United States v. Antonio Davis

USCA4 Appeal: 21-7325 Doc: 68 Filed: 04/18/2024 Pg: 1 of 27

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7325

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ANTONIO DAVIS,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport
News. Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge. (4:13-cr-00004-RGD-TEM-2)

Argued: December 7, 2023 Decided: April 18, 2024

Before GREGORY, WYNN, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Wynn joined. Judge Rushing wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Rachel A. Chung, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant. Aidan Taft Grano-Mickelsen, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael R. Dreeben,
O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United
States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, Eric M. Hurt, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.
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GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

Antonio Davis is currently serving a 210-month prison sentence for conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute heroin. After serving about half of his sentence, and in the

midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Davis petitioned the district court for compassionate

release based on his elevated risk of severe COVID-19 and a change in the law regarding

his career offender status. The Court denied that relief. Davis now appeals. We conclude

that the district court fairly assessed that Davis was not due compassionate release based

on his susceptibility to COVID-19. But because the district court did not fully consider

each of Davis’s arguments, we vacate the district court’s denial of compassionate relief and

remand for further proceedings.

I.

In January 2013, Davis was indicted on charges of conspiracy to distribute and

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846(a)(1)

and 841(b)(1)(A), and possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). In June of that year, he pled guilty, pursuant to a plea

agreement, to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. According to the

Statement of Facts attached to the plea agreement, Davis was “responsible for more than

400 grams and less than 700 grams of heroin.” J.A. 336. Davis received a career offender

enhancement under § 4B1.1 because he’d previously been convicted of certain other

offenses and because the offense at issue here was a “controlled substance offense” at the

time of conviction. J.A. 329. The prior offenses included a 1990 attempted murder

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conviction and a 2003 attempted robbery conviction. After applying a three-level reduction

for acceptance of responsibility, the court adopted an advisory guidelines range of 188 to

235 months imprisonment. Ultimately, Davis was sentenced to 210 months imprisonment,

with a four-year term of supervised release to follow.

In February 2021, Davis filed a pro se motion for compassionate release under 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which requires that any reduction in a sentence is warranted by an

“extraordinary and compelling reason[].” J.A. 186. Davis presented two extraordinary and

compelling reasons for compassionate release. First, he argued that he was uniquely

susceptible to the potential spread of COVID-19 due to his type-2 diabetes and hypertension.

Second, he argued that this Court’s holding in United States v. Norman, which was decided

after Davis was sentenced, that Virginia robbery did not constitute a violent felony under the

Armed Career Criminal Act invalidated his career offender Guidelines designation. See 935

F.3d 232, 239 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that drug conspiracy offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 846

are not categorially controlled substance offenses for the purposes of applying the career

offender Guideline). 1 Davis indicated that he had exhausted all his administrative remedies

prior to filing the motion because he requested relief from the warden but received no

response after thirty days. He asserted that his release was justified under the § 3553(a)

factors because the conduct underlying the offense of conviction was not particularly severe,

he no longer posed a danger to the public, and he had completed several rehabilitation

Although Appellant Davis first cited Norman in his initial February 2021 pro se
1

motion for compassionate release, J.A. 214, Davis clarified and expanded the Norman
argument in his motion to amend or correct his motion for compassionate release, filed in
May 2021. J.A. 233.
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programs since his sentencing. The government opposed the motion, arguing in part that

Davis’s change-in-law arguments sounded in habeas and therefore were not cognizable as a

justification for compassionate release.

The district court (the same judge who originally sentenced Davis) denied the

motion. The court found that Davis failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons

for release based on the pandemic because he did not make a significant showing of a

particularized susceptibility to COVID-19 or a particularized risk of contracting the disease

while in prison. The court noted Davis’s health conditions but concluded that they were

not particularly severe given that Davis was 46 and fully vaccinated.

The district court likewise rejected Davis’s career offender argument, finding that

§ 2255 was the appropriate vehicle for Davis to request relief on this basis. And even if Davis

had shown the necessary extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief, the court maintained

that his release would not be justified under the § 3553(a) factors. The court noted that Davis

had only served half of his sentence and determined that 210 months’ imprisonment remained

necessary to reflect the seriousness of his crimes and the risk of recidivism.2

2
In its memorandum order, the district court sua sponte raised the question of
whether Davis properly exhausted his remedies. J.A. 296–97. The government did not
raise this issue below. In United States v. Muhammad, we held that § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s
exhaustion requirement is a “non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule” that can be waived
or forfeited if not timely raised. 16 F.4th 126, 130 (4th Cir. 2021). Thus, the government
has waived the issue of exhaustion, and it is not a barrier to remand.
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Davis timely noted an appeal. He remains incarcerated at FCI Talladega. If Davis

were sentenced today, his guidelines range would be 92 to 115 months—about half of his

210-month sentence.

II.

We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for compassionate release for abuse

of discretion. United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2021). “A district court

abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially

recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or

legal premises, or commits an error of law.” United States v. Jenkins, 22 F.4th 162, 167

(4th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018)). In

determining whether a district court has abused its discretion, we presume “that the district

court sufficiently considered relevant factors in deciding a [§] 3582(c)(2) motion” or a

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion. United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 396 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing

United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 729–30 (4th Cir. 2000)). However, we consider de

novo whether a court ruling on a compassionate release motion must provide an

individualized explanation. Martin, 916 F.3d at 395.

III.

We begin with some background. Generally, a court “may not modify a term of

imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). However, Congress

created an exception to that general rule when “extraordinary and compelling reasons

warrant such a reduction.” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Until the passage of the First Step Act in

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2018, district courts could only entertain motions for compassionate release filed by the

Bureau of Prisons (BOP). High, 997 F.3d at 185 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)

(2002)). The First Step Act amended § 3582(c) to allow incarcerated persons to file their

own motions for compassionate release after first requesting that the BOP move for

compassionate release and waiting thirty days for the BOP to act. See First Step Act, Pub.

L. 115-391 § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5339 (2018); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3532(c)(1)(A);

United States v. Ferguson, 55 F.4th 262, 267–69 (4th Cir. 2022) (explaining that an appeal

of the BOP’s refusal to move for compassionate release requires exhaustion of

administrative remedies). Section 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a district court first to find

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a sentence reduction. Then, after

considering any appropriate § 3553(a) factors, the court must determine whether the

requested reduction in sentence is consistent with “applicable policy statements issued by

the Sentencing Commission.” Jenkins, 22 F.4th at 169; Kibble, 992 F.3d at 330-32.

But until recently—well after the district court in this case entered its order—there

were no applicable policy statements to reference. This Court acknowledged that void,

noting that “there is no applicable policy statement governing compassionate release motions

filed by defendants.” United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th Cir. 2020); see also

Jenkins, 22 F.4th at 169. Given this lack of guidance from the Commission, courts looked

to relevant sentencing guidelines provisions to evaluate whether a motion presented an

extraordinary and compelling circumstance warranting a sentence reduction. See Jenkins,

22 F.4th at 169–70; see also United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 187 (4th Cir. 2021).

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In May 2023, the Sentencing Commission, having finally achieved a quorum,

promulgated amendments to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, the section that governs § 3582 and

discusses the contours of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons. 88 Fed. Reg. 28254

(May 3, 2023). That guidance reinforced that a defendant’s increased risk of suffering

complications or death from exposure to disease during a public health emergency can be

an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.

Further, the amendment provides that if a defendant “received an unusually long

sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law

(other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive)

may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and

compelling reason.” Id. However, this consideration only applies where such a change in

law “would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence

likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the

defendant’s individualized circumstances.” Id.

If the intervening change in law would not produce a gross disparity, a defendant cannot rely

on the change in law as an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. However, “if a

defendant otherwise establishes that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence

reduction under this policy statement, a change in the law (including an amendment to the Guidelines

Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered for purposes of determining the

extent of any such reduction.” Id. Thus, if Davis can present another extraordinary and compelling

reason but does not otherwise meet the criteria for an “unusually long sentence,” the court can still

use the change in law to determine how much to reduce his sentence.

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The district court did not have the benefit of the Sentencing Commission’s guidance

when it denied Davis’s compassionate release motion. Nonetheless, the district court was on

notice that “gross” sentencing disparities due to changes in law can be extraordinary and

compelling reasons for compassionate release. In McCoy, which predates the amendments

to § 1B1.13, this Court held that a district court may treat “the disparity of defendant’s

§ 924(c) sentences and those provided under the First Step Act” as “extraordinary and

compelling reasons for compassionate release.” 981 F.3d at 285–86. McCoy thus indicated

that disparities between nonretroactive, correctly calculated, pre-First Step Act sentences and

the sentences defendants would have received post-First Step Act are properly considered as

“extraordinary and compelling” reasons. Further, Section 3582(c)(2), which also predates

the § 1B1.13 amendments, explicitly provides that a district court may reduce a sentence “in

the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a

sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”

Martin, 916 F.3d at 395. Together, McCoy and Section 3582(c) indicated that changed legal

circumstances may sometimes provide a basis for compassionate release.

IV.

Davis presents two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district court abused

its discretion in concluding that he failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for

his compassionate release. He offered three reasons that he’s entitled to compassionate

release: (1) his type-2 diabetes and hypertension made him particularly susceptible to

COVID-19; (2) intervening changes in law would result in a lower sentence if he were

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sentenced today; and (3) his rehabilitation efforts have been effective and extraordinary.

Second, he argues that the district court erred in concluding that he did not merit a sentence

reduction under the § 3553(a) factors without first addressing each of Davis’s arguments.

Taking each argument in turn, we find Davis’s argument regarding his susceptibility

to COVID-19 unpersuasive. However, we agree that the district court did not properly

address Davis’s arguments regarding intervening changes in law and rehabilitation.

A.

Davis first argues that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the

COVID-19 pandemic was not an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. To

establish that the risk posed by COVID-19 presents an extraordinary and compelling reason

for release, the defendant must allege that the risk of contracting COVID-19 is higher in

prison than outside of it, and that his preexisting conditions increase the risk of

experiencing a serious or fatal case of the virus. United States v. Brown, 78 F.4th 122, 128

(4th Cir. 2023); see also High, 997 F.3d at 185. Although this “inquiry is multifaceted and

must account for the totality of relevant circumstances,” Bethea, 54 F.4th at 832 (internal

quotation marks omitted), courts examine whether the movant “shows both a particularized

susceptibility to COVID-19 and a particularized risk of contracting the disease at his prison

facility.” Hargrove, 30 F.4th 189, 196 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

Davis asserts that his diagnoses of type-2 diabetes and hypertension constituted the

sort of particularized susceptibility required by law. The district court acknowledged Davis’s

medical history but found that that history did not present extraordinary circumstances for

relief. The court determined that Davis’s relatively young age of 46 and his full vaccination

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status undermined his claim that he was especially susceptible to serious illness from the

pandemic. That call was squarely within the court’s discretion. This Circuit has previously

declined to treat similar ailments as extraordinary in the context of the pandemic. See U.S.

v. Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 196 (upholding district court’s determination that defendant’s asthma

and high blood pressure did not present extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release

during the pandemic); see also Brown, 78 F.4th at 129 (agreeing that defendant’s obesity and

high blood pressure did not show that he had a particularized risk of contracting COVID

when defendant refused the vaccine without grounds).

Davis particularly takes umbrage at the district court’s emphasis on his vaccination

status as a mitigating factor for his vulnerability to serious illness. But district courts enjoy

the discretion to give additional weight to any one factor so long as they do not confine

their analysis to that factor. See, e.g., United States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 381–82 (4th Cir.

2021) (stating that a requirement to equally weigh factors “would . . . toss our deferential

abuse-of-discretion review to the winds”). Given this deferential standard of review, we

cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in denying compassionate release

based on Davis’s susceptibility to COVID-19.

B.

Second, Davis contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider

whether his career-offender-status claim was an extraordinary and compelling reason for

release. Years after Davis was sentenced, this Court held that the generic definition of

conspiracy must include an overt act. United States v. McCollum, 885 F.3d 300, 308–09 (4th

Cir. 2018). Later, in United States v. Norman, this Court relied on that decision to find that a

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21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy conviction (i.e., Davis’s offense of conviction) is not categorically

a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of the career offender guidelines because it does

not require an overt act. 935 F.3d at 237–40. Thus, if Davis were sentenced after Norman, he

would no longer be designated a career offender because his § 846 conspiracy conviction

would not qualify for the career offender enhancement. However, once a career offender status

is imposed, it cannot be retroactively altered.

In addition, Davis’s motion presented a second intervening change in law that would

further reduce his sentence if he were sentenced today. Amendment 782 of the Sentencing

Guidelines, added in 2014, lowered the base offense level for Davis’s § 846 conviction by two

points. This reduction was retroactive. Because Davis was considered a career offender when

his sentence was imposed, he was sentenced according to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (“Career

Offender”), not § 2D1.1(c) (“Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or

Trafficking”). Today, Davis would not be sentenced as a career offender. Therefore, the court

would now sentence him under § 2D.1.1(c), making him eligible for the retroactive two-point

reduction. But because he was not sentenced under that guideline but as a career offender

under § 4B1.1 (a designation cannot be retroactively altered), he cannot seek that reduction.

The court failed to indicate that it considered this argument in its order denying the

motion. Instead, it concluded that Davis’s change-in-law claim was not an extraordinary and

compelling reason for relief because 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the federal habeas statute, was “the

appropriate vehicle for Defendant to request the sought-after relief.” J.A. 298. It is true that

a defendant cannot challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence in a compassionate

release motion. See United States v. Ferguson, 55 F.4th 262, 269–72 (4th Cir. 2022). “[N]o

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matter how an inmate characterizes his request for relief, the substance of that request

controls. If in substance he attacks his conviction and/or sentence, his filing is subject to the

rules set forth in § 2255,” which bars second or successive habeas petitions. Id. at 270.

Yet Davis’s pro se motion does not attack the validity of his sentence. His original

motion requests only compassionate release or a sentence reduction. J.A. 201. He does

not claim that a mistake was made during his original sentencing, and, as a result of that

mistake, the sentence imposed was too long. Instead, he says that subsequent changes in

the law mean that, if sentenced today, his term of imprisonment would be substantially

shorter. As such, Davis’s motion does not sound in habeas, as the district court claimed.

We now grapple with whether a change in law can constitute an extraordinary and

compelling reason for compassionate release. McCoy said that it can. “[T]he very purpose

of § 3582(c)(1)(A) is to provide a safety valve that allows for sentence reductions where

there is not a specific statute that already affords relief but extraordinary and compelling

reasons nevertheless justify a reduction.” McCoy, 981 F.3d at 287 (cleaned up).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022),

further confirms that changes in law are fair game in compassionate release motions. In

Concepcion, the defendant received a 19-year prison sentence under the Anti-Drug Abuse

Act of 1986, which established a 100 to 1 sentencing disparity between the drug weight of

crack and powder cocaine. Id. at 487. Ten years later, the defendant petitioned for a

sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act. Id. at 488. Among other things,

Concepcion argued that he should receive a reduced sentence because, if sentenced at the

time of the motion, he would no longer be considered a career offender. Id. at 489. The

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district court denied relief, reasoning that courts could not consider intervening legal

developments in First Step Act proceedings. On appeal, Concepcion contended that the

district court erred by declining to consider those changes of law. Id.

The Supreme Court sided with the petitioner. The Court reasoned that “[b]ecause

district courts are always obligated to consider nonfrivolous arguments presented by the

parties, the First Step Act requires district courts to consider intervening changes when

parties raise them.” Id. at 487. It went on: “It is only when Congress or the Constitution

limits the scope of information that a district court may consider in deciding whether, and

to what extent, to modify a sentence, that a district court’s discretion to consider

information is restrained . . . .” Id. at 486–87. And the majority observed that “Congress

is not shy about placing such limits where it deems them appropriate.” Id. at 494. See,

e.g., Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 326–28 (2011) (holding that Congress barred

judges for considering rehabilitation needs in support of an increased prison sentence); see

also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (barring courts from considering the need for retribution in

imposing terms of supervised release).

Congress also has not been silent regarding compassionate release motions. As

previously discussed, Congress expressly cabined district courts’ discretion by requiring

courts to follow the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. Until May 2023, those

policy statements neither limited that which could be “extraordinary and compelling” nor

barred consideration of changes in law.

Concepcion’s broad reasoning permits federal judges to think expansively about

what constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release, absent specific

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congressional limitations. And the Sentencing Commission’s latest guidance goes a long

way to resolve any remaining questions of congressional intent not answered by the

Supreme Court’s decision.

With that being said, neither Concepcion nor the new amendments to U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.13 existed when the district court denied Davis’s motion. Like many courts across

the country, the district court likely found the Commission’s old policy statement on

compassionate release outdated after the First Step Act and was forced to operate without

Commission guidance. We cannot hold this against the court. However, the district court

did not account for this Court’s decision in McCoy, which already explained that district

courts could consider any extraordinary and compelling reasons for release raised by a

defendant. 981 F.3d at 284. Concepcion and the latest policy statement serve to confirm

and amplify this Court’s earlier ruling. Nonretroactive changes in law remain relevant

when a court has to decide when and how to modify a sentence. Concepcion, 597 U.S. at

494; see also McCoy, 981 F.3d at 268. As such, the district court should have considered

Davis’s argument that he no longer qualifies as a career offender, and it abused its discretion

when it failed to do so. It now falls on the district court to revisit Davis’s arguments in

light of the Sentencing Commission’s new policy statement outlining when and how to

consider changes in law as an extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduction.

C.

Davis also argues that his post-conviction rehabilitation and stable reentry plan

presented an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release. When he filed his

initial motion seeking compassionate release, Davis had been incarcerated for 96 months.

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By all accounts, he was a model inmate during that time, receiving no infractions and

completing ten education courses. He likewise took steps toward self-improvement,

finishing a drug education course, participating in a cognitive skills group, excelling in a

paralegal studies program, and receiving a promotion at his job.

The district court did not directly address these rehabilitation arguments as they

pertain to the “extraordinary and compelling” analysis. “[I]n the Fourth Circuit, when

evaluating the sufficiency of a sentencing court’s explanation, there is a presumption that

the district court sufficiently considered relevant factors in deciding a [compassionate

release] motion.” Martin, 916 F.3d at 396 (citing United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724,

729-30 (4th Cir. 2000)). But defendants can overcome this presumption by presenting

evidence of rehabilitation that was not available at their original sentencing hearing. Id.;

McDonald, 986 F.3d 402, 411 (4th Cir. 2021). Here, Davis did exactly that. Davis

submitted letters from the Blackstone Career Institute commending him for his work in

their paralegal studies course. J.A. 198. His unit manager at work also provided a letter,

noting that Davis had “distinguished himself on multiple occasions” and had been a

“positive influence on his fellow co-workers.” J.A. 291. “While a district court is still

empowered in its discretion to consider the facts of Appellants’ original transgressions, the

district court must also at least weigh [Davis’s] conduct in the years since [his] initial

sentencing[].” McDonald, 986 F.3d at 412.

Citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), which generally directs the Sentencing Commission to

provide guidance on “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” the government contends

that a district court can only consider rehabilitation in its § 3553(a) analysis, not in its

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“extraordinary and compelling reasons” analysis. This argument is unavailing. While

Congress did specify that rehabilitation alone cannot be considered an extraordinary and

compelling reason for release, it may be considered as one factor among several under

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). McCoy, 981 F.3d at 286 n.9; see also 88 Fed. Reg. 28254 (“Rehabilitation

of the defendant while serving the sentence may be considered in combination with other

circumstances in determining whether and to what extent a reduction in the defendant’s

term of imprisonment is warranted.”). The new policy statement reiterated this principle,

but the district court already had sufficient guidance prior to its publication. When no

applicable policy statement limits the discretion of the court, “courts may make their own

independent determinations of what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason

under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” McCoy, 981 F.3d at 284 (cleaned up). The district court therefore

abused its discretion in overlooking Davis’s evidence of rehabilitation.

D.

Even if a district court abuses its discretion in assessing whether the defendant

presents extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, this Court may still affirm if the

district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors was sound. 3 High, 997 F.3d at 186–

87. District courts are not required to acknowledge and address each of the defendant’s

3
The § 3553(a) factors include “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), “the need for the
sentence imposed” to “provide just punishment for the offense,” “to afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct,” “to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant,” and “to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,”
§ 3553(a)(2), and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” § 3553(a)(6).
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arguments on the record when conducting a § 3553(a) analysis. Id. at 189. In their

reasoning, a sentencing judge “need only ‘set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court

that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his

own legal decisionmaking authority.” Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 113

(2018). Still, in more complex cases, “more explanation [than a cursory analysis] may be

necessary.” Id. at 116; see also High, 997 F.3d at 190. This is one such case.

Here, the district court incorporated by reference the § 3553(a) analysis conducted

at Davis’s sentencing several years earlier, citing his prior convictions and risk of

recidivism. The court then opined that Davis’s criminal history presents a risk of

recidivism because he committed the offense of conviction after having previously served

seventy-two months in prison. “Notably,” the court pointed out, “Defendant’s prior felony

convictions . . . required his categorization as a career offender.” J.A. 299–300.

In Chavez-Meza v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether district

courts were required to provide a detailed explanation of the reasons underlying the denial

of a sentence reduction pursuant to the compassionate release statute. 585 U.S. 109 (2018).

There, petitioner sought a sentence reduction under the compassionate release statute. Id.

at 114. The district court granted that reduction, but not by the amount requested. In doing

so, the district court entered only a form order stating that it had considered the petitioner’s

motion and the § 3553(a) factors in reducing petitioner’s sentence. Id.

The Supreme Court upheld the court’s use of a form order. It explained that the

record of the initial sentencing illuminated the reasons why the court reduced the sentence

by less than the petitioner requested. Id. at 115–16. But the Court made clear that its

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holding did not mean that courts never had to provide more detailed explanations of their

compassionate release decisions. “It could be that, under different facts and a different

record, the district court’s use of a barebones order in response to a motion like petitioner’s

would be inadequate . . . [T]he courts of appeals are well suited to request a more detailed

explanation when necessary.” Id. at 119.

Subsequent cases within this Circuit add color to Chavez-Meza. In Martin, two

appellants sought compassionate release based on substantial records of post-sentencing

mitigation evidence. 916 F.3d at 389. Without addressing that mitigating evidence, the district

court denied one motion and gave only a small reduction on the other, based on the § 3553(a)

factors. Id. at 393–95. This Court acknowledged Chavez-Meza but nonetheless held that the

district court improperly failed to consider appellants’ evidence. We said that, due to the nature

and volume of evidence presented by appellants, the district court erred in failing to provide an

individualized explanation for why that evidence was unconvincing. Id. at 397–98. Instead,

the district court was “content to memorialize [appellant’s] past transgressions without giving

any weight to the multitude of redemptive measures” that appellants took since their

sentencings. Id. at 397. Later, in McDonald, the Court extensively referenced Martin to reverse

a district court’s denial of compassionate release on much the same basis. 986 F.3d at 412.

However, in High, this Court affirmed the district court’s denial of compassionate

release. 997 F.3d at 183. High filed his motion for release only sixteen months after his

sentencing. Id. And he filed the motion before the judge who initially sentenced him.

Should the district court have granted his desired sentence reduction, High’s term of

imprisonment would have been reduced by approximately two-thirds. Id. at 187. The

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district court thus found that the § 3553(a) factors governing the original sentence remained

unchanged. Id. at 189. This Court affirmed. Unlike the appellants in Martin and

McDonald, the Court explained, High’s post-sentencing mitigation evidence was more

limited. Id. at 190. In large part, High lacked a similar “mountain of new mitigating

evidence” because the time that elapsed between his sentence and his motion was a tiny

fraction of the “nearly two decades” that had elapsed in both Martin and McDonald. Id.

(quoting Martin, 916 F.3d at 396). See also Jenkins, 22 F.4th at 172 (finding the court

adequately explained its denial where the defendant did not present post-sentencing

mitigation evidence, and the judge was also the sentencing judge).

In both length of incarceration and evidence of rehabilitation, the case before us

rests somewhere between Martin and High. Like in High, the district judge who ruled on

Davis’s compassionate release motion was the same judge who originally sentenced him.

And Davis’s tenure in prison was about a decade shy of the appellants’ lengths of

incarceration in Martin and McDonald. Davis offered the court more mitigation evidence

than did High, though his letters admittedly fell short of the mountain of evidence presented

by appellants in Martin.

Nonetheless, Martin and McDonald are more on point. As in Martin, Davis

“submitted documentary evidence that corroborat[ed] [his] coursework and good behavior,”

including a glowing letter from his employer that spoke to his character and desire for self-

improvement. Martin, 916 F.3d at 396. And although Davis’s judge was also the sentencing

judge, the ten-year gap between proceedings (compared to the short nineteen-month gap in

High) allowed for both foreseeable and unforeseeable changes in circumstances during the

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interim. This possibility strengthens the argument that the judge needed to offer more than

a mere recitation of Davis’s original criminal behavior. See id. at 397.

In Davis’s case, a great deal did change before he moved for compassionate release.

Some of those changes were considerable. As Davis engaged in the rehabilitation opportunities

available to him, the legal landscape shifted. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission promulgated

Amendment 782, which could have reduced Davis’s base offense level by two points had he not

been sentenced as a career offender. See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 782 (effective Nov. 1, 2014).

Five years later, this Court’s decision in Norman clarified that, if Davis was sentenced today, he

would not be subject to that career offender status. Norman, 935 F.3d at 239.

If applied in a new sentencing today, these changes would lower Davis’s guidelines

range from a 188–235 months range to 92–115 months range. Had that been the guidelines

range in 2013, it is very likely that Davis would already be out of prison. That reality alone

implicates one of the applicable sentencing factors: “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence

disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar

conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). This sentence disparity is so stark, and the change in law so

substantial, that Davis’s case is not the sort of simple case described in Chavez-Meza. 585 U.S.

at 113. Chavez-Meza reassured us that “courts of appeals are well suited to request a more

detailed explanation when necessary.” Id. at 119. We find that such action is necessary here.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion

by declining to address Davis’s change-in-law and rehabilitation arguments in its

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“extraordinary and compelling reasons” analysis. We also find that, given the mitigation

evidence Davis supplied, the substantial changes in law between the original sentencing

and today, and the potentially gross sentencing disparity created by those changes, the

district court’s explanation of the § 3553(a) factors is insufficient. However, we find that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis’s motion due to his asserted

susceptibility to COVID-19.

We also recognize that the Sentencing Commission’s new policy statement set forth

guidelines for considering changes in law that were not in effect when the court denied

Davis’s motion. Application of that new guidance requires a factual inquiry that the district

court should conduct in the first instance.

In addition, remand is appropriate in light of the tremendous shift in the legal

landscape that occurred between the order on appeal and now. See United States v. Love,

849 F. App’x 417, 418 (4th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (vacating and remanding “because the

district court did not have the benefit” of intervening Circuit decisions); United States v.

Diaz, 546 F. App’x 281, 282 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (same); Hanick v. Duncil, 135

F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 1998) (table) (same).

Therefore, we vacate the district court’s denial of Davis’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion

and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

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RUSHING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The same judge who originally sentenced Antonio Davis to 210 months in prison

for his part in a heroin distribution conspiracy subsequently denied Davis’s motion for

compassionate release after concluding that the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

continued to warrant a 210-month sentence. I would affirm.

Even if a federal prisoner is eligible for a sentence reduction based on “extraordinary

and compelling reasons,” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the district court “has discretion to

grant or deny relief based on its assessment of the salient § 3553(a) factors,” United States

v. Bethea, 54 F.4th 826, 831 (4th Cir. 2022). Similarly, this Court can affirm a district

court’s compassionate release decision “regardless of a flaw in the eligibility analysis” if

the court’s “§ 3553(a) assessment was sound.” Id. at 833; see also United States v. High,

997 F.3d 181, 187 (4th Cir. 2021). “District courts enjoy broad discretion in evaluating

the § 3553(a) factors when deciding a motion for compassionate release.” United States v.

Centeno-Morales, 90 F.4th 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We review the district court’s decision only for abuse of that discretion. United States v.

Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).

Procedurally, district courts must “consider the parties’ arguments” with respect to

a sentence modification but need not “invariably acknowledge and address each of the

[movant’s] arguments on the record.” High, 997 F.3d at 189; see also Centeno-Morales,

90 F.4th at 279. Absent a contrary indication, the district court’s consideration of “‘issues

that have been fully presented for determination . . . is implicit in the court’s ultimate

ruling.’” United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 728 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States

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v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995)). That presumption applies with particular force

“‘when the same judge who sentenced the defendant rules on the compassionate release

motion.’” Centeno-Morales, 90 F.4th at 279 (quoting Bethea, 54 F.4th at 834). When the

sentencing judge “‘assesses the § 3553(a) factors again for compassionate release

purposes, there’s a strong indication that the judge knows of the defendant’s circumstances,

both favorable and unfavorable, and considers the totality of the record when assessing

whether a different sentence is now warranted.’” Id. (quoting Bethea, 54 F.4th at 834).

Here, the same judge who sentenced Davis in 2013 considered his arguments for

compassionate release and concluded that his original sentence of 210 months’

imprisonment remained necessary “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, and to protect

the public from further crimes of the Defendant.” J.A. 299. The court first incorporated

by reference the reasons given at Davis’s sentencing and explained that reducing his

sentence “would disserve these important § 3553(a) factors, especially considering he has

only served half of his sentence.” J.A. 299. The court elaborated that Davis’s crime was

“rather serious” and his criminal history “presents a risk of recidivism.” J.A. 299.

Expanding on Davis’s recidivism risk, the court explained that he committed the present

offense after having recently served 72 months in prison for attempted robbery and use of

a firearm, and he also had an earlier felony conviction for attempted murder. Ultimately,

the court found that Davis “continues to present a danger to the safety of the community,”

making compassionate release inappropriate. J.A. 300.

This explanation was sufficient to demonstrate that the district court “‘considered

the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal

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decisionmaking authority,’ so as to ‘allow for meaningful appellate review.’” High, 997

F.3d at 190 (quoting Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018)). The

court’s reasoning disposed of every argument Davis advanced. Cf. Concepcion v. United

States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2404–2405 (2022) (reiterating that a district court is not required

“to expressly rebut each argument made by the parties” but need only “demonstrate that it

has considered the arguments before it” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Earlier in its

opinion, the district court acknowledged Davis’s position that, if he were sentenced today,

his Guidelines range would be lower because he would not be classified as a career

offender. In assessing the § 3553(a) factors, the court nevertheless reasoned that Davis’s

offense and his criminal history both remained serious and a sentence outside “the range

of [210] months” was inadequate to reflect the present-day seriousness of his heroin

conspiracy offense and protect the public from further crimes. J.A. 299.

The district court also implicitly rejected Davis’s claim of post-sentencing

rehabilitation when it concluded that he “continues to present a danger to the safety of the

community.” J.A. 300; see United States v. Mangarella, 57 F.4th 197, 203–204 (4th Cir.

2023) (“[O]mission [of an argument] does not by itself establish that the district court failed

to consider [it], at least implicitly, in weighing the § 3553(a) factors.”). We have

repeatedly found this type of explanation sufficient in cases with similarly sparse

rehabilitation evidence. See Centeno-Morales, 90 F.4th at 281 (concluding evidence of “a

few vocational courses” and only “two disciplinary infractions” did not require robust and

detailed explanation); High, 997 F.3d at 190 (same, regarding evidence of completed prison

courses and clean disciplinary record); United States v. Hargrove, 30 F.4th 189, 191–192,

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199–200 (4th Cir. 2022) (same, regarding evidence of clean disciplinary record and

participation in various prison programs); see also United States v. Johnson, No. 22-6035,

2022 WL 13888725, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 24, 2022) (per curiam); United States v. Rozelle,

No. 21-6901, 2023 WL 6619539, at *4 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 2023) (per curiam); United States

v. Bass, No. 20-7561, 2023 WL 4105711, at *1 (4th Cir. June 21, 2023) (per curiam). As

has the Supreme Court. Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967 (holding that the district court’s

disposition of a sentence reduction motion via “a barebones form order” sufficiently

addressed the movant’s argument regarding “various educational courses he had taken in

prison”).

The majority asserts that this case is like United States v. Martin, where more

explanation was required because the district court had “failed to address any” of the

movants’ “mountain of new mitigating evidence.” 916 F.3d 389, 396 (4th Cir. 2019). But

Martin’s requirement for “‘a more robust and detailed’ explanation” in response to

substantial evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitation “is the exception, not the rule.”

Centeno-Morales, 90 F.4th at 281 (quoting Martin, 916 F.3d at 396). And that exception

does not apply here.

The entirety of Davis’s rehabilitation argument to the district court was that he “is

now 45 years old,” maintained a “clean disciplinary record” for his 8 years in custody,

“ha[d] obtained numerous certificates and qualifications” which he did not specify, and

had “enroll[ed] in” a paralegal studies program. J.A. 210–211. For evidence, he presented

(1) letters showing he had enrolled in a paralegal certificate program and completed at least

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some coursework, and (2) a letter from a prison factory manager praising Davis’s work

ethic and attitude during his two years of prison employment.

By contrast, in Martin, both movants were elderly prisoners who had amassed

uncommonly significant rehabilitation records in their decade of incarceration. See, e.g.,

Martin, 916 F.3d at 397 (“The Government . . . conceded that Martin’s post-sentencing

behavior is among the best that it has seen.”). For example, one movant earned her GED,

became a respected tutor for other inmates, and displayed such exemplary behavior that

correctional staff moved her into a low security facility. Id. at 396. The other movant

created an educational tool to help his fellow inmates and demonstrated such

trustworthiness that he was moved to a minimum-security facility and allowed to work

outside the prison compound. Id. at 397. We vacated and remanded the district court’s

judgments because this “significant evidence of mitigation” required some

acknowledgement and explanation from the district court. Id. at 397–398.

Similarly, in United States v. McDonald, we remanded three movants’ cases for

further explanation where “each of the district court’s orders merely included a single

checkmark ‘granting’ the [sentence-reduction] motion and a single sentence noting” the

extent of the reduction. 986 F.3d 402, 412 (4th Cir. 2021). The movants had presented

“extensive” rehabilitative evidence spanning almost two decades, including “that they

obtained their GEDs, undertook significant coursework, engaged in prison programming,

. . . earned good time credit for their good behavior, and earned low levels of security

clearance.” Id. at 411. Relying on Martin, we concluded that some explanation of the

district court’s reasons for its sentence reduction decisions was necessary. Id. at 412.

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Davis is not similarly situated to the movants in Martin and McDonald. Despite his

good disciplinary record, Davis is a medium-security inmate and the Bureau of Prisons has

assessed his risk of recidivism as high. Although his prison employment record and

coursework are positive, they are “much more similar to the ‘various educational courses’”

of Chavez-Meza (and the clean disciplinary record and educational courses in High) than

“to the exceptional post-sentencing conduct of the defendants in Martin and McDonald.”

High, 997 F.3d at 190. Most importantly, the district court here did not “leave [us] in the

dark as to the reasons for its decision.” Martin, 916 F.3d at 398. The court issued a

reasoned opinion explaining that Davis’s 210-month sentence remains appropriate because

of the seriousness of his crime, his long and violent criminal history, his risk of recidivism,

and the continuing danger he poses to the public. That ruling—by the same judge who

sentenced Davis originally—fully resolved Davis’s claim that his rehabilitation and

intervening changes in sentencing law justified a sentence reduction.

The district court fulfilled its obligation “to demonstrate that it ha[d] considered the

arguments before it” when ruling on Davis’s motion for compassionate release.

Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2405; see also United States v. Reed, 58 F.4th 816, 823 (4th Cir.

2023) (calling this requirement “a low bar”). No more was required. The majority

concludes otherwise, so I must respectfully dissent.

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