USCA11 Case: 22-13975 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2024 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13975
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JESUS CHAVEZ-BORJA,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00334-CEH-MRM-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13975 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2024 Page: 2 of 5
2 Opinion of the Court 22-13975
Before ROSENBAUM, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jesus Chavez-Borja appeals his sentence of 87 months’ im-
prisonment after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with in-
tent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. See 21
U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). He challenges the calculation
of his guideline range and the conditions of his supervised release.
The government has moved to dismiss the appeal based on a sen-
tence-appeal waiver in Chavez-Borja’s plea agreement. Chavez-
Borja responds that we should adopt and apply a “miscarriage-of-
justice” exception to appeal waivers and hear his challenges.
We review de novo the validity and scope of an appeal-waiver
provision. King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2022).
Sentence-appeal waivers are enforceable if they are made know-
ingly and voluntarily. Id. at 1367. To enforce a waiver, “[t]he gov-
ernment must show that either (1) the district court specifically
questioned the defendant concerning the sentence appeal waiver
during the Rule 11 colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the
record that the defendant otherwise understood the full signifi-
cance of the waiver.” United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351
(11th Cir. 1993).
“We have consistently enforced knowing and voluntary ap-
peal waivers according to their terms.” United States v. Bascomb, 451
F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006). Thus, an appeal waiver may apply
“not only to frivolous claims, but also to difficult and debatable
USCA11 Case: 22-13975 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2024 Page: 3 of 5
22-13975 Opinion of the Court 3
legal issues” or even “blatant error.” King, 41 F.4th at 1367 (quota-
tion marks omitted). Still, we have recognized certain exceptions
to appeal waivers, including jurisdictional defects, sentences based
on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as race, sentences
that exceed the statutory maximum penalty, or “extreme circum-
stances” like a “public flogging” sentence. Id. But we have “never
adopted a general ‘miscarriage of justice’ exception to the rule that
valid appeal waivers must be enforced according to their terms.”
Id. at 1368 n.3; see also Rudolph v. United States, 92 F.4th 1038, 1048–
49 (11th Cir. 2024) (declining to recognize a miscarriage-of-justice
exception to appeal waivers).
Here, the government has shown that the appeal waiver is
enforceable. In a provision of the plea agreement titled and under-
lined, “Defendant’s Waiver of Right to Appeal the Sentence,”
Chavez-Borja “expressly “waive[d] the right to appeal [his] sen-
tence on any ground, including the ground that the Court erred in
determining the applicable guidelines range,” except the grounds
that the sentence (a) exceeded the guideline range as determined
by the district court, (b) exceeded the statutory maximum, or (c) vi-
olated the Eighth Amendment. In addition, Chavez-Borja would
be released from the waiver if the government appealed. Chavez-
Borja initialed the bottom of each page of the plea agreement, and
he and his attorney signed the final page under a certification stat-
ing that he fully understood the plea agreement’s terms.
Then, during the plea colloquy, a magistrate judge ques-
tioned Chavez-Borja through an interpreter about the terms of the
USCA11 Case: 22-13975 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2024 Page: 4 of 5
4 Opinion of the Court 22-13975
plea agreement, including the appeal waiver. The magistrate judge
explained that, under the appeal waiver in his plea agreement,
Chavez-Borja was “waiving [his] right to appeal [his] sentence ex-
cept on very narrow grounds.” In particular, the magistrate judge
stated, he was “waiv[ing his] right to appeal [his] sentence on any
ground, including the ground that the [d]istrict [j]udge made a mis-
take in calculating [his] sentencing guidelines range,” unless one of
the waiver’s exceptions applied, which the magistrate judge de-
scribed nearly verbatim from the agreement. Chavez-Borja con-
firmed that he understood the appeal rights he was giving up, that
he had discussed the appeal waiver with his attorney, that he did
not have any questions about it, and that he made the waiver freely
and voluntarily. The magistrate judge found that Chavez-Borja
pled guilty freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the con-
sequences. And the district court accepted the plea without any
objections.
Because Chavez-Borja was specifically questioned about the
waiver, and it is otherwise clear from the record that he understood
the waiver’s full significance, we will enforce the waiver according
to its terms. See Bascomb, 451 F.3d at 1294; Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.
And Chavez-Borja does not contend that the terms of his appeal
waiver permit his current appeal, which challenges the guideline
range under which he was sentenced and the conditions of his su-
pervised release.
Instead, Chavez-Borja maintains that we should adopt and
apply a miscarriage-of-justice exception, as some other circuits
USCA11 Case: 22-13975 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2024 Page: 5 of 5
22-13975 Opinion of the Court 5
have done. See, e.g., United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1327 (10th
Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir.
2003) (en banc). But he fails to explain why the issues he raises
would qualify under such an exception.1 And we have repeatedly
declined to recognize any exceptions beyond “our established cat-
egories of unwaivable claims,” which are outlined above and do
not apply in this case. King, 41 F.th at 1368 n.3; see also Rudolph, 92
F.4th at 1048–49 (“declin[ing] to create [a miscarriage-of-justice] ex-
ception”). We follow that same course here.
For these reasons, we grant the government’s motion to dis-
miss Chavez-Borja’s appeal based on the appeal waiver in his plea
agreement.
DISMISSED.
1 It does not appear Chavez-Borja would be barred from filing a motion under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to obtain the benefit of Amendment 821 to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, which took effect after sentencing. Similarly,
Chavez-Borja may move to modify the conditions of his supervised release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2).