People v. Bell

2024 IL App (1st) 11545-U

No. 1-21-1545

Order filed March 28, 2024.

First Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 2016 CR 0920902
)
FLOYD BELL, ) The Honorable
) Patrick Coughlin,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Pucinski concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of armed robbery by
accountability beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing defendant to a 33-year term of imprisonment. This court affirmed the decision of the
trial court.

¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Floyd Bell was found guilty by accountability of armed

robbery and was sentenced to 33 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency

of the evidence to support his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, contending the State’s
No. 1-21-1545

occurrence witness was biased and falsely implicated him in the crime, and his inculpatory

statement was incredible and therefore invalid. Defendant also contends his 33-year sentence is

excessive. We affirm.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant was arrested and charged with the aforementioned offense, along with felony

murder, after a group of men robbed a Boost Mobile telephone store (Boost) in South Holland,

on 162nd Street, and murdered one of the store’s clients around 2 p.m. on May 17, 2016. Police

traced the crime back to defendant, then age 24. The State theorized that although defendant did

not enter the store, he was the master-mind behind the armed robbery because he had dated the

store clerk, Imani Williams (formerly Smith), and had visited the store where she usually worked

alone prior to the hold-up, essentially casing the store. The State presented evidence that, in

addition to conveying details of the store’s layout to his accomplices, defendant also served as

the getaway driver and received portions of the armed robbery proceeds.

¶5 The Criminal Offenses

¶6 In particular, the evidence at trial showed that on the day in question, defendant drove in

a vehicle with his brothers, Deangelo Parker, Cornelius Bell, and an acquaintance, John Carter,

to Boost. Once at the store, defendant remained in the vehicle. Parker, who was armed and

wearing a white ski mask covering his face, along with Carter, entered the store and ordered the

three occupants, consisting of Gail Norfleet, her boyfriend Christopher Lloyd, and Boost store

clerk, Williams, to put their hands up. According to Norfleet, prior to that, she had been simply

shopping for a new phone. Norfleet was ordered to empty her purse, and the unarmed man (later

understood to be Carter) ordered the store clerk Williams to open the register, containing almost

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$200. Carter took the money out of the register and then asked if there was also a safe. Williams

responded that it was in the back.

¶7 Carter ordered Williams and customers Norfleet and Lloyd to walk inside the room

where the safe was located; Parker, still armed, followed behind the group. Norfleet and

Williams walked inside, while Lloyd stood just outside with Parker directly behind him. Carter

and Parker demanded the password to the safe and tried it several times, but it did not work.

Lloyd pled with Williams to open the safe, but he then turned around and grabbed Parker. They

began to “tussle” and fell out of view. Carter went to help, while Norfleet locked the door to the

safe room, and she and Williams then hid in a utility closet. Norfleet heard Lloyd “asking them

not to - - to shoot.”

¶8 Norfleet heard two shots, and the gunman order Lloyd to get on the ground if he wanted

to live. Lloyd agreed and then it went quiet. Norfleet heard the back door chime, as if someone

had left the store, so she opened the safe room door, but observed Parker still standing over

Lloyd, who was on the floor. She slowly closed the door, and the women returned to the utility

closet. Norfleet heard the front doorbell and Williams’ friend calling her name. The door chimed

again, and Norfleet could hear what she believed were Parker’s footsteps inside the safe room

again. He then left, and the back door chimed. Meanwhile, Lloyd was moaning.

¶9 Eventually, Norfleet and Williams emerged when the offenders had left. Norfleet ran to

Lloyd, who was lying on the floor beaten and shot, and she screamed to call the police. A 911

call reporting a robbery at Boost was made at 2:04 p.m. Lloyd subsequently died from the

gunshot wound to his abdomen and cardiac arrest before even arriving at the hospital.

¶ 10 Williams’ testimony about the incident was largely the same as Norfleet’s, delineated

above, only she stated that Parker initially had his mask rolled up, so she could see his face. He

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pulled it down as he took out the gun. She also testified that initially she and Carter were the only

two in the safe room, with the others standing at the doorway. She added that following the

tussle between Parker and Lloyd she heard one of the robbers say words to the effect that,

“You’re going to die trying to be a hero today, you’re going to get shot trying to be a hero

today.” She also heard two shots and then the alarm, signaling first that the front door and then

that the back door was being opened. In addition, Williams testified that Kiara Stallworth,

Williams’ friend, came in the front door inquiring about what was happening, and it was then

that Williams felt safe enough to emerge from the closet. Lloyd was on the ground, and Norfleet

leaned down next to him and was crying. Williams then called the police, and they arrived within

minutes.

¶ 11 Williams’ testimony on direct and cross-examination further revealed that she went to the

police station immediately after the robbery and again two days later (on May 19), reporting that

the gunman looked familiar and Williams “recognized him,” but she did not recall who he was.

During the second interview, an investigator mentioned defendant’s name, and Williams

“immediately knew that he had to have something to do with” the incident. She had known

defendant over a year before the robbery. They were “really close” and had been in “somewhat”

of a dating relationship, which was admittedly sexual in nature. It dawned on Williams that

defendant’s brother, Parker, was one of the robbers and the gunman. Williams had met Parker

once at a family gathering of defendant’s; in addition, she had met Cornelius several times

(although she did not see Cornelius the day of the robbery).

¶ 12 Williams subsequently identified Parker in a police lineup as the robber with the gun,

and she also identified defendant from a photo presented to her by investigators and then in court

at trial. Norfleet identified Carter from a photo line-up. Norfleet did not see defendant inside the

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store. At trial, both Williams and Norfleet identified the ski mask, an exhibit, that Parker wore

during the robbery.

¶ 13 Williams further testified that the week before the robbery, defendant spent the night with

Williams and went with her to her workplace at Boost the next morning (he had been to the store

five or six times before). He was with her almost her entire work day, and during that time,

Williams and defendant went to the back of the store where the safe was located. On cross,

however, she admitted that he never asked about the safe, its code, security cameras and guards

(although, neither was visible in the store), or how much she kept in the register. Williams

testified she and defendant then argued later that night because another woman picked defendant

up from the store, and as a result, around May 14 (three days before the robbery), Williams

ruined defendant’s clothes that he’d left behind. She gave them to him before the offenses in

question but stated she did not see defendant on the day of the robbery. On redirect, Williams

stated that on May 17, she posted on social media that her store had been robbed, and defendant

called her that night to ask what happened and if she was okay, reporting that he had seen her

post.

¶ 14 The Investigation & Videotaped Admissions

¶ 15 Police subsequently responded to the armed robbery and shooting on May 17, 2016,

learning that the offenders had exited the back of the store. In the neighborhood behind the store,

they saw a man later identified as Parker behind a tree in a yard. He was sweating and out of

breath with what appeared to be blood stains on his pants. Police exited their vehicle, and

attempted to address Parker, but he ran. However, shortly thereafter, police detained Parker and

brought him to the station, within a mere 10 minutes of first learning about the offense.

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¶ 16 Based on subsequent interviews with Parker, police began searching for the vehicle used

in the hold-up and murder, a white Lincoln with Utah registration in Parker’s name. They were

also searching for the other suspects, defendant and Carter. Police learned that the suspects and

vehicle possibly could be found at 10815 S. Hoxie in Chicago. Therefore, the day after the

murder, on May 18, a surveillance team proceeded to that location, observing Cornelius step out

of 10815 S. Hoxie. He looked up and down the block and returned. 1 Defendant then exited that

same residence and drove away in the suspect vehicle. Defendant was stopped, arrested and

taken into custody.

¶ 17 Following Mirandized warnings, police interviewed defendant around 4 p.m. on May 18,

2016, for 45 minutes to an hour. Defendant initially denied any involvement in the offenses but

began admitting certain information. Defendant was then taken back to his lockup cell. Police

conducted a quick interview around 6:45 p.m., but soon thereafter discovered that the recording

equipment had quit working at some point during the first interview (about the last 10 to 20

minutes was missing). 2 Incidentally, it was during this point when the video quit working that

defendant began to admit information. The police created a memo regarding the failed recording.

As a result, police reinterviewed defendant around 11:30 p.m. in a different room with working

equipment following another set of Miranda warnings, and then again on May 19, 2016.

¶ 18 During the course of the interviews, defendant admitted that he and Parker had planned

the armed robbery in advance and obtained a gun for that purpose. Defendant stated he had been

1
Cornelius was arrested and admitted to being in the white Lincoln during the robbery and to also
receiving funds from the robbery, but he was not charged. He was also subsequently murdered. Cornelius
positively identified Carter.
2
The State presented evidence that defendant identified a photo of Carter (whom he referred to as
“Lee John”). Defendant stated that Carter had ridden with them and then went into Boost with his brother
to rob the store. During his interview with police, defendant stated that Cornelius had not been inside
Boost. Further, the charges against Carter were ultimately dismissed.

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No. 1-21-1545

inside the store several times with Williams and knew the store’s layout. Beforehand, defendant

and Parker discussed how the store was set up, and defendant told Parker he did not remember

seeing any cameras. Defendant admitted that after they stopped at the gas station, he rode along

with Cornelius, Carter and Parker to Boost; on the way there, Carter asked about the safe and

discussed the logistics of the armed robbery. Then, Carter and Parker both went inside Boost

with the intent of committing the armed robbery. Additionally, defendant knew the gun was

inside a Wilson tennis bag (later determined to be the Babolat brand), which Parker carried

inside the store. Defendant could not go inside because he knew Williams, and he had recently

spent the night with her. Defendant, however, advised his cooffenders not to hurt Williams or do

anything while customers were inside the store. Defendant stated that he and his criminal cohort

had agreed that if the police came to Boost, they would leave. After Parker and Carter went

inside, defendant got into the driver’s seat of the vehicle.

¶ 19 Following the offenses, Carter ran out of the store, entered the vehicle with defendant,

and they drove off looking for Parker for some 30 to 45 minutes. Carter described the armed

robbery to defendant and also had money with him. Parker called defendant several times, but

they could not find him, and so they left the neighborhood when they saw police. They (minus

Parker) then returned to defendant’s home at Hoxie. Defendant thus admitted being inside the

vehicle before, during, and after the offenses. Defendant also received the proceeds of the armed

robbery.

¶ 20 Following the interviews, defendant made calls from his jail cell, which were recorded

and published to the jury. Defendant stated, “We ain’t do no first degree murder,” and that “none

of this was supposed to happen.” He further stated that he “should have stayed home,” and that

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he told the police about “the ride” and that he “was in the car.” He added that “there’s some time

[that’s] gonna be done.”

¶ 21 An officially sanctioned police search later ensued at and around 917 East 161st Place,

which was within walking distance from Boost. At the outside trash bin, police recovered a

Babolat tennis racquet with stains on the case cover. Inside the case was a gray sweatshirt with

blood-like stains and a .40 caliber HiPoint firearm, loaded with six bullets, that had apparent

blood stains on it, in addition to a cell phone. The firearm was swabbed for DNA.

¶ 22 In the customer area of Boost, police recovered a cash register containing only loose

change (totaling $4.85). In the storage area, they recovered a cut-up, bloody gray sweatshirt

bearing apparent blood splatters on the cuff consistent with a close-range shooting, and a white t-

shirt with a hole in it consistent with a fired bullet entering through it. Police further recovered

from the storage area two gold-colored .40 Tulammo Smith & Wesson spent shell casings; an

unfired bullet of the same type; and a white ski mask, swabbed for DNA. There were several

holes in the wall with projectile fragments from a firearm discharge, along with similar

fragments on the floor. Just outside the storage room was a clump of hair with blood-like stains

on it. The items were inventoried. Forensic evidence showed that the fired cartridge casings and

an unfired cartridge case found at Boost did indeed come from the firearm found at 917 161st

Place (a HiPoint JCP, 40 Smith & Wesson firearm in proper working condition), as did one

bullet that entered Lloyd, which was recovered during the autopsy.

¶ 23 The parties then stipulated to the following forensic evidence. Parker was a possible

donor of the major DNA profile identified on the white facial mask, which had been swabbed for

DNA; Lloyd and Carter were excluded. Lloyd was included as a donor of the DNA found on the

firearm and its components, which had also been swabbed for DNA; Carter was excluded. Lloyd

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was included as a donor of additional male DNA found on Parker’s fingers; Carter was excluded.

Oral swabs, hair, and fingernail specimens were collected from Lloyd. Parker was included as a

donor of the minor DNA profile found on the right fingernails of Lloyd; Carter was excluded.

¶ 24 In addition, police collected video surveillance with time stamps around the time of the

offenses (which occurred about 2 p.m.) from various businesses within a quarter mile, a half

block, and around the corner from Boost, depicting a vehicle consistent with the White Lincoln

bearing Utah plates. The surveillance video from the business right next to Boost depicted the

victim and two other subjects walking into the business at 1:57 p.m. The surveillance video from

the GoLo Luke’s Gas Station in Hammond, Indiana, depicted the suspect vehicle at 1:30 p.m.

¶ 25 Following this evidence, the State rested. Defendant moved for a directed verdict, which

was denied.

¶ 26 Defendant’s Testimony & Jury Finding

¶ 27 Defendant testified on his own behalf denying that he was present at the scene or

involved in planning the armed robbery. Defendant testified instead that on the day in question

he spent the night with his girlfriend but was then dropped off at Parker’s home (78th an Yates)

around 9 a.m. Around 1 p.m., defendant and Parker went to GoLo in Hammond, Indiana, in a

white Lincoln Town car to get gas. Defendant identified himself in the video surveillance from

the gas station (on cross, he specifically acknowledged the video showed him getting out of the

white Lincoln and going into the store). Parker and defendant then went to 108th and Hoxie,

about five minutes from the gas station. There were a number of people there, including

Cornelius and Carter. A short while later, Cornelius, Carter, and Parker left in the white Lincoln,

but defendant did not know where they were going. Instead, defendant “kicked” it with his

girlfriend, Zsa Zsa Banks, and “smoked weed, played cards, talked shit.” While Cornelius and

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Carter returned that evening, Parker did not. Cornelius “was shook up like something happened,”

and then Cornelius and defendant “talked for hours and [Cornelius] told [defendant] what

happened with the robbery.” Cornelius also had money on him when he returned. Defendant

didn’t know they were going to commit a robbery beforehand. Defendant denied leaving the

neighborhood that day.

¶ 28 Defendant claimed he found out about the crimes the next day. He was driving Parker’s

car with keys he’d gotten from Cornelius when police stopped him. Defendant only spoke to

police because they told him on several occasions that they would release him if he “told them

what [he] knew.” Defendant initially told police that he had not been involved in the robbery but

confessed his involvement only after the video recording stopped. 3 He noted his story had to

match what Cornelius told him for “it to make sense.” Defendant was interviewed several more

times and essentially admitted that he was in the car during the robbery and that Williams had

been one of his girlfriends. Yet, while defendant had spent time in Boost, he never asked about

any security cameras, the safe, or how much money was in the cash register. He was not

“looking to rob her store.”

¶ 29 On cross, defendant acknowledged that during his interview he understood he was being

recorded and everything he said to officers could be used against him at trial, and yet, he kept

talking. Defendant admitted having told investigators about his involvement in the crimes, yet

continued to claim his inculpatory videotaped statements were coerced.

¶ 30 Defendant rested. Following evidence and argument, the jury acquitted defendant of the

first degree murder charge but found him guilty by accountability of armed robbery while armed

with a firearm. Defendant filed a posttrial motion, which was denied.

3
On cross, defendant acknowledged testifying at the motion to suppress hearing that police made
this promise after he was taken to his cell (not when the video recording stopped).

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¶ 31 Sentencing

¶ 32 The cause proceeded to sentencing, and it was noted that defendant faced a sentence of 6

to 30 years for armed robbery, plus a mandatory 15-year add-on for having inflicted great bodily

harm on the victim via a firearm, to be served at 85 percent. See 720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2014);

730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2014). The State presented and published four victim impact

statements, including from the victim’s mother, who noted that Lloyd was her only son; the

victim’s ex-wife, who noted Lloyd was only 45 years old, they were both expecting to be

grandparents, and their son struggled with the loss of his dad; the victim’s sister, who noted that

Lloyd was her only brother; and Norfleet, who discussed her intense pain on losing Lloyd.

Lloyd’s sister and ex-wife both asked for the maximum penalty, respectively claiming “these

criminals did not care or consider that my brother’s life mattered[,]” and “[a]t least [defendant’s]

family would be fortunate enough to see him even if it is behind bars. Unfortunately, our family

can’t say the same. We have to go to an empty gravesite and talk to our loved one but leave with

the void of never hearing him speak back to us.”

¶ 33 Defendant presented several statements to the court, which were published, including one

from his pastor who had known him prior to his incarceration. The pastor noted defendant would

not hurt anyone deliberately, he had a caring sensibility to others, and accepted responsibility for

his actions. The second was from his girlfriend who stated she had known defendant for 10

years, and he was a “gentle soul” who would not seek to hurt another. She noted he was a

devoted father to his 8-year-old child and had been reformed during his incarceration. She asked

for leniency.

¶ 34 In aggravation, the State argued that defendant orchestrated and planned the armed

robbery that cost Lloyd his life. The State noted that defendant admitted having a relationship

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with the store clerk, Williams; having been to her store on multiple occasions; having spoken

with Parker about the armed robbery; knowing that when Parker and Carter entered Boost, they

were armed; and driving the getaway vehicle. The State noted defendant had a pending public

indecency charge for masturbating in a room while on the phone. Defendant’s history also

showed 12 other separate infractions incurred over five years while incarcerated and awaiting

trial, including: fighting multiple times, battery, bribery, disobeying or resisting orders,

disrespecting staff, failing to maintain sanitary and orderly conditions, disorderly conduct,

uniform violations, telephone abuse, tattooing, and unauthorized drug possession and medication

misusage. Based on the foregoing, the State asked that defendant be sentenced to the maximum

allowed, 45 years.

¶ 35 In mitigation, defendant argued that the jury found him not guilty of murder and that he

had no prior felony convictions. Counsel maintained defendant did not produce a gun, enter the

store, or shoot anyone. Rather, “[t]his is something stupid that he did to try and get some

money.” Counsel asked that the court overlook the jail infractions. Counsel further noted that

defendant was close with his siblings and had the support of his girlfriend and pastor. Counsel

argued against giving defendant the maximum for a first-time offense, asserting that defendant

could still become a valuable member of society. Defendant prepared a statement, which counsel

read to the court. Defendant offered condolences to the Lloyd family, stating that if he could

change what happened, he would. Defendant asserted that he had been rehabilitated during his

five years of incarceration by reading books and attending barber college.

¶ 36 The court reviewed the letters offered by both the defense and the State, defendant’s

presentence investigation report, and defendant’s comments. In mitigation, the court noted

defendant’s abusive childhood, wherein he was transferred to several foster homes, and endured

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No. 1-21-1545

drug usage and physical abuse in the home. Although defendant completed only the 11th grade,

he had obtained his G.E.D. while incarcerated. Defendant had some employment history. He was

engaged and had a relationship with his two children, including his 8-year-old daughter, who

would experience hardship due to defendant’s incarceration. Defendant reported previous drug

usage, but denied anything current. The court noted defendant’s lack of adult felonies.

¶ 37 In aggravation, the court observed that while defendant was acquitted of Lloyd’s murder,

and the court would not punish defendant for a crime for which he was acquitted, there was no

question that Lloyd lost his life during this armed robbery. The court found the murder still could

be considered in aggravation because it was not an element of the armed robbery offense. The

court observed that defendant was at Boost with Williams, casing the store a week in advance,

and the cohort targeted this particular store because defendant was familiar with it. According to

the court, the only reason defendant did not enter was fear that Williams would recognize him.

The court further observed that although defendant told his codefendants not to harm Williams,

he likewise went with Parker to obtain the gun used in the robbery. Thus, defendant knew this

would be an armed robbery. Based on the foregoing, the court found defendant played a major

role in setting up the crime and the court could not say such conduct would not occur in the

future. Considering all the factors, including that great bodily harm was inflicted during the

armed robbery, the court sentenced defendant to 33 years’ imprisonment, to be served at 85

percent. The court noted the aggravating factor of deterrence applied. Defendant’s motion to

reconsider the sentence was denied. This appeal followed.

¶ 38 ANALYSIS

¶ 39 Defendant now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. When

considering such a challenge, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light

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most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Walls, 2022 IL App (1st) 200167, ¶ 17. Under

this standard, it’s for the trier of fact to fairly resolve any conflicts in testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. People v.

Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill 2d 213, 224 (2009). As a reviewing court, we will not substitute our

judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues involving the weight of the evidence or witness

credibility. Id. at 224-25. A conviction will not be set aside on appeal unless the evidence is so

unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of the

defendant’s guilt. People v. Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 70.

¶ 40 To prove defendant guilty of armed robbery, the State was required to establish that

defendant, or one for whom he was legally responsible, knowingly took “property from the

person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force”

and while armed with a firearm. 720 ILCS 5/18-1, 18-2(a)(2), 5-2 (West 2014). In addition to the

elements of the offense, the State had to prove that defendant was accountable, insofar as either

before or during the commission of the armed robbery, and with the intent to promote or

facilitate that commission, he solicited, aided, abetted, agreed, or attempted to aid his cohort in

the planning or commission of the armed robbery. See 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 2014). In other

words, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either defendant shared the criminal

intent of the principal, or there was a common criminal design. People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254,

266 (2000). Intent may be inferred from the character of the defendant’s acts and circumstances

surrounding the offense. Id.

¶ 41 Further, under the common-design rule, where two or more people engage in a common

criminal design or agreement, any acts in furtherance committed by one party are considered the

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acts of all parties, and all are equally responsible for those further acts. People v. Fernandez,

2014 IL 115527, ¶ 13; Walls, 2022 IL App (1st) 200167, ¶ 20. Evidence that a defendant

voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts with knowledge of its design supports

an inference that he shared the common purpose and will sustain his conviction for an offense

committed by another. Id. In addition, proof that a defendant was present during the offense, that

he fled from the scene, that he maintained close ties with his companions after the crime, and

that he failed to report the crime are all factors that the trier of fact may consider in determining

the defendant’s legal accountability. Walls, 2022 IL App (1st) 200167, ¶ 20.

¶ 42 Here, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, as we must, we cannot

say it was so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt of

defendant’s guilt, where it showed that defendant, along with his criminal cohort, committed the

following acts in furtherance of the armed robbery. See id. First, one week prior to the offenses,

defendant went with Williams to Boost, which ostensibly lacked both security guards and

cameras. Williams testified defendant spent almost the entire day with her, after having visited

the store on five or six prior occasions, and that they specifically went to the back of the store

where the safe was located. Second, prior to the incident, defendant admittedly obtained a gun,

along with Parker, for the purposes of using it in the armed robbery. Beforehand, defendant

admittedly told Parker of the store set-up and lack of cameras.

¶ 43 Third, defendant then admittedly drove in the car with cooffenders Parker and Carter to

Boost on the day in question, and waited there while Parker and Carter subsequently entered the

store and committed the armed robbery and murder of Lloyd. See 720 ILCS 5/5-2 (2014)

(presence at the crime scene with other circumstances may be considered). Defendant knew

Parker was carrying the Babolat tennis bag, containing the gun, into the store. Defendant

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admittedly drove the getaway vehicle with Carter, the unarmed robber, they searched for Parker,

the gunman, who had run from the crime scene, and defendant received proceeds from the armed

robbery. He did not report the crime. Last, the next day, police observed defendant driving this

same getaway vehicle (registered to Parker) after Cornelius (who was also present at the armed

robbery) looked in both directions from the house in an apparent attempt to check for authorities.

¶ 44 In addition to defendant’s admissions, the physical evidence revealed that Parker’s DNA

was associated with the white mask, which both Williams and Norfleet identified at trial as the

mask Parker wore. The register from the store contained only loose change, and the gun police

recovered from the apparently bloodied Babolat tennis bag (which defendant described) was the

same used in the murder of Lloyd with spent shell casings left at Boost. DNA from Parker was

discovered on Lloyd and DNA from Lloyd was discovered on Parker, confirming their struggle

as described by Norfleet and Williams. Norfleet and Williams testified in a manner that was

largely consistent as to the crimes. And, video surveillance confirmed defendant’s presence

and/or that of the same white Lincoln at businesses near Boost both before and around the time

of the crimes on the day in question.

¶ 45 Based on this evidence, the jury reasonably could have concluded that, using his

girlfriend as a pawn, defendant cased the telephone store for the purposes of committing the

armed robbery and acted in concert with his criminal cohort, conveying this information and then

engaging in the armed robbery that led to Lloyd’s demise. See Perez, 189 Ill. 2d at 266; People

v. Craigen, 2013 IL App (2d) 111300, ¶ 36; People v. Ivory, 333 Ill. App. 3d 505, 511 (2002).

The jury also reasonably could have concluded that defendant remained in the vehicle for fear

that Williams would recognize him and that Parker wore a mask during the armed robbery for

that reason, while Carter did not. As the trial court determined at sentencing, the above-stated

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evidence supported a finding that defendant played a major role in the armed robbery and bodily

harm inflicted on Lloyd. See Perez, 189 Ill. 2d at 268 (a defendant must intentionally aid or

encourage the crime’s commission for guilt to attach); In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 338 (1995)

(“accountability may be established through a person’s knowledge of and participation in the

criminal scheme, even though there is no evidence that he directly participated in the criminal act

itself”); People v. Velez, 388 Ill. App. 3d 493, 514 (2009) (a party may be accountable with some

advanced knowledge of the criminal plan).

¶ 46 Defendant nonetheless claims that Williams’ testimony was incredible due to her bias

and motive to testify falsely against him. We reject this contention out of hand. Williams’

potential bias as a jealous girlfriend (due to defendant’s multiple paramours) was fully explored

at trial. Williams’ supposition — upon realizing that Parker was the armed robber — that

defendant had to be involved in the crime was also reasonable given that defendant spent a great

deal of time in Boost with Williams and then sent his brother, whom Williams’ barely knew, to

do his dirty work. It was for the jury in this instance to evaluate Williams’ credibility and the

weight to accord the evidence. See Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill 2d at 228 (a reviewing court will not

reverse a conviction simply because the defendant claims that a witness was not credible);

People v. Nesbit, 398 Ill. App. 3d 200, 209 (2010).

¶ 47 Defendant also challenges the believability of his videotaped admissions. He points to

the malfunctioning video equipment and insists, contrary to the officer’s testimony at trial, that

police promised he could go home only if he provided an inculpatory statement. He contends his

brother Cornelius instead told him all the details of the crime, and he was not involved. This, too,

was fully explored before the jury. Again, it is the jury’s job, not ours, to determine witness

credibility, weigh evidence, and resolve any conflicts in the evidence. See id. Also, a trier of fact

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need not accept any possible explanation compatible with the defendant’s innocence and elevate

it to the status of reasonable doubt. Id. at 229. We note that the total evidence, including

defendant’s relationship with Williams and the video surveillance, contradicts defendant’s claim

that his inculpatory statements were incredible. We also have reviewed the video evidence of

defendant’s statements in full, and it is consistent with the officer’s testimony that the equipment

inadvertently quit working. Indeed, in the third interview, the officer noted he had a problem

with the video and requested that defendant repeat his story once again. Moreover, on appeal,

defendant does not challenge the denial of his motion to suppress, which focused on this issue. 4

We thus reject his back-door approach to attacking his admissions under the sufficiency of the

evidence. For all these reasons, defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.

¶ 48 Sentencing

¶ 49 Last, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 33

years’ imprisonment. The sentence for armed robbery, a Class X offense, is 6 to 30 years. See

720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2014); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2014). In addition, defendant was

subject to a mandatory 15-year add-on for having inflicted great bodily harm on the victim via a

firearm. Id. Defendant now argues that with his minimal criminal background, community

support, and expressions of remorse and rehabilitation, he should have received a lesser sentence.

We disagree.

¶ 50 The sentencing decisions of a trial court are entitled to great deference and weight

because a trial judge is in a far better position to fashion an appropriate sentence after

considering a defendant’s credibility, demeanor, moral character, mentality, social environment,

4
In rejecting defendant’s motion to suppress statements, the court expressly found the video cut
short unintentionally, and there was no foul play by police. The court further found police did not make
any promises to defendant outside his custodial interrogation that was recorded.

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habits, age, and other relevant factors. People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999); People v. Cox,

377 Ill. App. 3d 690, 709 (2007). A sentence within the statutory guidelines is presumptively

correct, and a trial court’s sentencing decision will not be disturbed, absent an abuse of

discretion. People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46; Cox, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 709.

¶ 51 During the sentencing hearing, the court carefully considered the letters offered in

support of the defense and the State, defendant’s presentence investigation report, defendant’s

elocution, and the required sentencing factors. The court noted various mitigating factors,

including defendant’s abusive childhood, his educational progress, family situation, and lack of

adult criminal history.5 The court also noted various aggravating factors, including defendant’s

advanced casing of the store, acquisition of the gun with Parker, and knowledge of the armed

robbery. The court concluded that defendant played a “major role” in the armed robbery. Given

the seriousness of the offense, which resulted in great bodily harm inflicted on Lloyd, the fact

that the court believed such conduct could occur in the future, and the matter of deterrence, the

court sentenced defendant to 18 years for the armed robbery, plus the 15-year mandatory add-on,

for a total of 33 years. See Cox, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 709 (noting, the seriousness of the crime is

the most important factor in fashioning a sentence).

¶ 52 While defendant now points to evidence demonstrating his rehabilitative potential,

reformation, and remorse, he omits that during his incarceration in county jail he committed a

number of infractions that contradicted his claim of reformation. Regardless, a trial court is not

required to give greater weight to a defendant’s rehabilitative potential than to the seriousness of

5
We note that at sentencing, the State expressly said it was not relying on defendant’s juvenile
offenses (which included theft, giving false information, and unauthorized use of a vehicle) and asked the
court not to consider them. There is no indication the court did so. Instead, the court stated, “the defendant
has no prior history of criminal activity that applies.” We thus disregard defendant’s focus on those
juvenile offenses in his brief.

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the offense. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 214 (2010). Likewise, it was the court’s job to

evaluate defendant’s credibility and that of those who spoke on his behalf. Apparently, the court

did not believe defendant’s claims of total reformation. See Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 53.

¶ 53 Here, in balancing the society’s interests against defendant’s rehabilitative ability, as

required, the court issued an eminently reasonable sentence. It was exactly in the middle of the

minimum (21 years) and maximum (45 years) allowed, and consistent with the evidence

presented, the nature of the offense, and the law. See People v. Boyd, 2021 IL App (1st) 182584,

¶ 88; Cox, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 709; see also Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 54 (“A sentence within statutory

limits will not be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of

the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense”); cf. People v. Margentina,

261 Ill. App. 3d 247, 250 (1994) (finding the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the

defendant to over twice the minimum given that the defendant was a teenager from an abusive

home when he murdered a man who had provoked him with harassing conduct). Moreover,

neither party disputes that defendant must serve the sentence at 85 percent, making his sentence

potentially closer to 28 years. We decline defendant’s invitation to reweigh the sentencing

factors and conclude there was no abuse of discretion. See Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 214.

¶ 54 CONCLUSION

¶ 55 For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 56 Affirmed.

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