Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

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Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

ANTHONY J. MARSHALL III v. COMMISSIONER
OF MOTOR VEHICLES
(SC 20703)
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, Mullins,
Ecker and Dannehy, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b (c)), when a person has been arrested for
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any drug, the arresting officer ‘‘shall prepare a report of the
incident and shall mail or otherwise transmit . . . the report and a copy
of the results of any chemical test [of such person’s blood, breath or
urine] to the Department of Motor Vehicles within three business days.’’
Pursuant further to Volck v. Muzio (204 Conn. 507), an incident report
prepared in accordance with § 14-227b (c) is admissible at a motor
vehicle operator’s license suspension hearing, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, without the need for testimony from the arresting officer.

The plaintiff, who had been arrested for operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, appealed to the trial court
from the decision of the defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
who temporarily suspended the plaintiff’s license to operate a motor
vehicle. At the plaintiff’s license suspension hearing, the plaintiff’s attor-
ney objected to the admission of an incident report that was prepared
by the arresting officer on the ground that it was not prepared and
mailed to the Department of Motor Vehicles within three business days,
as required by § 14-227b (c). The arresting officer had not completed the
report until five business days after the plaintiff’s arrest. The department
hearing officer overruled the objection and admitted the report, which
was the only evidence submitted at the hearing. On appeal to the trial
court from the hearing officer’s decision, that court dismissed the appeal,
concluding that strict adherence with the preparation and mailing
requirement of § 14-227b (c) was not necessary for the report to be
admissible because the report bore indicia of trustworthiness and relia-
bility. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, conclud-
ing that, because § 14-227b (c) is not accompanied by any negative
or prohibitory language, the preparation and mailing requirement is
directory, and, therefore, strict compliance with that requirement is not
necessary for a report to be admissible at a license suspension hearing.
The Appellate Court further determined that there were sufficient indicia
of reliability of the report at issue. Accordingly, the Appellate Court
held that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in admitting
the report. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to
this court.
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Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
Held that the hearing officer abused her discretion in admitting an incident
report that did not strictly comply with the preparation and mailing
provision of § 14-227b (c) in the absence of testimony from the arresting
officer, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court’s judg-
ment and remanded with direction to reverse the trial court’s judgment
and to direct the trial court to sustain the plaintiff’s appeal:

Contrary to the Appellate Court’s conclusion that the preparation and
mailing requirement in § 14-227b (c) is directory, this court concluded
that that requirement was mandatory because, even though the statute
contained no negative or prohibitory language, the substantive nature
of the statutory provision was clear, insofar as it plainly promoted the
accuracy and reliability of the information that ultimately will be used
at a license suspension hearing.

The legislature enacted § 14-277b to protect the public from drivers who
are under the influence by authorizing the temporary revocation of their
operating privileges prior to conviction while also affording them due
process, to achieve that purpose, the legislature authorized the admission
of incident reports at license suspension hearings without the need to
produce the arresting officer, provided that the procedures set forth in
the hearsay exception created by § 14-277b (c) are followed to ensure the
reliability of the information contained in the report, and the legislature
determined that requiring the arresting officer to prepare the report
within three business days, while the officer’s recollection of the incident
remains fresh, is an appropriate time frame to imbue the report with
sufficient reliability.

Having concluded that the preparation and mailing requirement of § 14-
227b (c) is mandatory, this court clarified that § 14-227b (c) describes
substantive requirements that incident reports must meet, and the failure
to meet those requirements renders a report inadmissible insofar as it
fails to satisfy the exception for the report to be admitted without the
need to produce the arresting officer at the suspension hearing.

In the present case, it was undisputed that the arresting officer failed
to comply with the three business day requirement prescribed by § 14-
227b (c), the plaintiff’s attorney objected to the admission of the report
on the grounds that that requirement was not met and that the arresting
officer was not present at the hearing to offer testimony, and, by admitting
the report without hearing testimony from the arresting officer, the
hearing officer abused her discretion.

Moreover, the Appellate Court’s conclusion that an incident report that
fails to strictly comply with § 14-227b (c) nevertheless may be admissible
if it meets some of that provision’s requirements was based on that court’s
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Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
incorrect determination that the preparation and mailing requirement is
directory, and, therefore, that conclusion could not stand.
Argued October 27, 2023—officially released April 9, 2024

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the defendant suspending
the plaintiff’s motor vehicle operator’s license and requir-
ing the installation of an ignition interlock device in the
plaintiff’s vehicle, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of New London and transferred to the
judicial district of New Britain, where the case was tried
to the court, Cordani, J.; judgment dismissing the
appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to the Appel-
late Court, Alexander and DiPentima, Js., with Pres-
cott, J., dissenting, which affirmed the trial court’s
judgment, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certifica-
tion, appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment
directed.
Drzislav Coric, with whom was Brandon H. Marley,
for the appellant (plaintiff).
Drew S. Graham, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

MULLINS, J. Connecticut law provides that an inci-
dent report prepared in accordance with General Stat-
utes § 14-227b (c)1 is admissible in an administrative
proceeding to suspend a motor vehicle operator’s license
without the need for testimony from the arresting offi-
cer. See Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507, 517–18, 529
A.2d 177 (1987). The question presented in this case is
1
Although § 14-227b has been amended since the date of the incident in
question; see, e.g., Public Acts 2022, No. 22-40, § 14; Public Acts, Spec. Sess.,
June, 2021, No. 21-1, § 118; those amendments have no bearing on the merits
of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, unless otherwise indicated, we
refer to the current revision of the statute.
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whether such a report is nevertheless admissible if the
arresting officer fails to comply with the statute’s require-
ment that the officer prepare and mail2 the report to
the Department of Motor Vehicles (department) within
three business days of the incident. In answering this
question, we are mindful that license suspension hear-
ings are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence and
are aimed at expeditiously protecting the public from
individuals arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol or drugs prior to any conviction. At the same
time, we must be cognizant of the fact that license
suspension hearings seek to revoke a privilege, and,
thus, the state may not revoke that privilege without
furnishing the holder of the license due process as
required by the fourteenth amendment to the United
States constitution. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 539, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971); see also,
e.g., Fishbein v. Kozlowski, 252 Conn. 38, 50–51, 743
A.2d 1110 (1999).
Our legislature balanced these concerns in § 14-227b
(c) by setting forth the requirements a police report
must meet to be used as evidence to suspend an opera-
tor’s license.3 We previously have explained that the
2
Section 14-227b (c) requires the police officer to ‘‘mail or otherwise
transmit’’ the report to the Department of Motor Vehicles within three
business days. For convenience, we use the term ‘‘mail’’ even though the
statute provides that the police report may be mailed or electronically trans-
mitted.
3
The police report typically contains the arresting officer’s rendition of
the four issues required to prove a license suspension. See General Statutes
§ 14-227b (g) (2) (‘‘[a] hearing based on a report submitted under subsection
(c) of this section shall be limited to a determination of the following issues:
(A) [d]id the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or any drug, or both; (B) was such person placed under arrest; (C) did such
person (i) refuse to submit to such test or nontestimonial portion of a drug
influence evaluation, or (ii) submit to such test, commenced within two
hours of the time of operation, and the results of such test indicated that
such person had an elevated blood alcohol content; and (D) was such person
operating the motor vehicle’’).
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requirements of § 14-227b (c) provide sufficient indicia
of reliability such that the report may be introduced
into evidence at a license suspension hearing without
the need to call the arresting officer. See Volck v. Muzio,
supra, 204 Conn. 517–18. Consistent therewith, we con-
clude that the failure to comply with the three business
day preparation and mailing provision of § 14-227b (c)
renders the report inadmissible in the absence of testi-
mony from the arresting officer.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. On July 14, 2019, Jeffrey H. Hewes,
an officer with the Stonington Police Department, heard
an announcement over the police radio describing a
vehicle that had allegedly been involved in a hit-and-
run accident. Shortly thereafter, he stopped a vehicle
matching that description. Upon approaching the vehi-
cle, Officer Hewes identified the plaintiff, Anthony J.
Marshall III, as the driver and observed that his eyes
were bloodshot, his speech was slow, and his breath
smelled of alcohol. Officer Hewes requested that the
plaintiff perform three standardized field sobriety tests,
all of which the plaintiff failed.
Officer Hewes then arrested the plaintiff and trans-
ported him to police headquarters, where the plaintiff
took two breath tests for alcohol. Those tests revealed
that the plaintiff had an elevated blood alcohol content.
As a result, the plaintiff was charged with operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a).4
Officer Hewes prepared a report of this incident that
consisted of an A-44 form and two attachments—a nar-
rative police report and the results of the plaintiff’s
Although § 14-227a has been amended since the date of the incident in
4

question; see Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2021, No. 21-1, §§ 116 and 117;
those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the
interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
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breath tests.5 Officer Hewes initially entered the narra-
tive police report on July 15, 2019. He later modified,
completed, signed, and dated the report on July 19,
2019—five business days after the plaintiff’s arrest. The
department did not receive the report until July 23, 2019.
On August 9, 2019, a department hearing officer held
an administrative hearing to determine whether the
plaintiff’s license to operate a motor vehicle should be
suspended pursuant to § 14-227b. At the hearing, the
plaintiff’s attorney objected to the admission of the
report on the ground that it was not prepared and mailed
to the department within three business days, as required
by § 14-227b (c). The hearing officer summarily over-
ruled the objection and admitted the report, which was
the only evidence submitted at the hearing.
Solely on the basis of the report, the hearing officer
found that the four issues necessary to support a license
suspension were satisfied, namely, (1) Officer Hewes
had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, (2) the plaintiff was arrested, (3) the plaintiff
submitted to breath tests for alcohol, which indicated
that he had an elevated blood alcohol content, and
(4) the plaintiff was operating the motor vehicle. See
General Statutes § 14-227b (g) (2). Accordingly, on the
basis of the hearing officer’s findings, the defendant,
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner),
5
An A-44 form is a form used by the police to report an arrest related to
the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or drugs. See Do v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 330 Conn. 651,
655 n.4, 200 A.3d 681 (2019). With respect to the narrative and the breath
test results, § 14-227b-10 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]dditional statements or materials necessary
to explain any item of information in the report may be attached to the
report’’ and ‘‘shall be considered a part of the report . . . .’’
Thus, we consider the A-44 form and its two attachments to collectively
constitute the ‘‘report,’’ as referenced in General Statutes § 14-227b (c) and
§ 14-227b-19 (a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.
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suspended the plaintiff’s license to operate a motor
vehicle for forty-five days and required the installation
of an ignition interlock device in his vehicle for six
months.
Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed from the commis-
sioner’s decision to the Superior Court pursuant to the
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA). See
General Statutes § 4-183. In that appeal, the plaintiff
argued that the hearing officer abused her discretion
by admitting the report into evidence because the report
did not comply with the preparation and mailing require-
ment of § 14-227b (c). The plaintiff further argued that,
because the improperly admitted report was the only
evidence submitted at the administrative hearing, there
was not substantial evidence on which to base the sus-
pension of his license. The trial court rejected the plain-
tiff’s arguments, concluding that adherence to the
preparation and mailing requirement of § 14-227b (c)
is not necessary for the report’s admissibility, so long
as the report is ‘‘reasonably found to bear indicia of
trustworthiness and reliability.’’ Therefore, the trial
court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.
The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, again
claiming that the report was improperly admitted because
the police had failed to comply with the statutory prepa-
ration and mailing requirement. See Marshall v. Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles, 210 Conn. App. 109, 111,
269 A.3d 816 (2022). In a divided decision, the Appellate
Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., 121.
The majority concluded that, because § 14-227b (c) is
not accompanied by any negative or prohibitory lan-
guage, the preparation and mailing requirement is direc-
tory. See id., 117–18. As such, it determined that strict
compliance with the preparation and mailing provision
of § 14-227b (c) is not necessary for a report to be
admissible at a hearing to suspend an operator’s license.
See id., 116–18. The majority further reasoned that there
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were sufficient indicia of reliability to ensure that the
report was both reliable and trustworthy, and, thus, the
hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in admitting
it. Id., 120–21.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Prescott concluded
that, in the absence of testimony by the author of the
report, a police report is not admissible if it fails to comply
with the strictures of § 14-227b (c). Id., 129 (Prescott,
J., dissenting). Because the report was prepared five
days after the incident, Judge Prescott would have con-
cluded that it was inadmissible absent testimony from
the arresting officer. See id., 122–23, 129 (Prescott, J.,
dissenting). This appeal followed.6
We begin by articulating the applicable standard of
review. ‘‘This court reviews the trial court’s judgment
pursuant to the . . . UAPA . . . . Under the UAPA, it
is [not] the function . . . of this court to retry the case
or to substitute its judgment for that of the administra-
tive agency. . . . Even for conclusions of law, [t]he
court’s ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light
of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably,
arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. . . .
Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke
a broader standard of review than is . . . involved in
deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency
has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse
of its discretion. . . . Furthermore, when [as here] a
state agency’s determination of a question of law has
6
We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to
the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that a
[d]epartment . . . hearing officer conducting a motor vehicle operator’s
license suspension hearing had the discretion to admit into evidence an A-
44 form and its attachments, including a narrative police report, notwith-
standing the fact that the form and attachments were neither prepared nor
mailed to the [c]ommissioner . . . in compliance with the timelines set
forth in . . . § 14-227b (c) and the fact that the officer preparing the form
and the attachments was not present for cross-examination?’’ Marshall v.
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 342 Conn. 912, 272 A.3d 198 (2022).
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not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny . . .
the agency is not entitled to special deference. . . .
We have determined, therefore, that the traditional def-
erence accorded to an agency’s interpretation of a statu-
tory term is unwarranted when the construction of a
statute . . . has not previously been subjected to judi-
cial scrutiny [or to] a governmental agency’s time-tested
interpretation . . . . [Thus] [t]he issue of statutory
interpretation presented in this case is a question of law
subject to plenary review.’’7 (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Emer-
gency Services & Public Protection v. Freedom of Infor-
mation Commission, 330 Conn. 372, 379–80, 194 A.3d
759 (2018).
Beginning with the language of the statute, as required
by General Statutes § 1-2z, we observe that § 14-227b
(c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The police officer shall
prepare a report of the incident and shall mail or other-
wise transmit in accordance with this subsection the
report and a copy of the results of any chemical test to
the Department of Motor Vehicles within three business
days. The report shall contain such information as pre-
scribed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and
shall be subscribed and sworn to under penalty of false
statement as provided in section 53a-157b by the arresting
officer. . . . The report shall set forth the grounds for
the officer’s belief that there was probable cause to
arrest such person for a violation of section 14-227a
. . . .’’
By the express terms of § 14-227b (c), the report shall
be prepared and mailed to the department within three
business days. It is well established that ‘‘the use of
the word shall, though significant, does not invariably
7
We note that the commissioner does not argue that the interpretation
of the department’s hearing officer is entitled to deference as a governmental
agency’s time-tested interpretation.
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create a mandatory duty.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the
State of Pennsylvania, 314 Conn. 749, 757, 104 A.3d
713 (2014). ‘‘[T]he test to be applied in determining
whether a statute is mandatory or directory is whether
the prescribed mode of action is the essence of the
thing to be accomplished, or in other words, whether
it relates to a matter of substance or a matter of conve-
nience. . . . If it is a matter of substance, the statutory
provision is mandatory. If, however, the legislative pro-
vision is designed to secure order, system and dispatch
in the proceedings, it is generally held to be directory,
especially [when] the requirement is stated in affirma-
tive terms unaccompanied by negative words.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Strand/BRC Group, LLC
v. Board of Representatives, 342 Conn. 365, 384–85, 270
A.3d 43 (2022).
It is true, as the Appellate Court pointed out, that the
legislative language at issue here is stated in affirmative
terms, unaccompanied by any negative or prohibitory
words. See Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehi-
cles, supra, 210 Conn. App. 117. The absence of such
language, however, is not dispositive, particularly when
the substantive nature of the statutory provision is clear.
See Strand/BRC Group, LLC v. Board of Representa-
tives, 342 Conn. 387 (concluding that certain require-
ments in provision of city charter were mandatory despite
lack of negative or prohibitory language because sub-
stantive nature of requirements was clear); Blake v.
Meyer, 145 Conn. 612, 616, 145 A.2d 584 (1958) (‘‘[i]t is
clear that the provision under consideration is manda-
tory, not merely directory, even in the absence of pro-
hibitory or negative language’’). We find that, despite
the absence of negative or prohibitory language in § 14-
227b (c), the substantive nature of the provision is clear
because it plainly promotes ‘‘the essence of the thing to
be accomplished’’; (internal quotation marks omitted)
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Strand/BRC Group, LLC v. Board of Representatives,
supra, 384–85; namely, the accuracy and reliability of
the information that will be used at the license suspen-
sion hearing.8
We arrive at this conclusion by first looking at what
the legislature intended with respect to § 14-227b in
general and subsection (c) in particular. In doing so,
we do not write on a clean slate. We previously have
explained that, in drafting § 14-227b, the legislature
intended ‘‘to protect the public by temporarily revoking,
prior to conviction, the operating privileges of those
who have demonstrated a reckless disregard for the
safety of others, while at the same time providing proce-
dures to afford due process to those [who] come within
its ambit.’’ State v. Hickam, 235 Conn. 614, 626, 668
A.2d 1321 (1995) (overruled on other grounds by State
v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 778 A.2d 947 (2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1138, 122 S. Ct. 1086, 151 L. Ed. 2d 985
(2002)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221, 116 S. Ct. 1851, 134
L. Ed. 2d 951 (1996); see also Fishbein v. Kozlowski,
supra, 252 Conn. 50. To achieve these purposes, the
legislature permitted the admission of police reports
at the license suspension hearing without the need to
produce the arresting officer, provided that certain pro-
cedures are followed to ensure the reliability of the
information contained in the report.
8
The Appellate Court has addressed the admission of reports that did
not strictly comply with the preparation and mailing requirement. See, e.g.,
Bialowas v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 44 Conn. App. 702, 710 and
n.6, 711–12 n.8, 692 A.2d 834 (1997) (upholding admission of report that
was mailed to department four days after plaintiff’s arrest); see also, e.g.,
Packard v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court, judicial district of New
London, Docket No. KNL-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (September 18, 1991) (5 Conn. L.
Rptr. 5, 7) (upholding admission of report that was not mailed to department
within three business days), aff’d, 29 Conn. App. 923, 616 A.2d 1177 (1992);
Peters v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-
New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 701413 (July 11, 1991) (4 Conn. L. Rptr.
301, 301) (same), aff’d, 26 Conn. App. 937, 601 A.2d 1 (1992). However, this
court has never squarely addressed the issue. Now that we do, we conclude
that the preparation and mailing provision is mandatory.
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Section 14-227b (c) provides those procedures by
describing the specific information that must be con-
tained in the report, and that information is both
detailed in nature and crucial to the determination that
must be made in the license suspension hearing. The
provision requires that the arresting officer not only
mail the report within three business days, but also
prepare the report within that time frame, while the
officer’s recollection of the incident remains fresh. Our
law recognizes that time is a key indicator of the reliabil-
ity, and subsequent admissibility, of evidence. See, e.g.,
E. Prescott, Tait’s Handbook of Connecticut Evidence
(6th Ed. 2019) § 8.4.2 (b) (1), p. 507 (‘‘[s]tatements are
frequently admitted under an exception when made
while observing events or shortly thereafter because
there is little time to forget or little opportunity to pre-
varicate or fabricate’’). Statements are often admitted
under a hearsay exception when they are made tempo-
rally near the event. See, e.g., Calcano v. Calcano, 257
Conn. 230, 240, 777 A.2d 633 (2001) (business records
are admissible only if made ‘‘at the time of the act
described . . . or within a reasonable time thereafter’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Gigliotti v. United
Illuminating Co., 151 Conn. 114, 124, 193 A.2d 718
(1963) (written statement is admissible as past recollec-
tion recorded only if ‘‘made at or about the time of the
events’’); Martin v. Sherwood, 74 Conn. 475, 482, 51
A. 526 (1902) (statements about then existing physical
condition are admissible, but statements regarding past
conditions are inadmissible).

Here, the legislature determined that the appropriate
time frame to imbue the report with sufficient reliability
is three business days. So long as the preparation and
mailing requirement is met, the report is automatically
admissible in a license suspension proceeding without
any further inquiry into its reliability for admission. See
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Do v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 330 Conn. 651,
668–69, 200 A.3d 681 (2019).
Additionally, preparation of the report, by the terms
of the statute, must include both the results of any
blood, breath or urine test and the basis for probable
cause; see General Statutes § 14-227b (a) and (c); which
are two of the four issues that must be established at
a license suspension hearing. See General Statutes § 14-
227b (g) (2). Thus, those issues and their timely prepara-
tion and subsequent mailing go to the essence of the
license suspension hearing. Consequently, the prepara-
tion and mailing requirement in § 14-227b (c) is manda-
tory, despite the lack of negative or prohibitory language.
See Strand/BRC Group, LLC v. Board of Representa-
tives, supra, 342 Conn. 387.
This very point underlies our decision in Volck, in
which this court stated that ‘‘[s]ubsection (c) was added
to § 14-227b . . . when the issues related to license
suspension were removed from the criminal setting and
transferred . . . to the department . . . for adminis-
trative determination. . . . Its evident purpose is to
provide sufficient indicia of reliability so that the report
can be introduced [into] evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule, especially in license suspension pro-
ceedings, without the necessity of producing the arresting
officer.’’ (Emphasis added; citation omitted.) Volck v.
Muzio, supra, 204 Conn. 517–18.
Furthermore, this court has previously noted that
‘‘§ 14-227b-19 (a) of the Regulations of Connecticut
State Agencies, which has the force and effect of a
statute . . . provides in clear and straightforward
terms that a police officer’s report concerning the arrest
of a drunk driving suspect shall be admissible into evi-
dence at [a license suspension] hearing if it conforms
to the requirements of subsection (c) of [§] 14-227b
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis altered; internal
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quotation marks omitted.) Do v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, supra, 330 Conn. 668.
Thus, the statutory language, the purpose of the stat-
ute, and the applicable regulations demonstrate that
the legislature intended for the report to meet the
requirements of § 14-227b (c) before the report could
be automatically admissible, thereby providing a regula-
tory scheme to remove reckless drivers from the road
expeditiously while also affording the operator the nec-
essary due process. Permitting the admission of the
report without the need for police officer testimony
accomplishes that legislative aim. Requiring the arresting
officer to be present at a license suspension hearing to
establish a report’s reliability and admissibility would
substantially slow the process and interfere with the
legislative goal of quickly protecting the public from
intoxicated drivers—hence, the creation of § 14-227b
(c) and the automatic admissibility of a report that is in
compliance therewith without the need for an arresting
office’s presence.
The issue posed by the present case, however, is
whether the failure to comply with the preparation and
mailing requirement of § 14-227b (c) renders the report
inadmissible in a license suspension hearing. Because
we have now determined that the requirement is manda-
tory, we conclude that, in the absence of the testimony
of the arresting officer, it does. Although this court
has not directly addressed whether a report may be
admissible even if it does not comply with the prepara-
tion and mailing requirement of § 14-227b (c), on two
occasions, we have suggested that the failure to meet
the requirements of the provision would be a basis to
exclude a report from admission into evidence at a
license suspension hearing, unless the arresting offi-
cer testifies.
First, in Volck, the plaintiff refused to submit to a
blood, breath or urine test that would help determine
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whether he had been operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. See
Volck v. Muzio, supra, 204 Conn. 508–509. Under those
circumstances, General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 14-
227b (c) required that a report be endorsed by a third
person who witnessed the refusal. See id., 516; see also
General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 14-227b (c) (‘‘[i]f the
person arrested refuses to submit to such test or analy-
sis . . . a written report of such refusal . . . shall be
endorsed by a third person who witnessed such refusal’’).
The report at issue did not include that third person’s
endorsement. Volck v. Muzio, supra, 509–10, 516. We
noted that ‘‘[t]he absence of the endorsement of a third
person who witnessed the [plaintiff’s] refusal of testing
would have rendered [the police officer’s] report inad-
missible if the plaintiff had objected thereto. No objec-
tion was raised, however, to its use at the license
suspension hearing.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 518.
Because there was no objection, the report was prop-
erly considered like any unobjected to hearsay evi-
dence. Id. We further explained that ‘‘[t]he restriction
of the license suspension hearing to the four issues
contained in [what is now § 14-227b (g) (2)] indicates
that compliance with [§ 14-227b (c)] was not intended
to be a prerequisite for a suspension.’’ Id., 517.
Second, more recently, in Do, in which the police
report satisfied all of the statutory requirements of § 14-
227b (c), but the report itself contained several signifi-
cant factual errors, the plaintiff claimed that the dis-
crepancies rendered the report unreliable despite its
compliance with the statute. See Do v. Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles, supra, 330 Conn. 655–56. Again, even
though compliance with the admissibility requirements
of § 14-227b (c) was not the issue, in addressing whether
a police report with internal inconsistencies bearing on
the report’s reliability was nevertheless admissible, we
noted that subsection (c) sets forth ‘‘admissibility
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requirements’’; id., 668; and that ‘‘[n]either this court
nor the Appellate Court has ever recognized any basis
for excluding a police report from evidence at a license
suspension hearing other than the failure to comply
with § 14-227b (c). Indeed, we consistently have rejected
claims that a report should be excluded for any other
reason.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 669.
We now make clear what we suggested in Volck and
Do. That is, § 14-227b (c) describes substantive require-
ments that police reports must meet, and the failure to
meet those requirements renders a report inadmissible
because it fails to satisfy the exception for the report
to be admitted without the need to produce the arresting
officer at the license suspension hearing. The provision
serves an ‘‘obvious and important purpose’’; Strand/
BRC Group, LLC v. Board of Representatives, supra,
342 Conn. 380; namely, to hasten the speed with which
unsafe drivers can be removed from the road without
posing due process concerns to the formal disposses-
sion of an operator’s license. The provision is thus sub-
stantive and mandatory, and the failure to comply with
it means that the report has not met the requirements
for admissibility.
Consequently, a report that does not comply with the
hearsay exception created by § 14-227b (c) cannot be
admitted into evidence without producing the arresting
officer. We acknowledge that a license suspension hear-
ing is limited to the four issues identified in § 14-227b
(g) (2) and that compliance with subsection (c) was
not intended to be a prerequisite to proving those ele-
ments. See Volck v. Muzio, supra, 204 Conn. 517; see
also Do v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 330
Conn. 674–75. Our conclusion today that a report is
inadmissible if it fails to comply with § 14-227b (c) is
not inconsistent with the fact that license suspension
hearings are limited to the four inquiries of § 14-227b
(g) (2). Rather, we point out that § 14-227b (c) speaks
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not to the proof necessary to support a license suspen-
sion but, rather, to the admissibility requirements of a
report used to prove the four issues identified in § 14-
227b (g) (2). In other words, compliance with subsec-
tion (c) is not a prerequisite for license suspension, but
it is a procedural hurdle that must be cleared if the
report is the means by which the four inquiries are
sought to be proven.
Turning now to the present case, we note that the
arresting officer did not complete the report until he
signed and dated it five business days after the plaintiff’s
arrest. It is undisputed that the arresting officer failed
to comply with the three business day preparation and
mailing requirement of § 14-227b (c). The plaintiff’s
attorney objected to the admission of the report on
that ground. The hearing officer simply overruled the
objection and admitted the report without hearing testi-
mony from the arresting officer. Because the report
failed to satisfy the preparation and mailing require-
ment, we conclude that the hearing officer abused her
discretion by admitting the noncompliant report with-
out the testimony of the arresting officer.
Although the Appellate Court concluded that the
report was admissible because there were other indicia
of reliability; see Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles, supra, 210 Conn. App. 120; we disagree that
a report that fails to comply with § 14-227b (c) is never-
theless admissible. Specifically, the Appellate Court
concluded that, because the report met some of the
requirements of § 14-227b (c)—in particular, the arresting
officer signed the report, set forth the grounds for his
belief that there was probable cause to arrest the plain-
tiff, and stated that the plaintiff had submitted to breath
tests—the report was sufficiently reliable to be admissi-
ble, even though it was not in strict compliance with
subsection (c). Id., 120–21. That conclusion was based
on the Appellate Court’s determination that the prepara-
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tion and mailing requirement is directory. Id., 118. How-
ever, in light of our determination that the requirements
of subsection (c) are mandatory, this conclusion, which
allows a report to be admissible if it meets some of the
requirements of § 14-227b (c), cannot stand. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that a report must comply with the
preparation and mailing requirement of § 14-227b (c)
to be admitted without the necessity of producing the
arresting officer.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to
reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand
the case to the trial court with direction to sustain the
plaintiff’s appeal.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.