NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEBORAH STAMPFLI, No. 23-15346
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC
v.
STEVE J. STUMP, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant,
and
SUSANVILLE SANITARY DISTRICT; et
al.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 25, 2024**
San Francisco, California
Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Steve Stump appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and granting Deborah
Stampfli’s motion for partial summary judgment on the basis that she was not an
at-will employee at the time of her termination. We have jurisdiction to review the
denial of qualified immunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we have pendent
jurisdiction to review the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment as the
corresponding issue is “inextricably intertwined” with “other issues properly
before the court.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1284 (9th Cir. 2000). We
affirm.
1. When assessing whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, we
engage in a two-prong inquiry. “First, we must determine whether the official
violated a constitutional right.” Levine v. City of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 907 (9th
Cir. 2008) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). “Second, we must
determine whether the right was clearly established such that a reasonable official
would [have] known that he was engaging in unlawful conduct.” Id. (citing
Aguilera v. Baca, 510 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2007)). “If an official reasonably
believed that his conduct was lawful, qualified immunity applies.” Id. (citing
Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001)).
2. First, the district court did not err in concluding that Stump violated
Stampfli’s procedural due process rights.
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As an initial matter, Stampfli properly established that she had a protected
property interest in her continued employment because she was not an at-will
employee at the time of her termination. Indeed, the Susanville Sanitary District’s
policies provide that an individual is entitled to for-cause protection from
termination (in addition to other procedural safeguards), provided they are a
permanent employee. And this court’s precedent establishes that those associated
protections do not terminate without proper notice. See McGraw v. City of
Huntington Beach, 882 F.2d 384, 388 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, the record
demonstrates that Stampfli was a permanent employee. Even viewing all evidence
in the light most favorable to him, Stump fails to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact concerning whether Stampfli was given proper notice that she would
be surrendering her pre-existing employment protections simply by accepting her
promotion to Assistant General Manager/Office Administrator. Thus, Stampfli was
entitled to procedural safeguards prior to her termination.
Because it is undisputed that Stampfli was not afforded any procedural
safeguards prior to her termination, the district court did not err in concluding that
Stump violated Stampfli’s procedural due process rights. The district court also
properly granted Stampfli’s motion for partial summary judgment.
3. Second, the district court did not err in determining that Stampfli’s rights
were clearly established at the time of her termination. Our precedents have long
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established that a “‘permanent employee,’ dismissible only for cause, has ‘a
property interest in [her] continued employment which is protected by due
process.’” Dorr v. Butte Cnty., 795 F.2d 875, 876 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Skelly v.
State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 207–08 (1975)); see also Beckwith v. Clark
Cnty., 827 F.2d 595, 597 (9th Cir. 1987); McGraw, 882 F.2d at 389. Our
precedents also establish that procedural protections for permanent employees may
not be removed without proper notice to the employee. See McGraw, 882 F.2d at
388 (“[I]t is very difficult to accept an argument that the City Council intended
‘permanent employee’ status, once earned, to terminate sub silentio upon
promotion, once again subjecting the promoted employee to the risks of what is
essentially the ‘at-will’ employment status.”). And one can violate clearly
established law “even in novel factual circumstances.” Bonivert v. City of
Clarkston, 883 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, at the time of Stampfli’s
termination, it was clearly established that terminating a public employee who was
afforded for-cause protections by district policy on the basis that she lost her for-
cause protections solely due to offhand, mistaken remarks made at a board meeting
would violate that employee’s due process rights.
4. Finally, Stump has failed to demonstrate that, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to Stampfli, “a reasonable official in [Stump’s] position could
have believed that his conduct was lawful.” Levine, 525 F.3d at 907. Indeed,
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“[w]hen the law is clearly established, as here, the qualified immunity defense fails
‘since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his
conduct.’” Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982)). Thus, summary judgment on
the basis of qualified immunity was appropriately denied by the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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