in its prior decision.” Smith, 257 Md. App. at 418. The intermediate

appellate court ultimately held that the Tenants may file a new motion for class certification

upon remand. Id. at 420. Relying on this Court’s decision in Chavis v. Blibaum &

Associates, P.A., 476 Md. 534, 579 (2021), the Appellate Court held that its rulings that

the named plaintiffs had asserted viable claims against Westminster meant “the legal

landscape confronting the circuit court ha[d] changed significantly,” such that a new

motion was warranted. Smith, 257 Md. App. at 418-20.

tenant leases, and that questions about particular fees paid by tenants could be answered
only by an in-depth examination of each tenant’s ledger.
51
 C. Addressing Multiple Motions for Class Certification

The Tenants argue that the circuit court erred in treating their Second Class Motion

as a motion for reconsideration. As explained at oral argument, they contend that a plaintiff

is entitled to file a new motion for class certification at least each time a complaint is

amended, and that regardless of the number filed, a trial court must treat every motion for

class certification as a new motion to be considered on its own merits, including holding a

hearing if requested and issuing a written order explaining the court’s findings and reasons

pursuant to Rule 2-231(d). Westminster contends that the circuit court properly treated the

Second Class Motion as a motion for reconsideration and properly denied it without a

hearing or further explanation. We do not agree fully with either party.

We have not had occasion to determine the appropriate standard for a circuit court

to apply to a motion concerning class certification after the court has ruled on an earlier

such motion. Here, the circuit court applied a material change in circumstances test to

determine whether it would consider the merits of the second motion. That comports with

the standard applied by many federal district courts, it is consistent with Rule 2-231, and it

strikes an appropriate balance between accommodating changes in circumstances and

judicial efficiency. We therefore agree with the circuit court’s articulation of the

appropriate standard.

Rule 2-231 does not identify a standard for a trial court’s consideration of

subsequent motions concerning class certification after it has ruled on an earlier motion.

However, in providing that any order certifying or refusing to certify a class “may be

52
conditional and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits,” the Rule

plainly anticipates that such subsequent motions may be filed and considered on their

merits. Md. Rule 2-231(d); see also Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir.

1983) (“Under [Federal] Rule 23 the district court is charged with the duty of monitoring

its class decisions in light of the evidentiary development of the case. The district judge

must define, redefine, subclass, and decertify as appropriate in response to the progression

of the case from assertion to facts.”); Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266,

1273-74 (11th Cir. 2000) (in discussing interlocutory appeals, noting that “class

certification determinations are so fluid and fact-sensitive that district courts should be

encouraged rather than discouraged from reassessing whether the prerequisites of [Federal]

Rule 23 exist and whether a class action is the most efficacious way to resolve the dispute”).

Seeking to balance the need to fairly respond to changes in circumstances with

concerns for judicial efficiency, some federal courts apply a “motion for reconsideration”

standard to subsequent motions related to class certification, requiring that the movant

identify a material change in circumstances before the court will revisit the merits of an

earlier decision. See, e.g., Hartman v. United Bank Card, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 591, 597 (W.D.

Wash. 2013) (stating that a change in circumstances is required for a court to reconsider a

class certification decision); Terrill v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 274 F.R.D. 698, 700

(S.D. Ga. 2011) (stating that revisiting a class certification decision is appropriate if

required by subsequent developments, upon a showing of new evidence or other grounds,

or upon a demonstration of changed circumstances); Washington v. Vogel, 158 F.R.D. 689,

53
692-93 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (denying a renewed motion for class certification because, among

other defects, no changed circumstances justified reconsideration of the issue); Cabrera v.

Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., No. 12-61390-CIV, 2015 WL 464237, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16,

2015) (“Generally, a Court ‘may revisit a prior denial of a class certification motion if there

is a change in the circumstances or facts since the prior denial.’” (quoting Barton v. RCI,

LLC, No. 10-CV-03657 PGS, 2014 WL 5762214, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2014) (emphasis

omitted))).31

Such a standard does not erect a high barrier to revisiting the merits of class

certification when, for example, plaintiffs make material changes to their proposed class

definition or a party identifies new evidence or other changes in circumstance that are

material to the certification issue. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 483 F.3d

70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[O]ur ruling rejected class certification only of the class as certified

by the District Court. Nothing in our decision precludes the Petitioners from returning to

the District Court to seek certification of a more modest class, one as to which the Rule 23

criteria might be met, according to the standards we have outlined.”); Hudson v. Delta Air

Lines, Inc., 90 F.3d 451, 458 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Of course, if, through further proceedings,

the plaintiffs are able to clarify and better support the need for class certification, the district

31
By contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has expressly
rejected this motion for reconsideration standard, holding that the plain language of Rule
23 “allows for multiple bites at the apple throughout the litigation, and . . . does not impose
an additional requirement on parties to prove a change in law or show new evidence to
succeed on a renewed motion for certification.” Hargrove v. Sleepy’s LLC, 974 F.3d 467,
476 (3d Cir. 2020).
54
court remains free to revisit the issue.”). Nor is this standard so low as to require a court

to consider repetitive filings that are not materially different or to accommodate

gamesmanship.

We agree that a material change in circumstances test to revisit the merits of a

decision concerning class certification strikes a proper balance and is consistent with Rule

2-231. Requiring a court to revisit the merits of an earlier decision absent a material change

in circumstances would often waste judicial and party resources without any substantial

prospect that the court might reach a different decision. On the other hand, imposing too

high a barrier before a court may revisit the merits of class certification would

inappropriately either foreclose the possibility of class treatment in a case in which it is

appropriate or require class treatment in a case in which it is not. A material change in

circumstances might accompany, among other things, alone or in combination, a

substantial change in the proposed class definition, new evidence obtained through

discovery, an intervening change in the law, or a relevant change in the legal landscape of

the case as a result of the plaintiffs modifying their claims or receiving rulings on motions,

provided that any such change is material to the certification issue.

Given that an initial decision on class certification must be made “as soon as

practicable after commencement of the action,” Md. Rule 2-231(d), and that the

appropriateness or not of class certification may not be fully apparent until the parties have

engaged in discovery and the nature of the claims to be litigated has been settled through

motions practice, it would be particularly unfair to erect too high a barrier to revisiting such

55
a decision in light of subsequent developments. In appropriate cases, class actions can

serve as essential tools for the pursuit of claims that otherwise would never be brought and

the vindication of rights that otherwise would be lost. In inappropriate cases, class actions

can impose extraordinary burdens on defendants and courts with perverse results driven by

the costs and risks of litigation rather than the merits of claims. Especially because in

Maryland, unlike in federal court, decisions on class certification are not subject to

interlocutory review, getting to the right answer on class certification is more important

than imposing an arbitrary barrier to reach finality on that issue at an early stage of

litigation.

Here, although we agree with the standard the circuit court articulated to determine

whether to revisit the merits of class certification, we hold that the court erred in its

application of that standard. The circuit court’s articulated reasons for denying the Second

Class Motion included an uncertain class definition, a lack of evidence that the conduct at

issue applied to all properties managed by Westminster, and the Tenants’ inclusion of

claims and requests for relief that were not amenable to class treatment. In response, the

Tenants presented new evidence concerning the breadth and uniformity of Westminster’s

conduct and made substantial changes to both their proposed class definition and their

claims, including dropping claims and a request for relief the court had identified as not

amenable to class treatment. In doing so, the Tenants fully addressed several of the issues

the court identified in denying class certification and at least partially addressed others. In

light of the reasons the circuit court provided for its initial decision on class certification,

56
those changes constituted a material change in circumstances.32 As a result, the circuit

court should have addressed the merits of the Second Class Motion.

For guidance on remand, we offer three additional points. First, our decision is that

the circuit court must address the merits of the Second Class Motion, including holding a

hearing if requested and issuing a written decision explaining its findings and reasons.

Whether the court grants the motion is a matter left to its sound discretion. Second, in

reviewing a subsequent motion concerning class certification, a court is not limited to

considering the grounds on which it granted or denied an earlier motion. Issues the court

did not feel the need to address in an initial ruling may take on new importance given the

materially changed circumstances justifying the subsequent motion. Third, a part of the

circuit court’s analysis of the revised motion for class certification here was that

determining class membership would require a series of “mini-trials.” A mini-trial, in this

context, is a proceeding that would involve “extensive and individualized fact-finding,”

thus rendering a class action “inappropriate.” EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358

(4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012)).

32
It is also significant to our analysis that the court had ruled only once on class
certification before the Tenants filed the Second Class Motion. This was not an attempt by
the Tenants to have a third, fourth, or fifth bite at the proverbial apple. Though
Westminster repeatedly states that Tenants had “nine attempts” at defining the class, in
reality, the circuit court had only two opportunities to rule upon the issue, the First Class
Motion and the Second Class Motion. Relatedly, we do not suggest that a putative class
representative would or should be permitted to intentionally seek certification of an overly
broad class and then progressively narrow the definition until the court finds it acceptable.
In an appropriate case, a court could reasonably exercise its discretion to refuse to consider
subsequent motions.
57
The need to review Westminster’s tenant ledgers to identify whether tenants were charged

particular fees is not necessarily the same as requiring mini-trials, at least as long as review

of the corporate records would produce an objective answer concerning whether the tenants

were charged those fees without the need to test the evidence extensively or resolve

complex disputes.33 See id. at 358 (“A class cannot be certified unless a court can readily

identify the class members in reference to objective criteria.”); Kelly v. RealPage Inc., 47

F.4th 202, 224 (3d Cir. 2022) (“[A] straightforward ‘yes-or-no’ review of existing records

to identify class members is administratively feasible even if it requires review of

individual records with cross-referencing of voluminous data from multiple sources.”);

City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2017)

(“Affidavits, in combination with records or other reliable and administratively feasible

means, can meet the ascertainability standard.”).

33
Because we decide that the circuit court erred in not addressing the merits of the
Tenants’ Second Class Motion, we need not address the Appellate Court’s reliance on our
decision in Chavis. We note, however, that this case is in a different procedural posture.
In Chavis, the circuit court had dismissed all but one of the plaintiff’s claims before
deciding the class certification motion. 476 Md. at 546, 578-79. In reviving the dismissed
claims, this Court therefore altered the legal landscape relevant to the class certification
decision. Id. at 545-47, 579. Here, the circuit court rendered its class certification decision
before dismissing any of the Tenants’ claims, and the grounds on which it ruled on class
certification did not depend on its views of the merits of those claims. Unlike in Chavis,
therefore, the Appellate Court’s decision on the merits of the Tenants’ claims did not alter
the legal landscape as it existed at the time of the court’s decision on class certification.
58
 In sum, the Tenants’ Second Class Motion presented a material change in

circumstances from the motion the circuit court had previously denied. The court thus

should have considered the motion on its merits.

III. THE TENANTS’ CROSS PETITION

In their cross petition, the Tenants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment

as to liability on their statutory and breach-of-contract claims. The Appellate Court did not

address that contention, on the ground that the Tenants did not meaningfully argue it.

Smith, 257 Md. App. at 380 n.38. The Tenants disagree and, in their brief before this Court,

point out that in their opening brief in the Appellate Court they “repeatedly argued that the

circuit court had improperly denied their motion for summary judgment and that the

Appellate Court ‘should . . . enter summary judgment in [their] favor.’” (Alterations in

original).

We agree with the Appellate Court that the Tenants did not adequately present to

that court their claim that the circuit court erred in denying their motion for summary

judgment. In the standard of review section of the Tenants’ opening brief before the

Appellate Court, they identified the standard of review applicable to appellate review of

the grant of a motion for summary judgment. They did not identify, there or anywhere else

in their brief, the different standard of review applicable to the denial of summary

judgment.34 And although the Tenants did state in several places in their Appellate Court

34
While the grant of summary judgment is reviewed without deference to the trial
court, Bd. of County Comm’rs of St. Mary’s County v. Aiken, 483 Md. 590, 616 (2023), the

59
brief that the circuit court had erred in denying their motion for summary judgment, they

did so only as an add-on, without any further analysis or explanation, at the conclusion of

each of their arguments that the circuit court had erred in granting Westminster’s motion

for summary judgment. That was insufficient to meet the Tenants’ obligation “to articulate

and adequately argue all issues the appellant desires the appellate court to consider in the

appellant’s initial brief.” Oak Crest Vill., Inc. v. Murphy, 379 Md. 229, 241 (2004); see

also DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 56 (1999) (“[I]f a point germane to the appeal is not

adequately raised in a party’s brief, the court may, and ordinarily should, decline to address

it.” (citing Health Serv. Cost Rev. v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664 (1984))); Md. Rule

8-504(a)(6) (“A brief shall . . . include . . . [a]rgument in support of the party’s position on

each issue.”). Accordingly, the Appellate Court did not err in declining to decide whether

the Tenants were entitled to an award of summary judgment and that issue was not

preserved for consideration by this Court.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we hold:

1. For purposes of Real Property § 8-401 as applied to residential leases, “rent”
consists of a tenant’s fixed, periodic payments to a landlord for the use or
possession of rented property;

2. A clause in a lease that purports to permit a landlord to allocate a tenant’s
payment of “rent” to an obligation other than “rent” violates Real Property
§ 8-208(d)(2) to the extent it would allow that landlord to bring a summary

denial of summary judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Dashiell v. Meeks, 396
Md. 149, 165 (2006).
60
 ejectment proceeding based on allegedly overdue “rent” that the tenant had
already paid;

3. A residential lease that permits a landlord to charge a penalty/late fee of 5%
of the rent due in the period at issue may not also permit the landlord to
charge additional fees incurred in connection with filing a summary
ejectment action (other than awarded court costs) or otherwise conditioned
upon nonpayment of rent;

4. A circuit court should generally consider the merits of a timely motion
concerning class certification if the motion is based on a material change in
circumstances and is not otherwise deficient. Here, the circuit court erred in
not ruling on the merits of the Tenants’ second revised motion for class
certification; and

5. The Appellate Court did not err in declining to address the circuit court’s
denial of the Tenants’ motion for summary judgment.

JUDGMENT OF THE APPELLATE
COURT OF MARYLAND AFFIRMED;
COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS.

61
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-17-004797
Argued: November 6, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 4

September Term, 2023
______________________________________

WESTMINSTER MANAGEMENT, LLC,
et al.

v.

TENAE SMITH, et al.
______________________________________

Fader, C.J.,
Watts,
Hotten,
Booth,
Gould,
Eaves,
Harrell, Glenn T., Jr. (Senior
Justice, Specially Assigned),

JJ.
______________________________________

Dissenting and Concurring Opinion by
Gould, J., which Harrell, J., joins.
______________________________________

Filed: March 25, 2024
 I join parts I and III of the Majority’s opinion and respectfully dissent, in part, to

part II of the Majority’s opinion. As explained below, I would affirm the circuit court’s

denial of the Tenants’ second motion for class certification (the “Second Class Motion”).

The Majority holds that a motion to revisit the merits of the circuit court’s grant or

denial of class certification should be reviewed under the material change in circumstances

test, which is applicable to motions for reconsideration. The Majority finds that the circuit

court correctly articulated the standard but erred in its application. Specifically, according

to the Majority, because the Second Class Motion “presented a material change in

circumstances from the motion the circuit court had previously denied[,]” the circuit court

“should have considered the motion on its merits.” Maj. Op. at 59. On remand, the circuit

court is now required to hold a hearing, if requested, and issue “a written decision

explaining its findings and reasons.” Maj. Op. at 57.

I agree with the Majority that the material change in circumstances test is the correct

standard to apply. I disagree with the Majority’s analysis and disposition of part II of the

opinion in four respects.

1

I believe the circuit court did consider the Second Class Motion on its merits. The

circuit court expressly stated:

Upon consideration of [the Second Class Motion, Westminster’s Opposition,
and the Plaintiffs’ Reply] it is . . . hereby:

ORDERED that [the Second Class Motion] is DENIED for the
following reasons:
 1. No compelling reasons exist for a de novo hearing or a
reconsideration based on Plaintiffs’ claim of newly discovered
evidence and the filing of the Third Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs’ request to have a de novo hearing is a request to have
the court reconsider its April 22, 2019 order. Plaintiffs argue that
“[t]his new information directly bolsters Plaintiffs’ arguments as
to typicality and predominance . . . results in circumstances
warranting this Court’s reconsideration . . .[.]” This court finds
that Plaintiffs request is absent any materially changed or clarified
circumstances to support a reconsideration. Plaintiffs failed to
show a significant, unexpected change in the facts or the law.
Plaintiffs make the same Maryland Rule 231 arguments as were
made in the initial motion for class certification. The fact that the
depositions bolster their arguments does not warrant a change or
reconsideration of the court’s initial denial of class certification.

2. Plaintiff’s’ Third Amended Complaint does not materially change
the circumstances of the case to convince the court to reconsider
or alter and amend its April 22, 2019 order.

3. A hearing on the motion or revising the motion will not promote
judicial economy.

The opening words “[u]pon consideration of,” followed by the list of filings, can be

interpreted in only one way—that the court did, in fact, consider each of the listed filings.

Moreover, that the court considered the Second Class Motion is also reflected in

another part of the court’s order:

This court finds that [the Tenants’] request is absent any materially changed
or clarified circumstances to support a reconsideration. Plaintiffs failed to
show a significant, unexpected change in the facts or the law.

In order to draw a conclusion about the materiality of the new evidence submitted by the

plaintiffs or to determine whether the plaintiffs showed “a significant, unexpected change

in the facts[,]” the court would have had to review and consider such evidence.

2
 2

The circuit court had reason to conclude that the changes to the plaintiffs’ complaint

and proposed class definition were not material changes warranting a do-over. The

Majority asserts that plaintiffs “presented new evidence concerning the breadth and

uniformity of Westminster’s conduct and made substantial changes to both their proposed

class definition and their claims, including dropping claims and a request for relief the court

had identified as not amenable to class treatment.” Maj. Op. at 56. “In doing so,” the

Majority asserts, “the Tenants fully addressed several of the issues the court identified in

denying class certification and at least partially addressed others.” Id. According to the

Majority, “those changes constituted a material change in circumstances.” Id. at 57.

I agree that changes to pleadings and class definitions as well as newly discovered

evidence could rise to the level of a material change in circumstances warranting

reconsideration of an order granting or denying class certification. But under the

circumstances presented here, where the defects in the pleadings and the class definition

were extensively addressed in the motion papers prior to the court’s initial ruling, the court

had the discretion to decline to reconsider its ruling.

In class action cases, it is expected that the class plaintiffs will advance what they

believe will be the most advantageous and appropriate class definition, and that the

defendants then highlight the perceived problems with the proposed definition and explain

why the case is not suitable for a class action. The class plaintiffs can amend their proposed

definition and the pleadings to address the defects alleged by the defendants or can stick to

their guns and let the court decide. If the class plaintiffs choose the latter, they should not

3
be entitled to an automatic do-over to rectify the problems after the court sides with the

defendant.

Here, as shown in the table below, the deficiencies that the court eventually found

to be disqualifying had previously been raised by the defendants in either their first or

second oppositions, yet the Tenants chose not to correct those shortcomings prior to the

court’s first order.

4
 Elements First Order Denying Certification Defendants’ Opposition
Definitiveness • The proposed class would • The proposed class cannot be
(Md. Rule 2- require an inquiry and mini-trials objectively identified without
231(b)) into (1) “whether the fees were first conducting an individual
charged in other types of cases,” analysis of liability and
(2) whether the fees were damages. This includes
actually paid by potential class “whether those fees were
members, and (3) whether the ‘related to the alleged late
practices occurred at all payment or non-payment of
Westminster-managed rent[.]’”
properties. • “Plaintiffs’ proposed class
definition is inherently
overbroad. Specifically,
Plaintiffs’ proposed class
definition seeks to include all
individuals who were ‘charged
fees,’ regardless of whether the
putative class member actually
paid such fees[.]”
• Additionally, “[p]laintiffs have
produced no evidence to
establish their contention that
the claims or situations of” the
five named plaintiffs, who
resided at four of Westminster’s
properties, are typical of the
claims “of tenants who resided
at the other 13 Westminster-
managed properties.”
Typicality and • There is insufficient evidence • Evidence shows that the
Adequacy (Md. that the alleged illegal fees had practices occurred at only four
Rule 2-231(b)(3), been charged at all 17 of the 17 properties.
(4)) Westminster properties. • “Plaintiffs have proposed an
• Since Westminster and JK2 unmanageable procedural
Westminster were the only situation by seeking to certify
defendants against whom class their class against only
certification was sought, other Westminster and JK2

5
 Elements First Order Denying Certification Defendants’ Opposition
non-class defendants could have Westminster and not the other
unique defenses to the individual Defendants named in the
claims of certain tenants that Second Amended Complaint.”
could not be proven on a class- • Plaintiffs’ class fails to account
wide basis. for individualized tenant
• Other individualized defenses circumstances, including
that could be raised are: whether “tenants: (1) receive
(1) whether a tenant received rental assistance; (2) owe
rental assistance and thus was not Westminster money in excess of
charged a fee; (2) whether a class the allegedly improper fees;
member owed Westminster and/or (3) waived and/or
money in excess of any amount released their rights to assert the
recovered; and (3) whether a claims alleged[.]”
class member had already • Individualized fact-finding is
waived their claims against required to determine if the
Westminster. defendants ever communicated
• Plaintiff H. Smith’s individual with a class member with
Maryland Consumer Debt frequency or at unusual hours to
Collection Act (“MCDCA”) harass. The court and both
claim based on alleged parties recognized this
harassment could not be proven deficiency, as plaintiffs agreed
on a class-wide basis. to amend their complaint to drop
the MCDCA claim if the class
was certified.
Predominance • The plaintiffs’ harassment-based • Individualized fact-finding is
(Md. Rule 2- claims under the MCDCA and required, such as whether the
231(c)(3)) their claims for unjust defendants ever communicated
enrichment—especially where with a class member with
the tenant would ultimately be frequency or at unusual hours to
required to pay the fees— harass.
required individualized fact- • Plaintiffs’ class definition “fails
finding to be proven. to account for the unique
• The consequential damages circumstances associated with
demand based on the landlord individual tenants” such as
charging the Tenants the alleged- whether a tenant “owe[s]
illegal fees was not simplistic and

6
 Elements First Order Denying Certification Defendants’ Opposition
could not be calculated on a Westminster money in excess of
class-wide basis. the allegedly improper fees[.]”
• “[E]ach putative class member
will allege payment of different
types of fees in different
amounts at different times at
different properties.”
Manageability • “[T]he manageability • The class will be unmanageable
(Md. Rule 2- requirement fails in that the where the class is certified
231(c)(3)(D)) Plaintiffs have only moved for against only two of the seven
class action against two of seven defendants.
Defendants.”

In declining to give the Tenants another bite at the apple, the court could certainly

have considered that the Tenants had ample time to craft an appropriate definition and tailor

their pleadings accordingly. Indeed, over the course of the eighteen months between the

filing of the lawsuit and the March 7, 2019 hearing on first revised motion for class

certification (the “First Class Motion”), the Tenants submitted eight proposed class

definitions.

The definition proposed in the Second Amended Complaint differed from the one

offered in the First Class Motion. The Second Amended Complaint included the following

class definition1:

1
Excluded from the class definition were:

a. those individuals who now are or have ever been executives of defendants
and the spouses, parents, siblings, and children of all such individuals;
and
7
 All persons who are or were tenants in a residential rental property in
Maryland managed by Westminster and/or JK2 Westminster, and who, since
September 27, 2014, have been charged fees by Westminster and/or JK2
Westminster and/or the Owners related to the alleged late payment or non-
payment of rent (other than a late fee of no more than 5% of the amount of
rent due for the period for which the payment was delinquent and/or actual
costs awarded by a court).

This definition included all tenants who had been charged an excessive fee for the late or

non-payment of rent by either (1) Westminster Management, LLC; (2) JK2 Westminster,

LLC; or (3) any of the entities that were “owners” of the 17 Westminster properties. In

contrast, the definition proposed in the First Class Motion omitted the language “and/or the

Owners.” Recognizing this difference, the Tenants presented a third, further inconsistent

definition during the March 7, 2019 hearing. That definition was stated as:

All persons who are or were tenants in a residential rental property in
Maryland managed by Westminster Management, LLC and/or JK2
Westminster, LLC, and who, since September 27, 2014, have been charged
one or more of the following fees by Westminster and/or JK2 Westminster:
agent fee, summons fee, writ fee, warrant fee, legal fee, court fee, and/or
filing fee.

In this revised definition, the Tenants eliminated the owners as class defendants, but

this time, contrary to the definitions proposed in the Second Amended Complaint and the

First Class Motion, the definition included any tenant that was charged any of the specified

fees, even if the court action prompting such fees was unrelated to a failure to pay rent.

b. any individual who was granted a discharge pursuant to the United States
Bankruptcy Code or state receivership laws after the date of all such
improper fees or misallocations of payments.

There were minor alterations to these exclusions throughout the eight class definitions
submitted by the Tenants that are not relevant here.
8
When this problem was pointed out by defendants, the Tenants submitted yet another class

definition that restored the requirement that the fees had to have been “related to the alleged

late payment or non-payment of rent.” The circuit court was aware of the Tenants’

numerous attempts to craft an appropriate definition and gave the Tenants a fair opportunity

to do so.

A change in litigation strategy to respond to an adverse ruling is not a change in

circumstances warranting a do-over. The circuit court must manage and allocate its time

and resources to give every litigant in every case a fair opportunity to present their case.

Consistent with its duties to determine “as soon as practicable after commencement of the

action whether it is to be maintained as a class action[,]” Md. Rule 2-231(d), and to apply

the rules “to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and elimination of

unjustifiable expense and delay[,]” Md. Rule 1-201(a), a court should be entitled (but not

required) to hold a party to its strategic choices under these circumstances. In my view,

the circuit court soundly exercised discretion in doing just that.

3

The circuit court denied the Tenants’ First Class Motion in part due to insufficient

evidence supporting the typicality requirement, noting that the Tenants’ evidence was

limited to only four of the 17 Westminster properties. The Tenants attempted to remedy

this by submitting then-recent deposition testimony from two additional Westminster

employees, which they claimed demonstrated that Westminster’s practices were applied to

all 17 properties. This was the only evidence that qualifies as newly discovered.

9
 Nonetheless, the circuit court had a reasonable basis to conclude that this testimony

did not move the needle enough to justify either another hearing or a change in its ruling.

In making that decision, the court considered Westminster’s opposition to the Second Class

Motion, which pointed to deposition testimony that, according to Westminster,

demonstrated that Westminster’s practices were not sufficiently consistent across the 17

properties to satisfy the typicality requirement. Westminster noted that there were

differences between tenant leases, that Westminster’s policies varied across properties, and

that fees were processed and collected differently depending on the property and tenant.

As we have stated, “[w]e ordinarily review a trial court’s decision regarding whether

to certify a class action for an abuse of discretion. Implicit in this standard is a recognition

that the basis of the certification inquiry is essentially a factual one, and thus, deference is

due.” Creveling v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 376 Md. 72, 90 (2003) (citations omitted).

Confronted with conflicting evidence and arguments, the circuit court had to determine

whether the incremental value of the Tenants’ new evidence justified a change in its ruling.

In stating in its order that “Plaintiffs failed to show a significant, unexpected change in the

facts or the law[,]” the court indicated that it did just that.

4

I do not agree with the Majority that, on remand, the circuit court should be required

to hold a hearing and issue written findings and reasons for granting or denying the Second

Class Motion. The requirements for a hearing and a written decision are set forth in Rule

2-231(d), which provides:

10
 Certification. On motion of any party or on the court’s own initiative, the
court shall determine by order as soon as practicable after commencement of
the action whether it is to be maintained as a class action. A hearing shall be
granted if requested by any party. The order shall include the court’s findings
and reasons for certifying or refusing to certify the action as a class action.
The order may be conditional and may be altered or amended before the
decision on the merits.

In my view, under the plain language of this subsection, the hearing and written

explanation requirements apply whenever the court decides to certify or not certify a case

as a class action. This certainly applies to the court’s initial decision, but it would also

apply when the court reverses itself in either direction; that is, by certifying a class action

after previously refusing to do so, or vice-versa. But the plain language does not require a

hearing or written explanation if the court declines to reverse its initial decision. In that

circumstance, the parties would have had a hearing if one was requested, and would have

already received a written explanation of the court’s decision granting or denying a class

action motion. Declining to reverse the initial decision maintains the status quo, which

requires neither a hearing nor a written explanation.

***

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent to part II of the Majority’s opinion. In all other

respects, I join the Majority’s opinion.

Senior Justice Harrell has authorized me to represent that he joins this opinion.

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