Matthew Meinecke v. City of Seattle

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MATTHEW MEINECKE, No. 23-35481

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-
v. 00352-BJR

CITY OF SEATTLE; DANIEL
NELSON, Lieutenant, Seattle Police OPINION
Department; ROBERT BROWN,
Lieutenant, Seattle Police Department;
SEAN CULBERTSON, Police
Officer, Seattle Police Department,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 7, 2024
Portland, Oregon

Filed April 18, 2024

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Jay S. Bybee, and Daniel
A. Bress, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bybee
2 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE

SUMMARY *

First Amendment/Heckler’s Veto

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of Matthew
Meinecke’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief in a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from two events—an abortion
rally and LGBTQ pride event—at which Meinecke, a devout
Christian, sought to read Bible passages and was arrested for
obstructing a police officer after he refused to move to a
different location.
When attendees at both events began to abuse and
physically assault Meinecke, officers asked him to move and
ultimately arrested him for obstruction when he refused,
rather than deal with the wrongdoers directly. Meinecke
sued the City of Seattle and certain Seattle police officers
(together, the City), and sought to preliminary enjoin them
from enforcing “time, place, and manner” restrictions and
applying the City’s obstruction ordinance “to eliminate
protected speech in traditional public fora whenever they
believe individuals opposing the speech will act hostile
toward it.”
The panel held that Meinecke has standing to pursue
prospective injunctive relief, given that the City has twice
enforced its obstruction ordinance against him, he has stated
that he will continue his evangelizing efforts at future public
events, and the City has communicated that it may file
charges against him for doing so.

*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE 3

The panel held that Meinecke established a likelihood of
success on the merits of his First Amendment claim. The
restrictions on his speech were content-based heckler’s
vetoes, where officers curbed his speech once the audience’s
hostile reaction manifested. Applying strict scrutiny, the
panel held that there were several less speech-restrictive
alternatives to achieve public safety, such as requiring
protesters to take a step back, calling for more officers, or
arresting the individuals who ultimately assaulted Meinecke.
The panel held that Meineke established irreparable
harm because a loss of First Amendment freedoms
constitutes an irreparable injury, and the balance of equities
and public interest favors Meinecke.
The panel remanded with instructions to enter a
preliminary injunction consistent with this opinion in favor
of Meinecke.

COUNSEL

Nathan W. Kellum (argued), Center for Religious
Expression, Memphis, Tennessee; Keith A. Kemper, Ellis Li
& McKinstry PLLC, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Dallas LePierre (argued), Assistant City Attorney; Ann
Davison, Seattle City Attorney; Seattle City Attorney’s
Office, Seattle, Washington; for Defendants-Appellees.
4 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Matthew Meinecke’s speech was not well
received by his audience. On two separate occasions in June
2022—an abortion rally and an LGBTQ pride event—
Meinecke sought to read Bible passages to attendees
gathered in the city of Seattle. When those attendees began
to abuse and physically assault Meinecke, Seattle police
officers asked Meinecke to move and ultimately arrested him
when he refused, rather than deal with the wrongdoers
directly. Meinecke sued the City of Seattle and certain
Seattle Police Department officers (together, “the City”),
seeking, inter alia, preliminary injunctive relief. The district
court denied the motion, surmising that the officers’ actions
were content neutral. “If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (citation
omitted). Consequently, “[i]f speech provokes wrongful acts
on the part of hecklers, the government must deal with those
wrongful acts directly; it may not avoid doing so by
suppressing the speech.” Santa Monica Nativity Scenes
Comm. v. City of Santa Monica, 784 F.3d 1286, 1292–93 (9th
Cir. 2015).
We reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
Matthew Meinecke is a devout Christian who seeks to
spread the message of the gospel at well-attended public
 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE 5

events. 1 When evangelizing, Meinecke often holds up signs,
hands out literature, and reads the Bible aloud. He also
converses with members of the public and endeavors to
answer their questions about Christianity. This appeal arises
out of two events in June 2022 in the city of Seattle.
A. June 24, 2022: Dobbs Protest
On June 24, 2022, the United States Supreme Court
overturned Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See generally
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215
(2022). In response, a significant number of people gathered
on Second Avenue outside the federal building in Seattle to
protest the decision. Meinecke arrived that afternoon
dressed in a shirt and tie and went to a public walkway
adjacent to Second Avenue. According to his complaint,
Meinecke “did not come to this event to condemn abortion”
or even to “speak on this topic, but to convey his faith in
Christianity to people who were in the area.” He held up a
sign, read from the Bible, and handed out Christian
literature.
Protestors surrounded Meinecke after about an hour.
One protestor seized Meinecke’s Bible. Meinecke retrieved
another Bible from his bag and continued reading aloud.
Another protestor grabbed hold of—and ripped pages
from—the new Bible. The altercation soon escalated. As
protestors, some of whom Seattle police characterized in
their written reports as Antifa, encroached, Meinecke took
hold of an orange-and-white traffic sawhorse. Five
protestors, some clad in all black and wearing body armor,

1
The facts are drawn from the record, including the district court’s
opinion, the complaint, the police reports, and video footage of the
incidents.
6 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE

picked up Meinecke and the sawhorse, moved him across the
street, and dropped him on the pavement. One law
enforcement officer who observed this interaction reported
that “‘Antifa’ members . . . began to fight/assault”
Meinecke.
Undeterred, Meinecke walked back to his original
location by the federal building and resumed reading and
held up a sign. While people gathered on the street, however,
some approached Meinecke, knocked him down, and took
one of his shoes.
Seattle police finally intervened. Although the officers
acknowledged that the protestors had assaulted Meinecke,
they took no action against the perpetrators. They instead
ordered Meinecke to leave the area. The precise dictates of
the officers’ order are in dispute. Meinecke maintains that
the officers instructed him “to go where no one could hear
[his] message or read [his] sign.” The City disagrees,
claiming that Seattle police simply directed Meinecke to the
other side of the street and that they told Meincke that he
“could still display his banner and exercise his [F]irst
[A]mendment rights.”
Regardless, Meinecke declined to go to a different
location. The officers then arrested Meinecke for
obstruction under Seattle Municipal Code Ordinance
§ 12A.16.010(A)(3), which provides, “A person is guilty of
obstructing a police officer if, with knowledge that the
person obstructed is a police officer, he or she . . .
[i]ntentionally refuses to cease an activity or behavior that
creates a risk of injury to any person when ordered to do so
by a police officer.” The officers took Meinecke to the police
precinct and kept him there for about two hours; they did not
 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE 7

book him. Meinecke was released after the abortion protest
ended.
B. June 26, 2022: PrideFest
Seattle’s annual PrideFest took place on June 26, 2022,
two days after the Dobbs rally. The event was held at the
Seattle Center, a public park. Meinecke, again dressed in a
shirt and tie, entered the park around noon and began to read
from the Bible in a conversational tone.
Eventually, PrideFest attendees noticed Meinecke’s
presence. As the district court found, they began “dancing
near him, holding up a flag to keep people from seeing him,”
and making “loud noises so he could not be heard.”
According to his complaint, “a couple of attendees stood
close to Meinecke and howled and barked like dogs, and
mocked Meinecke, while he read passages from the Bible.
Meinecke did not engage with them.” Another individual
poured water on Meinecke’s Bible. Meinecke kept reading
aloud.
After a couple of hours, more PrideFest attendees
gathered around Meinecke and began yelling. This attracted
the attention of about ten law enforcement officers, who
asked Meinecke “to move to a public area located outside
the park.” Meinecke declined and continued to read from
his Bible. A PrideFest attendee shouted at the officers,
demanding Meinecke’s removal. The officers then told
Meinecke “that they were imposing a ‘time, place, and
manner’ restriction on him and ordered him to leave the
park.” Again, Meinecke declined to leave. The officers told
Meinecke “that he was posing a risk to public safety,” and
they again demanded he leave the park. Meinecke told the
officers that he was not in any danger. The officers then
arrested Meinecke for obstruction.
8 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE

Meinecke again was taken to the precinct. This time,
though, the officers booked him. He was later released on
bond. At his hearing a few days later, the City informed
Meinecke that it was not pursuing the charges against him at
that time, but it warned Meinecke that “it could bring up
charges for this incident at a later time.”
C. Procedural History
Meinecke filed suit against the City of Seattle and certain
Seattle Police Department officers. He asserted causes of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights
under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Meinecke sought preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief, declaratory relief, and damages, costs, and attorneys’
fees.
This appeal concerns only Meinecke’s motion for
preliminary relief. Before the district court, Meinecke
sought to enjoin “Defendants from enforcing ‘time, place,
and manner’ restrictions and applying Seattle municipal
code ordinance § 12A.16.010(A)(3) ‘to eliminate protected
speech in traditional public fora whenever they believe
individuals opposing the speech will act hostile toward it.’”
The district court denied that motion without prejudice.
It first found that that “there is no indication in the record
that the City’s police officers acted based on the content of
Mr. Meinecke’s speech.” It further found that “the Seattle
police officers did not act to ‘silence’ Mr. Meinecke, nor did
they evict or banish him from the forum.” Finally, it
expressed concern “with the vague request for injunctive
relief,” opining that Meinecke’s request for an injunction
would not satisfy the specificity requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d).
 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE 9

Meinecke timely appealed.
II. JURISDICTION
Before turning to the merits, we briefly address the City’s
contention that Meinecke lacks Article III standing for
preliminary injunctive relief. “To bring a claim for
prospective injunctive relief, ‘[t]he plaintiff must
demonstrate that he has suffered or is threatened with a
concrete and particularized legal harm, coupled with a
sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a
similar way.’” Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. San Jose
Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 82 F.4th 664, 680–81 (9th
Cir. 2023) (en banc) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted); see also Tingley v. Ferguson, 47 F.4th 1055, 1066–
67 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The ‘unique standing considerations’ in
the First Amendment context ‘tilt dramatically toward a
finding of standing’ when a plaintiff brings a pre-
enforcement challenge.” (citation omitted)). To make such
a showing, plaintiffs like Meinecke “may rely on the
allegations in their Complaint and whatever other evidence
they submitted in support of their [preliminary-injunction]
motion to meet their burden.” City & County of San
Francisco v. USCIS, 944 F.3d 773, 787 (9th Cir. 2019)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Meinecke easily satisfies this standard. He has identified
two instances when the City enforced its obstruction
ordinance against him for violating putative “time, place,
and manner” restrictions, and he has stated that he will
continue his evangelizing efforts at future, well-attended
public events. The events at which Meinecke hopes to speak
are also typically impromptu, in response to unpredictable
political events; under such circumstances, we “do not
require plaintiffs to specify ‘when, to whom, where, or under
10 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE

what circumstances’ they plan to violate the law when they
have already violated the law in the past.” Tingley, 47 F.4th
at 1068 (citation omitted). Moreover, the City notified
Meinecke that the “Seattle City Attorney’s office” had
elected not to pursue charges against Meinecke “at th[at]
time,” but communicated that it “may file charges against
[him] in the future.” Meinecke has demonstrated a credible
threat of future enforcement adequate to establish Article III
standing for his request for preliminary injunctive relief.
The City does not challenge this conclusion. Instead, it
argues that Meincke lacks standing to pursue a facial
overbreadth claim. But Meinecke does not bring a facial
overbreadth claim, and we are satisfied that he has standing
to pursue the relief he seeks. We have jurisdiction over his
appeal from the denial of his motion for a preliminary
injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
III. FIRST AMENDMENT
We review the denial of a preliminary injunction for
abuse of discretion, but we review de novo the underlying
issues of law. Cal. Chamber of Com. v. Council for Educ. &
Rsch. on Toxics, 29 F.4th 468, 475 (9th Cir. 2022). Though
we defer to the district court’s findings of historical facts,
“we review constitutional facts de novo.” Thunder Studios,
Inc. v. Kazal, 13 F.4th 736, 742 (9th Cir. 2021). “In First
Amendment cases, we make an independent examination of
the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment
does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free
expression.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
This case comes to us following the denial of a
preliminary injunction. “The appropriate legal standard to
analyze a preliminary injunction motion requires a district
 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE 11

court to determine whether a movant has established that
(1) he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim, (2) he
is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent the preliminary
injunction, (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
(4) a preliminary injunction is in the public interest.” Baird
v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023); see Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Because
“the party opposing injunctive relief is a government entity”
here, the third and fourth factors “merge.” Fellowship of
Christian Athletes, 82 F.4th at 695 (quoting Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).
We address these factors in turn.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
We start with the likelihood of success on the merits,
which is the most important factor in the preliminary
injunction analysis. Edge v. City of Everett, 929 F.3d 657,
663 (9th Cir. 2019). It is all the more critical “when a
plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation and injury.” Baird,
81 F.4th at 1040. Consequently, we have articulated a unique
likelihood-of-success standard in First Amendment cases:
“[I]n the First Amendment context, the moving party bears
the initial burden of making a colorable claim that its First
Amendment rights have been infringed, or are threatened
with infringement, at which point the burden shifts to the
government to justify the restriction on speech.” Cal.
Chamber of Com., 29 F.4th at 478 (citation and quotation
marks omitted); accord Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563, 570
(9th Cir. 2014).
1. First Amendment standard
The First Amendment, made applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
12 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE

Amendment, provides: “[The States] shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. We
typically assess First Amendment claims in three steps.
First, we must decide whether the relevant speech “is
protected by the First Amendment”; second, “we must
identify the nature of the forum”; and third, “we must assess
whether the justifications for exclusion from the relevant
forum satisfy the requisite standard.” Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).
The first two steps are not at issue here. The parties agree
that the First Amendment protects religious speech like
Meinecke’s. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct.
2407, 2421 (2022); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 &
n.6 (1981). The City does not attempt to justify its actions
based on theories of incitement or fighting words. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011). It is
also beyond debate that Meinecke’s speech occurred in
traditional public fora—public sidewalks and a public park.
See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480–81 (1988); ACLU
of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir.
2003) (“The quintessential traditional public forums are
sidewalks, streets, and parks.”). Indeed, we have previously
observed that the Seattle Center—the park at issue here—is
an “especially important locale[] for communication among
the citizenry.” Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1036
(9th Cir. 2009).
Instead, only the third step—whether the City’s
restrictions satisfied the requisite level of scrutiny—is in
dispute. Content-based restrictions, on the one hand, are
“presumptively invalid.” Boyer v. City of Simi Valley, 978
F.3d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 2020). If a restriction is content
based, it is subject to strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
576 U.S. 155, 163–64 (2015). On the other hand,
 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE 13

municipalities may permissibly issue time, place, or manner
restrictions. “To pass constitutional muster, a time, place, or
manner restriction must meet three criteria: (1) it must be
content-neutral; (2) it must be narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest; and (3) it must leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.” Berger, 569 U.S. at 1036 (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
In urging us to affirm the district court’s judgment, the
City contends that it enforced a permissible content-neutral
“time, place, or manner” restriction on Meinecke’s speech.
Meinecke counters, maintaining that the City’s actions were
content based and fail strict scrutiny. We agree with
Meinecke: the restrictions on his speech were content-based
heckler’s vetoes, and the City has not carried its burden to
justify those restrictions under strict scrutiny.
2. Whether the restrictions were content neutral
Meinecke does not bring a facial challenge to the Seattle
obstruction ordinance under which he was arrested. It makes
little difference to our analysis, however, that the ordinance
is facially neutral. If a facially neutral statute “as read by
officers on the scene[] would allow or disallow speech
depending on the reaction of the audience, then the
ordinance would run afoul of an independent species of
prohibitions on content-restrictive regulations, often
described as a First Amendment-based ban on the ‘heckler’s
veto.’” Ctr. For Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles
Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 787 (9th Cir. 2008).
The City’s enforcement actions against Meinecke are
content-based heckler’s vetoes. Our precedent on this point
is clear: “The prototypical heckler’s veto case is one in
which the government silences particular speech or a
14 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE

particular speaker ‘due to an anticipated disorderly or
violent reaction of the audience.’” Santa Monica Nativity
Scenes Comm., 784 F.3d at 1293 (quoting Rosenbaum v. City
& County of San Francisco, 484 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir.
2007)); see also United States v. Rundo, 990 F.3d 709, 719
(9th Cir. 2021). As such, it “is a form of content
discrimination, generally forbidden in a traditional or
designated public forum.” Seattle Mideast Awareness
Campaign v. King County, 781 F.3d 489, 502 (9th Cir. 2015).
The Supreme Court has emphasized as “firmly settled” that
“the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their
hearers, or simply because bystanders object to peaceful and
orderly demonstrations.” Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S.
564, 567 (1970) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134
(1992) (“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-
neutral basis for regulation.”). It is apparent from the facts,
including the video available from police body cameras, that
the Seattle police directed Meinecke to leave the area
because of the reaction his Bible-reading provoked at the
Dobbs and PrideFest protests.
The City resists this conclusion by repeatedly referring
to its actions as time, place, or manner restrictions. The
police officers on scene, for example, can be heard on the
video recordings discussing “time, place or manner,” and
they told Meinecke that they were enforcing a “time, place,
and manner” restriction on him. But incanting the words
“time,” “place,” and “manner” over a content-based
restriction does not transmute it into one that is content
neutral. The evidence in the record is indisputable that the
officers curbed Meinecke’s speech because of the potential
reaction of the listeners. The arresting officer during the
 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE 15

Dobbs protest reported that law enforcement “wanted to
place a time and manner restriction on [Meinecke] . . . . due
to the fact that the government interest and the police role at
that point was to restore public order and prevent further
violence.” The officer’s report for PrideFest used nearly
identical language. The City on appeal acknowledges that
the restrictions were the direct result of “assaults on
[Meinecke]” and the “threat to public safety” posed by the
protestors. And the district court emphasized that the
officers’ actions “were prompted by physical altercations
and threats of violent behavior.” Those threats did not come
from Meinecke, and there is no evidence of any protester
being arrested for “physical altercations and threats of
violent behavior,” including those who seized and ripped his
Bible, poured water on him, took his shoes, and physically
carried him across the street.
The City cannot point to any legitimate time, place, or
manner restriction at issue here, such as a noise ordinance.
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989).
Instead, the invocation of “time, place, and manner” appears
to have been a shorthand for the convenience of the officers
in maintaining order for the primary events. The City’s
citation to buffer- and protest-zone cases is inapposite here.
Buffer and protest zones are regulations of general
applicability, often erected ex ante. See, e.g., Edwards v. City
of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam) (“Ordinance 4812 prohibits all demonstration
activity within a specified distance of health care facilities
and places of worship without regard to the message
conveyed.”); Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1129
(9th Cir. 2005) (“Under Order No. 3, persons could not
protest—in support of or against—any topic within the
restricted zone . . . . The restricted zone established by
16 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE

Order No. 3 applied equally to persons of all viewpoints.”);
see also Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980) (“[T]ime,
place, and manner regulations must be ‘applicable to all
speech regardless of content.’” (citation omitted)). The City
acknowledged at oral argument that it had not created protest
zones in advance of either gathering. To be sure, the June 24
protest was an impromptu reaction to the Supreme Court’s
Dobbs decision that very same day. Although we are
sensitive to the logistical difficulties of handling such a
dynamic situation, the City acted on Meinecke’s speech—
and on the record before us, no other speech—based
exclusively on the reaction of Meinecke’s audience.
PrideFest presents an even easier case, because the gathering
was planned and the City was aware of that event well in
advance. At both events, the Seattle police targeted
Meinecke’s speech only once the audience’s hostile reaction
manifested. That is part and parcel of a heckler’s veto. See
Santa Monica Nativity Scenes Comm., 784 F.3d at 1294.
In a final attempt to avoid strict scrutiny, the City
maintains that the police officers merely sought to relocate
Meinecke’s speech rather than ban it outright. The district
court followed this reasoning, surmising that the “officers
did not act to ‘silence’ Mr. Meinecke, nor did they evict or
banish him from the forum,” but only “order[ed] Mr.
Meinecke to move to a safer location.”
But the government cannot escape First Amendment
scrutiny simply because its actions “can somehow be
described as a burden rather than outright suppression.”
United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826
(2000). The buffer zone cases on this point belie rather than
support the City’s position. In McCullen v. Coakley, 573
U.S. 464 (2014), for example, the Supreme Court invalidated
 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE 17

a Massachusetts statute that criminalized knowingly
standing on a public sidewalk within thirty-five feet of a
place where abortions are performed. There, the petitioners
sought to “approach and talk to women outside such
facilities, attempting to dissuade them from having
abortions.” Id. at 469. Although the petitioners could
engage in expressive activity beyond the buffer zone, the
Court nevertheless concluded that the “buffer zones impose
serious burdens on the petitioners’ speech” because they
“compromise[d] petitioners’ ability to initiate . . . close,
personal conversations.” Id. at 487. The Court continued,
“while the First Amendment does not guarantee a speaker
the right to any particular form of expression, some forms—
such as normal conversation . . . —have historically been
more closely associated with the transmission of ideas than
others.” Id. at 488. “When the government makes it more
difficult to engage in these modes of communication, it
imposes an especially significant First Amendment burden.”
Id. at 489.
Even assuming that the officers simply instructed
Meinecke to cross the street, their directions burdened
Meinecke’s speech. Meinecke had a right, just as those
participating in the anti-Dobbs rally or the celebration of
PrideFest, to use public sidewalks and streets for the
peaceful dissemination of his views. Like the petitioners in
McCullen, Meinecke “hands out literature” and “engages in
conversation and answers questions” about Christianity. The
evidence is even clearer as to the officers’ restrictions during
PrideFest. The district court recognized that the officers
“ordered him to leave the park” altogether. When the police
single out a nonthreatening speaker for discipline, the
government is simply choosing sides in the debate and using
the obstruction statute to enforce its choice.
18 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE

In short, the City’s attempt to relocate Meinecke’s
speech—and subsequently arresting him for failing to
comply—was a content-based burden on Meinecke’s
expressive activity because the City did so only in response
to the actual and potential reaction of the audience.
3. Whether the restrictions satisfy strict scrutiny
Because the City’s restrictions on Meinecke’s speech
were not content neutral, they are permissible only if they
satisfy strict scrutiny. “To satisfy strict scrutiny, a restriction
on speech is justified only if the government demonstrates
that it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.” Twitter, Inc. v. Garland, 61 F.4th 686, 698 (9th Cir.
2023). “It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because
of its content will ever be permissible.” Askins v. U.S. Dep’t
Homeland Sec., 899 F.3d 1035, 1045 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted). The parties do not dispute that public safety and
security are compelling interests. Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1143
n.57 (“[T]he City’s interest in restoring and maintaining
safety and security also was a ‘compelling state interest.’”).
Instead, they spar over whether the City’s restrictions satisfy
the narrow tailoring element of strict scrutiny.
When a speech restriction is content-based, the narrow
tailoring requirement is demanding of the government. See
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 364 (2015) (“The least-
restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding.”
(citation omitted)); Brown, 564 U.S. at 799 (recognizing that
narrow tailoring “is a demanding standard” in content-based
cases). “To be narrowly drawn, a ‘curtailment of free speech
must be actually necessary to the solution.’” Twitter, 61
F.4th at 698 (quoting Brown, 564 U.S. at 799). Put
differently, “[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the
Government’s purpose, the [Government] must use that
 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE 19

alternative.” Id. (quoting Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S.
at 813); IMDb.com Inc. v. Becerra, 962 F.3d 1111, 1125 (9th
Cir. 2020) (“Even if a state intends to advance a compelling
government interest, we will not permit speech-restrictive
measures when the state may remedy the problem by
implementing or enforcing laws that do not infringe on
speech.”).
Curtailing speech based on the listeners’ reaction is
rarely—if ever—the least restrictive means to achieve the
government’s interest in safety. “If speech provokes
wrongful acts on the part of hecklers, the government must
deal with those wrongful acts directly; it may not avoid
doing so by suppressing the speech.” Santa Monica Nativity
Scenes Comm., 784 F.3d at 1292–93; cf. Playboy Ent. Grp.,
529 U.S. at 813 (“Where the designed benefit of a content-
based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of
listeners, the general rule is that the right of expression
prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative exists.”).
In this case, there were several less speech-restrictive
alternatives to achieve public safety. The officers could have
required the protestors to take a step back from Meinecke.
They could have called for more officers—as they did after
Meinecke was arrested. They could have erected a free
speech barricade. They could have warned the protestors
that any sort of physical altercation would result in the
perpetrators’ arrests. And they could have arrested the
individuals who ultimately assaulted Meinecke. See, e.g.,
Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty., 805 F.3d 228, 248 (6th Cir.
2015) (en banc). The City did none of those things. Instead,
the police report on Meinecke’s arrest simply recites that
“[w]hen resources allowed in the past[,] SPD would try and
keep the two opposing groups separated.” That is hardly the
sort of concrete proof necessary to establish that restricting
20 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE

Meinecke’s speech was the only way to avoid violence.
Victory Processing, LLC v. Fox, 937 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th
Cir. 2019) (“[T]he state must provide ‘more than anecdote
and supposition;’ it must point to evidence . . . that
demonstrates why the challenged restriction, rather than a
less restrictive alternative, is necessary to further its
significant interests.” (citation omitted)); Brown, 564 U.S.
at 799–800 (“[B]ecause [the government] bears the risk of
uncertainty, ambiguous proof will not suffice.” (internal
citation omitted)).
Meinecke has established a likelihood of success on his
First Amendment claim.
B. Irreparable Harm
The district court properly recognized that a loss of First
Amendment freedoms constitutes an irreparable injury.
Fellowship of Christian Athletes, 82 F.4th at 694 (“It is
axiomatic that ‘[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for
even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.’” (citation omitted)). The City replies
that there is “no irreparable harm where there is no
infringement on [Meinecke’s] First Amendment rights.”
That argument does not move the needle because Meinecke
has demonstrated a likelihood of a First Amendment injury
for the reasons explained above. See Am. Bev. Ass’n v. City
& County of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir.
2019) (en banc) (“Because Plaintiffs have a colorable First
Amendment claim, they have demonstrated that they likely
will suffer irreparable harm.”).
C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest
The balance of equities and public interest favor
Meinecke. “[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent
 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE 21

the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Fellowship
of Christian Athletes, 82 F.4th at 695 (citation omitted).
When a party “‘raise[s] serious First Amendment questions,’
that alone ‘compels a finding that the balance of hardships
tips sharply in [its] favor.” Id. (second alteration in original)
(quoting Am. Bev. Ass’n, 916 F.3d at 758). The government
doubtlessly has an interest in maintaining public order. But
even “undeniably admirable goals” “must yield” when they
“collide with the . . . Constitution.” Id. That is especially
true here because the City had other means of vindicating its
interests without restricting Meinecke’s speech.
D. Specificity of Injunctive Relief
Although the district court concluded that “Meinecke’s
request for a preliminary injunction is overbroad and lacks
the specificity that is required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(d),” a sufficiently particularized injunction
can be drawn here. District courts have “considerable
discretion in fashioning suitable relief and defining the terms
of an injunction,” Hecox v. Little, 79 F.4th 1009, 1036 (9th
Cir. 2023) (citation omitted), so the court was not required
to adopt Meinecke’s proposed language verbatim. At oral
argument, Meinecke confirmed that he was focused on
seeking an injunction specific to him. Consistent with
Rule 65(d), the district court could have enjoined the City
and its officers from enforcing § 12A.16.010(A)(3) against
Meinecke in public parks and streets based on the anticipated
hostile reaction of an audience. This would provide the “fair
and precisely drawn notice” required by Rule 65. In re Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap
Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239, 1263 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
22 MEINECKE V. CITY OF SEATTLE

IV. CONCLUSION
We reverse the district court and remand with
instructions to enter a preliminary injunction consistent with
this opinion in favor of Meinecke. Because we reverse as to
the First Amendment claim, we need not reach Meinecke’s
void-for-vagueness theory.
REVERSED and REMANDED.