23-455-cv
Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Balchem Corp.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
3 New York, on the 26th day of March, two thousand twenty-four.
4
5 PRESENT:
6 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
7 DENNY CHIN,
8 JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
9 Circuit Judges.
10 __________________________________________
11
12 RICKY KAMDEM-OUAFFO,
13
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 v. 23-455-cv
17
18 BALCHEM CORPORATION, GIDEON OENGA,
19 IN PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN CAPACITY
20 WITH BALCHEM CORPORATION, BOB
21 MINIGER, IN PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN
22 CAPACITY WITH BALCHEM CORPORATION,
23 RENEE MCCOMB, IN PERSONAL CAPACITY
24 AND IN CAPACITY WITH BALCHEM
25 CORPORATION, THEODORE HARRIS, CEO, IN
26 PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN CAPACITY
27 WITH BALCHEM CORPORATION, JOHN
28 KUEHNER, IN PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN
29 CAPACITY WITH BALCHEM CORPORATION,
30 TRAVIS LARSEN, IN PERSONAL CAPACITY
31 AND IN CAPACITY WITH BALCHEM
32 CORPORATION, MICHAEL SEASTRICK, IN
1 PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN CAPACITY
2 WITH BALCHEM CORPORATION,
3
4 Defendants-Appellees.
5 __________________________________________
6
7 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Ricky Kamdem-Ouaffo, pro se, New
8 Brunswick, New Jersey.
9
10 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Mary A. Smith, Jackson Lewis P.C., New York,
11 New York.
12
Appeal from post-judgment orders of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Philip M. Halpern, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the orders of the district court are AFFIRMED.
This is the first of two appeals arising out of a dispute between Plaintiff-Appellant Ricky
Kamdem-Ouaffo and Defendants-Appellees the Balchem Corporation and affiliated individuals
(collectively, “Balchem”). 1 In this appeal, Kamdem-Ouaffo, proceeding pro se, appeals orders
denying several of his post-judgment motions. He also challenges the original March 2021
dismissal of his complaint as a sanction—the appeal from which we earlier dismissed as frivolous,
see 2d Cir. 21-653, doc. 157—as well as other pre-judgment orders. We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer
only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
1
The other appeal is Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Balchem Corp., No. 23-458 (2d Cir.).
2
I. Scope of the Appeal
As an initial matter, this appeal is only timely as to certain of Kamdem-Ouaffo’s post-
judgment motions. A notice of appeal “must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The Court lacks
jurisdiction over untimely appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107; In re Am. Safety Indem. Co., 502 F.3d
70, 72 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
The only order of the district court that falls within thirty days of Kamdem-Ouaffo’s notice
of appeal, dated March 29, 2023, is the February 28, 2023 order denying his post-judgment
motions under Rule 59(a)(2) (which the district court treated as filed under Rule 59(e)) and Rule
60(b)(4) (the “February 2023 Order”). Additionally, the subsequent orders of the district court,
dated April 5, 2023 and April 13, 2023, denying his motion for recusal and motion for
reconsideration of that denial, are subject to our review because Kamdem-Ouaffo timely amended
his notice of appeal on April 28, 2023 to include them. Our jurisdiction also extends to the order
denying Kamdem-Ouaffo’s earlier Rule 60 motion and awarding attorneys’ fees to Balchem (the
“April 2022 Order”) because his Rule 59 motion was timely filed within twenty-eight days of the
April 2022 Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi); Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc., 802 F.3d 307,
309 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating that Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) allows “an appellant to toll th[e] 30-day time
limit by filing a [timely] motion for reconsideration”).
II. April 2022 Order
In its April 2022 Order, the district court denied Kamdem-Ouaffo’s motion under Rule
60(a) and (b), which sought reconsideration of its judgment and certain pre-judgment orders, and
calculated the total amount of attorneys’ fees owed to the defendants.
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a. Attorneys’ Fees Calculation
Kamdem-Ouaffo has abandoned any argument challenging the portion of the district
court’s order calculating the award of attorneys’ fees by failing to raise any argument as to it in his
opening brief before this court. See Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 728 F.3d 139,
142 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding that a pro se litigant forfeited a challenge to the district court’s
adverse ruling mentioned only “obliquely and in passing” in his opening brief).
b. Rule 60
We review an order denying Rule 60 relief generally for abuse of discretion. United
Airlines, Inc. v. Brien, 588 F.3d 158, 175 (2d Cir. 2009). We find no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s April 2022 Order. Assuming arguendo that Kamdem-Ouaffo’s January 2022 Rule
60 motion for reconsideration of the district court’s March 2021 dismissal of his second amended
complaint was timely filed, it fails on the merits because Kamdem-Ouaffo has not identified any
new evidence or exceptional circumstances warranting relief. See United States v. Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 391–92 (2d Cir. 2001). To the extent that he challenges the dismissal
of the case as a sanction, he was afforded sufficient process before the issuance of the order. To
the extent that he challenges the April 2022 Order under Rule 60(a) instead of Rule 60(b), he has
failed to identify any clerical errors, oversights, or omissions in the district court’s prior orders that
would provide a basis for Rule 60(a) relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a); see also Hodge ex rel. Skiff v.
Hodge, 269 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
III. February 2023 Order
The February 2023 Order denied Kamdem-Ouaffo’s motion pursuant to Rule 59(a)(2) and
Rule 60(b)(4), which the district court construed as pursuant to Rule 59(e), seeking reconsideration
4
of the April 2022 Order. The denial of a “motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 541 F.3d
476, 478 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). For substantially the same reasons set forth above with respect to the April 2022 Order,
we likewise discern no abuse of discretion in the February 2023 Order. In particular, Kamdem-
Ouaffo did not identify any intervening change in law or a clear error warranting correction. See
Metzler Inv. GmbH v. Chipotle Mex. Grill, Inc., 970 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2020). Instead, he
merely reiterated arguments that the district court had previously rejected and made unsupported
allegations of fraud against the district court and the defendants.
IV. Motion to Disqualify
“Recusal motions are committed to the sound discretion of the district court, and this Court
will reverse a decision denying such a motion only for abuse of discretion.” LoCascio v. United
States, 473 F.3d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 2007). We again find no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s denial of Kamdem-Ouaffo’s recusal motion and its subsequent denial of his motion to
reconsider that denial. The grounds that Kamdem-Ouaffo cited in support of his recusal motion
were that the magistrate judge and the district judge were biased against him and that they were
involved in a conspiracy against him, involving persons posing as attorneys from the United States
Department of Justice and officers of the U.S. Marshals Service “plotting [his] kidnapping and
murder, and/or [his] ambush and assassination.” 7:17-cv-02810-PMH-PED, doc. 313 at 2. The
Supreme Court has held that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias
or partiality motion,” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994), and Kamdem-Ouaffo’s
motion has provided no basis in law or fact to support his fanciful allegations of bias.
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* * *
We have considered Kamdem-Ouaffo’s remaining arguments and find them to be without
merit. 2 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the orders of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
2
Kamdem-Ouaffo has filed motions to submit various supplemental materials. Because those materials
do not affect our grounds for affirmance, the motions are denied as moot. However, his motion to seal
Exhibits A–E attached to his March 12, 2024 motion is granted. Any other requests for relief in his
pending motions are denied.
6