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Hepburn v. Brill
LAURIE HEPBURN v. CHANDLER BRILL
(SC 20832)
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff sought visitation with L, the minor child of the defendant
and the plaintiff’s deceased sister, pursuant to the third-party visitation
statute (§ 46b-59). The plaintiff had lived with L and L’s mother since
L was born in 2010, while the defendant lived elsewhere. After the death
of L’s mother in 2021, L initially continued to live with the plaintiff, but
the defendant eventually took L to live with him full-time. The defendant
moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s visitation petition for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, claiming that the plaintiff lacked standing under
§ 46b-59 (b) because she failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that
she had a parent-like relationship with L and that L would suffer real
and significant harm if visitation were to be denied. The plaintiff then
filed an amended petition for visitation with L, in which she alleged
that, in a series of video calls that occurred while L was living with the
defendant, L appeared very stressed, sad, and anxious. During those
calls, L reported, inter alia, that she was miserable living with the defen-
dant and devastated to be cut off from the plaintiff. L stated that she
was crying herself to sleep and had lost weight. L also told the plaintiff
that the defendant had mocked her for crying about the loss of her
mother and had thrown her up against a car. The defendant objected
to the amended petition, arguing that it would be improper for the court
to consider the amended petition while the motion to dismiss the initial
petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was pending. Following
a hearing, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the initial
petition, concluding, without elaboration, that it did not satisfy the
requirements of § 46b-59. The court also dismissed, sua sponte, the
amended petition, concluding that its allegations, if proven by clear
and convincing evidence, would not establish the plaintiff’s parent-like
relationship with L or establish that L would suffer real and significant
harm if visitation were to be denied. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed
from the trial court’s judgment.
Held that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s amended petition
for visitation with L, the plaintiff having adequately alleged therein both
the existence of a parent-like relationship and that the denial of visitation
would cause L real and significant harm, and, accordingly, this court
reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings:
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Hepburn v. Brill
1. The trial court improperly treated the defendant’s motion to dismiss as
implicating the court’s subject matter jurisdiction rather than its statu-
tory authority to act pursuant to § 46b-59:
In Roth v. Weston (259 Conn. 202), this court applied a judicial gloss to
a prior version of § 46b-59 to render the statute constitutional and, in
doing so, concluded that the parent-like relationship and the real and
significant harm requirements were matters of standing that implicated
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, but the legislature’s subsequent
amendment (P.A. 12-137, § 1) to § 46b-59, in accordance with the gloss
adopted in Roth, created a new statute that carried with it a strong
presumption of constitutionality such that the statute no longer required
a gloss to function within the bounds of the constitution.
The trial court has plenary and general subject matter jurisdiction over
legal disputes in family relations matters pursuant to statute (§ 46b-
1), § 46b-1 (a) (12) defines family relations matters to include matters
affecting or involving rights and remedies provided for in chapter 815j
of the General Statutes, § 46b-59 falls within chapter 815j and expressly
provides the court with the power to order visitation to any person
who meets the statutory standard, and, accordingly, §§ 46b-1 and 46b-
59 together provided the trial court in the present case with subject
matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s third-party visitation petitions.
Because the motion to dismiss implicated the trial court’s statutory
authority to act pursuant to § 46b-59 rather than its subject matter juris-
diction, this court treated that motion as raising the question of whether
the plaintiff had sufficiently proffered specific and good faith allegations
that both a parent-like relationship existed between her and L and that
the denial of visitation would cause real and significant harm to L.
2. Because the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff to amend her
initial petition for visitation, and because the trial court considered the
plaintiff’s amended petition, it was permissible for this court to consider
the allegations therein to determine whether the trial court properly
had declined to exercise its statutory authority under § 46b-59:
The defendant’s objection to the plaintiff’s amended petition was prem-
ised on his claim that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the rule of
practice (§ 10-60) governing amendments to pleadings in civil matters,
but visitation is governed by the less restrictive rule of practice (§ 25-
7) pertaining to amendments to pleadings in family matters, and, because
the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff to amend her initial
petition under the more liberal provision of Practice Book § 25-7, and
the trial court actually considered the amended petition, this court also
considered the amended petition to determine whether the plaintiff
pleaded sufficient facts to demonstrate that she had a parent-like relation-
ship with L and that L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation
were to be denied.
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Hepburn v. Brill
3. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the amended petition did not
include the specific and good faith allegations necessary to demonstrate
the existence of the plaintiff’s parent-like relationship with L and that
L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation were to be denied:
With respect to the parent-like relationship requirement, the plaintiff
alleged, inter alia, that she lived with L for more than ten years, was L’s
primary caretaker, and was involved in every aspect of L’s day, including
transporting L to school, assisting L with homework, enrolling L in
extracurricular activities, and taking L to medical appointments, and
that, after the death of L’s mother, she served as L’s primary provider
of emotional support, comfort, and care, and those allegations establish-
ing the duration, regularity, and magnitude of the care that the plaintiff
provided to L were sufficient to plead a parent-like relationship pursuant
to § 46b-59 (b) and (c).
This court emphasized that the parent-like relationship and real and
significant harm requirements should be analyzed separately and that
the severance of emotional ties between a nonparent who has developed
a parent-like relationship and a child, without more, should not be the
end of the analysis with respect to the harm requirement, but it also
recognized that there may be circumstances, such as when a child is
coping with the death of a parent in addition to the severance of substan-
tial emotional ties with a nonparent, that the denial of visitation with
the nonparent itself could cause serious and immediate harm to that child.
With respect to the real and significant harm requirement, the plaintiff
alleged, inter alia, that she was L’s primary caretaker and provider of
emotional support, that L was abruptly taken away from her home and
had been very emotional since she was cut off from her former life, that
L was very sad, anxious, fearful, crying excessively, experiencing suicidal
ideation, and losing weight, and that the defendant’s actions compounded
the emotional harm that he caused to L by depriving her of a relationship
with the plaintiff, and those allegations were more than sufficiently
specific to satisfy the statutory pleading requirement by demonstrating
that L was suffering significant emotional harm, manifesting itself
through her conduct, statements, and physical symptoms, as a result of
the deprivation of her relationship with the plaintiff.
Igersheim v. Bezrutczyk (197 Conn. App. 412), to the extent that it held
that it is improper for a trial court to consider an amended third-party
visitation petition that is filed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss
the initial third-party visitation petition, overruled.
Argued October 26, 2023—officially released April 16, 2024
Procedural History
Petition for third-party visitation with the defendant’s
minor child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
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Hepburn v. Brill
district of Fairfield, where the court, Truglia, J., granted
the defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered judgment
thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed. Reversed;
further proceedings.
Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, with whom were Thomas
A. Esposito and Clifford C. Garnett, for the appellant
(plaintiff).
Bruce W. Diamond, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
ROBINSON, C. J. This appeal requires us to consider
the jurisdictional effects of the 2012 amendments to
the third-party visitation statute, General Statutes § 46b-
59 (b); see Public Acts 2012, No. 12-137, § 1; on the
judicial gloss articulated in Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn.
202, 234–35, 789 A.2d 431 (2002), which imposed ‘‘high
jurisdictional hurdles’’ that individuals petitioning for
third-party visitation with a minor child must overcome.
The plaintiff, Laurie Hepburn, appeals1 from the judg-
ment of the trial court dismissing her amended verified
petition for third-party visitation (amended petition)
with her niece, L, who is the biological child of the
defendant, Chandler Brill. On appeal, the plaintiff con-
tends that the trial court improperly treated the defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss as presenting a question of
subject matter jurisdiction rather than the court’s statu-
tory authority to act pursuant to § 46b-59. The plaintiff
also contends that the trial court incorrectly determined
that the amended petition failed to include the specific
and good faith allegations necessary to demonstrate
that (1) she had a parent-like relationship with L, and
(2) L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation
were to be denied. We agree with the plaintiff and con-
clude that, given the Superior Court’s plenary jurisdic-
1
The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate
Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2.
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Hepburn v. Brill
tion over family relations matters under General
Statutes § 46b-1; see, e.g., Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn.
757, 776–77, 143 A.3d 578 (2016); and the 2012 amend-
ments to § 46b-59 (b), the trial court incorrectly deter-
mined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
Roth. We also conclude that the amended petition
alleges facts sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing
under § 46b-59. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s amended petition.
The record reveals the following factual allegations
asserted by the plaintiff, which we construe in her
favor,2 and procedural history. The subject of this visita-
tion action is the plaintiff’s niece, L, who was born
in December, 2010. From the time of her birth until
September, 2021, L lived with her mother, Hallie Hep-
burn, her grandmother, Patricia Hepburn, and Hallie’s
sister, the plaintiff. The defendant, who is L’s biological
father, would regularly visit L at the home L shared
with Hallie, Patricia, and the plaintiff, but the defendant
and L would have only about one visit per year outside
of the home.
In 2015, Patricia suffered a stroke, and Hallie became
her primary caretaker. Because Hallie was focused on
taking care of Patricia, at this time, the plaintiff became
increasingly responsible for L, acting as her parent by
serving as her primary caretaker and provider of emo-
tional support. Specifically, Hallie and the plaintiff
shared the responsibility of transporting L to school,
assisting with her homework, taking her to medical
appointments, and engaging in recreational activities
with her, among other tasks. The plaintiff was involved
2
See, e.g., Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542,
550, 23 A.3d 1176 (2011) (‘‘[i]n ruling [on] whether a complaint survives a
motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the
complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations,
construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
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Hepburn v. Brill
in all aspects of L’s day; she woke her up in the morning,
provided her with meals, and got her ready for bed. L
looked to the plaintiff for comfort and support by, for
example, talking to the plaintiff about school issues and
her feelings.
In September, 2021, Patricia died, and, two days later,
Hallie died by suicide. L looked to the plaintiff for com-
fort and support during that difficult time, while contin-
uing to live in the same house with the plaintiff. The
defendant, who had been living in Massachusetts, even-
tually moved to Connecticut and started taking L to
live with him on the weekends. In November, 2021, the
defendant revoked the plaintiff’s privileges to pick up
L from school and took L to live with him full-time.
After unsuccessfully attempting to arrange a visitation
schedule with the defendant, the plaintiff filed in the
Northern Fairfield County Probate Court (Probate
Court) petitions for emergency temporary custody of
L, temporary custody of L, removal of the defendant
as L’s guardian, and her appointment as L’s permanent
guardian. The Probate Court denied the plaintiff’s
motion for emergency custody, and the plaintiff subse-
quently withdrew the remaining petitions. On July 18,
2022, the plaintiff commenced the present third-party
visitation action by filing her initial verified petition for
visitation (initial petition) with the trial court.
The defendant, who had relocated back to Massachu-
setts with L, moved to dismiss the initial petition for lack
of personal jurisdiction. When the parties subsequently
appeared before the trial court for an evidentiary hear-
ing, that hearing did not go forward. Instead, counsel
for the parties met with the court in chambers. During
that meeting, the court questioned on its own whether
the plaintiff had included sufficient facts in the initial
petition to vest the court with subject matter jurisdic-
tion pursuant to § 46b-59 (b). At the conclusion of the
meeting in chambers, the plaintiff’s counsel indicated
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Hepburn v. Brill
that he would file an amended petition. The court did
not issue an order with respect to the permissibility of
amending the initial petition.
Following the meeting, on October 6, 2022, the defen-
dant filed a second motion to dismiss, claiming that the
plaintiff lacked standing under § 46b-59 (b) because
the initial petition failed to allege sufficient facts to
establish both that she had a parent-like relationship
with L and that L would suffer real and significant harm
if visitation were to be denied. The following day, the
plaintiff filed the amended petition, which alleged addi-
tional facts with respect to the plaintiff’s parent-like
relationship with L and the harm caused by the lack of
visitation. The amended petition included additional
factual allegations arising from thirteen video calls
between the plaintiff and L, which occurred between
December, 2021, and February, 2022, prior to the filing
of the initial petition. The plaintiff described L as
appearing ‘‘very stressed and very upset’’ during the
video calls and alleged that L ‘‘was desperate to come
home and didn’t understand why it was taking so long.’’
During one call, L stated that ‘‘she was very dizzy, could
barely walk . . . [had] a headache,’’ and had vomited
several times. During another call, L said that, if it was
not for the plaintiff, her friends, and school, ‘‘there
would be ‘no point in living because [she would] just
be miserable with [the defendant].’ ’’ L further stated
that she could not cry in front of the defendant because
he would mock her and swear at her. L ‘‘said that, when
she [would cry] about [her] mom, [the defendant would
tell] her to stop whining.’’ During later video calls, the
plaintiff alleged that L ‘‘appeared exhausted, pale, and
so very sad,’’ and that L had stated that she was ‘‘not
feeling strong anymore’’ and had ‘‘lost eight pounds.’’
In February, 2022, the defendant ended the plaintiff’s
video access to L.
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Hepburn v. Brill
Subsequently, in July, 2022, the plaintiff received a
phone call from L in the middle of the night, during
which L sounded sad, depressed, and anxious. L made
several statements during that call that caused the plain-
tiff great concern with respect to L’s mental and emo-
tional well-being. L told the plaintiff that (1) ‘‘she sleeps
on the floor every night and prays to her mother in
heaven to be her guardian angel and [to] get her out of
this situation living with [the defendant],’’ (2) ‘‘she often
cries herself to sleep,’’ (3) ‘‘she is devastated about
being cut off from [the plaintiff],’’ (4) ‘‘she desperately
wanted to return home to live with [the plaintiff], as
she always did,’’ (5) ‘‘people think she is fine because
she goes to school and looks fine, but she is not fine
on the inside,’’ (6) the defendant yells and swears at
her ‘‘all the time’’ and ‘‘completely ignores her feelings,’’
(7) the defendant ‘‘shoved her up against his car’’ and
screamed ‘‘the f-word at her,’’ (8) ‘‘she constantly tells
[the defendant] that she wants to go home,’’ (9) she is
‘‘ ‘not doing well’ ’’ and does not want to live with the
defendant, (10) ‘‘she wants to get away from [the defen-
dant] and then [to] get a restraining order against him
because she is scared of him,’’ (11) ‘‘her worst fear was
staying with [the defendant] and going to school in
Massachusetts,’’ and (12) the defendant ‘‘is an awful
person and a terrible parent,’’ and she ‘‘ ‘never want[s]
to see him again because of what he has done to [her].’ ’’
The plaintiff further alleged in the amended petition
that L ‘‘lost three major live-in, daily relationships and
two attachment figures within one year. She has now
lost her childhood home, her school, friends, providers,
and more.’’ Finally, the plaintiff contends that she is
‘‘the only connection [L] currently has to her mother
and her entire childhood before her mother died. Even
though [the defendant] is aware of [L’s] critical emo-
tional needs and the psychological necessity of continu-
ing [their] relationship, he continues to refuse access
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Hepburn v. Brill
or contact of any kind. Even more concerning, [L] is
reporting that [the defendant] is emotionally insensi-
tive, dismissive, neglectful, and even outright abusive.’’
The defendant filed an objection to the amended peti-
tion, arguing that, under Appellate Court case law, it
would be improper for the court to consider the
amended petition while a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction is pending, even if that
amended petition purports to cure the alleged jurisdic-
tional defect. See Igersheim v. Bezrutczyk, 197 Conn.
App. 412, 420, 231 A.3d 1276 (2020); Fennelly v. Norton,
103 Conn. App. 125, 137–39, 931 A.2d 269, cert. denied,
284 Conn. 918, 931 A.2d 936 (2007).
Following a hearing, the trial court issued a memoran-
dum of decision, granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss the initial petition, and dismissed the amended
petition on its own. With respect to the initial petition,
the trial court concluded, without elaboration, that it
‘‘did not satisfy the requirements of . . . § 46b-59
. . . .’’ With respect to the amended petition, the trial
court determined that (1) ‘‘[t]he allegations, if proven
by clear and convincing evidence at trial, would estab-
lish that the plaintiff assisted [Hallie] in caring for [L]’’
but ‘‘would not establish that a [parent-like] relationship
presently exists between the plaintiff and [L],’’ and (2)
the allegations did ‘‘not set forth specific facts from
which the court [could] conclude that denying the plain-
tiff access and visitation [would] cause [L] to be neglected,
uncared for, mistreated, or harmed in some way.’’ This
appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court
improperly dismissed both of her petitions for third-
party visitation. Relying on, for example, Amodio v.
Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 729–30, 724 A.2d 1084 (1999),
the plaintiff claims that the trial court has ‘‘plenary and
general subject matter jurisdiction’’ over petitions for
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Hepburn v. Brill
third-party visitation because they are ‘‘family relations
matters,’’ as defined by § 46b-1; according to the plain-
tiff, this means that the defendant’s motion to dismiss
concerned the trial court’s statutory authority to act
pursuant to § 46b-59, rather than the plaintiff’s standing
as a jurisdictional matter. See Practice Book § 25-1
(defining ‘‘family matters’’ for purpose of rules of prac-
tice).3 With respect to the merits of the trial court’s
authority to act, the plaintiff argues that the trial court
incorrectly determined that her allegations in both the
initial petition and the amended petition concerning a
parent-like relationship, when interpreted in the light
most favorable to her, demonstrate only that she merely
assisted L’s mother in caring for L. The plaintiff further
contends that her allegations of specific instances of
neglect, coercive control, and failure to care for L sup-
port the statutory element of real and significant harm.
Accordingly, the plaintiff argues that the allegations in
both her initial petition and her amended petition are
sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of § 46b-
59 (b) and that we should remand this case for an
evidentiary hearing on its merits.
In response, the defendant relies on Roth v. Weston,
supra, 259 Conn. 202, and DiGiovanna v. St. George,
3
Practice Book § 25-1 provides: ‘‘The following shall be ‘family matters’
within the scope of these rules: Any actions brought pursuant to General
Statutes § 46b-1, including, but not limited to, dissolution of marriage or
civil union, legal separation, dissolution of marriage or civil union after legal
separation, annulment of marriage or civil union, alimony, support, custody,
and change of name incident to dissolution of marriage or civil union, habeas
corpus and other proceedings to determine the custody and visitation of
children except those which are properly filed in the Superior Court as
juvenile matters, the establishing of paternity, enforcement of foreign matri-
monial or civil union judgments, actions related to prenuptial or pre-civil
union and separation agreements and to matrimonial or civil union decrees
of a foreign jurisdiction, actions brought pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-
15, custody proceedings brought under the provisions of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and proceedings for enforcement
of support brought under the provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act.’’ (Emphasis added.)
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Hepburn v. Brill
300 Conn. 59, 12 A.3d 900 (2011), to contend that ‘‘[a]
consistent body of appellate case law makes it clear
that the issue . . . before this court is one of subject
matter jurisdiction’’ and, therefore, that ‘‘the trial court
did not err in dismissing the petition.’’ Relying further
on the Appellate Court’s decisions in Igersheim v. Bez-
rutcyzk, supra, 197 Conn. App. 420, and Fennelly v.
Norton, supra, 103 Conn. App. 137–39, the defendant
contends that, because he moved to dismiss the initial
petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court
is limited to considering the allegations of the initial
petition. He argues that the plaintiff’s allegations in the
initial petition, even when interpreted in the light most
favorable to her, establish only that visitation might be
in L’s best interest or simply beneficial to her, which
does not meet the requirements of § 46b-59 (b). The
defendant also argues that, even if we were to consider
the allegations in the amended petition in deciding this
appeal, those allegations also fail to meet the statute’s
threshold requirements, and that having to continue to
defend against either petition violates his parental rights
as guaranteed by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States constitution.
We agree with the plaintiff and conclude that the trial
court improperly dismissed this case because it had
subject matter jurisdiction under § 46b-1 and that the
allegations in the amended petition are sufficient to
confer statutory authority to act under § 46b-59 (b).
The plaintiff’s claims in this appeal, which concern
the interpretation of pleadings and whether the trial
court has subject matter jurisdiction or statutory authority
to act under the statutory scheme governing petitions
for third-party visitation, present a question of law over
which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Carpenter v.
Daar, 346 Conn. 80, 128, 287 A.3d 1027 (2023); Reinke
v. Sing, 328 Conn. 376, 382, 179 A.3d 769 (2018); DiGio-
vanna v. St. George, supra, 300 Conn. 70.
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Hepburn v. Brill
We begin our analysis by recognizing that, ‘‘[w]hen-
ever the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the notice
of the court or tribunal, cognizance of it must be taken
and the matter passed [on] before it can move one
further step in the cause . . . as any movement is nec-
essarily the exercise of jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody
N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996).
Because it affects whether we should consider the plain-
tiff’s initial petition or her amended petition in determin-
ing whether her allegations are sufficient to meet the
pleading standard set forth in § 46b-59, we must first
consider the distinction between a trial court’s subject
matter jurisdiction and its authority to act pursuant to a
particular statute. ‘‘Subject matter jurisdiction involves
the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of contro-
versy presented by the action before it. . . . A court
does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has
competence to entertain the action before it. . . . Once
it is determined that a tribunal has authority or compe-
tence to decide the class of cases to which the action
belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is
resolved in favor of entertaining the action. . . . It is
well established that, in determining whether a court
has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring
jurisdiction should be indulged.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Amodio v. Amodio,
supra, 247 Conn. 727–28; accord Reinke v. Sing, supra,
328 Conn. 389.
Our jurisdictional analysis is informed by a review
of the constitutional principles governing petitions for
third-party visitation, which reflect ‘‘the status of par-
ents’ interest in the care, custody and control of their
children’’ as being ‘‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamen-
tal liberty interests recognized by [the United States
Supreme] Court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Roth v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 216. When a parent
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Hepburn v. Brill
is fit, ‘‘there will normally be no reason for the [s]tate
to inject itself into the private realm of the family to
further question the ability of that parent to make the
best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s
children.’’ Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69, 120
S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). ‘‘The essence of
parenthood is the companionship of the child and the
right to make decisions regarding [that child’s] care,
control, education, health, religion and association.’’
(Emphasis added.) Roth v. Weston, supra, 216–17. This
court also recognized in Roth, however, ‘‘that there are
circumstances in which interests arise that outweigh
the parents’ fundamental right to make decisions relat-
ing to their child.’’ DiGiovanna v. St. George, supra, 300
Conn. 71. One such limitation occurs when otherwise
fit parents deny their child ‘‘access to an individual who
has a parent-like relationship with the child’’ and the
‘‘decision regarding visitation will cause the child to
suffer real and substantial emotional harm . . . .
Under such circumstances, the state has a compelling
interest in protecting the child’s own complementary
interest in preserving [parent-like] relationships that
serve [the child’s] welfare by avoiding the serious and
immediate harm to [the] child that would result from
the parent’s decision to terminate or impair the child’s
relationship with the third party.’’ (Citation omitted;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Boisvert v. Gavis, 332 Conn. 115, 133, 210 A.3d 1 (2019).
This constitutional limitation, which allows courts to
grant visitation rights to grandparents and other third
parties, is statutorily implemented in Connecticut by
§ 46b-59. See id., 134. This court’s 2002 decision in Roth
considered the constitutionality of Connecticut’s then
governing third-party visitation statute in light of the
United States Supreme Court’s then recent decision in
Troxel v. Granville, supra, 530 U.S. 57. See Roth v.
Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 209–35. In Roth, this court
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held that the statute was ‘‘unconstitutional as applied
to the extent that the trial court . . . permitted [third-
party] visitation contrary to the desires of a fit parent
and in the absence of any allegation and proof by clear
and convincing evidence that the children would suffer
actual, significant harm if deprived of the visitation.’’
Id., 205–206. To save the statute, this court applied a
judicial gloss and concluded that, ‘‘to have jurisdiction
over a petition for visitation contrary to the wishes of
a fit parent . . . the petition must contain specific,
good faith allegations that the petitioner has a relation-
ship with the child that is similar in nature to a parent-
child relationship. The petition must also contain spe-
cific, good faith allegations that denial of the visitation
will cause real and significant harm to the child. . . .
[T]hat degree of harm requires more than a determina-
tion that visitation would be in the child’s best interest.
It must be a degree of harm analogous to the kind of harm
contemplated by [General Statutes] §§ 46b-120 and 46b-
129, namely, that the child is ‘neglected, uncared-for or
dependent.’ The degree of specificity of the allegations
must be sufficient to justify requiring the fit parent[s] to
subject [their] parental judgment to unwanted litigation.
Only if these specific, good faith allegations are made
will a court have jurisdiction over the petition.’’
(Emphasis added.) Id., 234–35. In concluding that the
matters addressed in the judicial gloss in Roth impli-
cated the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, this court
followed its then recent decision in Castagno v. Who-
lean, 239 Conn. 336, 338–40, 684 A.2d 1181 (1996),
before casting the judicial gloss as a matter of standing.4
See Roth v. Weston, supra, 209–19.
4
Approximately five years prior to Roth, in Castagno v. Wholean, supra,
239 Conn. 336, this court ‘‘recognized that a literal reading would place
[§ 46b-59] in constitutional jeopardy because of the protection traditionally
afforded to a parent’s right to family integrity . . . .’’ Roth v. Weston, supra,
259 Conn. 210. In order to save the statute, this court applied a judicial gloss
that incorporated a threshold requirement ‘‘that plaintiffs must demonstrate
disruption of the family sufficient to justify state intervention.’’ Castagno
v. Wholean, supra, 338. Because the plaintiffs in Castagno did not satisfy
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In 2012, the legislature enacted Public Acts 2012, No.
12-137, § 1, which amended § 46b-59 in accordance with
the judicial gloss articulated in Roth. See Boisvert v.
Gavis, supra, 332 Conn. 134. Subsection (b) of the amended
statute requires that ‘‘a verified petition,’’ which may be
filed by any person, ‘‘include specific and good-faith
allegations that (1) a parent-like relationship exists
between the person and the minor child, and (2) denial
of visitation would cause real and significant harm.’’
General Statutes § 46b-59 (b). ‘‘In determining whether
a parent-like relationship exists between the person
and the minor child, the Superior Court may consider,
but shall not be limited to, the following factors: (1)
The existence and length of a relationship between the
person and the minor child prior to the submission of
a petition pursuant to this section; (2) [t]he length of
time that the relationship between the person and the
minor child has been disrupted; (3) [t]he specific parent-
like activities of the person seeking visitation toward
the minor child; (4) [a]ny evidence that the person seek-
ing visitation has unreasonably undermined the author-
ity and discretion of the custodial parent; (5) [t]he
the threshold requirement, this court concluded that ‘‘the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to decide the issue of visitation . . . .’’ Id. We note that this
court framed its analysis in Castagno as a matter of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, which was consistent with the arguments of the parties in that case
both before the trial court and on appeal; it did not at all question whether
the parties’ claims actually presented a question of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, rather than the court’s authority to act. See id., 338–39, 352; see also
id., 338 n.2 (observing that it was undisputed that ‘‘a motion to dismiss was
the proper procedure in [Castagno, in which] the issue [was] whether, under
any circumstance, any third party can satisfy the requirements of § 46b-
59’’ (emphasis in original)).
This court subsequently concluded in Roth, however, that ‘‘the threshold
requirement articulated in Castagno fail[ed] to protect adequately the funda-
mental right to rear one’s child and the right to family privacy.’’ Roth v.
Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 217. Accordingly, in Roth, this court overruled
Castagno to that limited extent, but we did not question or disturb the
aspects of Castagno describing the requirements of § 46b-59 as subject
matter jurisdictional in nature. See id.
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significant absence of a parent from the life of a minor
child; (6) [t]he death of one of the minor child’s parents;
(7) [t]he physical separation of the parents of the minor
child; (8) [t]he fitness of the person seeking visitation;
and (9) [t]he fitness of the custodial parent.’’ General
Statutes § 46b-59 (c). With respect to the second prong
of the pleading requirement, subsection (a) (2) provides
that ‘‘ ‘[r]eal and significant harm’ means that the minor
child is neglected, as defined in section 46b-120, or
uncared for, as defined in said section.’’ General Stat-
utes § 46b-59 (a) (2). ‘‘A child may be found ‘neglected’
who . . . is being denied proper care and attention,
physically, educationally, emotionally or morally
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-120 (4) (B). ‘‘A child may
be found ‘uncared for’ . . . whose home cannot pro-
vide the specialized care that the physical, emotional
or mental condition of the child requires . . . .’’ Gen-
eral Statutes § 46b-120 (6) (B).
With these principles in mind, we examine the source
of the court’s jurisdiction to issue third-party visitation
orders in order to determine whether the trial court
properly treated the motion to dismiss in this case as
implicating its subject matter jurisdiction. Section 46b-
1 provides the Superior Court ‘‘with plenary and general
subject matter jurisdiction over legal disputes in family
relations matters . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Reinke v. Sing, supra, 328 Conn. 389. Family
relations matters are ‘‘matters affecting or involving,’’
among other things, ‘‘all rights and remedies provided
for in chapter 815j . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-1 (a)
(12). Section 46b-59, which falls within chapter 815j,
expressly provides the court with the power to order
visitation to ‘‘any person’’ who meets the statutory stan-
dard. General Statutes § 46b-59 (b). We conclude that
these two statutes provide the trial court with subject
matter jurisdiction over the third-party visitation peti-
tions in the present case. See Reinke v. Sing, supra,
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390 (concluding that trial court had subject matter juris-
diction over claim seeking modification of dissolution
agreement because trial court has plenary and general
subject matter jurisdiction over dissolution actions pur-
suant to § 46b-1, with authority to ‘‘assign to either spouse
all or any part of the [marital] estate’’ under General
Statutes § 46b-81 (a)); Sousa v. Sousa, supra, 322 Conn.
760–61 (concluding that it was not ‘‘ ‘entirely obvious’ ’’
that trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
modify property distribution in dissolution of marriage
judgment ‘‘given a conflict in the case law . . . and
the Superior Court’s plenary jurisdiction over family
relations matters’’ (emphasis added)); Amodio v.
Amodio, supra, 247 Conn. 729–30 (concluding that Gen-
eral Statutes §§ 46b-1 (c) and 46b-86 (a) together pro-
vide trial court with subject matter jurisdiction over
modification claim).
Describing it as a matter of standing, this court applied
a judicial gloss in Roth to allow § 46b-59 ‘‘to continue
to function within the bounds of the constitution.’’ Roth
v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 233. By amending the statute
to include the parent-like relationship and real and sig-
nificant harm requirements, however, the legislature
created a new statute that ‘‘carries with it a strong
presumption of constitutionality . . . .’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic
Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 405, 119 A.3d 462 (2015).
With no challenge to the constitutionality of the
amended § 46b-59 in light of the due process principles
explained in Troxel v. Granville, supra, 530 U.S. 57, the
statute no longer requires a gloss to function within
the bounds of the constitution. If the legislature had
intended these requirements to implicate the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, it knew how to do so. See,
e.g., Stafford v. Roadway, 312 Conn. 184, 194, 93 A.3d
1058 (2014) (‘‘[i]t is a well settled principle of statutory
construction that the legislature knows how to convey
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Hepburn v. Brill
its intent expressly’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278
Conn. 751, 779, 900 A.2d 1 (2006) (‘‘[w]e . . . require a
clear showing of legislative intent that a failure to comply
with a particular statutory requirement deprives the
court of subject matter jurisdiction’’); Williams v. Com-
mission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn.
258, 269–70, 777 A.2d 645 (2001) (acknowledging that,
although ‘‘mandatory language may be an indication that
the legislature intended a . . . requirement to be juris-
dictional, such language alone does not overcome the
strong presumption of jurisdiction, nor does such lan-
guage alone prove strong legislative intent to create a
jurisdictional bar’’). In the absence of any indication that
the legislature intended these requirements to implicate
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, they serve only
to guide the exercise of the court’s authority in a manner
that protects the constitutional due process rights of fit
parents to make decisions concerning the rearing of their
children.
Put differently, this ‘‘authority to act pursuant to a
statute is different from its subject matter jurisdiction.
The power of the court to hear and determine, which
is implicit in jurisdiction, is not to be confused with
the way in which that power must be exercised in order
to comply with the terms of the statute.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Amodio v. Amodio, supra, 247
Conn. 728. ‘‘As we have stated, the trial court unques-
tionably has the power to hear and determine [third-
party visitation matters]. With subject matter jurisdic-
tion established, the trial court’s task is to apply the
statute to the facts of a particular case; indeed, interpre-
ting statutes and applying the law to the facts before
it [fall within] the traditional province of the trial court.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reinke v. Sing,
supra, 328 Conn. 390. Accordingly, we conclude that the
trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over the plain-
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tiff’s petition for third-party visitation in the present
case. We will therefore treat the motion to dismiss as
raising the question of whether the plaintiff has suffi-
ciently alleged specific and good faith facts that both
(1) a parent-like relationship exists between her and
L, and (2) denial of visitation would cause real and
significant harm, as specifically defined in the statute.5
See General Statutes § 46b-59 (a) (2).
Before we consider whether the trial court properly
declined to exercise its statutory authority under § 46b-
59, we must determine whether it is permissible to con-
sider the amended petition or if we must, as the defen-
dant contends, consider only the initial petition to deter-
mine if the plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to
demonstrate that (1) the plaintiff had a parent-like rela-
tionship with L, and (2) L would suffer real and signifi-
cant harm if visitation was denied. The trial court
determined that the Appellate Court’s decision in Igers-
heim v. Bezrutczyk, supra, 197 Conn. App. 420, pre-
cluded it from considering the amended petition during
the pendency of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
initial petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the
trial court considered the allegations in the amended
petition out of concern for fairness to the plaintiff. In
Igersheim, the Appellate Court concluded that it was
improper for the trial court to consider an amended
petition filed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss
an initial petition for third-party visitation. See id., 419–
5
Given our jurisdictional conclusion, we note that the proper vehicle to
challenge the sufficiency of the allegations for third-party visitation would
be a motion to strike under Practice Book § 25-16. We further note that,
although not jurisdictional in nature, the ‘‘specific and good-faith allegations’’
required by § 46b-59 (b) remain a ‘‘necessary [safeguard] to prevent families
from having to defend against unjustified petitions for visitation’’ in the first
instance. Roth v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 222. In cases in which pleadings
are insufficient to meet that standard, an evidentiary hearing should not
be held.
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20. In concluding that it was required to consider only
the initial verified petition for visitation, the Appellate
Court, consistent with this court’s decision in Roth,
treated the statutory requirements of a parent-like rela-
tionship and harm to the child as jurisdictional under
§ 46b-59 (b). See id., 416 (‘‘[t]he statutory jurisdictional
requirements relevant to [Igersheim] are prescribed in
. . . § 46b-59, the third-party visitation statute’’
(emphasis added; footnote omitted)). The Appellate
Court cited this court’s decisions in Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., supra, 239 Conn. 99,
and Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 545, 590 A.2d
914 (1991), for the proposition that it would be improper
to consider an amended petition during the pendency
of a motion to dismiss an initial petition for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Igersheim v. Bezrutc-
zyk, supra, 420.
Given our conclusion that the amended statutory
requirements presently set forth in § 46b-59 (b) do not
implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we
overrule the Appellate Court’s decision in Igersheim.
Although the defendant’s objection to the consideration
of the amended complaint in this case was grounded
on his claim that the plaintiff had failed to comply with
Practice Book § 10-60,6 which is the rule of practice
governing amendments to pleadings in civil matters,
that rule of practice does not apply in this case. Rather,
because visitation is a ‘‘family matter’’ governed by
chapter 25 of the rules of practice, the trial court should
follow those provisions, rather than chapter 10, which
applies to civil matters generally, with respect to
amending a petition for third-party visitation. See Prac-
6
Practice Book § 10-60 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[A] party may amend
his or her pleadings or other parts of the record or proceedings at any time
subsequent to that stated in the preceding section in the following manner:
(1) By order of judicial authority; or (2) By written consent of the adverse
party; or (3) By filing a request for leave to file an amendment together
with the amended pleading or other parts of the record or proceedings. . . .’’
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Hepburn v. Brill
tice Book § 25-1 (providing that ‘‘[a]ny actions brought
pursuant to . . . § 46b-1’’ are ‘‘family matters’’ under
rules of practice). Specifically, Practice Book § 25-4
requires that ‘‘[e]very application or verified petition in
an action for visitation of a minor child . . . state the
name and date of birth of such minor child or children,
the names of the parents and legal guardian of such
minor child or children, and the facts necessary to give
the court jurisdiction.’’7 In contrast to the more restric-
tive civil rule of Practice Book § 10-60, Practice Book
§ 25-7, which governs amendments to pleadings in fam-
ily matters, provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[i]f . . .
[Practice Book §] 25-4 is not complied with, the judicial
authority, whenever its attention is called to the matter,
shall order that the complaint or the application, as
the case may be, be amended upon such terms and
conditions as it may direct. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
Because the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff
to amend the petition under the more liberal provision
of Practice Book § 25-7, and the plaintiff has indeed
amended the petition and the trial court has considered
it, we, too, will consider the plaintiff’s amended petition.
We now turn to whether the amended petition
includes the specific and good faith allegations neces-
sary to demonstrate, as required by § 46b-59, that (1)
the plaintiff had a parent-like relationship with L, and
(2) L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation
was denied. It is well established that the ‘‘interpreta-
7
Given our conclusion that the statutory requirements in § 46b-59 (b) are
not a jurisdictional threshold, we observe that the text of Practice Book
§ 25-4 with respect to the court’s jurisdiction would benefit from the attention
of the Rules Committee of the Superior Court to render it consistent with
the doctrinal changes discussed in this opinion. See, e.g., Rules Committee
of the Superior Court v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn.
234, 237, 472 A.2d 9 (1984) (noting that ‘‘[the] function [of the Rules Commit-
tee of the Superior Court] is to consider proposed changes in the rules of
practice for the Superior Court, and to recommend amendments to the
Practice Book’’).
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tion of pleadings is always a question of law for the court
. . . . Our review of the trial court’s interpretation of
the pleadings therefore is plenary. . . . Furthermore,
we long have eschewed the notion that pleadings should
be read in a hypertechnical manner. Rather, [t]he mod-
ern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to con-
strue pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than
narrowly and technically. . . . [T]he complaint must
be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect
to the pleading with reference to the general theory
[on] which it proceeded, and do substantial justice
between the parties. . . . Our reading of pleadings in
a manner that advances substantial justice means that
a pleading must be construed reasonably, to contain
all that it fairly means, but carries with it the related
proposition that it must not be contorted in such a way
so as to strain the bounds of rational comprehension.’’
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Carpenter v. Daar, supra, 346 Conn. 128.
Guided by the Appellate Court’s decision in Jeanette-
Blethen v. Jeanette-Blethen, 172 Conn. App. 98, 159 A.3d
236 (2017), we first conclude that the amended petition
adequately alleges the existence of care provided with
sufficient duration, regularity, and magnitude to estab-
lish a parent-like relationship between the plaintiff and
L, as that term is defined by § 46b-59 (c). In Jeanette-
Blethen, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s
finding that a parent-like relationship existed in granting
a grandmother’s motion to intervene, pursuant to § 46b-
59, in a custody modification proceeding. See id., 99. In
concluding that the trial court’s finding was not clearly
erroneous, the Appellate Court observed that the chil-
dren had lived with the grandparents for six years, dur-
ing which time ‘‘the grandparents provided care for the
children, including . . . preparing their meals, bathing
them, getting them ready for school, caring for them
when they were sick, and transporting them to [health-
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Hepburn v. Brill
care] appointments.’’ Id., 100; see id., 102–103. The trial
court additionally ‘‘found that the grandparents ‘pro-
vided a constant example of strength, discipline, sacri-
fice, stability, and unconditional love on which [the
children] . . . could rely.’ ’’ Id., 100; see also Boisvert
v. Gavis, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham,
Docket No. WWM-FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 11, 2017)
(65 Conn. L. Rptr. 81, 82, 84) (finding existence of par-
ent-like relationship when grandmother provided vari-
ous types of care, including feeding child, transporting
child to day care, as well as school and doctor appoint-
ments, and taking child on day trips and on vacation),
aff’d, 332 Conn. 115, 210 A.3d 1 (2019); Germano v.
Germano-Delorfano, Docket No. HHD-FA-XX-XXXXXXX-
S, 2014 WL 1647094, *2, *7 (Conn. Super. March 26, 2014)
(finding existence of parent-like relationship when child
resided with plaintiffs for majority of first ten years of
her life, and plaintiffs provided ‘‘regular daily care,’’ includ-
ing feeding her, finding educational programs for her,
enrolling her in activities, and transporting her).
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that (1) she
lived with L for more than ten years, (2) she was L’s
primary caretaker and was involved in every aspect of
L’s day, from waking her up in the morning to getting
her ready for bed at night, (3) she shared the responsibil-
ity of transporting L to school, assisting with her home-
work, enrolling her in extracurricular activities, and
taking her to medical appointments, and (4) after Patri-
cia’s stroke, she provided comfort and support to L as
L’s primary giver of emotional support and care. Indeed,
the petition alleges that, for all practical purposes, the
plaintiff acted as a co-parent of L while Hallie was alive
and was, perhaps, L’s most attentive parent following
Patricia’s stroke. When construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the allegations establishing
the duration, regularity, and magnitude of the care that
the plaintiff provided to L, which are akin to those found
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Hepburn v. Brill
proven by clear and convincing evidence in Jeanette-
Blethen, are sufficient to plead a parent-like relationship
pursuant to § 46b-59 (b) and (c). Accordingly, we con-
clude that the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to demon-
strate that a parent-like relationship exists between her
and L.
We next consider whether the amended petition con-
tains specific, good faith allegations to establish that
the denial of visitation would cause L real and signifi-
cant harm, namely, that L ‘‘is being denied proper care
and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or
morally . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-120 (4) (B). We
conclude that it does. However, before examining the
harm caused to L, we emphasize that it is important to
analyze the two prongs of the threshold requirements
separately. Although severance of the emotional ties
between a nonparent and a child who have developed
a parent-like relationship, without more, should not be
the end of the analysis with respect to the harm prong,
in Roth, this court concluded that there could be ‘‘cir-
cumstances in which a nonparent and a child have
developed such substantial emotional ties that the
denial of visitation could cause serious and immediate
harm to that child.’’ Roth v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn.
225; see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Howard, 661
N.W.2d 183, 191 (Iowa 2003) (‘‘when a grandparent has
established a substantial relationship with a grandchild,
as required under [the Iowa] statute, an emotional bond
can be created that, if severed, can inflict harm on the
child’’); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 664, 774 N.E.2d
1052 (2002) (observing that bond between grandparent
and grandchild may ‘‘become crucial to the child’s phys-
ical or emotional security’’ and that state ‘‘intervention
may be necessary to secure the child’s well-being from
traumatic separation from the grandparent’’), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1189, 123 S. Ct. 1259, 154 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (2003);
Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 117, 827 A.2d 203 (2003)
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Hepburn v. Brill
(‘‘the termination of a long-standing relationship between
the grandparents and the child . . . [can] form the basis
for a finding of harm’’), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124
S. Ct. 1408, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004).
It may be sufficient, however, when, as in the present
case, the child is coping with the death of a parent in
addition to the severance of substantial emotional ties
with a nonparent.8 For example, in In re Estate of S.T.T.,
144 P.3d 1083, 1095–96 (Utah 2006), the Supreme Court
of Utah upheld an order of third-party visitation, con-
cluding that the loss of a substantial relationship
between a child, whose mother had recently died, and
her grandparents would be harmful to the child. The
Utah court relied on the trial court’s decision to credit,
in its finding that the grandparents had rebutted the
presumption that parents act in the best interest of their
children, the conclusions reached by an expert that ‘‘(1)
the child demonstrated an ‘emotional attachment to her
grandparents [that] was as strong as [that] seen between
parents and children’; (2) the attachment could be
explained by the grandparents’ role as primary caregiv-
ers; (3) the loss of her mother remained a deep emo-
tional wound for the child that had not been resolved;
(4) the child kept the memory of her mother alive
through her relationship with her grandparents; (5) the
8
We find instructive several Superior Court decisions in the wake of
the amended statute in which the court has concluded that the petition
sufficiently alleged that denial of visitation would result in substantial emo-
tional harm to the child, particularly in situations, such as that in the present
case, in which the child had already experienced the death of a parent.
See, e.g., Alexopoulous v. Alexopoulous, Superior Court, judicial district of
Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. FBT-FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 7, 2013)
(56 Conn. L. Rptr. 622, 626) (grandparents adequately alleged that children
would be harmed if visitation was denied because (1) disruption in grandpar-
ents’ ‘‘ability to continue to forge a strong bond with their grandchildren
[would] cause substantial harm to the children’s emotional health,’’ and (2)
removal of ‘‘caring, loving, consistent and supportive role models from [the
children’s] lives’’ after death of their father would ‘‘cause them more pain
and irreparable damage’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Hepburn v. Brill
child would be unable to work through the loss of her
mother without frequent access to her grandparents;
and (6) the loss of contact with the [grandparents]
would be devastating and cause the child to suffer.’’
(Emphasis added.) Id., 1095; see also In re A.S.A., 21
Wn. App. 2d 474, 486, 507 P.3d 28 (2022) (Pennell, J.,
concurring) (‘‘[t]rauma might be especially likely when
a child has experienced the death of a parent and contin-
ued contact with the deceased parent’s family is neces-
sary for grief and healing’’).
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that (1) she
was L’s primary provider of emotional support and pri-
mary caretaker, (2) L would look to her for comfort
and support, (3) she is concerned about L’s emotional
well-being following the deaths of Patricia and Hallie,
(4) L was abruptly taken away from her home and her
primary caretaker, and (5) L has been very emotional
since being cut off from her former life. The plaintiff
also alleges in the amended petition that ‘‘[L] has
reported feeling stressed, sick, and rundown. She has
been sad, anxious, fearful, and confused. She reports
excessive crying and crying herself to sleep because
she has been cut off from [the plaintiff]. She sleeps with
objects that remind her of ‘home,’ even though these
objects are not comfortable for sleep. She had lost a
lot of weight. She stated that she isn’t doing well. She
has made statements that show suicidal ideation.’’ The
plaintiff further alleges that the defendant’s actions
compounded the emotional harm that he caused to L
by depriving her of a relationship with the plaintiff.
During that time, the defendant mocked L for crying
about the loss of her mother, yelled at her, cursed at
her, and threw her up against a car. The allegations in
the amended petition are more than sufficiently specific
to satisfy the statutory pleading requirement by demon-
strating that L is suffering significant emotional harm,
manifesting itself through her conduct, statements, and
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physical symptoms, as a result of the deprivation of her
relationship with the plaintiff. Given our long-standing
mandate to construe pleadings broadly and realistically;
see, e.g., Carpenter v. Daar, supra, 346 Conn. 127; it is
necessarily implied by the plaintiff’s allegations that
L will be emotionally harmed—and is currently being
harmed emotionally—from being cut off from the plain-
tiff in such an abrupt and complete manner. If the plain-
tiff produces clear and convincing evidence to support
these allegations, a fact finder may well conclude that
visitation is necessary to help L work through her grief,
cope with the other significant changes imposed on her
daily life, and otherwise overcome the suffering that
she has experienced as a result of her mother’s death,
among other things. Construing the allegations in the
manner most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude
that the amended petition adequately pleads facts that
would establish that L ‘‘is being denied proper care and
attention . . . emotionally . . . .’’ General Statutes
§ 46b-120 (4) (B). Accordingly, the trial court incor-
rectly determined that the amended petition does not
contain specific, good faith allegations that the denial
of visitation would cause real and significant harm.
The defendant relies on the Appellate Court’s deci-
sions in Fuller v. Baldino, 176 Conn. App. 451, 168 A.3d
665 (2017), and Romeo v. Bazow, 195 Conn. App. 378,
225 A.3d 710 (2020), in arguing that the trial court prop-
erly dismissed the petition. This reliance is misplaced.
With respect to the second prong of § 46b-59 (b), the
petitions in Romeo and Fuller contained only the most
general and conclusory allegations of harm, without the
supporting factual basis found in the amended petition
in the present case. Specifically, in Romeo, the Appellate
Court concluded that the only harm alleged in the plain-
tiffs’ petition was that ‘‘ ‘[t]here can be no greater harm
to a child than the neglecting to promote and foster a
child’s roots in family [and] friends which directly affect
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Hepburn v. Brill
the child’s emotional growth and moral compass. The
harm to the children, by deracinating their family roots
is real and significant because it undermines a substan-
tial part of who they are.’ ’’ Romeo v. Bazow, supra,
392. Similarly, in Fuller, the plaintiff alleged only that
he had ‘‘a ‘very strong bond’ with the child and that the
child ‘suffers’ and is ‘very emotional’ when unable to
see [the plaintiff] . . . .’’ Fuller v. Baldino, supra, 459.
In contrast, the amended petition in the present case
contains specific factual allegations of harm, namely,
that L is being harmed emotionally by being denied the
ability to work through the death of her mother and
grandmother, and the disruption of her entire life, with
her primary provider of emotional support, the plaintiff.
Because the plaintiff adequately had alleged both the
existence of a parent-like relationship and that the
denial of visitation would cause real and significant
harm, we conclude that the trial court improperly dis-
missed the amended petition. On remand, the plaintiff
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which she must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that she has a
parent-like relationship with L and that denial of visita-
tion would cause L real and significant harm. See Gen-
eral Statutes § 46b-59 (b).
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.