Olentangy Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision

[Cite as Olentangy Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2024-Ohio-1564.]

COURT OF APPEALS
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

OLENTANGY LOCAL SCHOOL : JUDGES:
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION : Hon. John W. Wise, P.J.
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
Appellant : Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
:
-vs- : Case Nos. 23 CAE 09 0062
: 23 CAE 09 0067
DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF : 23 CAE 09 0069
REVISION, ET AL. : 23 CAE 09 0070
: 23 CAE 09 0077
Appellees : 23 CAE 09 0078
: 23 CAE 09 0079
: 23 CAE 09 0080
:
: OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeals from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case Nos. 23 CV F 06 0373,
23 CV F 06 0378, 23 CV F 06 0380,
23 CV F 06 0381, 23 CV F 06 0388,
23 CV F 06 0389, 23 CV F 06 0390,
23 CV F 06 0391

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT: April 23, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Appellant For Appellees BOR & Auditor

MARK H. GILLIS MICHAEL P. CAVANAUGH
KELLEY A. GORRY 145 North Union Street, 3rd Floor
5747 Perimeter Drive, Suite 150 P.O. Box 8006
Dublin, OH 43017 Delaware, OH 43015
For Appellee 561 Westar Holdings, LLC For Appellee Soccer Matters Case
and Appellee 8771 Moreland, LLC Avenue, LLC

REBECCA A. KELLEY SCOTT B. BIRRER
600 East Rich Street 655 Metro Place South, Suite 600
Columbus, OH 43215 Dublin, OH 43017

For Appellee St. Powell, LLC For Appellee Arbaugh Properties of
Owenfield, LLC
SEAN F. BERNEY
4725 Grayton Road ARBAUGH PROPERTIES OF
Cleveland, OH 44135 OWENFIELD, LLC
c/o United States Corp. Agents, Inc.
1991 Croker Road #600-755
Westlake, OH 44145
For Appellee Sunbury XM, LLC

MATT MILLER-NOVAK
3074 Madison Road For Appellee Coughlin Automotive II
Cincinnati, OH 45209 Realty, LLC

COUGHLIN AUTOMOTIVE II
REALTY, LLC
For Appellee 9200 Worthington Holdings, LP c/o CPM Statutory Agent Corp.
950 Goodale Boulevard
TERENCE L. GALLAGHER Columbus, OH 43212
8740 Orion Place, Suite 200
Columbus, OH 43240
King, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Olentangy Local School District Board of Education ("BOE"),

appeals the decision of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas dismissing its

complaints challenging the 2022 tax value of certain real property.

{¶ 2} Appellees are Delaware County Board of Revision ("BOR"), Delaware

County Auditor ("Auditor"), and the following property owners: 561 Westar Holdings, LLC,

Soccer Matters Case Avenue, LLC, 8771 Moreland, LLC, St. Powell, LLC, Arbaugh

Properties of Owenfield, LLC, Sunbury XM, LLC, Coughlin Automotive II Realty, LLC, and

9200 Worthington Holdings, LP. We affirm the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 3} The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:

{¶ 4} In 2022, BOE filed numerous original valuation complaints with the BOR for

tax year 2022, challenging the true value of certain real property and seeking an increase

in the value of properties owned by the property owners, appellees herein.

{¶ 5} The BOR did not hold a hearing on BOE's complaints and issued decisions

dismissing BOE's complaints "due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction" for noncompliance

with R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a)(i).

{¶ 6} BOE appealed these decisions to the Delaware County Common Pleas

Court as an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506.01.

{¶ 7} Shortly after commencing its appeals to the common pleas court, BOE

moved the court to stay its appeals based on an action pending before the Board of Tax

Authority in a related appeal by a third-party taxpayer complainant, and a declaratory
judgment action pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2721 pending in the Franklin County Common

Pleas Court.

{¶ 8} Appellee property owners filed motions to dismiss in their respective cases,

arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

{¶ 9} The trial court denied appellant's motions for a stay and granted the property

owners' motions to dismiss, finding that appellant lacks statutory standing to file an appeal

with the common pleas court under R.C. 2506.01.

{¶ 10} Appellant BOE filed an appeal in each case with the following identical

assignments of error:

I

{¶ 11} "THE DELAWARE COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT R.C. 2506.01 DOES NOT CREATE AN INDEPENDENT RIGHT OF

APPEAL IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE

STATUTE AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT."

II

{¶ 12} "THE DELAWARE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COURT COMMITTED

LEGAL ERROR IN CITING JRB HOLDING, HAMER, AND NKANGINIEME AS

SUPPORT FOR ITS HOLDING THAT R.C. 2506.01 DOES NOT CREATE AN

INDEPENDENT STATUTORY RIGHT OF APPEAL."

III

{¶ 13} "THE DELAWARE COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THE BOARD OF EDUCATION LACKED STATUTORY STANDING TO

APPEAL PURSUANT TO R.C. 2506.01."
 I, II, III

{¶ 14} The issue before this court is whether the trial court erred in holding that a

board of education lacks statutory authority to appeal a decision of a county board of

revision to the common pleas court as an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506.01.

Statutory Background

{¶ 15} This appeal presents an issue of statutory construction occasioned by the

passage of H.B.126, which took effect on July 21, 2022. H.B. 126 imposed severe

restrictions on the participation of boards of education in ad valorem real property tax

proceedings and enacted a series of new procedural and substantive requirements for

boards of education filing valuation complaints. See R.C. 5715.19(A)(6). Among the

most severe of the new restrictions, the General Assembly eliminated the right of boards

of education (and other public entities and political subdivisions authorized to participate

in board of revision cases) to appeal decisions of boards of revision to the Board of Tax

Appeals ("BTA") pursuant to R.C. 5717.01.

{¶ 16} Previously, R.C. 5717.01 allowed boards of education to appeal board of

revision decisions to the BTA:

An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be taken

to the board of tax appeals * * *. Such an appeal may be taken by the

county auditor, the tax commissioner, or any board, legislative authority,

public official, or taxpayer authorized by section 5715.19 of the Revised

Code to file complaints against valuations or assessments with the auditor.
 {¶ 17} In its relevant part, the revisions to R.C. 5717.01 read:

An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be taken

to the board of tax appeals * * *. Such an appeal may be taken by the

county auditor, the tax commissioner, or any board, legislative authority,

public official, or taxpayer authorized by section 5715.19 of the Revised

Code to file complaints against valuation or assessments with the auditor,

except that a subdivision that files an original complaint or counter-

complaint under that section with respect to property the subdivision does

not own or lease may not appeal the decision of the board of revision with

respect to that original complaint or counter-complaint. R.C. 5717.01,

amended by H.B. 126.

{¶ 18} It is undisputed that H.B. 126's elimination of a board of education's right to

appeal to the BTA applies to boards of education filing "original complaints" and "counter-

complaints" as those terms are now defined by newly enacted R.C. 5715.19 after the

effective date of H.B. 126.

{¶ 19} It is also undisputed that H.B. 126 did not amend R.C. 5717.05 which

provides an additional avenue for an appeal of a board of revision decision to the county

common pleas court "as an alternative to the appeal provided for in section 5717.01" to

the BTA "by the person in whose name the property is listed or sought to be listed for

taxation" (i.e., the property owner). See R.C. 5717.05. The General Assembly has not

amended R.C. 5715.05 since its enactment in 1989. See R.C. 5717.05.
 {¶ 20} BOE herein concedes that prior to the amendment of R.C. 5717.01 by H.B.

126, it did not have a statutory right to appeal a decision of the BOR to the common pleas

court pursuant to R.C. 2506.01 because R.C. 2506.01(C) specifically provides that an

appeal is not available from a "decision from which an appeal is granted by * * * statute

to a higher administrative authority if a right to a hearing on appeal is provided * * * " and

because an appeal to the BTA pursuant to R.C. 5717.01 routinely provides for a hearing

on appeal, R.C. 5717.01 precluded an appeal under R.C. 2506.01. BOE argues,

however, that when H.B. 126 removed a board of education's right of appeal to the BTA

pursuant to R.C. 5717.01, it opened up an avenue for a board of education to appeal to

the common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 2506.01.

Standing

{¶ 21} It is well established that before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a

legal claim, the person seeking relief must establish standing to sue. Ohio Contractors

Association v. Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, 643 N.E.2d 1088 (1994).

{¶ 22} "The right to appeal an administrative decision is neither inherent nor

inalienable; to the contrary, it must be conferred by statute." Midwest Fireworks

Manufacturing Co. v. Deerfield Township Board of Zoning Appeals, 91 Ohio St.3d 174,

177, 743 N.E.2d 894, 897 (2001), citing Roper v. Board of Zoning Appeals, Richfield

Township, Summit County, 173 Ohio St. 168, 173, 180 N.E.2d 591 (1962).

{¶ 23} "Because one cannot appeal an administrative order absent statutory

authority, the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear a case unless authority to appeal is

granted by statute." Alesi v. Warren County Board of Commissioners, 12th Dist. Warren

Nos. CA2013-12-123, CA2013-12-124, CA2013-12-127, CA2013-12-128, CA2013-12-
131, and CA2013-12-132, 2014-Ohio-5192, ¶17. Therefore, standing is a jurisdictional

prerequisite that cannot be waived. Id.

{¶ 24} "The burden of proof to establish standing lies with the party seeking to

appeal and therefore that party must ensure that the record supports his or her claim of

standing." Safest Neighborhood Association v. Athens Board of Zoning Appeals, 4th Dist.

Athens Nos. 12CA32 thru 12CA35, 2013-Ohio-5610, ¶ 20; Kurtock v. Cleveland Board of

Zoning Appeals, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100266, 2014-Ohio-1836, ¶10; Alexis

Entertainment, L.L.C. v. Toledo, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-13-1028, 2013-Ohio-3946, ¶ 9,

citing Kraus v. Put-In-Bay Township Board of Zoning & Appeals, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-

04-011, 2004-Ohio-4678, ¶12.

{¶ 25} Whether a party has established standing to bring an action before the court

is a question of law, which we review de novo. Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55,

2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 20, citing Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners

v. State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, 858 N.E.2d 330, ¶ 23.

Analysis

{¶ 26} The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires a court to first look at the

specific language of the statute itself and, if the meaning of the statute is unambiguous

and definite, further interpretation is not necessary and a court must apply the statute as

written. State v. Jordan, 89 Ohio St.3d 488, 492, 733 N.E.2d 601 (2000), quoting State

ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School District Board of Education, 74 Ohio St.3d 543,

545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996). Ambiguity exists only if the language of a statute is

susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, and the facts and circumstances

of a case do not permit a court to read ambiguity into a statute. Dunbar v. State, 136
Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, ¶ 16. " '[W]here the language of a statute is clear and

unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to enforce the statute as written, making neither

additions to the statute nor subtractions therefrom.' " State v. Knoble, 9th Dist. Lorain No.

08CA009359, 2008-Ohio-5004, ¶ 12, quoting Hubbard v. Canton City School Board of

Education, 97 Ohio St.3d 451, 2002-Ohio-6718, 780 N.E.2d 543, ¶ 14. "Thus, inquiry into

legislative intent, legislative history, public policy, the consequences of an interpretation,

or any other factors identified in R.C. 1.49 is inappropriate absent an initial finding that

the language of the statute is, itself, capable of bearing more than one meaning." Dunbar

at ¶ 16.

{¶ 27} "It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that 'the General Assembly is

not presumed to do a vain or useless thing, and that when language is inserted in a statute

it is inserted to accomplish some definite purpose.' " State v. Wilson, 77 Ohio St.3d 334,

336, 673 N.E.2d 1347 (1997), quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v.

Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 479, 159 N.E.2d 756 (1959); See also New Albany-Plain Local

Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-

732, 2023-Ohio-3806, 226 N.E.3d 1035, ¶ 35.

{¶ 28} As set forth above, revised R.C. 5717.01 provides that school boards of

education are prohibited from filing appeals from a decision by the board of revision with

the BTA regarding property the school boards neither own nor lease. Further, the

legislature made no changes to R.C. 5717.05 which allows an appeal by the property

owner from the board of revision to the common pleas court.

{¶ 29} We find no ambiguity in either R.C. 5717.01 or R.C. 5717.05.
 {¶ 30} BOE concedes it no longer has a right to appeal to the BTA, but argues

instead that because of said changes, they now have a right to appeal to the common

pleas court under R.C. 2506.01.

{¶ 31} R.C. Chapter 5717 does provide a right to appeal to the common pleas court

under R.C. 5717.05, however this right is granted only to property owners, not boards of

education.

{¶ 32} R.C. Chapter 5717 could not be clearer in expressing the intent that the

right to appeal to the common pleas court under R.C. 5717.05 resides solely with the

property owner.

{¶ 33} "All statutes relating to the same subject matter must be read in pari materia,

and construed together, so as to give the proper force and effect to each and all such

statutes." (Emphasis sic.) In re K.J., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-1050, 2014-Ohio-3472, ¶ 21,

citing State v. Cook, 128 Ohio St.3d 120, 2010-Ohio-6305, 942 N.E.2d 357, ¶ 45.

{¶ 34} Upon review, we find that the General Assembly expressed its intent to deny

boards of education a right to appeal a decision of a board of revision by removing said

right under R.C. 5717.01 and by not modifying R.C. 5717.05 to include said boards of

education.

R.C. 2506.01

{¶ 35} Appellant herein argues that it now has a right to appeal under R.C.

2506.01.

{¶ 36} R.C. 2506.01 establishes the right to appeal an administrative decision of a

political subdivision that determines "rights, duties, privileges, benefits or legal

relationships of a person * * *." R.C. 2506.01(C).
 {¶ 37} We look to the language of Revised Code 2506.01, which provides:

(A) Except as otherwise provided in sections 2506.05 to 2506.08 of

the Revised Code, and except as modified by this section and sections

2506.02 to 2506.04 of the Revised Code, every final order, adjudication, or

decision of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission,

department, or other division of any political subdivision of the state may be

reviewed by the court of common pleas of the county in which the principal

office of the political subdivision is located as provided in Chapter 2505. of

the Revised Code.

(B) The appeal provided in this section is in addition to any other

remedy of appeal provided by law.

(C) As used in this chapter, "final order, adjudication, or decision"

means an order, adjudication, or decision that determines rights, duties,

privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a person, but does not include

any order, adjudication, or decision from which an appeal is granted by rule,

ordinance, or statute to a higher administrative authority if a right to a

hearing on such appeal is provided, or any order, adjudication, or decision

that is issued preliminary to or as a result of a criminal proceeding.

{¶ 38} This court recognizes that R.C. 2506.01 " 'does not address the question of

who has standing to bring such an appeal.' " (Emphasis sic.) Myers v. Clinebell, 6th Dist.

Sandusky No. S-98-048, 1999 WL 300620 (May 14, 1999), quoting Willoughby Hills v. C.
C. Bar's Sahara, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 24, 26, 591 N.E.2d 1203 (1992). We construe the

plain, clear and unambiguous language of R.C. 2506.01 its usual and customary

meanings. Medcorp, Inc. v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Services, 121 Ohio St.3d

622, 2009-Ohio-2058, 906 N.E.2d 1125, ¶ 9. " '[I]t is the duty of the court to give effect

to the words used, not to delete words used or insert words not used.' " Westgate

Shopping Village v. Toledo, 93 Ohio App.3d 507, 517-518, 639 N.E.2d 126 (6th

Dist.1994), quoting Cline v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 61 Ohio St.3d 93, 97, 573

N.E.2d 77 (1991).

{¶ 39} R.C. 2506.01 does not create a cause of action where none otherwise

exists. Regarding administrative appeals under R.C. 2506.01, Ohio courts require a party

to identify a statutory provision that expressly authorizes the filing of an appeal. Yanega

v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision, 156 Ohio St.3d 203, 2018-Ohio-5208, 124 N.E.3d

806, ¶ 10 ("there is no inherent right to appeal an administrative decision; rather, the right

must be conferred by statute"). This statutory permission cannot come from R.C. 2506.01

itself. JRB Holdings, LLC v. Stark County Board of Revision, 5th Dist. Stark No.

2021CA00144, 2022-Ohio-1646, ¶11-18 (looking beyond R.C. Chapter 2506 to determine

whether an appeal from a board of revision is permitted).

{¶ 40} Rather, that authority must arise from another statutory provision. See also

Hamer v. Danbury Township Board of Zoning Appeals, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1210,

2020-Ohio-3209, 155 N.E.3d 218, ¶ 10 ("jurisdiction over an administrative appeal is

improper unless granted by R.C. 119.12 or other specific statutory authority"), quoting

Nkanginieme v. Ohio Department of Medicaid, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-596, 2015-

Ohio-656, 29 N.E.3d 281, ¶ 15.
 {¶ 41} R.C. 2506.01 is a general statute dealing with appeals from various bodies.

R.C. 5717.01, on the other hand, is a special statute specifically dealing with board of

revision property valuations and rights of appeal therefrom. Under such circumstances,

R.C. 5717.01 prevails and is exclusively applicable. As set forth by the Supreme Court

of Ohio in Acme Engineering Co. v. Jones, 150 Ohio St. 423, 83 N.E.2d 202 (1948):

A special statutory provision which applies to a specific subject

matter constitutes an exception to a general statutory provision covering

other subjects as well as the specific subject matter which might otherwise

be included under the general provision. (State, ex rel. Steller et al.,

Trustees, v. Zangerle, Aud., 100 Ohio St. 414, 126 N.E. 413, and paragraph

one of the syllabus in State, ex rel. Elliott Co., v. Connar, Supt., 123 Ohio

St. 310, 175 N.E. 200, approved and followed.)

See also Ruprecht v. City of Cincinnati, 64 Ohio App.2d 90, 92-93, 411 N.E.2d 504, 507

(1st Dist.1979).

{¶ 42} We further find that the Supreme Court of Ohio's holdings in Nuspl v. City

of Akron and Anderson v. City of Akron, 61 Ohio St.3d 511, 575 N.E.2d 447 (1991),

Sutherland-Wagner v. Brook Park Civil Service Commission, 32 Ohio St.3d 323, 512

N.E.2d 1170 (1987), and Walker v. Eastlake, 61 Ohio St.2d 273, 275, 400 N.E.2d 908,

909-910 (1980), provide that "an appeal is available from a final order of a commission of

a political subdivision of the state unless another statute, enacted subsequent to the
enactment of R.C. 2506.01, clearly prohibits the use of this section." The Nuspl court

specifically held R.C. 2506.01 "provides an aggrieved party an additional avenue of relief

that is not expressly prohibited by a subsequently enacted statute." Id. at 515.

{¶ 43} Here, we find R.C. 5717.01 (and R.C. 5717.05) was enacted subsequent to

R.C. 2506.01 and that such statute, through its newly enacted revisions, prohibits an

appeal from a decision of the board of revision by a board of education to either the BTA

or the common pleas court.

{¶ 44} Having found BOE is without standing to appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506.01,

we find no error by the trial court in granting appellees' motions to dismiss.

{¶ 45} Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware

County, Ohio, is affirmed.

By King, J.

Wise, P.J. and

Baldwin, J. concur.