This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0709
Omar Kwabena Walford, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed April 8, 2024
Reversed and remanded
Cochran, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-16-5993
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this appeal from the postconviction court’s denial of postconviction relief,
appellant argues that (1) his guilty pleas were unintelligent due to the affirmative misadvice
of advisory counsel, (2) he was denied the effective assistance of advisory counsel, and
(3) his guilty pleas were invalid due to violations of due process in the evaluation of his
competency to proceed. Because appellant’s guilty pleas were not intelligently entered,
we reverse and remand to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty pleas.
FACTS
On August 18, 2016, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Omar
Kwabena Walford with terroristic threats in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 609.713, subdivision 1 (2016), and domestic abuse in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 518B.01, subdivision 14(a) (2016), based on allegations that Walford
threatened his estranged wife while speaking with her over the phone and in person.
Walford was initially represented by a public defender but later requested to
represent himself. The district court granted Walford’s request to represent himself and
discharged his public defender. At a subsequent hearing, Walford affirmed his waiver of
counsel and declined advisory counsel. The district court, however, appointed advisory
counsel sua sponte under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.04, subdivision 2,
“because of concerns about fairness of the process.” The district court also affirmed that
Walford “retain[ed] the right to decide when and how to use advisory counsel.”
Pretrial Proceedings and First Competency Evaluation
At a pretrial hearing in June 2017, Walford told the district court that he had
“persistent and severe mental illnesses”; struggled with attention-deficit disorder and
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder; and was forced to represent himself “when [he]
probably should not be.”
2
The district court ordered a competency evaluation under Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 20.01 to determine whether Walford was competent to proceed. The
competency evaluation concluded that Walford had several mental-health disorders but
nevertheless opined that Walford was competent to proceed because he understood the
charges against him, was able to discuss his version of events in a logical manner, and had
a rational trial strategy. The evaluation was submitted to the district court and received by
the prosecutor.
At a September 8, 2017 hearing, 1 the district court asked the parties if they had any
additions or corrections to the competency evaluation. The state declined, but Walford
objected to the evaluation, explaining he “had two prior evaluations” that “were totally
different than this one.” Walford did not submit his objection in writing or request a
contested competency hearing. The district court noted Walford’s objection, adopted the
evaluation, and found that Walford was competent to proceed.
The trial was delayed, however, until February 2020, after the district court ordered
several continuances in response to Walford’s complaints that the state was not responding
to his discovery requests. During his many pretrial hearings, Walford repeatedly expressed
his desire to preserve his right to appeal.
Shortly before trial, the district court relieved advisory counsel of his duties because
Walford “[did not] talk to him” and “[did not] want to talk to him.” The district court
1
The record does not reflect whether Walford or his advisory counsel received a copy of
the competency evaluation before the September 8, 2017 hearing. Walford alleges that his
advisory counsel received a copy before this date but that he did not.
3
indicated that it would appoint different advisory counsel at trial because Walford did not
understand the court rules.
Trial and Second Competency Evaluation
During jury selection, Walford stated that he was “done” and refused to proceed.
After a prolonged exchange with the district court, the district court suspended proceedings
and ordered another rule 20.01 competency evaluation. The district court explained that it
was “concerned about [Walford’s] competency” based on his statements and behavior. The
district court also appointed advisory counsel under rule 5.04, subdivision 2, based on its
concerns about “[d]elays in completing the trial, the potential for disruption by the
defendant, or the complexity or length of trial.”
Walford’s 2020 competency evaluation similarly concluded that Walford suffered
from several mental-health disorders but nevertheless opined that Walford was competent
to proceed. Because Walford refused to participate in the evaluation, the evaluator relied
on other documentation related to Walford’s competence, including two rule 20.01
evaluations; one psychological evaluation; incident, discipline, and mental-health reports
from various correctional facilities where Walford had been incarcerated; presentence
investigation reports; and various other documents. Based on his review, the evaluator
concluded that Walford’s mental health and cognitive ability remained unchanged from his
prior competency evaluations and determined that Walford was competent to proceed.
On May 20, 2020, the district court issued an order adopting the 2020 competency
evaluation and found Walford competent to proceed. Neither party objected to the
competency finding or requested a contested competency hearing.
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Alford Pleas and Sentencing
Shortly after the 2020 competency evaluation, Walford entered an Alford plea to
both charges. 2 At the plea hearing, advisory counsel informed the district court that the
parties had been negotiating a plea deal and, earlier in the day, Walford authorized advisory
counsel to present the state with a counteroffer to the state’s last offer. The counteroffer
“call[ed] for an Alford plea to both counts” with time running concurrently to time that he
was already serving in prison. The state accepted the offer, and Walford told the court that
he wished to plead guilty by an Alford plea.
Advisory counsel then reviewed the plea agreement with Walford on the record
before the district court. Advisory counsel confirmed Walford’s understanding of an
Alford plea, including that Walford would be “giving up certain constitutional rights” even
though he was maintaining his innocence. Advisory counsel then explained an additional
term of Walford’s counteroffer:
ADVISORY COUNSEL: Mr. Walford, when you authorized
me to present a counter-offer to the state there are two
additional things that we talked about, right? One, that you
wanted to reserve your ability to appeal decisions or things
that had happened prior to today; is that correct?
2
An Alford plea allows a criminal defendant to enter a guilty plea without an admission of
guilt to obtain the benefit of a plea agreement with the state. North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970); see also Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn.
2015) (“An Alford plea is a plea in which an individual accused of a crime may voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence while not
admitting guilt.” (quotation omitted)). When entering an Alford plea, a criminal defendant
generally “acknowledge[s] on the record at the plea hearing that the evidence the [s]tate
would likely offer against him is sufficient for a jury, applying a reasonable doubt standard,
to find the defendant guilty of the offense to which he is pleading guilty.” See Doe 136,
872 N.W.2d at 879 (quotation omitted). Minnesota formally adopted the use of Alford
pleas in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977).
5
WALFORD: Correct.
ADVISORY COUNSEL: And I told you that both the judge
and [the prosecutor] from the state, that it’s neither of their
intentions to prohibit that; is that correct?
WALFORD: Yes, ma’am.
ADVISORY COUNSEL: And you talked to me about what is
called a Lothenbach plea; is that right?
WALFORD: Yes.
ADVISORY COUNSEL: And I told you in this particular case
that that wasn’t the appropriate kind of a thing because there
wasn’t one particular what I call dispositive issue; is that right?
WALFORD: Yes, ma’am.
ADVISORY COUNSEL: And I explained to you what
dispositive meant?
WALFORD: Yes, ma’am.
ADVISORY COUNSEL: And you agree with me that based
on that, that the Lothenbach wasn’t the way to go; is that right?
WALFORD: Yes, ma’am.
(Emphasis added.) Neither the state nor the district court objected to these terms.
The district court accepted Walford’s guilty plea to each of the two charges and
sentenced him to 39 months in prison for each count, to be served concurrently with the
sentence he was already serving. Walford did not directly appeal his convictions.
Petition for Postconviction Relief
On August 23, 2022, Walford filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking to
withdraw his guilty pleas. In the petition, Walford argued that: (1) his convictions violated
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due process because he was not competent to plead guilty; (2) his guilty pleas were
unintelligent and therefore invalid because he did not understand that he was waiving his
right to appeal pretrial issues by pleading guilty, due to misadvice by advisory counsel;
(3) his guilty plea for terroristic threats was invalid because it did not address an essential
element of the offense.
The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. Walford
testified, in relevant part, that he entered his Alford pleas with the intention of preserving
his right to appeal pretrial issues, including issues related to his right to a speedy trial and
alleged discovery violations. Walford also testified that he understood that he would be
able to appeal those issues based on the advice of his advisory counsel. When asked
whether he recalled any discussion of a “stipulated-facts trial or a stipulated-evidence trial
as an alternative to preserve [his] pretrial issues for appeal,” Walford stated: “I don’t
remember anything like that.” Walford testified that, if he had known that he would lose
his right to appeal pretrial issues by entering Alford pleas, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have instead proceeded to trial.
On March 16, 2023, the postconviction court denied Walford’s petition for
postconviction relief. The postconviction court concluded that Walford was not entitled to
postconviction relief because: (1) the district court did not violate due process in
determining that he was competent to enter guilty pleas; (2) his guilty pleas were intelligent
because his “Alford pleas—with the specific retention of his right to appeal, [were]
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effectively a trial on stipulated evidence”; and (3) Walford’s Alford plea to terroristic
threats was valid.
Walford appeals.
DECISION
Walford challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his petition for
postconviction relief on several grounds. A person who is convicted of a crime may
petition for postconviction relief under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 1
(2022). Petersen v. State, 937 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Minn. 2019). When a person files a
postconviction petition under section 590.01, subdivision 1, the district court must “hold
an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law unless the petition
and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled
to no relief.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We review a postconviction court’s denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion. Sanchez v. State, 890 N.W.2d 716, 719-20 (2017). “A postconviction court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” Id. at 720 (quotation omitted). We review legal issues
de novo and factual findings for clear error. Id. We will not disturb a postconviction
court’s findings if there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain them. See
Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017).
On appeal, Walford argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by
denying his petition for postconviction relief because his guilty pleas were constitutionally
invalid. Walford contends that his guilty pleas were invalid because: (1) his guilty pleas
8
were unintelligent due to the misadvice of advisory counsel; (2) he was denied effective
assistance of advisory counsel; and (3) the district court’s competency proceedings
violated due process.
We begin and end our analysis with Walford’s first argument—that his guilty pleas
were not intelligently entered—because that argument is dispositive. We first address the
standard of review applicable to this specific issue, which the parties dispute, and then we
consider the merits of Walford’s plea-withdrawal argument.
I. Because the record shows that Walford entered Alford pleas, the standard of
review for the denial of a request to withdraw a guilty plea applies.
While we review a district court’s denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse
of discretion, the validity of a guilty plea presents a legal issue that we review de novo.
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). This includes whether the guilty plea
was intelligently entered. See id. The state argues, however, that we should not review the
validity of Walford’s guilty plea de novo. Instead, the state asserts that we should apply
the plain-error standard of review.
The state’s argument is premised on its view that Walford did not enter Alford pleas
but instead participated in a stipulated-evidence trial under rule 26.01, subdivision 3, as
found by the postconviction court. Rule 26.01, subdivision 3, provides a procedure
whereby “[t]he defendant and the prosecutor may agree that a determination of the
defendant’s guilt . . . may be submitted to and tried by the [district] court based entirely on
stipulated facts, stipulated evidence, or both.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3(a). Under
the rule, a criminal defendant waives all trial-related rights, stipulates to the facts or
9
evidence, and acknowledges that the court may enter a finding of guilt based on that
evidence. Id., subd. 3(a)-(b). After consideration of the stipulated facts or evidence, the
district court may determine the defendant’s guilt. Id., subds. 2, 4(h). And, if the court
finds the defendant guilty, the defendant may appeal from the judgment of conviction and
raise issues on appeal as from any trial to the court. Id., subd. 3(f).
To support its argument that Walford did not plead guilty to the charges and
instead proceeded under rule 26.01, subdivision 3, the state relies on State v. Myhre,
875 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. 2016). 3 In that case, Myhre argued that his conviction was invalid
because the district court did not strictly comply with the procedures set forth in rule 26.01,
subdivision 4. Id. at 803. Because Myhre did not challenge the alleged rule violations in
district court, the supreme court concluded that the plain-error analysis was “the proper
framework” for reviewing Myhre’s conviction. Id. at 804.
The state’s reliance on Myhre is misguided. In Myhre, the record reflected the
parties’ intent to proceed under rule 26.01, subdivision 4. Id. at 802. Here, by contrast,
the record shows that the parties understood that Walford entered guilty pleas for each
offense via an Alford plea. And, notwithstanding the postconviction court’s finding to the
contrary, the record is clear that Walford was not proceeding under rule 26.01,
subdivision 3; rule 26.01, subdivision 4; or Lothenbach. See State v. Lothenbach,
3
The state argues that Myhre applies to the postconviction court’s decision under
rule 26.01, subdivision 3, even though the supreme court decided Myhre under rule 26.01,
subdivision 4. See 875 N.W.2d at 802. For purposes of this appeal, we assume without
deciding that Myhre applies to proceedings under rule 26.01, subdivision 3, in the same
manner as it applies to proceedings under rule 26.01, subdivision 4.
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296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn. 1980) (describing a procedure by which a criminal defendant
enters a not-guilty plea, waives his right to a jury trial, and stipulates to the state’s evidence
to obtain appellate review of pretrial issues); see also Myhre, 875 N.W.2d at 802
(explaining that rule 26.01, subdivision 4, “replaced Lothenbach as the method for
preserving a dispositive pretrial issue for appellate review in a criminal case”). At the
postconviction hearing, Walford testified that he did not remember discussing the
possibility “of doing a stipulated-facts trial or a stipulated-evidence trial as an alternative”
to pleading guilty. And the record from the plea hearing reflects that the parties did not
stipulate to the facts or evidence, as required under rule 26.01, subdivision 3. Moreover,
the district court did not make a finding of guilt based on the facts or evidence, as required
by the rule; rather the district court accepted Walford’s guilty pleas. Lastly, Walford
confirmed during both the plea hearing and the postconviction hearing that he did not
intend to enter a Lothenbach plea because he (mistakenly) believed that an Alford plea was
the proper way to preserve pretrial issues for appeal.
In sum, the state’s comparison to Myhre is unavailing because the parties here did
not proceed under rule 26.01, subdivision 3, or rule 26.01, subdivision 4. See 875 N.W.2d
at 804. Rather, Walford entered an Alford plea to each of the two offenses. The
postconviction court abused its discretion when it found otherwise. Accordingly, we
review de novo the postconviction court’s denial of Walford’s request to withdraw his
Alford pleas on the ground that his pleas were unintelligent. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
at 94.
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II. The postconviction court abused its discretion by denying Walford’s request to
withdraw his Alford pleas because these pleas were not intelligently entered.
We next consider whether the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying
Walford’s request to withdraw his Alford pleas on the basis that they were not intelligently
entered. A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea
after it is entered. Id. at 93. But a defendant may seek to withdraw a guilty plea at any
time when “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” State v. Rhodes,
675 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Minn. 2004) (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1). “A
manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. “To be
constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. The
defendant bears the burden of proving that his guilty plea was invalid. Id.
The intelligence requirement ensures “that the defendant understands the charges,
understands the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty, and understands the consequences
of his plea.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). One effect of a valid guilty
plea is the “waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.”
See State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986). Issues pertaining to discovery
disputes and a defendant’s right to a speedy trial are non-jurisdictional pretrial issues. See
Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Minn. 2017) (rejecting an argument that would
allow a defendant to challenge “any allegedly erroneous procedural or evidentiary ruling”
because it undermined “the rule that only jurisdictional challenges may be entertained after
a” guilty plea); State v. Smith, 749 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. App. 2008) (“[W]hen [appellant]
12
pleaded guilty, his speedy-trial right evaporated, and any delay up to that time was nullified
by his plea.”).
As discussed above, Walford argues that his Alford pleas were unintelligent because
he “was induced to enter [these pleas] based on inaccurate advice from advisory counsel
and the prosecutor that he could challenge non-jurisdictional speedy trial and discovery
issues following his pleas.” 4 In other words, Walford contends that his Alford pleas were
unintelligent because he did not understand the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty.
We agree.
The record reflects that Walford did not understand that he would be waiving his
right to appeal non-jurisdictional pretrial issues by entering his Alford pleas. See Ford,
397 N.W.2d at 878. During his many pretrial hearings, Walford repeatedly expressed his
desire to preserve his right to appeal. Walford also entered his Alford pleas on the express
condition that he “reserve [his] ability to appeal decisions or things that had happened prior
to [the plea].” And Walford testified at his postconviction hearing that he believed he could
“appeal pretrial issues on an Alford plea” and that he would not have pleaded guilty if he
had known that were not true. Taken together, these facts show that Walford did not
understand that he was waiving his right to appeal non-jurisdictional pretrial issues when
he entered his Alford pleas. We therefore conclude that Walford’s Alford pleas were not
intelligent and that the postconviction court abused its discretion by declining his request
4
Applying the plain-error standard of review articulated in Myhre, the state contends that
any misinformation from advisory counsel did not affect Walford’s substantial rights, did
not prejudice Walford, and does not entitle Walford to reversal. Because we conclude that
plain-error review does not apply here, we do not consider these arguments.
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to withdraw these pleas. See id.; Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 93. 5 Accordingly, we reverse
and remand to allow Walford to withdraw his Alford pleas.
Reversed and remanded.
5
At oral argument, the state appeared to contend that Walford deliberately delayed court
proceedings and disrespected the district court and that this behavior, coupled with
Walford’s history of appealing his criminal convictions, indicates that Walford was
manipulating the judicial process to secure reversal on appeal. The state’s argument is not
properly before us because it was raised for the first time at oral argument. See In re
Disciplinary Action Against Stoneburner, 882 N.W.2d 200, 203 n.3 (Minn. 2016)
(declining to address an argument that was raised for the first time at oral argument).
Regardless, the record refutes this argument. We also note that even the most difficult
defendants have constitutional rights, and those rights must be upheld.
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