NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FREEDOM CHRISTOPHER AUS No. 23-15412
PFAENDLER,
D.C. No. 4:20-cv-00188-JCH
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
SAHUARITA, TOWN OF; JOHN
GEORGE; JOSEPH A. RIVERA; JESS
VILLANUEVA; SHANNON COLLIER;
SAMUEL ALMODOVA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John Charles Hinderaker, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 4, 2024
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Freedom Christopher Austin Pfaendler appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment on his civil rights claims against the Town of
Sahuarita and the individual police officers who arrested him, brought under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arizona state law. The district court granted summary
judgment to Defendants on Pfaendler’s false arrest, malicious prosecution, and
illegal search claims, finding that the officers’ actions were constitutionally valid
or protected by qualified immunity.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. O’Doan v. Sanford, 991
F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2021). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
we affirm.
1. To sustain a claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution under
§ 1983 or Arizona law, a plaintiff must show the absence of probable cause.
Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2015); Slade v. City of
Phoenix, 541 P.2d 550, 552-53 (Ariz. 1975). “To determine whether an officer had
probable cause for an arrest, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and
then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an
objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56-57 (2018) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within
the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent person to
believe that a crime has been committed.” Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d
1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009).
Pfaendler first asserts that the district court failed to properly apply the
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summary judgment standard in its probable cause analysis. But he fails to identify
any disputed issue of material fact, as the factual disputes he identifies are (1) not
“over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), (2) belied by video evidence in the record, see
Hernandez v. Town of Gilbert, 989 F.3d 739, 746 (9th Cir. 2021), or (3) disputes
that would require us to “draw unreasonable inferences from circumstantial
evidence,” McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988).
“In the absence of material factual disputes, the objective reasonableness of
a police officer's conduct is a pure question of law.” O’Doan, 991 F.3d at 1035
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The undisputed facts were more
than sufficient for a reasonable officer to conclude that Pfaendler had violated
Arizona’s trespassing law, which requires in relevant part that a person
“[k]nowingly enter[] or remain[] unlawfully on any real property after a reasonable
request to leave by . . . the owner or any other person having lawful control over
such property . . . .” A.R.S. § 13-1502(A)(1).1 Officers had uncontradicted
information that the store manager, a “person having lawful control over [the]
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Though Pfaendler was ultimately charged with disorderly conduct, “an arrest
is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest for any offense, not just the
offense cited at the time of arrest or booking.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 54 n.2. We limit
our discussion to trespass, as that analysis is sufficient to resolve this case.
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property,” had made one or more “reasonable request[s] to leave.” Pfaendler, still
in the store when officers arrived, appeared to be “remaining unlawfully.”
Pfaendler counters that officers “failed to meaningfully account
for . . . exculpatory evidence” suggesting that he had not knowingly refused a
request to leave. Specifically, he contends that he never heard the manager’s
requests to leave. But “[t]he mere existence of some evidence that could suggest [a
valid defense] does not negate probable cause.” Yousefian, 779 F.3d at 1014. All
that is required is “a ‘fair probability’ that the person knew” their conduct was
unlawful. Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1430 (9th Cir. 1994). It was not
unreasonable for officers to conclude that under the totality of the circumstances –
which included not only Pfaendler’s innocent explanation, but also the manager’s
countervailing statements, 911 calls relating that Pfaendler was ignoring requests
to leave, and officers’ own observations of and interactions with Pfaendler – there
was a fair probability that Pfaendler knew he had been asked to leave and yet
remained. Cf. O’Doan, 991 F.3d at 1041 (“If arresting officers had to accept at face
value claims of potential lack of mens rea, as here, many arrests for unlawful
conduct would likely be called into question . . . .”).
2. Pfaendler also contends that a material factual dispute remains over
whether the decision to arrest was based on his “contempt of cop,” i.e., his
“invocation of his right to remain silent or his failure to be sufficiently deferential
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to officers.” We will not ordinarily scrutinize an officer’s actual motivations for an
otherwise valid arrest. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)
(“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.”). Where, as here, the objective facts provide probable cause
to arrest, the arresting officers’ subjective intent is irrelevant. See Nieves v.
Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1724-25 (2019).
3. Pfaendler urges reversal of the dismissal of his federal illegal search
claim, as well as the reinstatement of his claims for equitable relief. Because these
arguments are predicated on the absence of probable cause for his arrest, they must
also fail.
AFFIRMED.
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