This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1107
Allen Logelin,
Respondent,
vs.
Randy J. Poynter,
Appellant.
Filed March 25, 2024
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge
St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CV-22-279
Michael E. Orman, Beaumier Trogdon Orman Hurd & Viegas, PLLP, Duluth, Minnesota
(for respondent)
William D. Paul, William D. Paul Law Office, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to respondent
on respondent’s adverse-possession claim. Because respondent presented evidence
showing that he met the requirements for adverse possession of the disputed area, and
appellant failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Allen Logelin and appellant Randy J. Poynter have been neighbors
since Logelin purchased his homestead from his parents in 1997. This dispute focuses on
a strip of land between Logelin’s parcel and Poynter’s parcel that is roughly 90 feet wide.
The strip includes a wooded area on either end and an open area in the middle.
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Logelin submitted a personal
affidavit along with affidavits from several other witnesses attesting to Logelin’s activities
on the disputed area. Poynter submitted an affidavit from a witness with expertise in the
field of geographic information systems that included a number of aerial photographs,
along with an affidavit from his attorney attaching aerial photographs from 2009 and 2013.
Poynter submitted no personal affidavit or other sworn testimony in opposition to Logelin’s
motion. The following summarizes the contents of the affidavits.
Logelin built his house on his property in 2003. In that same year, he installed a
raised mound septic system with vent pipes; the raised mound and vent pipes for the septic
system are located on the disputed area and are visible above ground. Logelin obtained a
permit from the county for installation of the system. Between 2003 and 2004, he also
built a small shed and pig and poultry pens, and planted a garden on the disputed area. The
pig pen was located between trees and Logelin believed that it would not be visible from
the air. The structures were improved and expanded over time, but have been there
continuously since at least 2004. In addition, Logelin stated that he has engaged
continuously in other activities on the disputed area, such as hunting and trapping, creating
a deer plot, harvesting trees, and storing firewood, since at least 2004.
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In October 2021, Poynter objected for the first time to Logelin’s use of the disputed
area and put up no trespassing signs. Logelin then stopped hunting and trapping in the
disputed area but did not stop other activities or remove any structures.
Logelin commenced this action in 2022, seeking title to the disputed area by adverse
possession or, in the alternative, “boundary [line] by practical application.” Poynter
answered and filed counterclaims for trespass and nuisance.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In an expert affidavit
submitted by Poynter in his motion papers, the expert opined that no structures are “visible
to the naked eye” in aerial photographs of the disputed area taken in 2003-2004, 2006, and
2009, except that a garden can be seen in the 2009 photograph. In the affidavit from
Poynter’s attorney, the attorney claimed that, except for the garden in 2009, no structures
are visible until the 2013 photograph. As noted earlier, Poynter offered no other sworn
testimony.
The district court granted Logelin’s summary-judgment motion, denied Poynter’s
motion, and dismissed Poynter’s counterclaims. The district court concluded that
Poynter’s submission failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
because, even if the expert affidavit was admissible, the most that the affidavit and aerial
photographs could establish is that there were no structures visible in the aerial photographs
prior to 2010. The district court noted, however, that many of the uses alleged by Logelin
would not be visible in an aerial photograph, including the septic system installed in 2003
and activities such as cutting and stacking firewood. As such, the district court reasoned
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that the evidence failed to demonstrate the existence of disputed facts sufficient to
overcome Logelin’s summary-judgment motion.
DECISION
“We review a district court’s summary judgment decision de novo.” Riverview
Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010). “In doing
so, we determine whether the district court properly applied the law and whether there are
genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Id. The moving party
bears the burden of demonstrating no genuine issue of material fact exists. Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn. 1988). “However, when the moving party makes out a prima
facie case, the burden of producing facts that raise a genuine issue shifts to the opposing
party.” Id. If the nonmoving party then fails to offer evidence demonstrating the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law. Id.; see Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. “Mere speculation, without some concrete
evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.” Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v.
Hangsleben, 505 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Minn. 1993).
As a general matter, a party seeking to obtain title to property by adverse possession
must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the party has exercised actual, open,
continuous, exclusive, and hostile possession of the property for at least 15 years. 1 Ganje
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When the claim for adverse possession involves a separately assessed parcel, the party
must also demonstrate that the party has paid property taxes for the parcel for at least five
consecutive years, unless an exemption applies. See Minn. Stat. § 541.02 (2022). This
case was submitted to the district court as a boundary-line dispute, which is one of the
exemptions to the property-tax payment requirement in Minn. Stat. § 541.02. See St. Paul
Park Refin. Co. LLC v. Domeier, 950 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 2020); Starbeck v. Gibson,
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v. Schuler, 659 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn. App. 2003) (citing Ehle v. Prosser, 197 N.W.2d
458, 462 (Minn. 1972)). Logelin brought forward evidence to support each element of an
adverse-possession claim.
Poynter argues that the aerial photographs he submitted, along with his expert’s
opinion that no structures are “visible to the naked eye” in the aerial photographs through
2009, establish a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat Logelin’s summary-
judgment motion. But as the district court noted, permanent above-ground structures are
not required to sustain a claim for adverse possession. See id. at 267; see also Young v.
Grieb, 104 N.W. 131, 131 (Minn. 1905). An adverse-possession claim can be supported
by the types of uses a typical owner might exercise under the circumstances—it need not
include every possible use. See Costello v. Edson, 46 N.W. 299, 300 (Minn. 1890)
(affirming adverse-possession finding because the adverse claimant’s use of a “wild and
unoccupied” property, which included cutting timber and clearing brush, was constructive
use).
Here, the only evidence provided by Poynter in opposition to Logelin’s motion were
several aerial photographs and the opinion from Poynter’s expert about what was “visible
to the naked eye” in those photographs. Viewing that evidence in the light most favorable
to Poynter (and assuming for the purpose of this appeal that his expert’s opinion would be
admissible evidence), all that Poynter has established is that there may not have been
structures built on the disputed area before 2013 that were visible from the air. This does
__ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL 73107, at *3 (Minn. App. Jan. 8, 2024), petition for rev.
filed (Minn. Feb. 2, 2024).
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not, however, negate Logelin’s evidence that he continuously used the disputed area for
other applications, including most notably, the installation of a septic system in 2003 for
which he obtained a permit from the county. We also deem it significant that Poynter made
no claim that the disputed area was divisible such that Logelin’s activities in one part of
the disputed area—for example, the area where the septic system was located—would not
apply to an adverse-possession claim for another part. The disputed area was treated as
one indivisible whole throughout the proceedings before the district court. We thus agree
with the district court that the “extremely limited evidence” brought forward by Poynter,
“even assuming its admissibility,” fails to create a fact issue sufficient to defeat summary
judgment. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Logelin’s
favor.
Affirmed.
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