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22-P-1168 Appeals Court
BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF PEPPERELL vs. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF
PEPPERELL & another1 (and a consolidated case2).
No. 22-P-1168.
Suffolk. December 5, 2023. – April 12, 2024.
Present: Green, C.J., Neyman, & Englander, JJ.
Dump. Municipal Corporations, Dump, By-laws and ordinances.
Zoning, Dump, Accessory building or use, By-law.
Declaratory Relief. Practice, Civil, Declaratory
proceeding, Summary judgment.
Civil actions commenced in the Land Court Department on
February 14 and 15, 2019.
After consolidation, the cases were heard by Diane R.
Rubin, J., on motions for summary judgment.
Christine E. Dieter for Mass Composting Group Inc., &
another.
David K. McCay for board of selectmen of Pepperell.
Jonathan M. Silverstein for Phillip Dzubinski & others.
1 Mass Composting Group Inc.
2 Phillip Dzubinski & others vs. Zoning Board of Appeals of
Pepperell & others.
2
GREEN, C.J. Mass Composting Group Inc. (MCGI) proposes to
conduct a soil reclamation project on a former gravel pit in the
town of Pepperell (town). As described by MCGI, the project
would entail depositing soils and materials on the property over
a seven to nine year period to prepare the property for future
development. On motions for summary judgment, a judge of the
Land Court concluded and declared that section 277 of chapter
165 of the acts of 2014 (§ 277) does not preempt the town's
authority to regulate the proposed project, and that the
proposed project constitutes a commercial dumping ground as
defined in the local zoning bylaw –- a use prohibited in the
industrial zoning district in which the property is located.
MCGI appeals, and we vacate the judgment. We remand for the
entry of a declaratory judgment consistent with this opinion and
for further consideration of whether the proposed project is a
use prohibited by the bylaw.
Background. 1. The locus and project. The site at issue
consists of forty-nine acres located in the town's industrial
zoning district, and was the site of a gravel pit or quarry
between 1965 and the late 1980s. There is no current gravel
removal operation, or other active use, conducted on the site.3
3 A three-year special permit was granted for soil and
gravel removal in 1985. The board of selectmen (board) issued a
new special permit for gravel removal in 1991, but it was
3
MCGI seeks to "reclaim" the property by a project that will
deposit approximately 3.2 million cubic yards of "soil" over a
seven to nine year period. The project would include
installation of a scale house, electrical utilities, fencing,
and monitoring wells. The soil deposits would be comprised of
"excess soil from excavation and construction projects in
Massachusetts," and "qualified soils" from Vermont, New
Hampshire, and Maine. Approximately sixty-five truckloads a day
would be deposited, bulldozers would flatten the soil, and the
process would be repeated to achieve a final elevation. MCGI's
stated purpose of the proposed project is "to improve current
topographic conditions by restoring elevations to pre-quarrying
conditions, install a sustainable vegetative cover[,] and
prepare the property for future development." MCGI has not
identified a specific future use, though a solar farm has been
discussed.
Prior to quarrying activities, the elevation of the
property ranged from 170 to 260 feet above sea level, with the
majority of the site at over 200 feet in elevation. Current
topography ranges between 172 to 260 feet above sea level;
Nashua Road, which fronts the western and northern edges of the
property, is 195 to 220 feet above sea level. The project's
subsequently revoked in 1992. The record does not reflect that
any further permitting for gravel removal currently exists.
4
proposed finished grade will be a flat plateau of fourteen to
seventeen acres at 299.5 feet above sea level, an apparent
deviation from the project's stated purpose that we will discuss
later in this opinion.
The owners of the originating sites will pay MCGI to
deposit excess soil and fill material on the site. If it were
not being paid, MCGI would not take the soil. The proposed
project, as designed, would generate $20 to $25 million in
revenue for MCGI over the course of the project.
2. Legislation and agency policy. In 2014, the
Legislature directed the Department of Environmental Protection
(department) to establish "regulations, guidelines, standards[,]
or procedures for determining the suitability of soil used as
fill material for the reclamation of quarries, sand pits[,] and
gravel pits." § 277. Section 277 provides
"[t]he regulations, standards[,] or procedures shall ensure
the reuse of soil poses no significant risk of harm to
health, safety, public welfare[,] or the environment
considering the transport, filling operations[,] and the
foreseeable future use of the filled land. The department
may adopt, amend[,] or repeal regulations establishing:
(1) classes or categories of fill or reclamation activities
requiring prior issuance of a permit issued by the
department; (ii) classes or categories of fill or
reclamation activities that may be carried out without
prior issuance of a permit issued by the department; and
(iii) classes or categories of fill that shall require
local approval based on the size, scope[,] and location of
a project" (emphasis added).
5
In response, the department adopted an interim policy under
the authority of § 277. See "Interim Policy on the Re-Use of
Soil for Large Reclamation Projects Policy #COMM-15-01" (August
28, 2015) (interim policy). See also the department's "Similar
Soils Provision Guidance," WSC#-13-500 (Sept. 4, 2014). The
interim policy sets out the procedure by which the department
will review quarry reclamation proposals, stating, inter alia,
that its purpose is to provide
"notice of [the department's] intent to issue site-specific
approvals, in the form of an Administrative Consent Order,
to ensure [that] the reuse of large volumes of soil for
reclamation of . . . quarries poses no significant risk of
harm to health, safety, public welfare[,] or the
environment and would not create new releases or threats of
releases of oil or hazardous materials."
Among other things, the interim policy requires that soil
accepted by the quarry "can contain no more than de minimis
quantities of Solid Waste (e.g.[,] Municipal Solid Waste and/or
Construction and Demolition Waste) as defined in 310 C[ode]
M[ass.] R[egs.] [§] 16.00 [2012] and 310 C[ode] M[ass.] R[egs.]
[§] 19.00 [2014]."4 Further, projects "must ensure that the
filling does not create new, reportable releases of oil or
hazardous materials to the environment."
Finally, the interim policy specifically provides that
4 These regulations define "Construction and Demolition
Waste," and "Municipal Solid Waste," see 310 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 16.02 (2012) and 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 19.006 (2014), but do
not define the term "de minimis."
6
"[n]othing in this Interim Policy eliminates, supersedes[,]
or otherwise modifies any local, [S]tate[,] or [F]ederal
requirements that apply to the management of soil,
including any local, [S]tate[,] or [F]ederal permits or
approvals necessary before placing the soil at the
receiving location, including, but not limited to, those
related to placement of fill, noise, traffic, dust control,
stormwater management, wetlands, groundwater[,] or drinking
water source protection."5
The interim policy anticipates that the developer will work
closely with local authorities and respond appropriately to
their comments "on project impacts related to noise, dust, odor
and/or trucks." In addition, the interim policy requires a
"plan for communicating with the public and involving interested
parties at key points in the implementation of the reclamation
project."6
3. Local zoning. The local zoning bylaw (bylaw) contains
a "Table of Principal Uses." See Pepperell zoning bylaw,
5 The interim policy provides that it will stay in effect
until regulations are adopted, and that projects commenced under
an administrative consent order would be accommodated by any
regulations subsequently adopted. Counsel for MCGI confirmed at
oral argument that no relevant regulations have yet been
adopted.
6 The project, as proposed, would comply with the interim
policy requirements and ongoing soil testing, and screening
would occur to ensure the suitability of the deposits before
they are made. MCGI indicated at oral argument that, although
it had submitted a request for approval of the project to the
department, the department has suspended its review of that
request until this action is resolved. For purposes of these
declaratory judgment actions, we will assume that any project
executed by MCGI will obtain an appropriate administrative
consent order from the department before it commences.
7
Appendix A, as revised July 28, 2014. A soil reclamation
facility is not a use listed in the table. Id. Pursuant to the
bylaw's table of principal uses, a commercial dumping ground is
not allowed in any zoning district in the town. Id. The bylaw
defines a "commercial dumping ground" as a "disposal site for
garbage, rubbish, the deposit of demolition materials or other
refuse[,] or as a site for a refuse disposal incinerator." Id.
at § 10000.
4. Procedural history and Land Court decision. Cleared of
the underbrush, before us are the parties' requests for
declaratory judgment pursuant to G. L. c. 231A and G. L. c. 240,
§ 14A.7 All of the parties, whether in a complaint or
7 The case followed a convoluted path to reach us for
review. On September 24, 2018, the board of selectmen (board)
requested that the building inspector determine whether the
proposed project qualifies as a "commercial dumping ground" and
whether a commercial dumping ground is an allowed use of the
property. Although the building inspector determined that the
proposed project constitutes a commercial dumping ground, the
town's zoning board of appeals (zoning board) disagreed, and the
board thereafter commenced an action challenging the zoning
board's decision pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17. A group of
town residents, mostly abutters and referred to as the "private
plaintiffs," among other things (residents), also commenced a
similar action pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17. After the two
cases were consolidated, a judge suggested that the zoning board
was without jurisdiction to review that building inspector's
determination, so that the § 17 appeals were inapt as a means to
consider the question. Instead, she suggested that the parties'
dispute should more appropriately be resolved by amended
complaints under G. L. c. 240, § 14A. Accordingly, by third
amended complaint, the residents sought, among other things, a
declaratory judgment, pursuant to G. L. c. 231A and G. L.
c. 240, § 14A, that the zoning board's decision did not
8
counterclaim, have sought a declaration as to whether the
proposed project is prohibited as a "commercial dumping ground"
or because the proposed use constitutes a use that is not
otherwise allowed in the town. Although G. L. c. 240, § 14A,
does not authorize the board of selectmen (board) to bring a
declaratory judgment action,8 MCGI unquestionably has the right
to obtain a declaratory judgment that will resolve doubts as to
the requirements of the zoning bylaw as applied to its property,
establish that the proposed project was an allowed use under the
town's zoning bylaw. In its second amended complaint, the board
added a count seeking a declaratory judgment, pursuant to G. L.
c. 231A, that the project is a prohibited use under the bylaw,
and a declaratory judgment pursuant to G. L. c. 240, § 14A, that
the proposed project is prohibited because it constitutes a
commercial dumping ground and is not otherwise allowed under the
zoning bylaw. In its answer to the board's second amended
complaint, MCGI asserted two counterclaims -- the first seeking
a declaratory judgment pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 1, that the
project does not constitute a "commercial dumping ground," and
that § 277 preempts the bylaw, and the second seeking a
declaratory judgment, pursuant to G. L. c. 240, § 14A, that the
project would not constitute a "use" under the bylaw. Ruling on
cross motions for summary judgment by the board and the
residents -- and with the parties stipulating to the dismissal
of their G. L. c. 40, § 17, appeals -- the judge concluded that
the project was a commercial dumping ground, and that § 277 did
not preempt the town's authority to regulate the project.
Summary judgment entered in favor of the board and the residents
on all claims. Accordingly, no issues relevant to an appeal
under § 17 are before us, and only the parties' claims for
declaratory relief and judgment are before us.
8 We also note that the board ordinarily would not be
entitled to a declaratory judgment concerning an interpretation
of the bylaw under G. L. c. 231A. See Leonard v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals of Hanover, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 500 (2019).
9
and the board is the appropriate party defendant in any such
action.9 See G. L. c. 240, § 14A; Whitinsville Retirement Soc'y,
Inc. v. Northbridge, 394 Mass. 757, 762-763 (1985). The issue,
therefore, is properly before us and we proceed to consider it.
The judge identified the issues before her as whether the
project would be lawful under the bylaw and whether § 277 and
the interim policy preempt the local bylaw. Where the soil
management plan allows up to five percent by volume of asphalt,
brick, and concrete material, and up to one percent of ash or
solid waste, the judge concluded that the deposits are
reasonably characterized as trash or garbage. The judge
rejected the idea that only de minimis amounts of such
prohibited materials would be deposited; she calculated that,
based on the scope of the proposed project, up to 192,000 cubic
yards of prohibited materials would be deposited in total. She
concluded that the department's limitation of "de minimis"
amounts of prohibited materials is irrelevant where the bylaw's
definition of commercial dumping ground does not contain a
qualifying threshold amount of prohibited materials. The judge
9 The residents, too, have authority under G. L. c. 240,
§ 14A, to challenge a bylaw interpretation to the extent "there
is a direct effect of the zoning enactment through the permitted
use of other land." Hansen & Donahue, Inc. v. Norwood, 61 Mass.
App. Ct. 292, 295 (2004), quoting Harrison v. Braintree, 355
Mass. 651, 655 (1969).
10
ultimately concluded that the proposed project would constitute
a commercial dumping ground, prohibited by the town's bylaw.
The judge also concluded that § 277 and the interim policy
do not preempt local bylaws from prohibiting the filling of
quarries with reclaimed soil. The judge reasoned that "[w]hile
[§ 277] does contemplate uniform standards for determining the
suitability of fill for the reclamation of quarries, sand
pits[,] and gravel pits, it stops short of explicitly limiting
the manner in which cities and towns may also act to regulate
land within their boundaries."
Having concluded that the project constitutes an
impermissible commercial dumping ground, the judge declined to
consider whether, as the board argued, (1) the project would
only be an allowable "accessory or incidental use to a quarry or
gravel pit" if the primary use were allowed under the bylaw; (2)
where the bylaw prohibits uses not expressly permitted, the
project falls under no allowed use category; and (3) the project
requires a water resource protection overlay district special
permit, which MCGI has not obtained.
Discussion. 1. Commercial dumping ground. We first
consider whether the proposed project will constitute a
"commercial dumping ground," defined in the bylaw as a site for
the disposal of "garbage, rubbish, . . . demolition materials[,]
or other refuse." Pepperell zoning bylaw § 10000. The bylaw
11
does not contain specific definitions of the latter terms, but
"[w]e construe the meaning of a bylaw using 'ordinary principles
of statutory construction,' beginning with the plain language of
the bylaw" (citation omitted). Williams v. Board of Appeals of
Norwell, 490 Mass. 684, 693 (2022).
Because of the posture in which these issues come before us
(i.e., before review and approval by the department under its
interim policy), we will assume that the proposed project, as
eventually executed, will comply with § 277 and the interim
policy and will be approved by the department.10 Thus, our
review assumes that the department will determine that, as to
any project it approves, there is no "significant risk of harm
to health, safety, public welfare[,] or the environment[,]" see
§ 277, and only "de minimis quantities of Solid Waste" will be
deposited, see interim policy.11 Further, as provided in the
interim policy, the department will ensure that the project will
"not create new, reportable releases of oil or hazardous
materials to the environment." Rather than quibble about the
meaning of commonly used terms such as garbage, rubbish, and
10In other words, we presume that, since such approval is
required by the department's interim policy, no quarry
reclamation project will proceed unless and until it receives
such approval.
11We offer no opinion on whether the department will in
fact grant its approval to the proposed project.
12
refuse as used in the bylaw, we accept that "de minimis"
quantities of such materials as described in § 277 and the
interim policy will be deposited on the site pursuant to the
proposed project. That does not mean, however, that the
inclusion in the soils used as fill in the quarry reclamation
project of de minimis quantities of materials that might be
described as "refuse," in some sense of the term, will cause the
site to be considered a "commercial dumping ground" within the
meaning of the bylaw.
In the context of the proposed project, a number of factors
lead us to conclude that the proposed project will not
constitute a commercial dumping ground (assuming, again, that
only a de minimis quantity of harmful materials are deposited).
Section 277 and the interim policy act together to ensure that
the soils deposited at the project site will pose "no
significant risk of harm to health, safety, public welfare[,] or
the environment." § 277. Indeed, as we read it, the very
purpose of § 277 and the interim policy is to ensure, in effect,
that a quarry is not used as a commercial dumping ground. The
department's interim policy seems to recognize, however, that it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to fill a quarry with
soil and materials that do not include any materials that, in
bulk, could put the health, safety, public welfare, or the
environment at risk. Thus, the statutory framework engages the
13
department in making a determination of whether any such
materials are "de minimis," and any project approved by the
department will of necessity conform to that standard. We
conclude that the department's approval of the composition of
soils deposited on the site, based on its determination that the
soils are appropriate for use as fill, means that the soils are
not "garbage" or "refuse" within the meaning of the bylaw, and
their use as fill material accordingly does not transform the
former quarry into a commercial dumping ground.12
12We do not intimate that the department is the arbiter of
the meaning of the term "commercial dumping ground" in the
town's bylaw for all purposes, or that the town is without
authority to impose more stringent standards. Instead, in the
circumstances of the present case, and in light of the
department's oversight of the composition of soils used in
quarry reclamation projects in the Commonwealth, and in the
absence of any definition of the terms "garbage, rubbish, the
deposit of demolition materials or other refuse" within the
definition of the term "commercial dumping ground" in the town's
bylaw, our conclusion applies the department's review of quarry
reclamation projects under the interim policy as an interpretive
aid to construe the bylaw provision. We note as well that this
is not a situation in which we are admonished to defer to an
interpretation by a local administrative body charged with
enforcement of the bylaw. See Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers
of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Billerica, 454 Mass. 374,
381 (2009). As we observed earlier, see note 7, supra, the case
is before us on requests for declaratory judgment; the parties
stipulated to the dismissal of an action that would have
presented the question of the propriety of the interpretation by
the zoning board (consistent with ours) that the proposed
project would not constitute a commercial dumping ground within
the meaning of the bylaw. Our view of the case, resting on
interpretation of the bylaw, obviates any need to address the
parties' competing arguments on whether § 277 operates to
preempt local regulation of quarry reclamation projects, or of
14
While the judge was concerned that in the aggregate,
substantial amounts of impermissible materials will be
deposited, we reiterate that the interim policy guards against a
collection that would create a "significant risk of harm to
health, safety, public welfare[,] or the environment."
Moreover, where the interim policy is specific to filling former
quarries, the department had to be aware that aggregate
quantities of deposited soils would be high, and the
department's review of the project accordingly will take total
amounts into consideration.
The board and the plaintiffs in the companion case
(residents), see note 7, supra, suggest that because MCGI will
be compensated for taking the soil deposits, the deposits must
constitute unwanted trash. "But one man's rubbish may be
another's treasure." 1 J.F. Campbell, Popular Tales of the West
Highlands, iii (Alexander Gardner new ed. 1890). There are many
examples in contemporary commerce of objects or materials that
are unnecessary in a particular location and require payment to
transport them to another, and yet are put to beneficial use at
another location. In the circumstances of the present case, it
is enough to observe that soil materials may need to be removed
from a site and developers may be willing to deposit them
projects in general involving soils used to fill land proposed
for development.
15
elsewhere for any number of reasons; it does not mean that the
soils are in essence contaminated, unwanted refuse. Indeed, in
the circumstances here, the department's policies should ensure
that only de minimis quantities of contaminants in soils used as
fill may be deposited on the site.
2. The reclamation project as a "use." The board and the
residents argue that even if the proposed project does not
constitute a commercial dumping ground, the project still is not
allowed because, regardless of the type of fill, the reclamation
project itself constitutes a "use" and that use is not an
allowed use under the bylaw. MCGI contends that the reclamation
project is not a "use," that there is no presently proposed use
of the property because the quarry is not active or licensed,
and that there is no definitive future use; in MCGI's view, the
project is "a process that must necessarily precede a future
'use' and does not itself constitute a 'use' of land within the
[b]ylaw." MCGI suggests that the proposed project is merely
"site work" in anticipation of a future use and does not
constitute a use itself.
Having concluded that the project does constitute a
"commercial dumping ground," the judge declined to address these
arguments. We observe that in analogous circumstances involving
the question of what constitutes an incidental use, the Supreme
Judicial Court stated that "[d]etermining whether an activity is
16
an 'incidental' use is a fact-dependent inquiry, which both
compares the net effect of the incidental use to that of the
primary use and evaluates the reasonableness of the relationship
between the incidental and the permissible primary uses." Henry
v. Board of Appeals of Dunstable, 418 Mass. 841, 844 (1994).
We, therefore, remand the case for consideration of these issues
by the judge in the first instance. See Merrimack College v.
KPMG LLP, 480 Mass. 614, 629 (2018).
We note that our appellate cases have considered whether
large earth removal projects constitute an "accessory use"
related to the existing or planned future use of the property.
See Henry, 418 Mass. at 845 ("We conclude that the net effect of
the volume of earth to be removed, the duration of the project,
and the scope of the removal project are inconsistent with the
character of the existing and intended agricultural uses"); Old
Colony Council-Boy Scouts of Am. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of
Plymouth, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 47-49 (1991) (two and one-half
year earth removal project to create cranberry bog not
incidental to construction and maintenance of cranberry bog).
While they consider earth removal projects, as contrasted with a
filling project as in the present case, those cases are
instructive.
Here, the 1985 special permit, see note 3, supra, called
for storing removed topsoil on the site and the bylaw then in
17
effect provided that "as soon as possible thereafter [following
excavation], ground levels and grades shall be established in
accordance with the specifications set forth in the special
permit." It is unclear on the present record whether the quarry
operators complied with the bylaw or the special permit, and in
any event, that special permit expired by its terms after three
years and was not renewed.13 It may well be that for this or
other reasons, some level of reclamation may be considered
necessary "site work" without constituting a separate and
independent "use." We note, however, that the record suggests
that the average elevation of the site before quarrying began
was approximately 200 feet above sea level, and that MCGI
proposes to create a flat plateau of fourteen to seventeen acres
at an elevation of 299.5 feet. Although MCGI has stated that
the purpose of the project is "to improve current topographic
conditions by restoring elevations to pre-quarrying conditions,
install a sustainable vegetative cover[,] and prepare the
property for future development," in fact, the filling it
proposes to conduct will bring the site to a much higher
elevation than the prequarrying elevation, and it has not
attempted to justify the proposed elevation as necessary for any
general or specific use.
13A subsequent special permit, issued in 1991, was revoked
in 1992.
18
Conclusion. The judgment of the Land Court entered August
1, 2022, is vacated. The case is remanded for further
proceedings on the use issue consistent with this opinion and
for the entry of a declaration that MCGI's proposed project, if
conducted so that only de minimis quantities of harmful
materials are deposited, would not constitute a commercial
dumping ground as that term is used in the bylaw.14
So ordered.
14 The board's request for costs is denied.