United States v. Campas

Appellate Case: 24-4024 Document: 010111028961 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 9, 2024
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 24-4024
(D.C. No. 2:23-CR-00403-DS-1)
CHRISTOPHER THOMAS CAMPAS, (D. Utah)

Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________

Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________

In November 2023, a grand jury in the District of Utah indicted Christopher

Thomas Campas on two charges: attempted coercion and enticement of a minor in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and interstate travel with the intent to engage in

illicit sexual conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Campas appeals the

district court’s pretrial detention order. Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3145(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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I. BAIL REFORM ACT STANDARDS

The Bail Reform Act requires pretrial detention “[i]f, after a hearing . . . ,

[a] judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will

reasonably assure [1] the appearance of the person as required and [2] the safety of

any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (bracketed numerals

inserted for clarity). When contemplating detention, the district court must consider

“available information concerning”:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
including whether the offense . . . involves a minor victim
...;

(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;

(3) the history and characteristics of the person . . . ; and

(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person
or the community that would be posed by the person’s
release.

§ 3142(g).

Section 3142 further creates a presumption “that no condition or combination

of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the

safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to

believe that the person committed” certain enumerated offenses, including the

offenses with which Campas has been charged. See § 3142(e)(3)(E). The defendant

may rebut that presumption by producing “some evidence” that his appearance could

be assured and that he would not be a danger to the community. United States v.

Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1355 (10th Cir. 1991). If the defendant meets that burden,

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“the [statutory] presumption [of detention] remains a factor for consideration by the

district court in determining whether to release or detain.” Id.

Regardless of the presumption’s effect, “the burden of persuasion regarding

risk-of-flight and danger to the community always remains with the government.” Id.

at 1354–55. Specifically, “[t]he government must prove risk of flight by a

preponderance of the evidence, and it must prove dangerousness to any other person

or to the community by clear and convincing evidence.” United States v. Cisneros,

328 F.3d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Preparation for the Detention Hearing

When the grand jury indicted Campas in November 2023, he had already been

arrested based on the alleged conduct underlying the indictment. Pursuant to the Bail

Reform Act, a magistrate judge soon set a hearing to determine if Campas should

remain detained pending trial.

Ahead of the hearing, the government moved for detention, and submitted the

following background:

An FBI agent was acting in an undercover capacity on a
social media platform, purporting to be a father who was
offering his 7-year-old son for sex. Beginning on October
11, 2023, Campas made contact with the UC on a social
media platform. Over the course of the next two weeks,
the two engaged in sexually explicit conversations. The
FBI UC asked Campas if he had “age limits,” to which
Campas responded, “F**k no, nothing hotter than a father
nursing his newborn on his c**k.” Campas further stated
that he was going to drive from Oregon to Utah to sexually

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abuse the 7-yr-old. Campas described what he wanted to
do to the boy in graphic detail, to include rape and sodomy.

Campas arranged to meet the UC on October 27, 2023, at a
prearranged location in North Salt Lake, Utah. Campas
was arrested without incident at this location. Campas is a
resident of Arizona and does not live in or have
connections to Utah. It appears he was driving from
Oregon, where he had been living on a marijuana farm for
the previous month, to Utah for the purpose of sexually
abusing this boy. A cell phone found with Campas was
confirmed to be the cell phone communicating with the
FBI UC.

Campas made admissions during a post-arrest interview.
During that interview, Campas stated that he believes
children are capable of consenting to sex and he does not
believe what he is doing is wrong.

Of significance, Campas was also communicating with
other UC law enforcement officers on various social media
platforms at the same time regarding his sexual interest in
children.

Aplt. App. vol. I at 14 (capitalization normalized) (redactions in original). Moreover,

the government said it had “a video recording of the interview with Campas, where

he makes the admissions set forth in the [block-quoted text above].” Id.

(capitalization normalized).

Also in anticipation of the detention hearing, a probation officer submitted a

pretrial services report. Some of this report repeats verbatim the government’s

accusations from its motion to detain. But the report also offers more detail about

what Campas said in his online chats with the undercover FBI agent:

Campas described [to the undercover agent] what he
wanted to do to the [seven-year-old] boy, to include:
“Hang naked, suck each other’s cocks, rimming, making
out, fucking, teach him how to fist me, teach him how to
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fuck and get fucked.” Campas said he would “like to make
it a lifelong love.”

Aplt. App. vol. II at 1.1

The pretrial services report further noted that Campas is thirty-five years old

and has lived in Arizona his whole life. He is unemployed, single, and does not have

a valid passport. In terms of prior criminal history, he had been twice arrested, ten

years earlier, for simple possession of a controlled substance, but there was no record

of any conviction.

In the probation officer’s opinion, “the information known at this time” and

“the comments made by the defendant at the time of his arrest” show “there are no

conditions which can be imposed to mitigate the risk the defendant poses at this

time.” Id. at 6.

1
Campas submitted the pretrial services report under seal as volume II of his
appendix, and he moved to keep volume II sealed. The Clerk of Court granted that
motion, subject to this panel’s further consideration. We do not disturb the Clerk’s
order because the pretrial services report contains personal identifying information
and other sensitive information. However, “information obtained in the course of
performing pretrial services functions in relation to a particular accused shall be used
only for the purposes of a bail determination and shall otherwise be confidential.”
18 U.S.C. § 3153(c)(1) (emphasis added). The bail determination remains in play,
obviously, and some of Campas’s arguments raise the question of where the district
court obtained the information it relied upon. In our review, it is clear some of the
challenged information ultimately traces back to the pretrial services report. Thus,
although volume II of Campas’s appendix will remain sealed, we nonetheless find it
necessary to quote portions of it in this order and judgment. Most of what we quote
can already be found elsewhere in the unsealed record, although usually without
attribution to the pretrial services report. See, e.g., Aplt. App. vol. I at 157 (district
court decision listing the sexual acts Campas hoped to perform on the seven-year-old
boy); Aplt. Opening Br. at 2–3 (summarizing information from the pretrial services
report about Campas’s circumstances and prior arrests).

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B. The Detention Hearing Before the Magistrate Judge

The magistrate judge held the detention hearing on November 29, 2023.

There, the probation officer who prepared the pretrial services report informed the

parties that he had since spoken with one of Campas’s brothers, who lives in Tucson.

This brother was willing to have Campas live at his home while awaiting trial.

As far as arguments for and against detention, the government rested heavily

on Campas’s alleged danger to the community. The government emphasized “that the

defendant stated in a recorded statement he does not believe what he did was wrong

here. . . . [T]o not believe that there’s something wrong with that I think raises a

huge concern if he were to be released.” Aplt. App. vol. I at 44. The government

also noted that online communications led to this situation, and it opined that it is

difficult to limit a person’s ability to communicate online.

Campas’s attorney “[took] the government’s representation . . . that . . . there

may have been some discussion about [Campas’s] beliefs,” apparently referring to the

recorded statement relied upon by the government. Id. at 46. “But,” he countered,

“certainly whatever those beliefs may be ha[ve] not led to prior arrests or prior

investigations.” Id. As to the government’s concern about inability to restrict online

communications, he conceded “we’re past the point where it’s feasible to function in

the world without at least one [electronic device],” but the probation office could

install monitoring software on a cell phone. Id. at 47–48. Finally, the defense

attorney admitted “we don’t often . . . see . . . someone who makes a statement . . .

that they have told the police that this type of conduct should be legal,” but he had

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spoken to his client and “he has no intention of defying the Court’s orders, if [the

court] were to release him, and engage in whatever his beliefs may be and engage in

any type of conduct that is being alleged here.” Id. at 48.

The magistrate judge first focused on “the allegation that [Campas] made some

admissions to law enforcement about [his] belief system that are problematic. . . .

[T]hose kinds of statements . . . move[] [the charges] into a different class in terms of

risk.” Id. at 50. On the other hand, the magistrate judge found it significant that

there was no evidence Campas had ever acted on his beliefs before now. That,

combined with family support, convinced the magistrate judge that Campas could be

released on “very strict conditions.” Id. at 51. Those conditions included, among

other things, GPS monitoring, home detention in his brother’s home (with exceptions

for work and other necessary activities), full-time employment, no use of devices that

can access the Internet other than for employment purposes (and those devices must

have monitoring software), no viewing of sexually explicit materials (including those

involving only adults), and no contact with anyone younger than eighteen without

supervision of a court-approved adult.

C. The Appeal to the District Court

The government appealed the magistrate judge’s ruling to the district court.

The district court held a hearing, at which the government’s attorney elaborated

further on Campas’s confession to law enforcement:

Apparently there was some dispute in front of [the
magistrate judge] about whether or not the United States’
summary of the defendant’s interview was accurate.

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Specifically the United States has taken the [position] that
during a post Miranda interview with law enforcement
follow[ing] his arrest Mr. Campas expressed that he did not
believe that he had done anything wrong in communicating
with an undercover officer about the possibility of
engaging in sexual activity with a seven-year-old. I want
to reiterate, Your Honor, that it remains the United States’
position that is in fact a correct and fair summary of that
interview.

And I want to specifically mention[] a couple of comments
that Mr. Campas made during his interview, the first of
which involved him indicating or representing that he
himself as a small child was sexually attracted to adult
males. Without commenting further upon that claim, Your
Honor, the defendant went on to explain to law
enforcement that given his own sexual proclivities with
respect to older men, he described the United States system
of laws as it relates to consent as both discriminatory and
arbitrary.

Mr. Campas explained on more than one occasion to law
enforcement that he was very troubled by United States
law as it relates to the age of consent and the fact that it is
a criminal offense in the United States for adults to engage
in sexual activity with children.

Mr. Campas expressed he wished he would be in the
position to argue [as is] sometimes done apparently in
Europe that he is a minor-attracted person, which is in his
view not a choice. He then explained that he believed that
all children should have the ability to control what they
wanted to do in terms of their own sexuality and their own
sexual activity even as it relates to sexual contact with
adults.

Mr. Campas was expressly asked if he had shown up on the
evening of his arrest and there had been an actual seven-
year-old that appeared willing to engage in sexual activity
with him, he indicated that he would not have any problem
with doing that. He indicated that he believed that children
should be able to indulge in sexual curiosity in whatever
way they wanted even if they were as young as seven years
old.
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Relatedly, Your Honor, Mr. Campas during his chats with
the undercover officer indicated that he did not believe
there was any age limit for adults and children to engaged
in sexual activity. He described that he believed that
children did have the ability in fact to engage in
consensual activity, sexual activity with adults.

....

Your Honor, in the government’s view the circumstances of
this offense are extraordinarily egregious. Mr. Campas
traveled to the state of Utah fully expecting that he would
in fact engage in sexual activity with a seven-year-old.
And in the government’s view there are no conditions or
combination of conditions that would reasonably secure his
appearance here in connection with this case and also the
safety of the community.

Aplt. App. vol. I at 65–68. The government also re-emphasized its skepticism that

release conditions would protect the community:

As the Court is well aware, any restriction that would
prohibit Mr. Campas from accessing the Internet or
engaging in chats in the future is virtually unenforceable.
Once he would be released from custody Mr. Campas’
activity as it relates to these kinds of chats and these kinds
of efforts would be virtually impossible to police for the
probation office or for anyone, quite frankly.

So in light of all of those factors, Your Honor, the United
States continues to firmly believe that Mr. Campas should
be detained pending that outcome of this matter.

Id. at 68.

Campas’s attorney countered with further context about his client’s confession

to the government:

What we ended up here having something very unusual.
About an hour and a half long conversation between Agent
Ross who is quite experienced in investigating these kind
of offenses and somebody who is a little out of ordinary,
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right? Numerous times throughout this interview,
Mr. Campas had told Agent Ross that he wasn’t going to
act—you know, that he wasn’t there for the child, right?
The crime with which he’s charged is the crime not so
much of the completed act as an attempt to even engage in
that act. It’s all based on communication. But if we’re
going to talk about risks there’s a couple things that are
important to know, and I don’t believe the government has
evidence to the contrary.

First, he’s denied being sexually attracted to children.
He’s admitted that when he was 14 years old he was
sexually attracted to an adult male, and that’s where some
of his ideas and some of his thoughts and some of his
musings on that particular area come from. He’s also
discussed with Agent Ross in quite an open conversation
that in his mind the laws that have to do with statutory rape
and sex crimes when it comes to age are arbitrary. And he
gave an example of somebody being 17 years old as
opposed to 18 years old. That was the example that
Mr. Campas gave in that particular conversation.

He said he’s never done it in the past. He said there would
be nothing on his phone that would reveal anything
different. He has had he says since 2012 discussions with
others about sexual[] attraction to children. He’s not
denying that. And I believe the government in its last
presentation said, yes, there were conversations that he has
had with other individuals who were sexually attracted to
children, or so they believed, but it was nothing of the sort
where there would be some action or some agreement to
meet somewhere.

In this particular instance as difficult as this is to hear, and
I understand that, you know—what I hope comes across
here is this is someone who is really struggling with his
identity, with who he is, who had not acted on this in this
same fashion for the 35 years of his life, and who is not
here to—if it were the case that he is on a crusade because
he believes the laws should be changed, then you would
have reasons to believe that he’s not going to comply with
your orders.

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Id. at 72–74. As for the government’s concern that pretrial release conditions would

not matter, Campas’s attorney asserted that the government was setting up a no-win

scenario:

To say that he’s virtually unsupervisable is equal to saying
nobody is supervisable because I suppose anybody can
violate conditions. But you can impose conditions, and
some are mandatory with good reasons with these kind of
cases. He can have GPS monitoring. He can have no
Internet. He can be restricted to his brother’s home in
Tucson with the exception of probation visits, with
exception of contact with his attorney, with the condition
of church services and employment.

But those are conditions that are routinely imposed. And
based on the 35 years of his life, some of which was
commendable and remarkable, I worry that we are just
judging him on this allegation alone, which of course he
hasn’t yet been convicted. That’s why he’s been ordered
released, because all that the government has at this point
are the allegations in this case.

Id. at 74–75.

In rebuttal, the government asked the court to look again at Campas’s online

dialogue with the undercover FBI agent, such as the exchange where Campas denied

having “age limits.” In this light, the government claimed that

to suggest that this man does not have a sexual attraction to
children is simply false. Mr. Campas made those
representations to an undercover officer in a setting in
which he had no reason to believe that anyone else would
ever see those chats. These are completely unguarded
comments that he made in conjunction with his attempt to
engage in sexual activity with a seven-year-old. Not only
did he engage in chats about this activity, he actually
made—he deliberately came to Utah for purposes of
meeting with this seven-year-old. This wasn’t just
conversation that happened in a vacuum. He showed up

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here to meet with this seven-year-old. And he explained in
excruciating detail what he wanted to occur between
himself and this seven-year-old child.

He also acknowledged in his interview with the police that
had that actual seven-year-old child been at that hotel or at
that location he likely would have gone through with
engaging in sexual activity with that child. And when he
was specifically asked, you wouldn’t feel guilty about it if
that kid appeared to be consenting in the conduct,
Mr. Campas[] responded, that’s probably accurate.

Id. at 76–77.

The district court ruled from the bench that Campas would remain detained

pending trial:

Based on my [review], counsel, of this very important
case, based on my review of the conversation with the
undercover contact, based on my review of the specificity
of that conversation, based on my review of experience
with these types of cases in the past, and the great respect I
have for [the magistrate judge],[2] the Court is of the view
that there is no fact or set of facts that can guarantee public
safety or appearance in this important matter. And I’m
accordingly going to find that Mr. Campas be held pending
trial in this very important case. I believe the evidence is
very strong, and we’ll just see how it unfolds as the case
proceeds.

But the Court will affirm the government’s objection to the
magistrate judge’s order and find that the judge’s,
magistrate judge’s order is overruled pursuant to what the
Court has just stated.

Id. at 77–78.

2
In context, it appears the district court meant something to the effect of “and
despite the great respect I have for [the magistrate judge].”

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D. The First Appeal to this Court (No. 24-4003)

Campas appealed the district court’s decision to this court. He argued, among

other things, that the district court failed to explain its decision with reference to the

factors it was required to consider under the Bail Reform Act. This court agreed. We

held that the district court did not adequately explain its decision. We therefore

remanded for further explanation or, alternatively, for the district court to release

Campas with conditions.

E. The District Court’s Remand Decision

The district court did not call for further briefing or argument. Rather, a week

after our decision, and before we had issued the mandate, the district court issued a

written order reinstating its detention decision.

In terms of factual findings, the district court’s order reproduces, mostly

verbatim, a portion of the brief filed by the government when it appealed the

magistrate judge’s release decision to the district court. That appeal brief went

through each of the Bail Reform Act factors—the nature and circumstances of the

offense, the weight of the evidence, Campas’s history and characteristics, and the

nature and seriousness of the danger he poses if released—and listed facts allegedly

supporting detention under each factor. The district court’s remand order generally

tracks this factor-by-factor analysis precisely.

By way of legal analysis, the order emphasizes that Campas’s danger to the

community, standing alone, was enough under the circumstances to justify detention:

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While it is true that Mr. Campas has no criminal record and
that this is the first time he has acted out, the court finds
that this allegation is so serious and potentially harmful to
children, that judging Mr. Campas on this allegation alone
is not only appropriate, but necessary. Mr. Campas made
the disturbing admission that he does not believe there is
anything wrong with sexually molesting seven-year-old
boys. Mr. Campas’s belief that there is nothing wrong with
sexually molesting young boys demonstrates a moral
corruptness that is contrary to every principle of Western
civilization throughout history. If Defendant is incapable
of recognizing such an inherent depravity, it stands to
reason that no external, court-ordered compulsory
restrictions would overcome his internal justifications for
this behavior.

Aplt. App. vol. I at 161. Finally, as to potential release conditions, the district court

stated:

[1] The United States has emphasized the risk to the public
that would exist if Mr. Campas were released on these
charges. He engaged in similar behavior with three
separate undercover officers, believing that he had the
opportunity to engage in sexual conduct with
extraordinarily young children. And whether the Court
imposes restrictions or not, there is no practical way to
enforce any restriction that would prohibit Mr. Campas
from accessing the Internet. [2] Also, GPS monitoring
does not tell us what a defendant is doing at any given
time. It just tells us after-the-fact where the defendant has
been. A person could arrange to meet another parent with
sexual access to his child, arrive at the meet location and
molest a young boy all before anyone would have any idea
that he had violated a single term of pretrial release.

Id. at 161–62 (bracketed numerals inserted for clarity). Part [1] of this paragraph

is a near-verbatim quote of the government’s argument at the hearing preceding

the district court’s original detention order. See id. at 77. Part [2] is another

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near-verbatim quote from the government’s brief appealing the magistrate judge’s

decision to release Campas. See id. at 23.

Campas filed a notice of appeal from this decision, leading to the current

proceeding (No. 24-4024). This court entered its mandate in the previous appeal

(No. 24-4003) about two weeks later.

III. JURISDICTION

As the government points out, the district court’s order on remand, which is

the order on appeal here, was entered before this court’s mandate in the previous

appeal issued. This raises a question of the district court’s jurisdiction to issue the

order pre-mandate. Ideally, our remand in No. 24-4003, should have been a limited

remand. But given the procedural reality of what actually happened, we conclude

that it is in the interest of judicial efficiency to overlook any potential problem

created by the fact that this court’s mandate followed, rather than preceded, the

district court order on appeal.

The rule that jurisdiction lies with the appellate court from the notice of appeal

until the mandate is “a judge-made doctrine, designed to promote judicial economy

and avoid the confusion and inefficiency that might flow from putting the same issue

before two courts at the same time.” United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1226

(10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, there was no danger

of confusion or inefficiency. In fact, the same issue was not before this court and the

district court at the same time. Remanding to the district court with instructions to

re-enter the same order now, post-mandate, would be the opposite of promoting

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judicial economy and avoiding inefficiency. We therefore conclude, in this particular

case and under these particular circumstances, the procedural irregularity is

irrelevant, and we proceed to the merits.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court “accept[s] the district court’s findings of historical fact . . . unless

they are clearly erroneous.” Cisneros, 328 F.3d at 613. The court reviews de novo

the district court’s application of those facts to the law governing pretrial detention.

Id.

V. ANALYSIS

Campas offers several arguments in favor of a second remand, but this time in

front of a different judge. We address his arguments in turn.

A. Failure to Say Whether Campas Met His Rebuttal Burden

As previously noted, the crimes with which Campas has been charged carry a

rebuttable presumption that he should be detained pending trial. No party disputes

this.

The district court’s order generically describes the rebuttable-presumption

framework in § 3142(e), but the order does not say if Campas successfully produced

“some evidence,” Stricklin, 932 F.2d at 1355, as required to overcome the

presumption. Campas says the district court erred by not announcing whether he had

rebutted the presumption.

If this was error—a question we do not decide—it was harmless for at least

two reasons. First, the district court never said anything to suggest Campas failed to

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meet his burden, or that the court was holding any failure against him. Instead, it

analyzed all the § 3142(g) factors, and it explained its conclusion with reference to

the evidence, not the presumption. Second, regardless of the presumption, “the

burden of persuasion regarding risk-of-flight and danger to the community always

remains with the government.” Stricklin, 932 F.2d at 1354–55. There is no hint the

district court disregarded this rule. Accordingly, the district court’s lack of an

explicit statement about whether Campas rebutted the presumption provides no

reason to vacate or reverse.3

B. Failure to Say Whether the Government Carried its Burden

Campas next argues that the district court did not mention the government’s

preponderance burden (for risk of flight) and clear-and-convincing burden (for

danger to the community). Therefore, according to Campas, “[t]his court is left to

speculate about the process the district court followed and the analysis the district

court conducted.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 14–15.

Campas is correct that the district court did not say anything about the

preponderance or clear-and-convincing burdens, but we do not agree with his

conclusion. The district court analyzed the § 3142(g) factors, reached a conclusion,

and explained its reasoning. This court is not required to speculate. Cf. United

States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating, in the sentencing

3
Campas also argues, without elaboration, that “the district court misstate[d]
§ 3142(e).” Aplt. Opening Br. at 13. We have not located any such misstatement in
the district court’s order.

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context, “We do not require a ritualistic incantation to establish consideration of a

legal issue, nor do we demand that the district court recite any magic words to show

us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has

instructed it to consider.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, we review

de novo whether the facts as found by the district court meet the legal standard for

detention. Cisneros, 328 F.3d at 613. Thus, the fact that the district court’s decision

does not recite the burdens of persuasion or state that the government met them does

not provide a basis to vacate or reverse.

C. Failure to Make Factual Findings

As already noted, the district court’s findings, and much of its analysis, came

almost verbatim from the government’s arguments when it appealed the magistrate

judge’s release order to the district court. Campas criticizes this approach, but this

alone is not enough to justify a second remand. For instance, in the context of a civil

bench trial, the Supreme Court has stated that “even when the trial judge adopts

proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed

only if clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572

(1985). We believe the same rule applies in this context.

Verbatim adoption of a party’s findings and conclusions is a problem, however,

“when those findings [take] the form of conclusory statements unsupported by

citation to the record.” Id. Apparently with this in mind, Campas says that “[s]ince

the allegations in the government’s bail appeal are unsupported by the record, the

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district court can not (and does not) make any reference to any document or transcript

in this case.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 15 (footnote omitted).

Campas is correct that the district court’s order does not cite any document or

transcript. This makes our review more difficult. However, all of the district court’s

findings have support in the government’s motion for detention, the pretrial services

report, or the transcript of the hearing before the district judge (on appeal from the

magistrate judge’s release order). The district court’s most important findings are as

follows, to which we have added bracketed citations showing the record support:

(a) An FBI agent, acting in an undercover capacity on a
social media platform, purported to be a father who was
offering his seven-year-old son for sex. Beginning on
October 11, 2023, Mr. Campas contacted the undercover
agent on a social media platform. Over the course of the
next two weeks, the two engaged in sexually explicit
conversations. [Aplt. App. vol. I at 14 (government’s
motion for detention); Aplt. App. vol. II at 1 (pretrial
services report).]

(b) The FBI undercover agent asked Mr. Campas if he had
“age limits,” to which he responded, “Fuck no, nothing
hotter than a father nursing his newborn on his cock.”
Defendant was very specific about what he wanted to do to
the seven-year-old boy, to include: “Hang naked . . . suck
each other’s cocks . . . rimming . . . making out . . . fucking
. . . teach him how to fist me . . . Teach him how to fuck
and get fucked.” Defendant said he would like to “make it
a lifelong love.” [Aplt. App. vol. I at 14 (government’s
motion for detention); Aplt. App. vol. II at 1 (pretrial
services report).]

(c) Mr. Campas had planned to drive from Oregon, where
he had been living for the prior month on a marijuana
farm, to his mother’s home in Arizona, by way of Las
Vegas. However, after these conversations with the
undercover agent, he decided to go out of his way and

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travel to Utah so that he could sexually abuse the seven-
year-old. [Aplt. App. vol. I at 14–15 (government’s motion
for detention); Aplt. App. vol. II at 1–2 (pretrial services
report).]

(d) Mr. Campas arranged to meet the undercover agent and
his seven-year-old boy on October 27, 2023, at a location
in North Salt Lake, Utah. Mr. Campas arrived at that
location as planned, where he was arrested. He had in his
possession the cell phone he had been using to
communicate with the undercover agent. [Aplt. App. vol. I
at 14 (government’s motion for detention).]

(e) Mr. Campas was interviewed following his arrest.
During that interview, Mr. Campas stated that he did not
believe that what he was doing was wrong. He stated that
he knew from the time he was a very young boy that he
wanted to have sex with adult males and, therefore,
children are clearly capable of consenting to sex. [Aplt.
App. vol. I at 14 (government’s motion for detention); id.
at 66 (transcript of hearing before the district judge); Aplt.
App. vol. II at 1 (pretrial services report).]

(f) Mr. Campas was expressly asked if he had shown up on
the evening of his arrest and there had been an actual
seven-year-old that appeared willing to engage in sexual
activity with him, would he have engaged in sexual
activity with the child, and he indicated that he would not
have any problem with doing that. He indicated that he
believed that children should be able to indulge in sexual
curiosity in whatever way they wanted even if they were as
young as seven years old. [Aplt. App. vol. I at 67
(transcript of hearing before the district judge).]

(a) [sic] At the time Mr. Campas was communicating with
the undercover agent in this case, he was also
communicating with at least two other undercover agents
unrelated to this case on various social media platforms
about his sexual interest in young children. [Aplt. App.
vol. I at 14 (government’s motion for detention); Aplt.
App. vol. II at 2 (pretrial services report).]

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Aplt. App. vol. I at 157–58.4

Campas also appears to argue that the district court could not rely on the

government’s representations cited above because “[t]he only thing resembling a

proffer in [the] government’s appeal [from the magistrate judge’s release order]” is a

statement that “[o]fficers will testify that Mr. Campas arrived at the meet location

exactly as planned.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 15 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Similarly, Campas asserts “[t]he post-arrest interview was not part of the record,” so

“[t]he government’s interpretation of an alleged conversation about [his] supposed

beliefs [about adult-child sexual relations] is irrelevant.” Id. at 5 n.3; see also id. at 6

(“The government also pointed to Mr. Campas having made recorded statements

concerning his involvement in the instant matter, but made no proffer as to those

statements.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Campas’s argument ignores that some of the district court’s information is

found in the pretrial services report, not just the government’s submissions. The

argument is also waived. When the government described its evidence to the district

court, Campas’s attorney never objected that the government needed to introduce

4
These comprise the district court’s findings about the nature and
circumstances of the offense. The district court repeated many of the same findings
in summary form when it discussed the other § 3142(g) factors, i.e., the weight of the
evidence, Campas’s history and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the
danger he may pose. See Aplt. App. vol. I at 158–60. Under the circumstances, we
see no error. For example, Campas’s statements in his recorded interview naturally
matter to all of these factors. Thus, we find no basis to fault the district court for at
times repeating the same material under the various factors.

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something more than its own description. To be sure, as described above (Part II.C),

Campas’s attorney tried to persuade the district court that the government was

overstating what Campas had admitted in his post-arrest interview. But he never

argued that the government failed to make a valid proffer, and “[a]rguments that were

not raised below are waived for purposes of appeal,” Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d

1273, 1284 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Even if not waived, we disagree with the argument on the merits. “Every

circuit to have considered the matter . . . has . . . permitted the Government to

proceed by way of proffer.” United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir.

1996). Campas appears to believe a valid government proffer must begin with

special words such as “we would proffer” or “officers will testify that.” He offers no

authority for this position. We therefore reject the claim that the government’s

description of its evidence was not something on which the district court could rely—

or is not something on which this court may rely—for purposes of reaching a

decision about pretrial detention.

D. Reliance on the Charges Alone

Campas asserts it would be contrary to congressional intent if his alleged

crimes, by themselves, were enough to justify detention, because Congress did not

specify that any offense automatically requires detention. Campas further asserts the

district court violated congressional intent because the remand order “states in no

uncertain terms that the allegation itself is the sole ground upon which detention is

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ordered,” and the district court further “assumed that anyone charged with such

crimes presents a[n] unmitigated danger to society.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 17, 18.

If this were true, it would not necessarily lead to vacatur or reversal because

we review de novo the application of the historical facts to the detention standard. In

any event, Campas does not accurately describe the district court’s reasoning. The

district court did not conclude that the charged offenses, by themselves, are enough to

justify detention. Rather, the court relied on Campas’s willingness to go hundreds of

miles out of his way to commit the alleged crimes, his belief that he would have done

nothing wrong if he had gone through with his very explicit intentions, and his

simultaneous interactions with other undercover agents about the same topic.

Looking at this matter de novo, we come to the same conclusion as the district court,

namely, this combination of facts shows that Campas presents a unique danger.

E. Failure to Review the Magistrate Judge’s Release Conditions

When a party appeals a magistrate judge’s detention decision to the district

court, the district court “acts de novo and must make an independent determination of

the proper pretrial detention or conditions for release.” Cisneros, 328 F.3d at 616

n.1. Relying on Cisneros, Campas says “[t]he district court failed to make the

requisite independent determination of the magistrate [judge]’s findings that a

combination of conditions exist that would reasonably assure [his appearance and

community safety].” Aplt. Opening Br. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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This argument appears to assume the magistrate judge’s findings bear some

sort of presumptive weight before the district court. They do not. Again, the district

court reviews the matter de novo.

In any event, the district court considered potential release conditions.

Campas recognizes this because he goes on to criticize the district court’s finding that

GPS monitoring probably could only help to discover a violation after the fact.

Campas says the district court impermissibly relied on a “theoretical possibility that

[he] could do while under court supervision what he has never done before [i.e.,

commit a hands-on offense].” Id. at 21.

District courts making detention decisions are routinely engaging in

“theoretical” possibilities because they cannot know the future with certainty. This

alone cannot undermine the district court’s decision. In addition, the district court

considered Campas’s heretofore clean record. See Aplt. App. vol. I at 161 (finding

detention appropriate even though “it is true that Mr. Campas has no criminal record

and that this is the first time he has acted out”). If Campas means to say there is a

presumption in favor of release for first-time offenders, he offers no supporting

authority.

Campas also appears to be suggesting that the district court’s reasoning, if

affirmed, could allow district courts to discount GPS monitoring as a possible

condition of pretrial release in essentially all cases. We need not engage with that

argument because we evaluate the matter de novo, under the specific facts of this

case.

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Given Campas’s unique threat, the two most important considerations when

thinking about pretrial release are his ability to communicate and his ability to travel.

Concerning communication, the district court found—and Campas does not dispute—

that restrictions on Internet access would be ineffectual. We agree that the ubiquity

of devices with Internet access, combined with Campas’s unique beliefs and

motivations concerning adult-child sexual relations, demonstrate that restrictions on

Internet access would not be enough to adequately guarantee Campas’s inability to

engage in the kinds of communications that led to this prosecution. As for travel, we

conclude that the acknowledged weaknesses in GPS monitoring combined with the

unique threat posed by Campas (as demonstrated by his words and actions) show that

GPS monitoring would not be adequate in his case to protect the public.

VI. CONCLUSION

The government has carried its burden to show by clear and convincing

evidence that no conditions will protect the community from Campas’s behavior

while he awaits trial. We therefore affirm the district court’s detention order.

We deny as moot Campas’s request that the case be remanded to a different judge.

Entered for the Court
Per Curiam

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No. 24-4024, United States v. Campas
EID, J., dissenting.

A case cannot be in two places at once. Yet here, that is exactly what happened.

Before this Court had issued its mandate in the earlier appeal, the district court issued the

order underlying today’s per curiam decision determining the merits of the appellant’s

claims. Federal courts have “generally understood” that an appeal “divests the district

court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v.

Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Nonetheless, the per curiam

charts this course, reaching the merits of the case by deciding “in the interest of judicial

efficiency to overlook” the jurisdictional error. Per Curiam at 15. Respectfully, I would

not “overlook” the error for two reasons.

First, jurisdiction is jurisdiction, and this Court is bound by jurisdictional rules.

True, this case does not involve the more stringent jurisdictional requirements imposed

by Article III of the U.S. Constitution or a statute; rather, we are dealing with a “judge-

made doctrine.” Id. (quoting United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir.

2011)). But the jurisdictional rule in this case is “a longstanding tenet of American

procedure.” Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736, 740 (2023). The per curiam

unnecessarily “expand[s] the universe of court-created exceptions to the general rule

depriving the district court of authority to rule on matters once the case is in the court of

appeals.” Madrid, 633 F.3d at 1226–27 (citation omitted). Indeed, the new exception

now allows this Court to overlook a jurisdictional problem between a district court and
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itself so long as this Court finds it convenient to do so in the interest of “judicial

efficiency.” Per Curiam at 15.

Second, we had a simple solution here, one that we had complete control over.

This Court could have easily fixed the jurisdictional problem by entering an order

requiring the district court to fix the procedural defect via a re-entry of its findings and

conclusions. Such a solution would have posed no threat to judicial economy. The

district court could have fixed the jurisdictional error, and we could have then proceeded

to the merits without dismantling “a longstanding tenet of American procedure.”

Coinbase, Inc., 599 U.S. at 740. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

2