UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
ANDREW SHANK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 97-2730
THE PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.
(CA-97-569-JFM)
Submitted: August 11, 1998
Decided: September 16, 1998
Before MURNAGHAN and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Gerard P. Uehlinger, Towson, Maryland, for Appellant. Mark E.
Schmidtke, EBENSTEIN & SCHMIDTKE CONSULTANTS, Valpa-
raiso, Indiana; Ruth Atkinson Lusby, RUTH ATKINSON LUSBY,
P.A., Towson, Maryland, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Andrew Shank appeals from the district court's orders denying a
discovery request and granting the motion of Paul Revere Life Insur-
ance Company (Revere) for summary judgment on Shank's complaint
seeking long term disability benefits under a group insurance plan
sponsored by his former law firm, MJS&B. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
Shank was employed by MJS&B from May 1994 until May 18,
1995, when he voluntarily resigned because he was suffering from the
effects of severe stress. Shank sought treatment from his physician on
June 27, 1995, and was eventually hospitalized. 1 Shank filed a claim
with Revere for group disability benefits in March 1996. Revere
denied the claim, and Shank filed suit.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no genuine issue
of material fact," given the parties' burdens of proof at trial. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). In determining whether the moving party has shown that there
is no genuine issue of material fact, we must assess the factual evi-
dence and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. See Ross v. Communications Sat-
ellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985). We review a grant of
summary judgment de novo. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988). In the present case, we find
that the district court properly granted Revere's motion.
_________________________________________________________________
1 Although Shank claims that his symptoms began in February 1995
and that he called his physician about taking some of his wife's medica-
tion prior to his resignation, the record clearly shows that he did not see
a doctor for treatment until June.
2
Because the disability plan here gave Revere complete discretion
in determining eligibility for benefits and interpreting the terms of the
agreement, we review Revere's decision denying benefits to see
whether it was arbitrary or capricious. See Bernstein v. CapitalCare,
Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 787-88 (4th Cir. 1995).2 Shank's plan provided
coverage to employees who became disabled during the course of
their employment. To be considered disabled under the plan, an
employee must, inter alia, be under a doctor's care for treatment of
the disabling condition. We find that the record clearly shows that
Shank did not receive treatment until June 1995, over one month after
his resignation. Because the express language of the plan states that
treatment by a physician, not onset of symptoms, is the triggering
event for coverage, we find that Revere's decision denying benefits
was not objectively unreasonable, and summary judgment was appro-
priate.
It is well-settled that discovery decisions are within the trial court's
discretion, and we find no abuse of that discretion here. Shank sought
permission to depose certain employees of Revere hoping to find sup-
port for his conclusory allegation that Revere had a secret policy of
initially denying all claims. Since the proposed deposition testimony
did not address the ultimate reason for denial of Shank's claim (i.e.,
that he did not receive treatment for his condition until after his resig-
nation), we find that any such policy, even if it did exist, would not
have had any effect on the final outcome of his case. As a result, the
proposed testimony was irrelevant to any issue before the district
court, and the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shank's
request.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's orders. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
_________________________________________________________________
2 In this case, Revere was both the plan administrator and the payor of
benefits. We therefore review Revere's decision to see whether it was
objectively reasonable, given this possible conflict of interest. Id.
3