Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Reuben Andrew Neff

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 23–0572

Submitted October 11, 2023—Filed April 12, 2024

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Appellee,

vs.

REUBEN ANDREW NEFF,

Appellant.

On appeal from the report and recommendation of the Iowa Supreme

Court Grievance Commission.

In an attorney disciplinary action, the grievance commission recommends

suspension of an attorney’s license for violation of an ethical rule prohibiting

sexual harassment. ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all participating

justices joined. Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., took no part in the decision

of the case.
Matthew G. Sease (argued) and Delaney J. Kozlowski of Sease & Wadding,

Des Moines, for appellant.

Tara van Brederode, Robert A. Howard, III (argued), and Alexis W. Grove,

Des Moines, for appellee.
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MCDONALD, Justice.
Wapello County Attorney Reuben Neff made inappropriate statements at

work. The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board was made aware of

these statements and charged Neff with violating Iowa Rule of Professional

Conduct 32:8.4(g), which provides it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to

“engage in sexual harassment or other unlawful discrimination in the practice of

law.” Based on a stipulated record, the grievance commission found Neff violated

rule 32:8.4(g) and recommended his license be suspended for sixty days. Neff

filed this appeal. In this appeal, Neff argues the Board failed to prove a violation

of the rule. If the Board proved a violation of the rule, Neff contends, the rule

violates the United States Constitution’s First Amendment right to free speech

as applied to the facts of this case and on its face. Finally, Neff argues, if the

board proved a violation of the rule and the rule is constitutional, the grievance

commission’s recommended sanction is too severe. We conclude the Board

proved a violation of the rule, the rule is constitutional as applied and on its face,

and Neff should be reprimanded.

I.

The case was submitted to the grievance commission on a stipulated
record. The stipulated record shows the following. Neff was admitted to practice

law in Florida in 2011 and in Iowa in 2017. He was elected to serve as the Wapello

County Attorney in 2018 and served in that position at all times relevant to this

proceeding. The Wapello County Attorney’s Office employed ten individuals.

Among those ten were five attorneys and five administrative staff. Nine of the ten

employees were women. One of those nine women identified as a member of the

LGBTQ+ community. Although this attorney disciplinary proceeding involves

Neff’s inappropriate workplace statements, Neff’s staff “believe[d] that the office
dynamics [were] the best that they have been in a number of years and prefer[ed]

[Neff’s] leadership over the leadership of the two prior county attorneys.”
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Neff made at least nine comments that are at issue in this disciplinary

proceeding. At least some of his comments were made in front of his employees

Tanvi Yenna and Carly Schoemaker. Three of Neff’s comments related to

defendants in criminal cases pending at the county attorney’s office. While

prosecuting a criminal defendant, Neff told Yenna that a criminal defendant’s

“asshole” would be “this big” by the time the criminal defendant left prison. Neff

formed a circular shape with his hands when he made the statement. Another

time, while prosecuting a case involving sexual exploitation of a minor, Neff told

Yenna that the defendant should “lube up” and “grab his ankles.” After losing a

criminal sex abuse case, Neff told Yenna and Schoemaker that he wished the

defendant would be “raped by antelopes and mauled by lions at the same time.”

Neff also made inappropriate comments about judges. Neff “occasionally”

referred to judges as “bitches” following an unfavorable decision. Neff once

referred to a particular judge as a “limp dick” because Neff was frustrated about

how the judge presided over a sexual assault trial in which the defendant was

acquitted.

Finally, Neff told several off-color stories and jokes in the workplace. While

discussing false accusations in criminal cases, Neff relayed to Yenna and
Schoemaker that he was falsely accused of sexual assault in college. In the fall

of 2019 or spring of 2020, Neff told Yenna and Schoemaker about a college

memory in which another student came to class wearing pajamas and no shirt.

The student’s penis fell out of his pajama pants, and the professor yelled at the

student that he “[did] not care how proud he was of his size, get out.” Sometime

in early 2020, Neff made a joke. Upon arriving late to the office after

snow-blowing his driveway, Neff remarked that he spent the morning blowing

five inches, though he did not believe his wife minded. In response to a staff
member’s smirk, Neff quipped, “[T]hat’s what she said.” This statement was a
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quotation from a running joke made on the TV show “The Office.” Yenna and

Schoemaker frequently used the quote in the workplace.

The final statement relates to a telephone call Neff received from a member

of the public. Neff related to Yenna that the caller referred to Neff’s predecessor

as a “faggot.” After Yenna objected to Neff’s use of the word, Neff asserted his

ability to say the word by repeating the epithet. Neff used this epithet knowing

that Yenna identified as part of the LGBTQ+ community.

The Wapello County Attorney’s Office has a policy that prohibits sexual

harassment and retaliation against reporters of sexual harassment. Under the

policy, an employee can file a complaint with the county auditor, the county

attorney, or the county board of supervisors. Staff members were aware of the

policy. Yenna availed herself of the policy on a prior occasion and filed a

complaint against a female employee in the office.

No employee ever filed a complaint against Neff for violating the sexual

harassment policy, but Neff conceded Yenna informed him that his comments in

the workplace were inappropriate. The parties stipulated that Neff had

attempted, not always successfully, to address these issues. The parties

stipulated that Yenna and Schoemaker left their employment with the Wapello
County Attorney’s Office, in part, due to Neff’s comments.

Based on this stipulated record, the grievance commission found the

Board proved a violation of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(g). In

determining the appropriate sanction, the commission identified several

aggravating factors: Neff was an elected official, he held power over those in his

office, and his actions, in part, caused others to leave their employment. The

commission also found several mitigating factors: Neff’s cooperation with the

disciplinary process, his lack of prior discipline, his dedication to public and
community service, and his favorable character references. The commission
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recommended Neff’s license be suspended for sixty days. Neff timely filed this

appeal.

II.

“Avoidance of constitutional issues except when necessary for proper

disposition of [a] controversy is a bulwark of American jurisprudence.” Salsbury

Lab’ys. v. Iowa Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 276 N.W.2d 830, 837 (Iowa 1979); see

LSCP, LLLP v. Kay-Decker, 861 N.W.2d 846, 867 (Iowa 2015) (“[C]ourts have a

duty to avoid constitutional questions when [the] merits of a case may be fairly

decided without facing such questions.” (alterations in original) (quoting

Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 254 N.W.2d 737, 749 (Iowa 1977) (en banc))). Thus,

while Neff raises a constitutional challenge to rule 32:8.4(g), we begin with Neff’s

contention that the Board failed to prove a violation of the rule. If the Board failed

to prove a violation of the rule, then we need not address Neff’s constitutional

challenge to the rule.

“We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y

Disciplinary Bd. v. Stansberry, 922 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Iowa 2019). “The Board has

the burden of proving ethical misconduct of the attorney by a convincing

preponderance of the evidence.” Id. This burden is greater than the
preponderance standard required in civil cases but less than the reasonable

doubt standard in criminal cases. Id. Where the parties stipulate to the facts, we

review them “with reference to their subject matter and in light of the

surrounding circumstances and the whole record.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y

Disciplinary Bd. v. Nine, 920 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Iowa 2018) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct.

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 884 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Iowa 2016)).

Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(g) provides that “[i]t is

professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in sexual harassment or other
unlawful discrimination in the practice of law or knowingly permit staff or agents

subject to the lawyer’s direction and control to do so.” The rule applies outside
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the attorney–client relationship. The text of the rule “makes it clear that the rule

may be violated even if there is no attorney–client relationship between the

lawyer and the person subject to sexual harassment, as long as the attorney is

engaged in the practice of law.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moothart,

860 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Iowa 2015). The rule “may be violated if a lawyer sexually

harasses witnesses, court personnel, law partners, law-office employees, or other

third parties that come into contact with a lawyer engaged in the practice of law.”

Id.

Sexual harassment as used in the rule includes “sexual advances,

requests for sexual favors, and other verbal and physical conduct of a sexual

nature” that have no legitimate place in the practice of law. Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of

Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Steffes, 588 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Iowa 1999) (en banc)

(quoting Sexual Harassment, Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990)); accord

Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Newport, 955 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Iowa 2021);

Moothart, 860 N.W.2d at 604. Our cases have discussed distinct types of sexual

harassment. One category involves “come-ons.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary

Bd. v. Watkins, 944 N.W.2d 881, 887 (Iowa 2020). These include “any physical

or verbal act of a sexual nature that has no legitimate place in a legal setting.”
Id. (quoting Stansberry, 922 N.W.2d at 597). More recently, this court stated that

sexual harassment also includes sex-based put-downs. See id. at 887–88.

Examples include “ ‘woman bashing’ jokes, insults about [women’s]

incompetence, the irrelevance or sexual unattractiveness of older women, and

comments that women have no place in certain kinds of jobs . . . referring to

women by degraded names for body parts, pornographic images, [and] crude

comments about female sexuality or sexual activity.” Id. (alterations in original)

(citation omitted) (quoting Louise F. Fitzgerald & Lilia M. Cortina, Sexual
Harassment in Work Organizations: A View From the Twenty-First Century, in 1

APA Handbook of Psychology of Women 7 (Cheryl B. Travis & Jacquelyn W.
 7

White, eds., 2018)). This form of harassment “does not require an individual

woman to serve as its target or unwanted sexual overtures, nor does it need to

be explicitly linked to any job or consideration.” Id.

This court has applied rule 32:8.4(g) in a variety of circumstances. In Iowa

Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics v. Steffes, an attorney “took

photographs of his partially-clothed client under the pretext of documenting her

back injury.” 588 N.W.2d at 122. Steffes told the client that they should take

pictures of her “back so they could be used to demonstrate to the jury where her

pain was.” Id. While in his office, Steffes convinced the client to expose her back

and unhook her bra. Id. at 123. While the client was in a state of partial undress,

“Steffes walked over to her and pulled her shorts and underwear down to her

knees, and then stepped back to take the pictures.” Id. He said the pictures

would be helpful because the client had a “nice body.” Id. We had little trouble

concluding that Steffes violated the rule. We reasoned that “Steffes’s act of

photographing his partially-clothed client under the pretext that the

photographs would document her back injury and/or favorably impress male

jurors in her criminal trial constitutes physical conduct of a sexual nature.” Id.

at 124–25. Given that there was “no relationship between the frontal photograph
showing his client’s exposed breasts and pubic area, and a purported

documentation of her back injury,” we concluded that “the photographs were

sexual in nature, taken to satisfy Steffes’s own prurient interests” and so

constituted sexual harassment. Id. at 125. We suspended Steffes’s license for

two years. Id.

In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Furlong,

we suspended an attorney’s license for eighteen months for inappropriate

conduct with two clients. 625 N.W.2d 711, 713–14 (Iowa 2001) (en banc). With
respect to the first client, on the day her dissolution decree was final, the attorney

gave her “an uninvited kiss while they were at the courthouse during which he
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inserted his tongue into her mouth.” Id. at 712. Later that day, at the attorney’s

office, the attorney told the client that “she was beautiful, placed his hand inside

her underclothing, and digitally penetrated her vagina.” Id. The lawyer later had

sex with the client. Id. We concluded this violated the rule prohibiting lawyers

from having sexual relationships with clients. Id. at 713. The second client

testified that when she was in the lawyer’s “office he perpetually ogled her and

would attempt to rub her back and shoulders while calling her a ‘pretty little

thing.’ ” Id. at 712. She also testified the lawyer “placed his hands on her back

and shoulders.” Id. We found this conduct violated the rule against sexual

harassment. Id. at 713.

In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Moothart, we

suspended an attorney for thirty months for, among other things, sexual

harassment of four female clients. 860 N.W.2d at 618. The attorney plied a

twenty-two-year-old client with alcoholic drinks to the point of her intoxication,

convinced her to expose her breasts, and then sat on a couch with her in a dark

room in a sexually provocative position while making sexual suggestions. Id. at

608. We explained Moothart could not escape culpability on the ground the client

“did not expressly object” to Moothart’s sexual advances. Id. at 609. The attorney
kissed the second client, did other “stuff” with her in a courthouse conference

room, and later had sex with her. Id. We concluded this “unwanted sexual

contact” constituted sexual harassment. Id. at 611. Moothart engaged in similar

conduct with respect to a third client. Id. at 612. He commented on her breasts,

successfully requested she flash her breasts to him, and had her perform oral

sex on him in exchange for $100. Id. at 612–13. We concluded this conduct

constituted sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other physical

conduct of a sexual nature in violation of the rule. Id. at 613. The attorney
subjected a fourth client to explicit quid pro quo sexual harassment. Id. He asked
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this client to pull her shirt down and explained that the cost of services would

depend on how much cleavage the client exposed. Id.

This attorney also committed workplace sexual harassment with respect

to his legal secretary. Id. at 614. She testified Moothart “comment[ed] about her

weight and how her body looked in different outfits, about her breasts, and about

other aspects of her body” and “also asked her to perform lap dances and taped

a $20 bill to the back of a cabinet door and said she was free to take it if she

danced naked on the conference room table.” Id. He also grabbed her breast, told

her they should order a sex toy for use while having sex, looked up her skirt and

commented on her underwear, and regularly made “comments about female

clients’ breasts.” Id. We concluded Moothart violated rule 32:8.4(g) by “injecting

sexual commentary into the workplace.” Id.

The attorney in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v.

Stansberry committed severe invasions of his female colleagues’ privacy for the

sake of his own sexual gratification. 922 N.W.2d at 593. Specifically, “[t]he

attorney stole a woman colleague’s underpants from her home, rifled through

and photographed her undergarments in her bedroom, and rifled through female

colleagues’ gym bags at the office to photograph their undergarments, all for his
personal sexual gratification.” Id. We concluded that “taking photographs of their

intimate items and stealing underpants for his own sexual gratification” violated

rule 32:8.4(g). Id. at 597. We suspended the attorney’s license for one year. Id.

at 601.

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Watkins involved the

conduct of an elected county attorney in the workplace. 944 N.W.2d at 884.

Watkins’s behavior “virtually ran the whole gamut” of putdowns, come-ons,

degrading comments, and conduct and statements of a sexual nature. Id. at 888.
He appeared in front of his staff in his boxer briefs. Id. at 885. He kept a nude

image of his wife on his computer. Id. at 885–86. He showed a picture of his
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wife’s vagina, which he kept on his cell phone, and showed a video of his wife

squirting breast milk. Id. He made statements about sex in the workplace,

including stating that he just wished he had a wife who had sex with him all the

time. Id. at 888. He commented on women’s bodies, stating he would not want

to see one woman naked, stating that he wanted to know whether a courthouse

employee wore a padded bra or had really big boobs, and told an employee that

her “boobs [were] distracting him.” Id. at 885 (alteration in original). He asked

the same employee whether “her vagina was still broke” after she missed work

for a gynecology appointment. Id. He also referred to a local attorney as

“T. Queef,” a term which describes the emission of air from the vagina. Id. We

noted that in a different proceeding to remove Watkins from office, the district

court found “Watkins’s inappropriate conduct was pervasive and existed over a

significant period of time.” Id. at 886. We concluded Watkins’s inappropriate,

pervasive, and explicit sexual conduct violated rule 32:8.4(g) and suspended his

license for six months. Id. at 894.

Most recently, in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v.

Newport, we concluded that an attorney sexually harassed two clients.

955 N.W.2d at 182. Among other things, he discussed a medical procedure that
made it difficult to get an erection, and he discussed the color of his pubic hair.

Id. at 179. After reaching a settlement in the case, Newport said to one client

over the phone, “Deal’s done, drop your clothes off, and you can give me a blow

job.” Id. With respect to the second client, Newport proposed a quid pro quo

sexual arrangement for his legal services. Id. at 181. We found that “Newport

made repeated, harassing comments of a sexual nature.” Id. at 183 n.5. We

suspended his license for one year. See id. at 186.

We have little trouble concluding the Board proved Neff violated
rule 32:8.4(g) as interpreted and applied in these precedents. This case is most

similar to Watkins. As in Watkins, Neff interjected comments of a sexual nature
 11

into the workplace. He made hyperbolic statements wishing prison rape and

animal rape on criminal defendants. Those statements had no “legitimate place

in a legal setting.” Stansberry, 922 N.W.2d at 597 (quoting Moothart, 860 N.W.2d

at 604). Neff’s statements regarding criminal defendants were particularly

egregious because a prosecutor’s duty is “to do justice, not only for the accusers,

but also for the accused.” State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 568 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Iowa

1997) (en banc). Wishing violence, harm, and rape on the criminally accused was

contrary to Neff’s duties as a law enforcement officer. In addition to wishing

sexual violence against accused persons, Neff sex-stereotyped judges with whom

he disagreed. He “occasionally” called some judges “bitches,” and he called a

male judge a “limp dick.” Neff told inappropriate stories about a man’s penis

falling out of his pajamas. He made jokes with sexual innuendo. He used the

word “faggot” in a conversation with Yenna and repeated the word to her face

after her objection. See, e.g., People v. Abrams, 459 P.3d 1228, 1239–41 (Colo.

O.P.D.J. 2020) (holding that use of the words “faggot” and “homo” were in

violation of a similar provision of Colorado’s rules). Neff’s employees informed

him of the impropriety of his statements, but he was not successful in changing

his conduct. Two of Neff’s employees resigned their employment with the county
attorney’s office due, in part, to Neff’s statements and conduct in the workplace.

We cannot say that any one of these statements, standing alone, would be

sufficient evidence to violate rule 32:8.4(g), but Neff’s conduct, when taken as a

whole, objectively interfered with and caused harm in the workplace. While Neff’s

conduct is not as severe as pervasive or as explicitly sexual as that in Watkins,

that distinction makes this case only lesser in degree but not different in kind.

We thus conclude that the Board proved Neff violated rule 32:8.4(g).

III.
Neff contends that sanctioning him for violating rule 32:8.4(g) violates his

right to free speech as protected by the First Amendment to the United States
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Constitution. He makes an as-applied challenge and a facial-overbreadth

challenge to the rule. “[A]n ‘as applied’ challenge is a claim that the operation of

a statute is unconstitutional in a particular case while a facial challenge

indicates that the statute may rarely or never be constitutionally applied.” Const.

Party of Pa. v. Cortes, 824 F.3d 386, 394 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 16 C.J.S.

Constitutional Law § 243). For the reasons expressed below, we disagree with

both arguments.

A.

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .

abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The First Amendment is

applicable to the states via incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). As the licensing authority for

attorneys in this state, this court’s ability to revoke, suspend, or otherwise

sanction an attorney is “necessarily constrained by the First Amendment.” Iowa

Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Visser, 629 N.W.2d 376, 380 (2001)

(en banc) (quoting Peel v. Att’y Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91,

108 (1990)); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Att’y Doe No. 792, 878

N.W.2d 189, 194 (Iowa 2016) (stating in attorney disciplinary case we “analyze
whether the statement is entitled to First Amendment protection”); Iowa Sup. Ct.

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weaver, 750 N.W.2d 71, 80 (Iowa 2008). Yet,

“ ‘[m]embership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,’ to use the

oft-repeated statement of [Justice] Cardozo,” including First Amendment rights.

Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1062–63 (1991) (quoting In re Rouss,

116 N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917)). In that context, we “engage[] in a balancing

process, weighing the State’s interest in the regulation of a specialized profession

against a lawyer’s First Amendment interest in the kind of speech that was at
issue.” Id. at 1073.
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B.

We first address Neff’s as-applied challenge to rule 32:8.4(g). There is no

doubt that preventing sexual harassment and discrimination “is not only a

legitimate, but a compelling, government interest.” Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch.

Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2001). This court, as the state entity with the

power to license and sanction attorneys, certainly has a compelling interest in

ensuring that lawyers do not engage in sexual harassment in the practice of law.

This includes the sexual harassment of clients, “witnesses, court personnel, law

partners, law-office employees, or other third parties that come into contact with

a lawyer engaged in the practice of law.” Moothart, 860 N.W.2d at 603.

There is also no doubt that punishing a lawyer for sexual harassment

based solely on offensive speech can create tension with the Supreme Court’s

First Amendment jurisprudence. Under the Supreme Court’s precedents, the

government does not have an interest in regulating speech solely because of its

offensive content. See Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 223 (2017) (“Speech may not

be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”); Texas v. Johnson,

491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First

Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). Even

where the speech actually offends a listener, punishing such speech “would be

inconsistent with ‘[the Supreme Court’s] longstanding refusal to [punish speech]

because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the

audience.’ ” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (second alteration in

original) (quoting Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)). “The

emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary effect’ ” that can be

constitutionally regulated under the First Amendment. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992) (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321). This limiting principle

applies to laws prohibiting sexual harassment, including rule 32:8.4(g). “There
 14

is no categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the First Amendment’s free speech

clause.” Saxe, 240 F.3d at 204; see also DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301,

316 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating there is “no categorical rule that divests ‘harassing’

speech as defined by federal anti-discrimination statutes, of First Amendment

protection” (quoting Saxe, 240 F.3d at 204)).

Courts have explored the tension between the government’s interest in

eliminating sexual harassment and the First Amendment right to free speech in

different contexts. Title VII, prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace,

“has always had an uneasy coexistence with the First Amendment.” Yelling v.

St. Vincent’s Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329, 1344 (11th Cir. 2023) (per curiam)

(Brasher, J., concurring). “It is no use to deny or minimize this problem because,

when Title VII is applied to sexual harassment claims founded solely on verbal

insults, pictorial or literary matter, the statute imposes content-based,

viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on speech.” DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun.

Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 596–97 (5th Cir. 1995). Justice Thomas has

expressed the view that to uphold the constitutionality of content-based

antidiscrimination laws, such as Title VII, the Court “would have to substantially

modify [its] First Amendment jurisprudence.” Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v.
Aguilar, 529 U.S. 1138, 1141 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of

certiorari).

In Saxe v. State College Area School District, then-Judge Alito explored this

tension in the context of a constitutional challenge to a school’s antiharassment

policy that prohibited “unwelcome verbal, written or physical conduct which

offends, denigrates or belittles an individual because” of their protected

characteristics. 240 F.3d at 202–03. “There is of course no question that

non-expressive, physically harassing conduct is entirely outside the ambit of the
free speech clause. But there is also no question that the free speech clause

protects a wide variety of speech that listeners may consider deeply offensive
 15

. . . .” Id. at 206. “When laws against harassment attempt to regulate oral or

written expression on such topics, however detestable the views expressed may

be, we cannot turn a blind eye to the First Amendment implications.” Id. “[A]

disparaging comment directed at an individual’s sex . . . has the potential to

create an ‘hostile environment’—and thus come within the ambit of

anti-discrimination laws—precisely because of its sensitive subject matter and

because of the odious viewpoint it expresses.” Id. Then-Judge Alito rejected the

district court’s view that “ ‘harassment’—at least when it consists of speech

targeted solely on the basis of its expressive content—‘has never been considered

to be protected activity under the First Amendment.’ ” Id. at 209. He concluded

that “[s]uch a categorical rule is without precedent in the decisions of the

Supreme Court . . . , and it belies the very real tension between anti-harassment

laws and the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech.” Id.

Although there is a tension between this court’s interest in prohibiting

sexual harassment in the practice of law where the alleged harassment consists

solely of expressive speech and an attorney’s right to free speech as protected

under current First Amendment doctrine, that tension is not insoluble. We think

the constitutional protection afforded speech can be satisfied in the attorney
disciplinary context by requiring a showing the nonexpressive impact of the

speech resulted in objective harm beyond mere “adverse emotional impact on the

audience.” Boos, 485 U.S. at 322 (quoting Hustler Mag., 485 U.S. at 55).

Objective harm is measured from the viewpoint of a reasonable person and not

based on mere subjective offense of the listener. This court has incorporated a

similar standard into other disciplinary rules regulating attorney speech. See,

e.g., Attorney Doe No. 792, 878 N.W.2d at 194 (explaining that to avoid

constitutional concerns we adopted “an objective standard for assessing
criticisms of judicial officers made by attorneys”); Weaver, 750 N.W.2d at 82

(applying “an objective standard in cases involving criticism of judicial officers”);
 16

Visser, 629 N.W.2d at 382 (requiring an objective determination that statements

were “reasonably likely to affect the fairness of the proceedings”). And we think

a similar standard is inherent in rule 32:8.4(g).

The requirement that there be an objective assessment of harm is

“designed to play a crucial, mediating role in the effort to accommodate equality

and dignitary interests without trampling on free speech values.” Richard H.

Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog

That Didn’t Bark, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 44 (1994). The objective harm

requirement functions “as a constitutionally mandated limitation on”

antiharassment laws, id. at 45, because “[a]nti-harassment measures cannot

target ‘pure speech,’ ” Perlot v. Green, 609 F. Supp.3d 1106, 1120 (D. Idaho

2022). In the absence of requiring some evidence of objective harm, rule 32:8.4(g)

could veer toward the unconstitutional punishment of speech based solely on

punishing disfavored viewpoints. See Saxe, 240 F.3d at 206 (“ ‘Where pure

expression is involved,’ anti-discrimination law ‘steers into the territory of the

First Amendment.’ ” (quoting DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 596)); Eugene Volokh,

Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1791, 1828

(1992) (“But at least some of the speech that harassment law suppresses is
suppressed precisely because of its point of view; saying that women make bad

policemen can give rise to liability, but saying that men and women should be

treated equally cannot.”).

The Indiana Supreme Court applied a similar objective harm standard in

In re Brown, 703 N.E.2d 1041 (Ind. 1998) (per curiam). In that case, the court

suspended an attorney’s license for sexual harassment in the workplace. Id. at

1045. The court rejected the lawyer’s “faulty premise” that he could not be

punished if his conduct did not constitute sexual harassment as used in the
employment law context. Id. at 1044. The court reasoned that “we do not need

to satisfy . . . any other agency’s legal definition of what constitutes ‘sexual
 17

harassment’ to find that the respondent’s creation and perpetuation of a work

environment infected with inappropriate and unwelcome sexual advances

violated” the rules of professional conduct. Id. The court reasoned that it “need

only find that the ramifications of the respondent’s acts” degraded the work

atmosphere. Id. The court concluded that a violation was established and

sanction was warranted because “the respondent’s actions produced a work

atmosphere tainted with anxiety and stress” and “[t]he evidence also reveal[ed]

that some of his employees quit their jobs because of the respondent’s advances.”

Id.

Requiring a showing of objective harm is not a new concept in sexual

harassment law. For example, in the employment discrimination context,

liability can be imposed on a defendant for a hostile work environment only

where the expressive speech is “severe or pervasive enough to create an

objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a

reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Even in the employment law context, imposing liability

in the absence of some objective assessment of the nonexpressive impact of the

speech is in tension with and may violate the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence. See Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703,

710 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Harassment law generally targets conduct, and it sweeps

in speech as harassment only when consistent with the First Amendment.”);

DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 317–18 (stating regulation of protected speech violates the

First Amendment “[a]bsent any requirement akin to a showing of severity or

pervasiveness—that is, a requirement that the conduct objectively and

subjectively creates a hostile environment or substantially interferes with an

individual’s work”); Caleb C. Wolanek, Discriminatory Lawyers in A
Discriminatory Bar: Rule 8.4(g) of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility,
 18

40 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 773, 782 (2017) (“By requiring severity or

pervasiveness, Title VII is more about conduct than words.”).

Our discussion of sexual harassment law in the employment context is

meant only to illustrate the constitutional necessity of requiring an objective

assessment of the nonexpressive impact of speech—beyond mere adverse

emotional impact or subjective offense—as a prerequisite for disciplinary

sanction. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1076 (affirming regulation of attorney speech

as narrowly tailored because the rule “applies only to speech that is substantially

likely to have a materially prejudicial effect” and that is “neutral as to points of

view”). Our discussion is not meant to incorporate employment law standards

into rule 32:8.4(g). We reiterate that sexual harassment in the workplace under

rule 32:8.4(g) may be predicated upon conduct or speech “that may not give rise

to civil liability” in the employment law context. Newport, 955 N.W.2d at 182.

What constitutes “ ‘sexual harassment’ in [our] attorney disciplinary cases is

broader than the employment standard under Title VII.” Watkins, 944 N.W.2d at

891; see also Moothart, 860 N.W.2d at 604 (“We have not required that the

harassment be ongoing or pervasive as has been required in some employment

contexts.”).
Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that application of

rule 32:8.4(g) in this case runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment

jurisprudence. We have already concluded the board established by a convincing

preponderance of the evidence that Neff violated rule 32:8.4(g). There is ample

evidence, even on this stipulated record, that Neff’s speech caused harm in the

workplace when viewed from the vantage point of a reasonable person. His

employees complained to him about his conduct, and Neff conceded that he had

not always successfully addressed those complaints. He said the word “faggot”
in a conversation with Yenna. After she objected to his use of the word and told

him it offended her, he repeated the word to her face. See Abrams, 459 P.3d at
 19

1239–41 (holding that use of the words “faggot” and “homo” were in violation of

similar provision of Colorado’s rules); People v. Saxon, 470 P.3d 927, 943 (Colo.

O.P.D.J. 2016) (stating “abusive or harmful communication may be punished in

a variety of contexts, both criminal and disciplinary”). In addition, Neff stipulated

that two employees in his ten-employee office resigned their employment due, in

part, to his conduct and statements. Cf. In re Brown, 703 N.E.2d at 1044. When

Neff’s conduct is viewed as a whole, there is sufficient objective harm to justify

disciplinary action against him without running afoul of the Supreme Court’s

First Amendment jurisprudence.

C.

We next address Neff’s facial-overbreadth challenge. “An overbreadth

challenge is unusual.” United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 769 (2023).

Usually, “litigants mounting a facial challenge to a statute normally ‘must

establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be

valid.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,

745 (1987)). But “the overbreadth doctrine instructs a court to hold a statute

facially unconstitutional even though it has lawful applications, and even at the

behest of someone to whom the statute can be lawfully applied.” Id. The Supreme
Court has “justified this doctrine on the ground that it provides breathing room

for free expression,” explaining that “[o]verbroad laws ‘may deter or “chill” ’

constitutionally protected speech,’ and if would-be speakers remain silent,

society will lose their contributions to the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ ” Id. at 769–70

(quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)).

To prevail on an overbreadth claim, the challenger to the rule must

establish the rule “ ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech’ relative

to its ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id. at 770 (quoting United States v. Williams,
553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)); see Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct.

2373, 2387 (2021) (“In the First Amendment context, however, we have
 20

recognized ‘a second type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated

as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional,

judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” (quoting United

States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010))). “[A] law’s unconstitutional

applications must be realistic, not fanciful, and their number must be

substantially disproportionate to the statute’s lawful sweep.” Hansen, 599 U.S.

at 770. “The showing that a law punishes a ‘substantial’ amount of protected

free speech, ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,’ suffices

to invalidate all enforcement of that law, ‘until and unless a limiting construction

or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or

deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.’ ” Hicks, 539 U.S. at 118–19

(citation omitted) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613–15 (1973)).

“To judge whether a [rule] is overbroad, we must first determine what it

covers.” Hansen, 599 U.S. at 770. With respect to regulating attorneys in the

practice of law, the legitimate sweep of rule 32:8.4(g) is broad. The rule can be

applied to sanction an attorney for nonexpressive conduct constituting sexual

harassment because “nonexpressive conduct . . . does not implicate the First

Amendment at all.” Id. at 782; see also DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 316 (“[T]here is no
question that non-expressive, physically harassing conduct is entirely outside

the ambit of the free speech clause . . . .”). For example, in Steffes we sanctioned

an attorney who “took photographs of his partially-clothed client under the

pretext of documenting her back injury” and who physically “pulled her shorts

and underwear down to her knees, and then stepped back to take the pictures.”

588 N.W.2d at 122, 123. In Furlong, we suspended an attorney’s license for

violating rule 32:8.4(g) when he “perpetually ogled” a client and “placed his

hands on her back and shoulders.” 625 N.W.2d at 712. In Moothart, we
suspended an attorney for sexually harassing his clients and a female legal

secretary where he convinced two clients to expose their breasts to him, kissed
 21

a different client, and grabbed his secretary’s breasts and looked up her skirt.

860 N.W.2d at 614.

Rule 32:8.4(g) can also be applied to quid pro quo sexual harassment,

which also does not implicate the First Amendment. For example, a lawyer’s

statement “ ‘sleep with me or you’re fired’ may be proscribed not on the ground

of any expressive idea that the statement communicates, but rather because it

facilitates the threat of discriminatory conduct.” Saxe, 240 F.3d at 208. “Despite

the purely verbal quality of such a threat, it surely is no more ‘speech’ for First

Amendment purposes than the robber’s demand ‘your money or your life.’ ” Id.

Thus, in Moothart we had little trouble disciplining an attorney who subjected a

client to explicit quid pro quo sexual harassment when he told her that the cost

of his services would depend on how much cleavage the client exposed to him.

860 N.W.2d at 613. In Newport, we disciplined an attorney who proposed a quid

pro quo sexual arrangement with his client—oral sex in exchange for legal

services. 955 N.W.2d at 179.

Rule 32:8.4(g) can also be applied without constitutional concern to

violations of the criminal law that also amount to sexual harassment within the

meaning of the rule. In Stansberry, an attorney “stole a woman colleague’s
underpants from her home, rifled through and photographed her undergarments

in her bedroom, and rifled through female colleagues’ gym bags at the office to

photograph their undergarments, all for his personal sexual gratification.”

922 N.W.2d at 593. The attorney pleaded guilty to theft and criminal trespass.

Id. at 594. We concluded that “taking photographs of their intimate items and

stealing underpants for his own sexual gratification” violated rule 32:8.4(g). Id.

at 597.

Finally, as discussed above, rule 32:8.4(g) can be applied in accord with
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence where the lawyer is being
 22

sanctioned for causing harm in the practice of law beyond mere offense to the

content of his speech.

Neff acknowledges the constitutional applications of rule 32:8.4(g) but

argues the rule could also be applied to punish protected speech in violation of

the First Amendment in some circumstances. We do not necessarily disagree

with his contention, but that contention, standing alone, is not sufficient to

establish rule 32:8.4(g) is facially overbroad. Neff was required to establish that

rule 32:8.4(g)’s overbreadth is “substantial . . . relative to [its] plainly legitimate

sweep.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 292. He was required to show “from actual fact

that a substantial number of instances exist in which the [rule] cannot be applied

constitutionally.” N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988).

Neff failed to meet that burden of proving his overbreadth challenge.

Rule 32:8.4(g)’s prohibition of sexual harassment “has a wide legitimate reach

insofar as it applies to nonexpressive conduct,” unprotected speech, violations

of the criminal law, and to speech causing harm beyond mere offense to the

audience when viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person. Hansen,

599 U.S. at 784. Further, the rule only prohibits attorneys from engaging in

sexual harassment and other unlawful discrimination “in the practice of law.”
Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(g). This limitation is significant because the rule

does not at all encompass an attorney’s conduct or speech outside the practice

of law. Neff failed to show from actual fact that “the ratio of unlawful-to-lawful

applications is . . . lopsided enough to justify the ‘strong medicine’ of facial

invalidation for overbreadth.” Hansen, 599 U.S. at 784; see, e.g., Rowles v.

Curators of Univ. of Mo., 983 F.3d 345, 358 (8th Cir. 2020) (affirming the

dismissal of an overbreadth challenge to the university’s sexual harassment

policy and explaining the challenger failed to show a substantial number of
enforcement actions would involve protected speech). Neff “has not identified,

nor do we perceive, a broad swath of speech that would be impermissibly limited
 23

by [rule 32:8.4(g)] such that the [r]ule risks chilling or penalizing protected

speech.” In re Abrams, 488 P.3d 1043, 1054 (Colo. 2021) (en banc).

D.

In Neff’s briefing on his First Amendment challenge, he also mentions that

rule 32:8.4(g) is unconstitutionally vague and thus void for vagueness. However,

a vagueness challenge arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 9 of the Iowa

Constitution. See Formaro v. Polk County, 773 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Iowa 2009). Neff

failed to cite either of these constitutional provisions in his briefing, and he failed

to meaningfully develop his vagueness challenge to rule 32:8.4(g). We conclude

Neff forfeited his constitutional vagueness challenge to the rule. See State v.

Jackson, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL 1121676, at *9 (Iowa Mar. 26, 2024) (“A

party forfeits an issue on appeal when the party fails to make more than a

perfunctory argument in support of the issue.”).

IV.

Finally, we address the appropriate sanction in this case. “There is no

standard sanction for a particular type of misconduct, and though prior cases

can be instructive, we ultimately determine an appropriate sanction based on
the particular circumstances of each case.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.

Earley, 729 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Iowa 2007). “We do, however, seek a degree of

consistency in our disciplinary cases with respect to sanctions.” Iowa Sup. Ct.

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Taylor, 814 N.W.2d 259, 268 (Iowa 2012). “In

determining an appropriate sanction, we consider ‘the nature of the violations,

the need for deterrence, protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation

of the Bar as a whole, and the violator’s fitness to continue to practice law,’ as

well as any aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Earley, 729 N.W.2d
at 443 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Ramey,

639 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 2002)).
 24

The Board argues there are aggravating factors here that warrant a

thirty-day suspension. The fact Neff was serving as a county attorney when the

conduct occurred is an aggravating consideration. See Watkins, 944 N.W.2d at

892 (“Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond

those of other citizens. A lawyer’s abuse of public office can suggest an inability

to fulfill the professional role of a lawyer.” (quoting Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct

32:8.4 cmt. [5])). There was also a power imbalance here, but not to the same

degree as in Watkins, where the primary target of harassment was “a young,

inexperienced legal assistant” and the respondent “abuse[d] his position of power

and authority over his female employees to denigrate their positions and their

very existence as women.” Id. Finally, the effect of the harassment on Yenna and

Schoemaker can be considered aggravating.

Neff argues that there are mitigating factors here and that a private

admonition is the appropriate sanction. We agree there are mitigating factors

present here. Neff has no prior disciplinary history. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y

Disciplinary Bd. v. Leitner, 998 N.W.2d 627, 647 (Iowa 2023). He has cooperated

in these proceedings. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Sobel,

997 N.W.2d 421, 434 (Iowa 2023). He has dedicated himself to public service in
the State of Iowa. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bergmann,

938 N.W.2d 16, 23 (Iowa 2020) (noting public service as a mitigating factor).

Nonetheless, we cannot agree that a private admonition is the appropriate

sanction.

This case differs from our prior cases in which we have suspended an

attorney’s license for violation of rule 32:8.4(g). This case does not involve sexual

touching of clients that warranted suspension in our prior cases. In Steffes, the

attorney “took photographs of his partially-clothed client under the pretext of
documenting her back injury” and physically “pulled her shorts and underwear

down to her knees, and then stepped back to take the pictures.” 588 N.W.2d at
 25

122, 123. In Furlong, the attorney gave one client “an uninvited kiss while they

were at the courthouse during which he inserted his tongue into her mouth.” Id.

at 712. The attorney also ogled and touched another client. Id. In Moothart, the

lawyer convinced clients to show him their breasts and had sexual contact with

other clients. 860 N.W.2d at 618.

This case also does not involve quid pro quo sexual harassment of clients

or explicit sexual advances toward employees. For example, in Moothart, the

lawyer told his client that the cost of his services would depend on how much

cleavage she exposed to him. Id. at 613. The same lawyer in Moothart also

harassed his legal secretary, made explicit sexual comments directed to her

about her body, asked her to perform a lap dance, grabbed her breasts, looked

up her skirt, and commented on her underwear. Id. at 614. And, in Newport, the

attorney requested oral sex in exchange for his legal services. 955 N.W.2d at 181.

This case does not involve criminal activity that also constituted sexual

harassment as in Stansberry. In that case, “[t]he attorney stole a woman

colleague’s underpants from her home, rifled through and photographed her

undergarments in her bedroom, and rifled through female colleagues’ gym bags

at the office to photograph their undergarments, all for his personal sexual
gratification.” 922 N.W.2d at 593. We concluded that suspension was warranted

in that case.

This case is most similar to Watkins, but, as stated above, it is different in

degree than Watkins. Watkins “ran the whole gamut” of put-downs, come-ons,

and other sexually harassing conduct. Watkins, 944 N.W.2d at 888. Watkins

made crude, graphic comments to his female staff about specific female clients,

attorneys, and courthouse employees; showed naked pictures of his wife to

female staff; asked an employee a crude question about her vagina; and made
off-color sexual jokes in front of his female staff. Id. Watkins also appeared before

a female employee wearing only his boxer briefs. Id. His conduct led to a formal
 26

complaint before the county board of supervisors and an effort to remove him as

county attorney. Id. at 886. In contrast, in this case, Neff made nine

inappropriate statements. His comments, generally, were not targeted toward

people in the office. No complaint has been lodged against him other than this

ethics complaint. Most of the female employees in his office stand by Neff and

view him favorably as a fair prosecutor and a good boss to work for.

On balance, we conclude that a public reprimand is the appropriate

sanction for Neff’s improper statements here. Neff should have realized that his

statements were outside the bounds expected of Iowa lawyers. Membership in

the bar is a privilege with conditions. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1062–63. One of

those conditions is that an attorney conduct himself with professionalism in the

workplace and not engage in conduct that constitutes sexual harassment, even

if the conduct falls short of that creating civil liability in the employment law

context. Neff failed to meet the standard of conduct required of Iowa lawyers,

and we publicly reprimand him for his violation of rule 32:8.4(g).

ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED.
All justices concur except Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., who take

no part.