In re: Thomas John Shayman

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 8 2024
SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: BAP No. CC-23-1071-CSG
THOMAS JOHN SHAYMAN,
Debtor. Bk. No. 1:21-bk-10251-MT

THOMAS JOHN SHAYMAN, Adv. No. 1:21-ap-01025-MT
Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM∗
LEILA AQUINO,
Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Central District of California
Maureen A. Tighe, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: CORBIT, SPRAKER, and GAN Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

After a business and personal relationship soured, Thomas John Shayman

(“Shayman”) and Leila Aquino (“Aquino”) sued each other in state court for

alleged wrongs and debts due and owing. The jury found in favor of Aquino

exclusively, awarding her $428,192.97. When Shayman filed a chapter 7 1

bankruptcy petition, Aquino brought an adversary proceeding to except the

∗ This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for

whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value,
see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy

Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, all “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
1
state court judgment from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A) (false pretenses,

a false representation, or actual fraud) and § 523(a)(4) (fiduciary fraud or

defalcation).

The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment on both claims based

on issue preclusion.2 With respect to the § 523(a)(2)(A) claim, we AFFIRM.

However, we determine that the bankruptcy court erred in granting summary

judgment on Aquino’s § 523(a)(4) claim because it is unclear what issues were

actually and necessarily decided in the state court action that established the

elements of § 523(a)(4). As a result, we VACATE that portion of the judgment

and REMAND to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with

this decision.

FACTS

A. State court litigation

Aquino and Shayman met in 1997 when Shayman hired Aquino to

provide various business services for his restaurant, Burbank Bar and Grill. At

the time, Aquino was providing the business services through her company

Synergy Financials & Management Services, Inc. Over time, Aquino’s and

Shayman’s business relationship developed into a personal relationship.

2
Although Aquino’s motion for summary judgment sought an order of
nondischargeability pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(6), the bankruptcy court’s order
only addressed Aquino’s § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4) claims. The bankruptcy court later issued a
Civil Rule 54(b) certification and a final judgment as to Aquino’s § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4)
claims. Accordingly, only those two claims are subject to this appeal.
2
 1. Aquino’s cross-complaint

After their personal relationship ended in 2013, Shayman sued Aquino in

Los Angeles County Superior Court, alleging conversion, breach of fiduciary

duty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment against Synergy and

Aquino. Aquino brought a cross-complaint (the “Cross-Complaint”) against

Shayman and Harry Klein (“Klein”), who was the sole trustee of a family trust

(“Shayman Trust”) of which Shayman was the beneficiary (“State Court

Action”). 3

a. Acquisitions Unlimited, LLC

In the Cross-Complaint, Aquino specifically alleged that Shayman

committed breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud when he

failed to split certain proceeds related to their joint real estate investment.

Aquino stated that in 2002 she and Shayman entered into a joint business

venture by forming Acquisitions Unlimited, LLC (“Acquisitions”), a Nevada

limited liability company to hold certain real properties purchased as an

investment. Aquino alleged that when they formed Acquisitions, she and

Shayman agreed to be equals in all things including ownership, management

rights, and profits. Aquino also stated that she and Shayman agreed that each of

them would always act in the best interest of one another when it came to the

business of Acquisitions.

In 2003, Acquisitions purchased three townhomes in Henderson, Nevada

(the “Condos”). In the Cross-Complaint, Aquino asserted that in 2005, when the

3
Burbank Management Group, Inc. dba Canyon Grille v. Synergy Financials & Mgmt.
Services, Inc., et al., case no. BC584799 consolidated with case no. BC615815.
3
value of the Condos approximately doubled, Aquino wanted to sell the Condos

and split the profits. According to Aquino, Shayman disagreed. Rather,

Shayman thought that they should keep the Condos, take out a home equity

loan, and split the loan proceeds 50/50. Aquino alleged that she finally agreed.

Accordingly, Shayman on behalf of Acquisitions, obtained a home equity line of

credit in the amount of $242,000 secured by the Condos (“HELOC Funds”).

Aquino alleged that instead of splitting the HELOC Funds as agreed, Shayman

used the HELOC Funds for personal use and for expenses related to his

separate company, the Burbank Bar and Grill. Aquino alleged that when she

demanded payment of her half of the HELOC Funds ($121,000 plus interest

since 2005) early on and then again in 2013, Shayman refused.

Aquino alleged that Shayman’s failure to split the HELOC Funds as

agreed was a breach of contract. Without any additional facts or analysis, except

a reference to their personal relationship, Aquino alleged that Shayman’s failure

to split the HELOC Funds as agreed also qualified as a breach of fiduciary duty

and fraud.

b. Burbank Management Group, Inc.

Aquino also alleged that Shayman committed breach of contract, breach

of fiduciary duty, fraud, and intentional interference with prospective economic

advantage when he refused to give her stock in his new company as promised.

Aquino alleged that in April 2013 Shayman and Klein formed a new

company, Burbank Management Group, Inc., dba Canyon Grille (“BMG”).

According to Aquino, after forming the company, Shayman needed a person

4
with good credit and management skills for BMG and someone who could

provide capital for initial business expenses.

Aquino alleged that on or about January 2, 2014, Aquino, Shayman, and

Klein entered into an agreement whereby Aquino would serve as a signatory

and controller of the operating accounts for BMG and in exchange Shayman

and Klein would give her 50% of the outstanding stock of BMG (“BMG Stock

Agreement”). Aquino maintained that in reliance on the promises in the BMG

Stock Agreement, she made loans to Shayman and the Shayman Trust for

startup costs related to BMG.4 Aquino further maintained that she performed

all conditions, covenants, and promises required by her in accordance with the

terms and conditions of the BMG Stock Agreement. This performance included

fulfilling her duties as controller and signatory by applying for and obtaining a

liquor license for BMG, opening bank accounts and merchant accounts on her

credit, and obtaining various other licenses needed for BMG to operate.

However, Aquino never received the promised shares in BMG.

Aquino alleged that Shayman’s failure to perform under the BMG Stock

Agreement was a breach of contract. Aquino stated that it was undisputed she

would receive 50% of the outstanding stock of BMG if she provided certain

services. Aquino alleged that she performed her part of the agreement and all

that was left was for Shayman to perform, but he refused. Therefore, Aquino

concluded that Shayman breached the BMG Stock Agreement.

4
Aquino stated that she loaned a total of $57,352.00 which included $2,352.00 for a
liquor license, $5,000.00 for initial restaurant supplies, $10,000 for professional services, and
$40,000 for attorney fees.
5
 Aquino also alleged that Shayman’s failure to perform under the BMG

Stock Agreement was a breach of fiduciary duty. Aquino asserted that because

she, Shayman, and Klein were partners in the joint venture they owed a

fiduciary duty to each other. Aquino alleged that Shayman breached his

fiduciary duty “by repudiating the agreement entitling Aquino” to 50% of

BMG’s outstanding stock.

Aquino further alleged that Shayman committed fraud because he had no

intention of performing his obligations when he made the agreement.

Therefore, Aquino concluded that Shayman made the representations with the

intent to defraud and deceive her into providing BMG the needed capital and

services. Aquino alleged that she reasonably relied on Shayman’s promise, and

she acted in reliance of the promise that she would get 50% of BMG’s

outstanding stock. Aquino alleged that she was damaged in the amount of her

loans to BMG and additional damages to be proven at trial but estimated at $2

million.

Finally, Aquino alleged that Shayman’s failure to perform under the BMG

Stock Agreement was an intentional interference with her prospective economic

advantage. Aquino alleged that she and Klein had a meeting sometime in 2013

and at the meeting Klein agreed that Aquino was owed backpay for business

and other services she had provided “over the years.” Klein allegedly executed

a note in favor of Aquino for $502,648. The terms of the note required monthly

payments (which payments Aquino maintained were never made) and the note

was secured by a piece of real property held by the Shayman Trust. Aquino

alleged that when Shayman discovered the arrangement between Aquino and
6
Klein, Shayman initiated the State Court Action and threatened to also sue

Klein “if he fulfilled the terms of the agreement” with Aquino. Aquino alleged

that Klein refused to pay her as agreed because he did not want to be sued by

Shayman.

2. Jury’s special verdict findings

In the State Court Action, after a multi-day jury trial, the jury found in

favor of Aquino and against Shayman. The jury verdict form (the “Jury Form”)

did not identify the causes of action adjudicated. Rather, the Jury Form

included the jury’s answers to 31 special interrogatories. Relevant to this appeal,

the jury specifically responded to the following special interrogatories as

indicated below:

JURY’S SPECIAL VERDICT FINDINGS

1. Was Leila Aquino an agent and/or corporate officer of BMG? Yes

2. Did Leila Aquino act of behalf of BMG for purposes of serving as controller
and signatory on its bank accounts? Yes

10. Did Thomas Shayman enter into an agreement with Leila Aquino to act as
the controller and signatory of the bank accounts of BMG, and in exchange,
agree to grant Aquino 50% of the stock of BMG? Yes

11. Did Thomas Shayman enter into an agreement with Aquino regarding the
repayment of Aquino’s money? Yes

12. Did Aquino do all, or substantially all, of the significant things that the
contract required her to do? (The jury was asked to respond to both “Shares”
and “Money” for the next several questions). Shares? Yes / Money? Yes

13. Did all the conditions that were required for Shayman’s performance
occur? Shares? Yes / Money? Yes.

7
14. Did Shayman fail to do something that the contract required him to do?
Shares? Yes / Money? Yes.

15. Was Aquino harmed by Shayman’s breach of contract? Shares? Yes /
Money? Yes.

16. What are Aquino’s damages? Shares: $50,000; Money: $21,000

17. Was Shayman an agent of Aquino? Yes.

18. Did Shayman act on Aquino’s behalf for purposes of obtaining a
$242,000.00 line of credit? Yes.

19. Did Shayman fail to act as a reasonably careful agent would have acted in
the same or similar circumstances? Yes.

20. Was Aquino harmed? Yes.

21. Was Shayman a substantial factor in causing Aquino’s harm? Yes.

23. What are Aquino’s damages? Total: $121,000.00.

24. Did either Shayman or Harry Klein as trustee of the Shayman Trust, make
a promise to Aquino? Yes.

25. Did Shayman and/or Harry Klein as trustee of the Shayman Trust, intend
to perform this promise when he made it? Shayman: No; Klein: Yes.

26. Did Shayman and/or Harry Klein as trustee of the Shayman Trust, intend
that Aquino rely on this promise? Shayman: Yes; Klein: Yes.

27. Did Aquino reasonably rely on this promise? Shayman: Yes; Klein: Yes.

28. Did Shayman and/or Harry Klein as trustee of the Shayman Trust,
perform the promised act? Shayman: No; Klein: No.

29. Was Aquino’s reliance on Shayman’s and/or Harry Klein’s as trustee of
the Shayman Trust promise a substantial factor in causing harm to
Aquino? Shayman: Yes; Klein: Yes.

8
30. What are Aquino’s damages? Lost Profits: $20,000.00 / Other past
economic loss: $50,000.00.

31. What is the total amount of money you award against each party?
Shayman: $262,000.00; Klein: $0.

The Jury Form demonstrates that the jury did not award Aquino a general

amount for all damages nor did the jury award Aquino any punitive or

exemplary damages. Rather, the jury awarded Aquino damages in the amount

of $121,000 for her claims related to Acquisitions (her half of the HELOC Funds)

and damages in the amount of $70,000 for Shayman fraudulently inducing her

to enter into the BMG Stock Agreement.

3. State court judgment

Based on the jury’s determinations, the state court entered judgment for

Aquino on August 9, 2019. The state court entered an amended judgment in the

amount of $428,192.97 (which included costs, attorney’s fees, and interest) on

July 21, 2020 (together, the Jury Form and amended judgment are hereinafter

referred to as the “State Court Judgment”).

B. Shayman’s bankruptcy petition and Aquino’s adversary complaint

After entry of the State Court Judgment, Shayman filed a chapter 7

bankruptcy petition listing the judgment debt as an unsecured claim. Aquino

timely commenced an adversary proceeding seeking to except the State Court

Judgment from Shayman’s discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4).

9
 1. Aquino’s motion for summary judgment

Aquino moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, partial

summary judgment. Aquino’s motion was based solely on the State Court

Judgment’s alleged issue preclusive effect.

Aquino argued that issue preclusion applied to the State Court Judgment

because although the State Court Judgment did not specify that claims for

fraud, defalcation, and breach of fiduciary duty were adjudicated, the elements

establishing each of those claims was actually litigated and necessarily decided

in the State Court Action. Aquino argued that because preclusion applied, there

were no genuine issues of material fact, and she was entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Shayman opposed the motion arguing that the State Court

Judgment was too vague to support issue preclusion.

2. The bankruptcy court’s ruling and nondischargeable judgment

Following arguments at the hearing on the summary judgment motion,

the bankruptcy court relied on issue preclusion and granted Aquino summary

judgment excepting the State Court Judgment from discharge pursuant to

§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4).

In its ruling, 5 the bankruptcy court first determined that based on

preclusion, $70,000 of the State Court Judgment debt (plus interest at the

California statutory interest rate) was nondischargeable pursuant to

§ 523(a)(2)(A). The bankruptcy court determined that the State Court Judgment

conclusively demonstrated that all the elements of a § 523(a)(2)(A) were actually

5
The bankruptcy court first issued a tentative ruling which was later incorporated by
reference into its final ruling.
10
litigated and necessarily decided, despite the lack of a specific finding of fraud.

The bankruptcy court determined that: (1) Aquino “alleged facts and asserted a

claim for fraud and deceit [in her Cross-Complaint and the issue] was tried and

submitted to a jury”; (2) the Jury Form included “factual findings sufficient to

rule on the specific cause of action”; and (3) Shayman had not argued that the

issue’s determination was not “entirely unnecessary” to the judgment in the

initial proceeding, citing Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 335 (1990).

Therefore, the bankruptcy court granted Aquino’s motion for summary

judgment on her § 523(a)(2)(A) nondischargeability claim based on the issue

preclusive effect of the State Court Judgment.

The bankruptcy court next determined that based on issue preclusion,

$121,000.00 of the State Court Judgment debt (plus interest) was

nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(4). The bankruptcy court determined

that based on the allegations in the Cross-Complaint and the State Court

Judgment, the jury found each element of a § 523(a)(4) claim, again regardless

that the State Court Judgment did not include any explicit findings of an

express trust, fiduciary duty, or defalcation.

The bankruptcy court concluded that an express trust existed because

there was identifiable property that was entrusted to Shayman. The bankruptcy

court next determined that Aquino and Shayman were joint venturers in

Acquisitions and therefore were fiduciaries who owed fiduciary duties to each

other under California law. Finally, the bankruptcy court determined that

because the jury found that Shayman failed to act as a reasonably careful agent

would have acted in similar circumstances, the element of defalcation was
11
established. Because the bankruptcy court found that all elements of § 523(a)(4)

were actually litigated and necessarily determined in the State Court Action, the

bankruptcy court granted Aquino’s motion for summary judgment on her

§ 523(a)(4) nondischargeability claim based on the issue preclusive effect of the

State Court Judgment.

The bankruptcy court subsequently entered a judgment excepting the

State Court Judgment, in the total amount of $481,277.13 including interest and

attorney’s fees, from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4) (the

“Bankruptcy Judgment”).6

Shayman timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and

157(b)(1) and (2)(I). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUES

Did the bankruptcy court err in granting summary judgment to Aquino

on her § 523(a)(2)(A) claim based on issue preclusion?

Did the bankruptcy court err in granting summary judgment to Aquino

on her § 523(a)(4) claim based on issue preclusion?

Did the bankruptcy court err in determining that the interest, fees, and

costs related to the nondischargeable State Court Judgment debt were also

nondischargeable?

The initial judgment was amended twice, once to correct the total amount of the
6

judgment and second, after the BAP requested a Civil Rule 54(b) certification and final
judgment because the judgment did not address Aquino’s claims under § 523(a)(6).
12
 Did the bankruptcy court err in awarding post-judgment interest at the

state rate instead of the federal rate?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment rulings

and its determination to except a debt from discharge. Ilko v. Cal. State Bd. of

Equalization (In re Ilko), 651 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2011). We review de novo

the bankruptcy court’s determination that issue preclusion is available. Lopez v.

Emergency Serv. Restoration, Inc. (In re Lopez), 367 B.R. 99, 103 (9th Cir. BAP 2007).

We also review de novo the bankruptcy court’s interpretation of “the law

governing pre- and postjudgment interest.” Hamilton v. Elite of L.A., Inc. (In re

Hamilton), 584 B.R. 310, 318 (9th Cir. BAP 2018), aff'd, 785 F. App’x 438 (9th Cir.

2019). When we review a matter de novo, we give no deference to the

bankruptcy court’s decision. See Francis v. Wallace (In re Francis), 505 B.R. 914,

917 (9th Cir. BAP 2014).

If we determine that issue preclusion is available, we then review the

bankruptcy court’s decision to apply it for an abuse of discretion. In re Lopez,

367 B.R. at 103. A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion if it applies the wrong

legal standard or its findings of fact are illogical, implausible, or without

support in the record. TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th

Cir. 2011); United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en

banc).

13
 DISCUSSION

A. Summary judgment and issue preclusion

1. Summary judgment standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and supplemental

materials show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civil Rule 56(a)

(incorporated by Rule 7056); Roussos v. Michaelides (In re Roussos), 251 B.R. 86, 91

(9th Cir. BAP 2000), aff'd, 33 F. App’x 365 (9th Cir. 2002). “A properly-supported

summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by the mere existence of some

alleged factual dispute . . . .” Id. “[T]he requirement is that there be no genuine

issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)

(emphasis in original). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, all

inferences “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing

the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986).

Because Aquino’s motion for summary judgment is based solely on issue

preclusion, there are no disputed facts. Consequently, summary judgment is

appropriate only if issue preclusion is available and the elements of Aquino’s

nondischargeability claims are established as a matter of law by the State Court

Judgment. See Newman v. Lee (In re Newman), BAP No. CC-21-1250-GTL, 2022

WL 2100905, at *4 (9th Cir. BAP June 10, 2022).

14
 2. California issue preclusion elements and standard

Issue preclusion applies in § 523(a) discharge exception proceedings.

Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n.11 (1991); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (federal

courts must give “full faith and credit” to state court judgments). Bankruptcy

courts may apply the doctrine to an existing state court judgment as the basis

for granting summary judgment. Khaligh v. Hadaegh (In re Khaligh), 338 B.R. 817,

832 (9th Cir. BAP 2006), aff’d, 506 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2007). Issue preclusion in

nondischargeability proceedings is governed by the preclusion law of the state

in which the judgment was issued, which in this case is California. Harmon v.

Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001).

In California, issue preclusion prevents a party from relitigating a

previously decided issue if: (1) the issue is identical to that decided in the first

suit; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first suit; (3) the issue was

necessarily decided in the first suit; (4) the decision in the former proceeding is

final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom preclusion is sought

was the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. Plyam v.

Precision Dev., LLC (In re Plyam), 530 B.R. 456, 462 (9th Cir. BAP 2015) (citing

Lucido, 51 Cal.3d at 341). The court must additionally assess “whether

imposition of issue preclusion in the particular setting would be fair and

consistent with sound public policy.” In re Khaligh, 338 B.R. at 824-25 (citing

Lucido, 51 Cal.3d at 342-43).

In California, “an issue is ‘actually litigated’ when it is properly raised by

a party’s pleadings or otherwise, when it is submitted to the court for

determination, and when the court actually determines the issue.” In re Harmon,
15
250 F.3d at 1247 (citing People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 484 (1982)); Hernandez v.

City of Pomona, 46 Cal. 4th 501, 511 (2009). To conclude that an issue was

“necessarily decided,” California courts “require[] only that the issue not have

been ‘entirely unnecessary’ to the judgment in the initial proceeding.” Lucido, 51

Cal. 3d at 342. California courts have also held that if an issue is determined to

have been necessarily decided in a prior proceeding, the issue was actually

litigated. In re Harmon, 250 F.3d at 1248.

The party asserting preclusion bears the burden of establishing the

threshold requirements. Id. at 1245. This means providing “a record sufficient to

reveal the controlling facts and pinpoint the exact issues litigated in the prior

action.” Kelly v. Okoye (In re Kelly), 182 B.R. 255, 258 (9th Cir. BAP 1995), aff’d,

100 F.3d 110 (9th Cir. 1996). Ultimately, “[a]ny reasonable doubt as to what was

decided by a prior judgment should be resolved against allowing the [issue

preclusive] effect.” Id.

Both summary judgment and the doctrine of issue preclusion potentially

permit the entry of final orders or judgments without further proceedings.

Because of their potential to foreclose further proceedings, a ruling granting

summary judgment based on issue preclusion requires clarity and precision.

Clarity and precision not only aid in the Panel’s review but, more importantly,

ensure that the bankruptcy court properly determined whether a matter was

without genuine dispute and established as a matter of law.

B. Aquino’s § 523(a)(2)(A) claim.

On appeal, Shayman makes a general allegation that the bankruptcy court

erred in applying preclusion because the State Court Judgment was too vague.
16
However, he fails to support this general claim with any specific allegations of

error of fact or law related to either preclusion or § 523(a)(2)(A). Interestingly,

Shayman appears to concede that the State Court Judgment established that all

five elements of Aquino’s § 523(a)(2)(A) claim had been litigated and

determined. Shayman argues regardless, the bankruptcy court should have

considered his “new evidence” which would have demonstrated the jury’s

determinations were error. 7 For the following reasons, we disagree.

1. The five elements necessary to establish a § 523(a)(2)(A) claim.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from a debtor’s discharge any debt for money

obtained by false pretenses, a false misrepresentation, or actual fraud. To

establish a claim for fraud or misrepresentation under § 523(a)(2)(A), a creditor

must demonstrate the following five elements:

(1) that the debtor made the representations; (2) that at the time
he knew they were false; (3) that he made them with the
intention and purpose of deceiving the creditor; (4) that the
creditor [justifiably] relied on such representations; and (5) that
the creditor sustained alleged loss and damage as the
proximate result of such representations.

Diamond v. Kolcum (In re Diamond), 285 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Household Credit Servs. v. Ettell (In re Ettell), 188 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1999));

Turtle Rock Meadows Homeowners Ass’n v. Slyman (In re Slyman), 234 F.3d 1081,

1085 (9th Cir. 2000). These requirements mirror the elements of common law

7
Shayman’s attempts to introduce new evidence solely to negate the jury’s
determinations and the State Court Judgment are an impermissible collateral attack and
“irrelevant in determining the preclusive effect” of the State Court Judgment. See Killgore
Adventures, LLC v. Marek (In re Marek), 468 B.R. 406, 411 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2012).
17
fraud and actual fraud under California law. Tobin v. San Souci Ltd. P’ship (In re

Tobin), 258 B.R. 199, 203 (9th Cir. BAP 2001). “[A] promise made with a positive

intent not to perform or without a present intent to perform satisfies

§ 523(a)(2)(A).” Rubin v. West (In re Rubin), 875 F.2d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 1989).

2. The bankruptcy court’s determinations as to each § 523(a)(2)(A)
element.

In this case, the bankruptcy court correctly acknowledged that the State

Court Judgment could satisfy issue preclusion without a specific finding of

fraud as long as the prior decision established all the facts necessary to except

the debt from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A). See e.g. Pemstein v. Pemstein (In re

Pemstein), 492 B.R. 274, 283 n.19 (9th Cir. BAP 2013) (acknowledging the same

principle for purposes of § 523(a)(4) with respect to the term “defalcation”);

Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 342 (“The ‘identical issue’ requirement addresses whether

‘identical factual allegations’ are at stake in the two proceedings, not whether

the ultimate issues or dispositions are the same.”).

The bankruptcy court methodically went through each § 523(a)(2)(A)

element and then identified the corresponding jury response that the

bankruptcy court determined established that element.

a. The debtor made a representation.

First, the bankruptcy court determined that the jury found that Shayman

made a representation, the first element of a § 523(a)(2)(A) fraud claim. The

bankruptcy court pointed to jury response no. 10 in which the jury responded

“yes” to the question, “Did Thomas Shayman enter into an agreement with

Leila Aquino to act as the controller and signatory of the bank accounts of BMG,
18
and in exchange, agree to grant Aquino 50% of the stock of BMG?” The

bankruptcy court also cited to jury response no. 24 in which the jury answered

“yes” to the question, “Did either Shayman or Harry Klein as trustee of the

Shayman Trust, make a promise to Aquino?” Although the jury simply found

that Shayman or Klein made a promise to Aquino, the bankruptcy court

recognized that the promise referred to in jury response no. 24 was the promise

Shayman made related to the BMG Stock Agreement. Shayman has not argued

otherwise.

b. The debtor knew the representation was false at the time it
was made.

The bankruptcy court next determined that the jury found that Shayman

knew the representation was false when he made it, the second element of a

fraud claim. The bankruptcy court again cited jury response nos. 10 and 24. The

bankruptcy court also cited jury response no. 25 in which the jury responded

“yes” as to Shayman and “no” as to Klein when answering the question “Did

Shayman and/or Harry Klein as trustee of the Shayman Trust, intend to perform

this promise when he made it?”

c. The debtor made the representation with the intention and
purpose of deceiving the creditor.

Next, the bankruptcy court determined that the jury found that Shayman

made the promise with the intent to deceive, the third element of a fraud claim.

As support, the bankruptcy court cited to Aquino’s allegation that Shayman

made the promise to induce her to “perform her duties as controller.” The

bankruptcy court also cited to jury response no. 26 in which the jury responded

19
“yes” as to both Shayman and Klein when answering the question, “Did

Shayman and/or Harry Klein as trustee of the Shayman Trust intend that

Aquino rely on this promise?”

d. The creditor justifiably relied on the representation.

The bankruptcy court next determined the jury found that Aquino relied

on Shayman’s representation and also that her reliance was reasonable, the

fourth element of a fraud claim. The bankruptcy court cited to jury response no

27 in which the jury responded “yes” to the specific question “Did Aquino

reasonably rely on this promise?”

Although the jury found that Aquino “reasonably” relied on Shayman’s

promise, the bankruptcy court did not err in determining that this finding

satisfied the “justifiable” reliance standard under § 523(a)(2)(A). Field v. Mans,

516 U.S. 59, 73-77 (1995). This is because reasonable reliance is a more stringent,

objective standard. Id. at 77 (reasonable reliance “clearly exceeds the demand of

justifiable reliance”); Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d

1082, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining § 523(a)(2)(A) requires only justifiable

rather than reasonable reliance). A person may justifiably rely on a

representation even if its falsity could have been discovered upon investigation.

Romesh Japra, M.D., F.A.C.C., Inc v. Apte (In re Apte), 180 B.R. 223, 229 (9th Cir.

BAP 1995), aff'd, 96 F.3d 1319 (9th Cir. 1996). Typically, then, if reliance is found

to be reasonable, it also meets the lesser, subjective standard of justifiable

reliance. Tallant v. Kaufman (In re Tallant), 218 B.R. 58, 69 n.15 (9th Cir. BAP

1998). In this case, we find no clear error in the bankruptcy court’s finding that

the jury’s determination that Aquino reasonably relied on the representations
20
Shayman made as part of the BMG Stock Agreement also satisfied

§ 523(a)(2)(A)’s justifiable reliance requirement.

e. The creditor sustained alleged loss and damage as the
proximate result of the representation.

Lastly, the bankruptcy court determined that the jury found Aquino

suffered damages as a result of Shayman’s misrepresentations, the last element

of a claim for fraud. The bankruptcy court cited to jury responses nos. 27-30 in

which the jury specifically found that Aquino’s reliance on Shayman’s promise

was a “substantial factor in causing harm to Aquino.” The jury then found that

the harm was $20,000 in lost profits and $50,000 in other past economic loss.

3. The bankruptcy court’s application of issue preclusion.

Based on the foregoing, the bankruptcy court determined that the issue of

Shayman’s fraud had been litigated and decided in the State Court Action

despite no specific finding of fraud. The bankruptcy court determined that the

issue of fraud was actually litigated because Aquino properly raised a claim of

fraud in her Cross-Complaint based on Shayman’s fraudulent inducement and

failure to perform under the BMG Stock Agreement. The bankruptcy court

determined that the claim of fraud was necessarily determined because each

factual element of a claim for fraud was determined by the jury and the issue of

fraud was not “entirely unnecessary” to the State Court Judgment. According to

the bankruptcy court, a determination of fraud “was necessary to in [sic] order

to secure a judgment in favor of Plaintiff.”

21
 4. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in applying
issue preclusion to Aquino’s § 523(a)(2)(A) claim.

Although the State Court Judgment could have been clearer as to which of

Aquino’s claims were adjudicated, the bankruptcy court did not err in

determining that the elements of § 523(a)(2)(A) were actually litigated and

necessarily determined in the State Court Action as a matter of law. The

bankruptcy court correctly concluded that the promise referred to in jury

response no. 24 was Shayman’s promise related to the BMG Stock Agreement.

The jury responses that followed also related to the BMG Stock Agreement

based on the grouping of the jury questions and responses. Although Aquino

pled four separate causes of action related to Shayman’s failure to perform

under the BMG Stock Agreement (fraud, breach of contract, 8 breach of fiduciary

duty,9 and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage10),

only fraud includes the elements of a false representation made with an intent

to deceive or coerce the other party. Thus, the jury’s determination that

8 In California, the elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the
existence of the contract; (2) the plaintiff’s performance; (3) the defendant’s breach (failure to
perform); and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51
Cal. 4th 811, 821 (2011).
9 Under California law, the elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty

are: (1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage
proximately caused by the breach. Oasis W. Realty, LLC, 51 Cal. 4th at 820.
10 In California, the elements of a claim for intentional interference with prospective

economic advantage are 1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and third party
containing the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff, 2) knowledge by the
defendant of the existence of the relationship, 3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant
designed to disrupt the relationship, 4) actual disruption of the relationship, and 5) damages
to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant. Visto Corp. v. Sproqit Techs.,
Inc., 360 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
22
Shayman made a false representation with the intent of Aquino relying on the

false representation to her detriment, was only necessary if the jury adjudicated

Aquino’s fraud claim. See Baldwin v. Kilpatrick (In re Baldwin), 249 F.3d 912, 919

(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that although the state court default judgment did not

make an express finding on an issue, the issue was “necessarily decided”

because judgment could not have been rendered without finding all elements of

the claim met); Choi v. Kim (In re Kim), Bk. No. 99-03303, 2003 WL 22939483, at *3

(Bankr. D. Haw. Jan. 10, 2003) (A “court must presume that the prior judgment

was correct and . . . that the prior court made all of the findings and conclusions

. . . needed to support the judgment [and therefore,] [e]ach of those necessary

findings and conclusions has preclusive effect even if the state court did not

explicitly state them.”) (citation omitted).

On this record, we conclude that issue preclusion was available with

respect to Aquino’s § 523(a)(2)(A) claim based on the State Court Judgment and

we determine that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in applying

issue preclusion to the State Court Judgment. Furthermore, because there was

no genuine dispute of material fact for the bankruptcy court to adjudicate, it did

not err in granting summary judgment in Aquino’s favor and finding that a

portion of the State Court Judgment debt was nondischargeable pursuant to

§ 523(a)(2)(A).

C. Aquino’s § 523(a)(4) claim.

Shayman argues that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in

applying preclusion because the State Court Judgment provided an insufficient

basis for finding a fiduciary relationship between he and Aquino. Shayman also
23
argues that the State Court Judgment is not clear as to “which transaction the

jury found there to be a fiduciary relationship.” We agree that the bankruptcy

court erred in determining that issue preclusion was available for Aquino’s

§ 523(a)(4) claim.

1. The elements of § 523(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge “any debt for fraud or defalcation

while acting in a fiduciary capacity.” To prevail on a nondischargeability claim

under § 523(a)(4), a plaintiff must allege and demonstrate that (1) there was an

express trust; (2) the debtor was acting as a fiduciary to the creditor at the time

the debt arose; and (3) the debt arose from the debtor’s defalcation. Otto v. Niles

(In re Niles), 106 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by

Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 569 U.S. 267, 274 (2013).

The broad definition of fiduciary under nonbankruptcy law—a

relationship involving trust, confidence, and good faith—is inapplicable in the

dischargeability context. For purposes of § 523(a)(4), the Ninth Circuit has

adopted a narrow definition of “fiduciary” as a relationship “arising from an

express or technical trust that was imposed before, and without reference to, the

wrongdoing that caused the debt.” Cal-Micro, Inc. v. Cantrell (In re Cantrell), 329

F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). These requirements

necessarily exclude constructive, resulting, or implied trusts. See Ragsdale v.

Haller, 780 F.2d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Runnion v. Pedrazzini (In re

Pedrazzini), 644 F.2d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1981)).

24
 2. The bankruptcy court erroneously determined that each element
of Aquino’s § 523(a)(4) claim was established by the State Court
Judgment as a matter of law.

As noted above, entry of summary judgment based on issue preclusion

demands that the bankruptcy court employ clarity and precision when

determining whether each element of a claim is established as a matter of law.

Here, the bankruptcy court properly identified each of the three required

elements that Aquino had to establish to prevail on her § 523(a)(4) claim. The

bankruptcy court, however, erred in its determination that each of the elements

was established by the State Court Judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly,

the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in applying issue preclusion.

One of the necessary elements of a § 523(a)(4) claim is that the debt arose

from the debtor’s fraud or defalcation. Defalcation has two elements: a breach

of a fiduciary duty and a culpable state of mind. Maxwell v Maxwell (In re

Maxwell), 509 B.R. 286, 289 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2014). A breach of fiduciary duty

entails “misappropration of trust funds or money held in any fiduciary

capacity; [or] the failure to properly account for such funds.” Lewis v. Scott (In re

Lewis), 97 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal alteration omitted); In re

Pemstein, 492 B.R. at 282. Breach of fiduciary duty includes “wrongfully taking

trust property, engaging in self-dealing with trust property for . . . [the

fiduciary’s] own profit, and failing to provide a full accounting.” Tomasi v.

Savannah N. Denoce Tr. (In re Tomasi), No. CC-12-1401-KiTaD, 2013 WL 4399229,

at *12 (9th Cir. BAP Aug. 15, 2013); In re Pemstein, 492 B.R. at 282-83.

25
 Additionally, defalcation requires a “culpable state of mind . . . involving

knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature of the

relevant fiduciary behavior.” Bullock, 569 U.S. at 269 (2013). Conduct satisfying

this state-of-mind requirement includes “conduct that the fiduciary knows is

improper” or when the fiduciary “consciously disregards (or is willfully blind

to) a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will . . . violate a

fiduciary duty.” Id. at 74 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Further, the risk “must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the

nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him,

its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-

abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.” Id.

Although the bankruptcy court recited the applicable intent standard as

announced in Bullock, its only reference to evidence that the jury litigated and

determined Shayman’s intent was the jury finding that Shayman “failed to act

as a reasonably careful agent.” Specifically, as to this element, the bankruptcy

court determined:

The jury found that when Defendant took the entire $242,000
HELOC Funds, secured by the Condos, to use for his other
business and did not repay Plaintiff for her 50% share, [he]
failed to act as a reasonably careful agent would have acted in
similar circumstances. The actions described in the State Court
Complaint and the findings by the jury are sufficient for the
Court to find that there is no issue of material fact and Plaintiff
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Ruling, Feb. 8, 2023, pg. 7.

26
 We disagree that the jury’s finding establishes the element of defalcation

as a matter of law. Although the jury determined that Shayman was Aquino’s

agent and failed to act as a reasonably careful agent would have acted in the

same or similar circumstances, there is nothing in the record provided that

establishes this finding necessarily and actually established the requisite mental

state required by Bullock. Aquino, as the party asserting issue preclusion had the

responsibility to provide the bankruptcy court a record sufficient to reveal the

controlling facts and the exact issues litigated in the first suit.11 In re Kelly, 182

B.R. at 258. There is simply nothing in the record to suggest that the jury was

required, or asked, to determine Shayman’s mental state as part of Aquino’s

breach of fiduciary duty claim in the State Court Action.12

3. The bankruptcy court abused its discretion in applying issue
preclusion to Aquino’s § 523(a)(4) claim.

Based on the foregoing, Aquino failed to show “a record sufficient to

reveal the controlling facts and pinpoint the exact issues litigated in the prior

action.” See In re Plyam, 530 B.R. at 462. Rather, there is reasonable doubt about

11
Aquino provided the bankruptcy court with little evidence despite the fact that the
State Court Action involved a multi-day trial with litigation lasting over a year. In support of
her assertion that California preclusion law both applied and was satisfied, Aquino
introduced: (1) her Cross-Complaint; (2) Shayman’s verified answer to the Cross-Complaint;
(3) a portion of Shayman’s deposition testimony; and (4) the State Court Judgment. We note
that Aquino did not provide the bankruptcy court: (1) a copy of the trial transcript (or its
equivalent as allowed by California Rules of Court 8.130(h) and 8.134); (2) a copy of the jury
instructions; or (3) a copy of any exhibits or documents admitted as evidence during the trial.
12
Although there may be evidence demonstrating that Shayman’s intent when taking
the HELOC Funds satisfies the Bullock standard, Aquino’s motion for summary judgment
relied on issue preclusion and did not present such evidence to the bankruptcy court.

27
what was decided in the State Court Judgment. Reasonable doubt that an issue

was actually and necessarily decided in a prior action should be “resolved

against applying issue preclusion.” In re Lopez, 367 B.R. at 108; Frankfort Digit.

Servs., Ltd. v. Kistler (In re Reynoso), 477 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2007); Genesis VJ, Inc.

v. Nguyen (In re Nguyen), BAP No. CC-11-1379-LaPaMk, 2012 WL 603680, at *7

(9th Cir. BAP Feb. 17, 2012) (“As a matter of fairness, when faced with serious

questions about the scope of a ruling, the bankruptcy court should err on the

side of caution and avoid applying issue preclusion when a state court’s exact

determination is ambiguous.”).

Accordingly, based on this record, we conclude that issue preclusion was

not available with respect to Aquino’s § 523(a)(4) claim and the bankruptcy

court abused its discretion in applying issue preclusion to the State Court

Judgment. Likewise, because factual issues remain, the bankruptcy court erred

in granting Aquino summary judgment on her § 523(a)(4) claim. 13 See In re

Pemstein, 492 B.R. at 284 (remanding for the bankruptcy court to determine

whether the state court findings satisfied the “standard established in Bullock”).

As a result, there are issues of fact that must be resolved before the bankruptcy

court can determine the § 523(a)(4) claim.

13
Because we find that the bankruptcy court erred in determining that the element of
defalcation was established as a matter of law based on the State Court Judgment, we need
not determine whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining the remaining elements of
the § 523(a)(4) claim were established as a matter of law. However, upon remand we urge the
parties to be clear as to whether the parties were partners or joint venturers and whether
agency or membership in a limited liability company is a basis for the nondischargeability
claim under § 523(a)(4).
28
D. Shayman waived his claim as to the nondischargeability of
prejudgment attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest.

Shayman argues that the bankruptcy court erred in determining that the

prejudgment interest the State Court Judgment accrued while the issue of

nondischargeability was before the bankruptcy court, was nondischargeable.

Shayman also argues that the state court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to

Aquino. There is no evidence that Shayman made either argument to the

bankruptcy court. Indeed, the record indicates that the bankruptcy court

specifically gave Shayman the opportunity to brief the issues but Shayman

“declined to brief the issues of whether Plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment

interest and whether finding an attorney’s fee award nondischargeable under

Bartenwefer 14 was appropriate in this case.” Because Shayman failed to raise the

issues before the bankruptcy court, he has waived them on appeal. See Orr v.

Plumb, 884 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2018) (usual rule is that arguments raised for

the first time on appeal are deemed forfeited).

E. The nondischargeable judgment debt should continue to accrue interest
at the state rate.

Shayman argues on appeal that the bankruptcy court erred in granting

Aquino post-judgment interest on the nondischargeable debt at the California

rate instead of at the federal rate. Shayman further argues that because Aquino

did not specifically request interest in her motion for summary judgment, he

had no chance to oppose or brief the issue. Therefore, Shayman asserts that the

Bartenwerfer v. Buckley (In re Bartenwerfer), 613 B.R. 730, 735 (9th Cir. BAP 2020), aff’d,
14

No. 20-60020, 2021 WL 3560671 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2021).
29
issue should be remanded to the bankruptcy court. Shayman’s argument is

without merit.

Contrary to Shayman’s assertions, where the underlying debt has been

previously determined prepetition, § 523 only allows a bankruptcy court to

determine whether a debt is dischargeable. In re Hamilton, 584 B.R. at 323.

Section 523 does not permit a bankruptcy court to modify the amount of the

debt or adjust the applicable rate of interest. Id. Furthermore, because the

bankruptcy court did not have the discretion not to award the interest on the

nondischargeable debt, there was no reason to allow briefing on the issue.

Therefore, in this case, as in Hamilton, the Bankruptcy Judgment merely

established that a portion of the underlying State Court Judgment debt was

nondischargeable. It did not constitute a new money judgment under federal

law. Accordingly, interest on the “nondischargeable judgment debt should

continue to accrue at the state rate, even after the bankruptcy court determines

the nondischargeability of the debt.” Id.

Thus, the bankruptcy court did not err in awarding Aquino postjudgment

interest on the nondischargeable debt at the California statutory rate.

CONCLUSION

The bankruptcy court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor

of Aquino on her § 523(a)(2)(A) claim that the $70,000 the jury awarded her for

Shayman’s fraud related to the BMG Stock Agreement was nondischargeable

based on the preclusive effects of the State Court Judgment. Further, the

bankruptcy court did not err in determining that interest, costs, and fees related

to that portion of the State Court Judgment were also nondischargeable.
30
Similarly, the bankruptcy court did not err in recognizing that Aquino was

entitled to post-judgment interest on the portion of the nondischargeable debt

at the California statutory rate. We AFFIRM these portions of the bankruptcy

court’s decision.

However, the bankruptcy court erred in granting summary judgment in

favor of Aquino on her § 523(a)(4) claim that the $121,000 previously awarded

for the failure to turnover her half of the HELOC funds was nondischargeable

based on the preclusive effects of the State Court Judgment. Therefore, we

VACATE that portion of the bankruptcy court’s decision and REMAND to the

bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

31