Tyrone Martin v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm

                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                       No. 21-2406
                                       __________

                                   TYRONE MARTIN,
                                             Appellant

                                             v.

      SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
D. LEE; LT. HOLLIS, (Use of Force) (John Doe); LT. KOPP; SGT MROZEK; C/O K.
     M. MASON; C/O SLOAN; MS. SHEESLEY, (PSYC.); NURSE TAMMY
               JOHNSTON; SCI FOREST SUPERINTENDENT
                 ____________________________________

                   On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                         (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-18-cv-00215)
             Magistrate Judge: Honorable Richard A. Lanzillo (by consent)
                     ____________________________________

                    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                                 September 26, 2022

               Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and MATEY, Circuit Judges

                               (Opinion filed: May 3, 2024)
                                      ___________

                                       OPINION *
                                      ___________

PER CURIAM



*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
       Tyrone Martin, an inmate confined at State Correctional Institution at Phoenix

(“SCI-Phoenix”), appeals pro se from the District Court’s judgment in favor of the

defendants in his civil rights action. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.

                                             I.

       On May 29, 2018, while confined at State Correctional Institution at Phoenix

(“SCI-Forest”), Martin barricaded himself inside of his cell and requested to speak with

“psych.” When a Psychological Services Specialist offered to see him outside of his cell,

Martin refused. Martin also refused orders to uncover his cell door and approach the

wicket to be handcuffed. A team of corrections officers then extracted him from his cell

by spraying Oleoresin Capsicum (“OC”) spray into his cell. Martin was then taken to the

medical unit, where he was examined and treated by a nurse. The corrections officers

returned Martin to his cell, which had been cleared out and cleaned for decontamination

purposes. Twice more, Martin attempted to harm himself and officers deployed OC

spray to remove him from his cell.

       Martin subsequently filed a civil rights complaint against prison officials and staff

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. After some parties were dismissed, 1 and upon the completion of

discovery, the remaining defendants (“defendants”) moved for summary judgment. The

District Court granted the defendants’ motion and entered a judgment in their favor.

Martin filed a timely appeal.


1
 Martin does not challenge the District Court’s orders dismissing other defendants, or
any of the court’s interlocutory orders, on appeal.
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                                             II.

       We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a

grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard that the District Court applies.

Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2017).

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. See Murray v.

Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

       The District Court thoroughly detailed Martin’s allegations, the parties’

evidentiary submissions, and the relevant law. We have little to add to its analysis.

Notably, the District Court accurately described the video recordings of the subject

incident, which plainly contradicted Martin’s claims that officers hit him while returning

him to his cell.

       While the video evidenced showed that defendants did use OC spray to remove

Martin from his cell, it also demonstrates that the OC spray was applied in a “good-faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline,” rather than “maliciously and sadistically for the

purpose of causing harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); see Staples v.

Gerry, 923 F.3d 7, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2019). The video further showed that Martin received

medical care after each exposure to the OC spray, and that defendants acted reasonably in

relying on the decisions of medical personnel in treating him. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372

F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).



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       Regarding Martin’s allegation that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment

rights by subjecting him to a “cavity search,” the District Court properly determined that

defendants had a legitimate penological purpose in conducting a visual strip search after

Martin had covered his window and threatened to harm himself. See Ricks v. Shover,

891 F.3d 468, 475 (3d Cir. 2018). Similarly, we agree with the District Court that

defendants eliminated any question of fact as to Martin’s retaliation claim, as the record

showed that, given Martin’s barricading of his cell and refusal to comply with orders to

come to the wicket, defendants would have made the same decision to use force to

remove him from his cell absent any protected conduct. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d

330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir. 2017).

The District Court also properly concluded that Martin’s invocation of the Sixth

Amendment is without merit. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440 n.16 (1960)

(noting that the Sixth Amendment is limited to “criminal prosecutions”).

       While Martin contends on appeal that the District Court erred in overlooking a

triable issue of fact as to the value of his possessions that were thrown away in the

process of decontaminating his cell, we conclude that that question is inapposite because

defendants have shown that Martin had an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the

prison grievance system and was accordingly not denied due process. See Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that post-deprivation remedies provide

sufficient due process for both negligent and intentional deprivations of property);

Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that

prison grievance system was adequate post-deprivation remedy). Finally, because

                                             4
defendants eliminated all issues of fact relating to Martin’s constitutional claims, his

conspiracy claim is also without merit. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab.

Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 1999).

       We will accordingly affirm the judgment of the District Court. Martin’s
outstanding motions are denied.




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