Buzzard v. Fass

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Buzzard v. Fass

JOAN BUZZARD v. LAURA FASS ET AL.
(AC 46257)
Elgo, Clark and Lavine, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 45a-731), ‘‘[a] final decree of adoption . . . shall have
the following effect in this state . . . (4) The adopted person shall,
except as hereinafter provided, be treated as if such adopted person
were the biological child of the adoptive parent for purposes of the
applicability of all documents and instruments, whether executed before
or after the adoption decree is issued, which do not expressly exclude
an adopted person in their operation or effect.’’
Pursuant further to statute (§ 45a-731 (11), ‘‘[t]he provisions of subdivisions
(1) to (9), inclusive, of this section shall apply to the estate or wills of
persons dying prior to October 1, 1959, and to inter vivos instruments
executed prior to said date and which on said date were not subject to
the grantor’s power to revoke or amend, unless (A) a contrary intention
of the testator or grantor is demonstrated by clear and convincing evi-
dence, or (B) distribution of the estate or under the will or under the
inter vivos instrument has been or will be made pursuant to court order
entered prior to October 1, 1991.’’
The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from an order of the Probate
Court overruling her objection to the approval of a periodic accounting
of a testamentary trust, which had provided for distributions to the
defendants, F and W, the adopted great grandnieces of the testator,
T. In 1946, T executed a will and two codicils. T’s will established a
testamentary trust for the benefit of the descendants of his siblings. T’s
sister and the living issue of T’s other siblings were designated as the
original beneficiaries. T died in 1947, and, in 1949, the Probate Court
issued a decree that transferred the ‘‘rest, residue and remainder’’ of
T’s estate to the trustee, so that the trustee could make distributions
in accordance with the trust. W was adopted as a child in 1948 by a
descendant of one of the original beneficiaries and began receiving
distributions under the trust upon the death of her parent in 1997. F
was adopted in 2008 as an adult by one of the descendants of the original
beneficiaries and began receiving distributions under the trust in 2014
upon the death of her parent. In 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection in
the Probate Court to the approval of a periodic accounting of the trust,
arguing that the trust did not allow for distributions to F because she
had been adopted as an adult. The Probate Court approved the periodic
accounting, concluding that the presumption in favor of adopted persons
in § 45a-731 (4) applied, and the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court,
where the defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that
they were included within the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ used in
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Buzzard v. Fass
the trust pursuant to § 45a-731 (4). The plaintiff filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that the exceptions to § 45a-731 (4) in § 45a-
731 (11) applied and, therefore, the only persons permitted to receive
distributions from the trust were the originally named beneficiaries
and their lineal blood descendants. The Superior Court granted the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment, rejecting the plaintiff’s contention that
the exceptions to § 45a-731 (4) delineated in § 45a-731 (11) applied.
From the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this
court. Held:
1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the Superior Court erred
in rendering summary judgment for the defendants, which was based
on her claim that the exception to the presumption in favor of adopted
persons set forth in § 45a-731 (11) (B) applied: the 1949 decree, which
transferred the rest, residue and remainder of the estate to the trustee,
did not constitute a ‘‘distribution’’ for purposes of § 45a-731 (11) (B) so
as to require the application of the outmoded ‘‘stranger to the adoption’’
rule, which presumed that an adopted child was not within the intended
bounty of a settlor who was not the adopting parent, because the 1949
decree did not finalize the apportionment of the remainder of the estate
under the will, as distributions to those who were entitled to share in
the estate under the testamentary trust were still to occur into the future,
with the beneficiaries under the trust continually changing upon the
birth and death of T’s descendants, and the trust remained under the
jurisdiction of the Probate Court; moreover, other than the plaintiff’s
threadbare assertion that the 1949 decree fixed the identity of the distrib-
utees under the trust, the plaintiff did not explain how that decree vested
any interest in any beneficiary of the trust, rather, the record showed
that the 1949 decree simply transferred to the trustee the residue of the
estate so that the trustee could, in turn, make distributions to the proper
beneficiaries; furthermore, although some distributions under the trust
were made prior to October 1, 1991, other distributions were made and
approved after that date, and, therefore, § 45a-731 (11) (B) applies only
to trust distributions made or approved to be made pursuant to a court
order entered prior to October 1, 1991, and does not apply to those
distributions, such as the distribution challenged in this appeal, made
after that date.
2. The plaintiff’s claim that the exception to the presumption in favor of
adopted persons set forth in § 45a-731 (11) (A) applied because there
was clear and convincing evidence that T did not intend to include
adopted persons as beneficiaries under the trust was unavailing: there
was no rule of law at the time T’s will was executed in 1946 excluding
adopted persons from the definition of ‘‘issue’’ or ‘‘descendants,’’ rather,
under the common law, there existed a mere presumption against includ-
ing an adopted person within those terms when a testator’s intent was
unclear, and, although the presumption in effect when T executed his
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Buzzard v. Fass
will led some courts to interpret terms like the term ‘‘issue’’ to exclude
adopted persons, that presumption no longer applies because, in 1991,
the legislature altered that presumption, and, as a result, this court
presumes that the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ include legally
adopted persons when interpreting instruments that control distribu-
tions made in accordance with a will or an estate of a person that died
prior to October 1, 1959; moreover, the plaintiff’s argument that T’s use
of the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ constituted clear and convincing
evidence of an intent to exclude adopted persons because the old com-
mon-law presumption excluded them conflated T’s actual intent with a
rule of construction, and, although the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’
may have been presumed to exclude adopted persons at the time the
will was executed, the use of these terms in a will or trust, in the absence
of evidence that a testator actually considered the contingency of adop-
tion, does not provide the requisite clear and convincing evidence of
T’s intention that adopted persons be treated differently from biological
children; furthermore, although T executed a first codicil in which he
added the word ‘‘the’’ into the trust document, so that the trust as
amended provides that the interest of any of the original beneficiaries
shall be held upon the same terms for the benefit of ‘‘the other beneficiar-
ies then living and/or their issue or successors,’’ the addition of that
clarifying word did not imply anything with respect to T’s intent as to
adopted persons and did not constitute clear and convincing evidence
of an intention to exclude them.

Argued January 9—officially released May 7, 2024

Procedural History

Appeal from the decree of the Probate Court for the
district of Hartford approving the periodic accounting
of a testamentary trust, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court,
Sicilian, J., granted the defendants’ motions for sum-
mary judgment, denied the plaintiff’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, and rendered judgment thereon, from
which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
John F. Carberry, with whom, on the brief, were
Kelley Galica Peck and M. Juliet Bonazzoli, for the
appellant (plaintiff).
Steven L. Katz, with whom was Alan J. Rome, for
the appellee (named defendant).
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Buzzard v. Fass

Patrick M. Fahey, for the appellee (defendant Pamela
Baker Weiss).
Opinion

CLARK, J. The dispositive issue in this appeal is
whether the defendants, Laura Fass and Pamela Baker
Weiss, the adopted great grandnieces of Joseph Mer-
row, the testator, are included within the terms ‘‘issue’’
and ‘‘descendants’’ used in a testamentary trust exe-
cuted by the testator in 1946. The plaintiff, Joan Buz-
zard, claims that the only persons permitted to receive
distributions under the subject trust are the originally
named beneficiaries and their lineal blood descendants,
not the adopted defendants. The plaintiff claims that
the Superior Court improperly granted the defendants’
motions for summary judgment and denied her motion
for summary judgment because it erroneously con-
cluded that General Statutes § 45a-731 (4),1 which pro-
vides that the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ when
used in a will or trust shall include legally adopted
persons, applied to the trust at issue in this case. She
claims that the definitions set forth in § 45a-731 (4) do
not apply to the subject trust because the exceptions
to their application that are set forth in § 45a-731 (11)
(A) and (B)2 apply in this case. For the reasons that
1
General Statutes § 45a-731 provides in relevant part: ‘‘A final decree of
adoption, whether issued by a court of this state or a court of any other
jurisdiction, shall have the following effect in this state . . . (4) The adopted
person shall, except as hereinafter provided, be treated as if such adopted
person were the biological child of the adoptive parent for purposes of the
applicability of all documents and instruments, whether executed before or
after the adoption decree is issued, which do not expressly exclude an
adopted person in their operation or effect. The words ‘child’, ‘children’,
‘issue’, ‘descendant’, ‘descendants’, ‘heir’, ‘heirs’, ‘lawful heirs’, ‘grandchild’
and ‘grandchildren’, when used in any will or trust instrument shall include
legally adopted persons unless such document clearly indicates a contrary
intention. . . .’’
2
General Statutes § 45a-731 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(11) The provisions
of subdivisions (1) to (9), inclusive, of this section shall apply to the estate or
wills of persons dying prior to October 1, 1959, and to inter vivos instruments
executed prior to said date and which on said date were not subject to the
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Buzzard v. Fass

follow, we disagree with the plaintiff and affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court.
We begin with the relevant undisputed facts and pro-
cedural history of the case. The testator died on or
about March 27, 1947. He never had children and he
had no living siblings at the time of his death. The
testator executed a will on March 19, 1946, and later
executed two codicils, one on July 1, 1946 (first codicil),
and another on September 6, 1946 (second codicil). The
will established three testamentary trusts for the benefit
of the descendants of his siblings: the Article Fifth Trust,
the Article Sixth Trust, and the Article Eighth Trust.
The Article Eighth Trust (trust) is the subject of the
present dispute.
The trust provides for a contingent, outright distribu-
tion of a portion of the interests in the trust proceeds
to the testator’s nephew, John Merrow Washburn, but
it otherwise designated the testator’s sister, Mary W.
Merrow, who had no children, and the living issue of
the testator’s other two siblings, George W. Merrow
and Martha Belden Washburn, as original beneficiaries.3
Relevant for present purposes, the testator’s brother,
George W. Merrow, had nine children, four of whom,
John Merrow, Oliver Wolcott Merrow, Pauline M. Baker,
and Harriet M. Landon, also had children. John Merrow
had three biological children, all of whom had biological
children, and Oliver Wolcott Merrow had three children,
all of whom had biological children. Pauline M. Baker
grantor’s power to revoke or amend, unless (A) a contrary intention of the
testator or grantor is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, or
(B) distribution of the estate or under the will or under the inter vivos
instrument has been or will be made pursuant to court order entered prior
to October 1, 1991 . . . .’’
3
The testator’s sister, Mary W. Merrow, who was living at the time that
the testator executed his original will, predeceased the testator. The testator
expressly noted in the first codicil that he had taken that unfortunate contin-
gency into account when he drafted his will and noted that her death resulted
in an adjustment to the beneficiaries’ respective interests.
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Buzzard v. Fass

had three biological children. One of Pauline M. Baker’s
children, William Baker, adopted Weiss, who was born
in April, 1946, and was placed for adoption with William
Baker and his wife in or around February, 1947. Weiss’
adoption was approved by the Hartford Probate Court
on March 19, 1948. Harriet M. Landon had one biological
daughter, Elizabeth M. Landon, who had no biological
children. Elizabeth M. Landon adopted Fass in 2008,
when Elizabeth M. Landon was eighty-five years old
and Fass was fifty-three years old.
The trust provides in relevant part: ‘‘If any of the
original beneficiaries or their successors in interest as
herein determined shall die either before or after my
death leaving issue, the interest of the one so dying
shall thereafter be held upon the same terms for the
benefit of such issue, per stirpes. If any of the original
beneficiaries or their successors in interest as herein
determined shall die either before or after my death
leaving no issue, the interest of the one so dying shall
thereafter be held upon the same terms for the benefit
of [the] other beneficiaries then living and/or their issue
or successors . . . in the same proportions in which
they would inherit from the one so dying without issue
if he or she were unmarried under the laws covering
the distribution of intestate estates then in force in the
State of Connecticut; it being my intention that the
beneficial interests from the institution of this trust
until its termination shall devolve through the line of
descent or inheritance without including husbands or
wives of any of the beneficiaries so that at the termina-
tion hereof the distributees shall all be descendants of
one or more of the original named beneficiaries . . . .’’
(Emphasis in original.)
Upon the death of William Baker in 1997, Weiss suc-
ceeded to his interest. She began receiving distributions
under the trust whenever the trustee made distribu-
tions. Specifically, as her father’s only child, Weiss
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received the entirety of what previously had been her
father’s share of each distribution from the trust.4
After the death of Elizabeth M. Landon in 2014, the
distributions that were payable to her under the trust
were paid to Fass. An accounting listing Fass as a bene-
ficiary of the trust was approved by the Probate Court
in 2015. Fass received distributions from the trust from
2014 to 2019.
On or about December 5, 2019, the plaintiff filed an
objection in the Probate Court to the approval of a
periodic accounting of the trust. On January 6, 2020, a
hearing was held by the Probate Court on the approval
of the periodic accounting and the objection filed by
the plaintiff. At the hearing, the plaintiff’s counsel
argued that the trust document did not allow for distri-
butions of the trust proceeds to Fass because she was
adopted by Elizabeth M. Landon in 2008, when Fass was
an adult. Notwithstanding § 45a-731, which generally
provides that an adopted person shall have the same
rights of inheritance as a biological child, the plaintiff’s
counsel argued that the trust document did not allow
for a descendant not related to the testator by blood
to receive distributions from the trust. Counsel for Fass
and for the other beneficiaries under the trust, including
Weiss, opposed the plaintiff’s objection during the hear-
ing. The hearing on the periodic accounting was
adjourned and the court ordered the parties to submit
briefs on the plaintiff’s objection.
On June 9, 2020, the Probate Court rejected the plain-
tiff’s argument that the narrow exceptions to § 45a-731
When Weiss’ aunt, Ellen E. Baker, died in 2005 without issue, Weiss also
4

received the entirety of what previously had been her aunt’s share of the
distributions from the trust. The testator made specific provisions for a
beneficiary dying without issue. In such a circumstance, distributions would
be paid under the laws covering the distribution of intestate estates then
in effect in Connecticut. Weiss was the only person who inherited from
Ellen E. Baker under Connecticut’s intestacy laws.
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Buzzard v. Fass

(4) that are set forth in § 45a-731 (11) were applicable.
Accordingly, the Probate Court approved the periodic
accounting presented to it, thereby allowing Fass and
Weiss to continue receiving distributions under the
trust.
On July 9, 2020, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-
186,5 the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court. In
her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the Probate
Court erroneously concluded that there was insufficient
evidence of the testator’s intent to exclude adopted
persons. She also argued that a 1949 Probate Court
decree (1949 decree) ‘‘definitively established that the
beneficiaries entitled to distribution under the will were
those individuals expressly named in the will and their
descendants of the blood and not by adoption, whether
then living or thereafter born, prior to the final termina-
tion of the continuing trust under the will.’’
On February 28 and March 18, 2022, Fass and Weiss,
respectively, filed motions for summary judgment. They
claimed that § 45a-731 (4), which provides that the
terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants,’’ when used in a will
or trust, are to include legally adopted persons, applied
to the testator’s will that created the subject trust. They
claimed that the exceptions to § 45a-731 (4) set forth
in § 45a-731 (11) did not apply. Specifically, they argued
that the plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the testator had intended to exclude
adopted persons from taking under the trust or that the
trust had been distributed prior to October 1, 1991.
On April 6, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment. She argued that subdivisions (1)
through (9) of § 45a-731 were inapplicable because the
exceptions to their application, set forth in § 45a-731
5
General Statutes § 45a-186 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person
aggrieved by an order, denial or decree of a Probate Court may appeal
therefrom to the Superior Court. . . .’’
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Buzzard v. Fass

(11), applied. In particular, she claimed that the excep-
tion set forth in § 45a-731 (11) (B) was satisfied because
the testator died before October 1, 1959, and the 1949
decree was a ‘‘court order entered prior to October 1,
1991,’’ that distributed the estate. The plaintiff further
claimed that the exception set forth in § 45a-731 (11)
(A) also was satisfied because the testator’s intent to
exclude adopted persons was clear and unequivocal.
As a result, the plaintiff argued that § 45a-731 (4) was
inapplicable to the distributions at issue and that the
court was required to give the words in the testator’s
will their ordinary meaning at the time the will was
written and when the testator died. The plaintiff argued
that the law at the time the will was written and when
the testator died required the court to construe the will
to exclude adopted persons as potential beneficiaries
because the testator used the terms ‘‘issue’’ and
‘‘descendants’’ without any expression of an intent to
include adopted persons. The plaintiff claimed that
those terms, as they were ordinarily understood in 1946
and 1947, meant only ‘‘ ‘lineal blood relationships’
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted.)
On January 24, 2023, the court, Sicilian, J., issued
a memorandum of decision granting the motions for
summary judgment filed by Fass and Weiss, and denying
the motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff.
The court concluded that the exceptions set forth in
§ 45a-731 (11) did not apply to the undisputed facts of
this case and, therefore, Fass and Weiss were entitled
to distributions under the trust. The court rejected the
plaintiff’s contention that § 45a-731 (11) (B) applied
by its plain terms because the testator’s estate was
distributed to trusts pursuant to the 1949 decree. The
court stated that, ‘‘[p]lainly, there has been no final
distribution of the assets of the estate to the beneficiar-
ies of the trusts, and the testamentary trust has
remained under the jurisdiction of the Probate Court
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Buzzard v. Fass

and, as evidenced by the decree challenged in this pro-
bate appeal, the Probate Court has been presented with
periodic accountings seeking approval of distributions
to be made.’’
The court further explained that, contrary to the
plaintiff’s contention, § 45a-731 (11) (B) does not unam-
biguously require a court to apply the outmoded
‘‘ ‘stranger to the adoption’ ’’ presumption to exclude
adopted children from the class of beneficiaries of the
trust for purposes of distributions neither made nor
approved prior to October 1, 1991. The court reasoned
that ‘‘[t]he legislature has made clear that its intent is
to have adopted children treated equally with biological
children, absent a clearly expressed contrary intent and
except where doing so would disrupt distributions pre-
viously made pursuant to a court order. Section 45a-
731 (11), if interpreted to exempt every testamentary
trust that was subject to a probate decree prior to Octo-
ber 1, 1991, from the application of the modern pre-
sumption favoring adopted persons would significantly
undermine the legislature’s clearly expressed inten-
tion.’’ The court thus concluded that § 45a-731 (11) (B)
‘‘applies, in the context of testamentary trusts estab-
lished prior to October 1, 1991, only to trust distribu-
tions made or approved to be made pursuant to court
order entered prior to that date.’’
With respect to the exception set forth in § 45a-731
(11) (A), the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
testator intended to exclude adopted persons from the
class of beneficiaries created under the trust. Specifi-
cally, the court was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s
argument that a testator’s failure to expressly include
adopted persons in the trust constituted clear and con-
vincing evidence of an intention to exclude them. The
court concluded that such a ‘‘proposition [was] untena-
ble’’ and ‘‘would contravene the legislature’s intention
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Buzzard v. Fass

as reflected in § 45a-731 (4) and . . . (11).’’ In so con-
cluding, the court noted that ‘‘[the plaintiff] herself
appear[ed] to acknowledge the problem with her argu-
ment when she [said]: ‘It is possible the legislature, in
adopting [§ 45a-731 (11)] expected that there be some
additional evidence beyond the isolated use of the
words recited in [§ 45a-731 (4)].’ ’’ The court explained
that ‘‘it is more than possible,’’ as ‘‘[t]he plain import
of § 45a-731 (4) and . . . (11), and of its predecessor
statutes dating back to 1959, was to change the pre-
sumption of exclusion of adopted persons to a presump-
tion of inclusion of adopted persons.’’
The court went on to reject each of the plaintiff’s
additional arguments. Specifically, the court was not
persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that the addition
of the word ‘‘the’’ in the first codicil implied anything
about adopted persons. Nor was it persuaded by the
plaintiff’s contention that the provision of the will
excluding spouses of the descendants of the testator’s
siblings shed any light on the testator’s intention regard-
ing adopted persons. Accordingly, the court concluded
that the ‘‘[the plaintiff] fail[ed] to provide clear and
convincing evidence that the testator intended to
exclude adopted persons as beneficiaries of the trust
at issue.’’ This appeal followed. Additional facts and
procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the appropriate
framework for appellate review of a summary judgment
determination. Practice Book § 17-49 provides: ‘‘The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.’’
‘‘In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the
trial court must view the evidence in the light most
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Buzzard v. Fass

favorable to the nonmoving party.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Doe v. New Haven, 214 Conn. App.
553, 563, 281 A.3d 480 (2022). ‘‘[T]he moving party for
summary judgment has the burden of showing the
absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts,
which, under applicable principles of substantive law,
entitle [her] to a judgment as a matter of law.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the
Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).
‘‘[W]e must determine whether the legal conclusions
reached by the trial court are legally and logically cor-
rect and whether they find support in the facts set
out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cefaratti v. Ara-
now, 321 Conn. 637, 645, 138 A.3d 837 (2016). Our review
of the trial court’s rulings on the parties’ motions for
summary judgment is plenary. See, e.g., Community
Renewal Team, Inc. v. United States Liability Ins. Co.,
128 Conn. App. 174, 177, 17 A.3d 88, cert. denied, 301
Conn. 918, 21 A.3d 463 (2011). Because the resolution
of this appeal requires us to interpret § 45a-731 (11),
which sets forth the exceptions to § 45a-731 (4), we are
presented with an issue of statutory interpretation over
which our review also is plenary. See, e.g., Doe v. West
Hartford, 328 Conn. 172, 181, 177 A.3d 1128 (2018)
(‘‘[w]hen we are called upon to construe a statute that
is implicated by a summary judgment motion, our
review is plenary’’).

Before we turn to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims,
we begin with a brief history and overview of the law
governing the inheritance rights of adopted persons
in Connecticut. Prior to 1959, ‘‘[w]here the grantor or
testator [was] the adopting parent, it [was] reasonable
to presume that the adopted child was within the
intended bounty of such grantor or testator.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Middletown Trust Co. v.
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Buzzard v. Fass

Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 71, 112 A. 689 (1921). That presump-
tion, however, did not apply to a grantor or testator
who was not the adopting parent. See Mooney v. Tolles,
111 Conn. 1, 9, 149 A. 515 (1930). Connecticut courts
‘‘presumed that an adopted child [was] not within the
intended bounty of a settlor who, as a nonadopting
parent, [was] a stranger to the adoption.’’ Schapira v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 450, 455, 528
A.2d 367 (1987). ‘‘[T]he common law favor[ed] ancestral
blood and [would] presume that the settlor did not
intend that a stranger to his blood take.’’ Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bovey, 162 Conn. 201, 207, 292 A.2d
899 (1972). This has become known as the ‘‘stranger
to the adoption’’ doctrine. Mooney v. Tolles, supra, 9.
In 1959, the legislature enacted No. 106 of the 1959
Public Acts (P.A. 106),6 a predecessor of § 45a-731,
which effectively abrogated the ‘‘stranger to the adop-
tion’’ rule by replacing the common-law presumption
against including adopted persons as beneficiaries of
a will or trust with a presumption that adopted persons
were intended to be included as beneficiaries. By the
plain terms of P.A. 106, which was codified at General
Statutes (Cum. Supp. 1961) § 45-65a, however, the legis-
lature limited that statute’s application to wills and
trusts executed ‘‘subsequent’’ to October 1, 1959. See,
e.g., Parker v. Mullen, 158 Conn. 1, 5 n.1, 255 A.2d 851
(1969); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Hills, 157
Conn. 375, 378 n.1, 254 A.2d 453 (1969). Our courts
therefore declined to apply § 45-65a retroactively to
instruments executed prior to October 1, 1959. See, e.g.,
6
‘‘Number 106 of the 1959 Public Acts provided in pertinent part: ‘The
words ‘‘child’’, ‘‘children’’, ‘‘issue’’, ‘‘descendant’’, ‘‘descendants’’, ‘‘heir’’,
‘‘heirs’’, ‘‘lawful heirs’’, ‘‘grandchild’’, ‘‘grandchildren’’, when used in the
singular or plural in any will or trust instrument, shall, unless such document
clearly indicates a contrary intention, include legally adopted persons. . . .
The provisions of this act shall apply to wills and trust instruments executed
subsequent to the effective date hereof.’ ’’ Connecticut National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Chadwick, 217 Conn. 260, 264 n.2, 585 A.2d 1189 (1991).
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Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Bovey, supra, 162
Conn. 209 (‘‘we once again must refuse to hold . . .
[§] 45-65a applicable retrospectively’’). In 1973, the leg-
islature enacted No. 73-156, § 21, of the 1973 Public Acts
(P.A. 73-156), which repealed § 45-65a but specifically
retained the statutory presumption in favor of adopted
persons; see P.A. 73-156, § 14; which was subsequently
codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 45-64a (4).
For more than thirty years, the statutory presumption
in favor of adopted persons continued to apply only to
wills and trust instruments executed after October 1,
1959. In 1991, however, the legislature transferred the
provisions of § 45-64a to § 45a-731 and made substan-
tive changes to the law. Specifically, No. 91-83 of the
1991 Public Acts (P.A. 91-83) provides in relevant part
that ‘‘[t]he provisions of subdivisions (1) to (9), inclu-
sive, of [§ 45a-731]’’ shall apply ‘‘to the estate or wills
of persons dying prior to October 1, 1959 . . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) Although the legislature expanded
the presumption in favor of adopted persons to estates
or wills of persons dying prior to October 1, 1959, it
created two exceptions to this new rule. See P.A. 91-
83. Specifically, P.A. 91-83 provides that subdivisions
(1) through (9) of § 45a-731 would apply to the estate
or wills of persons dying prior to October 1, 1959,
‘‘unless (A) a contrary intention of the testator or
grantor is demonstrated by clear and convincing evi-
dence or (B) distribution of the estate or under the will
or under the inter vivos instrument has been or will be
made pursuant to court order entered prior to October
1, 1991 . . . .’’
As previously explained in this opinion, P.A. 91-83
transferred the statutory provisions governing the rights
of adopted persons to § 45a-731. The relevant provisions
of § 45a-731 for purposes of this appeal are located at
§ 45a-731 (4), (10), and (11). To that end, § 45a-731
provides in relevant part: ‘‘A final decree of adoption,
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whether issued by a court of this state or a court of
any other jurisdiction, shall have the following effect
in this state . . . (4) The adopted person shall, except
as hereinafter provided, be treated as if such adopted
person were the biological child of the adoptive parent
for purposes of the applicability of all documents and
instruments, whether executed before or after the adop-
tion decree is issued, which do not expressly exclude
an adopted person in their operation or effect. The
words ‘child’, ‘children’, ‘issue’, ‘descendant’, ‘descen-
dants’, ‘heir’, ‘heirs’, ‘lawful heirs’, ‘grandchild’ and
‘grandchildren’, when used in any will or trust instru-
ment shall include legally adopted persons unless such
document clearly indicates a contrary intention. . . .’’
Section 45a-731 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(10)
Except as provided in subdivision (11) of this section,
the provisions of law in force prior to October 1, 1959,
affected by the provisions of this section shall apply to
the estates or wills of persons dying prior to said date
and to inter vivos instruments executed prior to said
date and which on said date were not subject to the
grantor’s power to revoke or amend . . . .’’
Section 45a-731 (11) instructs that ‘‘[t]he provisions
of subdivisions (1) to (9), inclusive, of this section shall
apply to the estate or wills of persons dying prior to
October 1, 1959, and to inter vivos instruments executed
prior to said date and which on said date were not
subject to the grantor’s power to revoke or amend,
unless (A) a contrary intention of the testator or grantor
is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, or
(B) distribution of the estate or under the will or under
the inter vivos instrument has been or will be made
pursuant to court order entered prior to October 1, 1991
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 45a-731 (11).
With this background and overview of the relevant
statutory provisions in mind, we turn to the plaintiff’s
claims on appeal.
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I
The plaintiff first claims that the court erred in render-
ing summary judgment for the defendants because it
improperly concluded that § 45a-731 (4) applies to the
trust. Specifically, she directs this court to the 1949
decree, which she claims ‘‘ascertained the distributees
under the will and directed that the ‘rest, residue and
remainder of said estate be distributed, transferred and
paid over to and among the distributees above named
according to law and the provisions of the will of said
decedent.’ ’’ (Emphasis omitted.) She contends that,
‘‘[u]pon issuance of the 1949 decree, the class of poten-
tial distributees under this will was fixed by order of
the Probate Court,’’ and that ‘‘adopted persons could
not be added to the class of potential beneficiaries after
the 1949 decree was issued.’’ In the plaintiff’s view, once
the Probate Court issued its 1949 decree identifying the
distributees under the will, and once distribution was
made to the trust pursuant to that decree, ‘‘the rights
of the biological descendants were fixed and vested
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Accordingly, the plaintiff
argues that the 1949 decree clearly falls within the
exception set forth in § 47a-731 (11) (B) because that
decree constitutes a court order entered ‘‘prior to Octo-
ber 1, 1991’’ pursuant to which ‘‘distribution of the
estate or under the will . . . has been or will be
made . . . .’’
The defendants disagree. Weiss takes issue with the
plaintiff’s contention that all the interests in the trust
were ‘‘vested’’ by operation of the 1949 decree. Weiss
points out that the 1949 decree did not vest any interest
in the plaintiff or in any of the original beneficiaries of
the trust, rather, that the distribution in the 1949 decree
was only a distribution to the trustee of the trust. Weiss
notes that the trust remains subject to the jurisdiction
of the Probate Court and the beneficiaries of the trust
continue to receive distributions. She argues that the
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trial court properly construed the exception in § 45a-
731 (11) (B) in the context of a testamentary trust to
apply ‘‘ ‘only to trust distributions made or approved
to be made pursuant to a court order entered prior to
[October 1, 1991].’ ’’
Fass similarly argues that it is clear that the trust
was not distributed for purposes of the exception set
forth in § 45a-731 (11) (B) by virtue of the 1949 decree
because future trust distributions remained subject to
the ongoing jurisdiction and accounting approvals of
the Probate Court. Fass argues that the plaintiff’s con-
tention that the 1949 decree constitutes a distribution
for purposes of § 45a-731 (11) (B) runs counter to the
legislature’s clear intent to make § 45a-731 (4) retroac-
tive to all estates or wills of persons dying prior to
October 1, 1959. She further contends that the plaintiff’s
interpretation would result in an extremely narrow
application of the statute’s retroactive presumption in
favor of adopted persons. The better and more logical
interpretation of § 45a-731 (11) (B), Fass argues, is that
it applies only to a final distribution to a beneficiary
that was made prior to October 1, 1991, not to distribu-
tions to a testamentary trust that, by the terms of the
trust, will result in future distributions to beneficiaries
occurring after October 1, 1991. For the reasons that
follow, we agree with the defendants and conclude that
the presumption in favor of adopted persons set forth
in § 45a-731 (4) applies to the trust and distributions at
issue in this appeal.
‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec-
tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to
determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually
does apply. . . . The meaning of a statute shall, in the
first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute
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itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after
examining such text and considering such relationship,
the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and
does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratex-
tual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be
considered. General Statutes § 1-2z.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Seramonte Associ-
ates, LLC v. Hamden, 345 Conn. 76, 83–84, 282 A.3d
1253 (2022).
Section 45a-731 provides in relevant part that ‘‘(11)
[t]he provisions of subdivisions (1) to (9), inclusive, of
this section shall apply to the estate or wills of persons
dying prior to October 1, 1959 . . . unless . . . (B)
distribution of the estate or under the will or under
the inter vivos instrument has been or will be made
pursuant to court order entered prior to October 1, 1991
. . . .’’ The term ‘‘distribution’’ is not defined in § 45a-
731 or elsewhere in chapter 803 of the General Statutes.
As such, we must construe the term according to its
commonly approved usage, mindful of any peculiar or
technical meaning it may have assumed in the law. See
General Statutes § 1-1 (a). Indeed, in the absence of
statutory definitions, we often ‘‘find evidence of such
usage, and technical meaning, in dictionary definitions,
as well as by reading the statutory language within
the context of the broader legislative scheme.’’ State v.
Menditto, 315 Conn. 861, 866, 110 A.3d 410 (2015); see
also Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 338 Conn. 687,
697, 258 A.3d 1268 (2021) (‘‘in the absence of statutory
definitions, we look to the contemporaneous dictionary
definitions of words to ascertain their commonly
approved usage’’).
Contemporary to the 1991 amendment of § 45a-731,
the word ‘‘distribution,’’ in the probate context, was
defined as ‘‘[t]he apportionment and division, under
authority of a court, of the remainder of the estate of
an intestate, after payment of the debts and charges,
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among those who are legally entitled to share in the
same.’’ (Emphasis added.) Black’s Law Dictionary (6th
Ed. 1990) p. 475. More generally, the term ‘‘distribution’’
meant ‘‘the act or process of distributing’’ or ‘‘something
distributed . . . .’’ Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dic-
tionary (1990) p. 368.
We conclude that the plain language of § 45a-731 (11),
in the context of the entire statute, evinces a clear
legislative intent that adopted persons are to be pre-
sumptively treated the same as biological children for
purposes of inheritance under estates or wills of per-
sons dying prior to October 1, 1959. Indeed, subdivision
(11) makes clear that the substantive provisions of the
statute that require equal treatment of adopted persons
(i.e., subdivisions (1) through (9) of § 45a-731) shall
apply to the estates or wills of those dying prior to
October 1, 1959, unless one of two narrow exceptions
apply. As to the exception in § 45a-731 (11) (B), we
conclude that the language makes clear the legislature’s
intent that subdivisions (1) through (9) of § 45a-731
shall apply to the estates or wills of those dying prior
to October 1, 1959, but not to the extent that such
an application of those subdivisions would disturb or
otherwise invalidate a final distribution to a beneficiary
that occurred prior to October 1, 1991, the effective
date of the provision. See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra,
p. 475 (defining ‘‘[d]istribution’’ in probate context as
‘‘[t]he apportionment and division, under authority of
a court, of the remainder of the estate of an intestate,
after payment of the debts and charges, among those
who are legally entitled to share in the same’’ (emphasis
added)).
In applying § 45a-731 to the facts of this case, we
must reject the plaintiff’s argument that the 1949 decree,
which transferred the ‘‘rest, residue and remainder’’ of
the estate to the trustee (i.e., so that the trustee could
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later make distributions in accordance with the testa-
mentary trust), constitutes a distribution for purposes
of § 45a-731 (11) (B) so as to require application of the
outmoded ‘‘stranger to the adoption’’ rule to all trust
distributions occurring after October 1, 1991. Although
the 1949 decree in this case transferred to the trustee
the ‘‘rest, residue and remainder’’ of the estate, that
decree did not finalize the apportionment and division
of the remainder of the estate under the will, as distribu-
tions to those who would be entitled to share in the
remainder of the estate under the testamentary trust
were still to occur into the future. As the trial court
aptly noted, ‘‘the testamentary trust has remained under
the jurisdiction of the Probate Court and, as evidenced
by the decree challenged in this probate appeal, the
Probate Court has been presented with periodic
accountings seeking approval of distributions to be
made.’’

Furthermore, the plaintiff’s contention that the 1949
decree ‘‘affirm[ed] the identity of the distributees . . .
and distribution was made pursuant to that [decree]
[and] that the rights of the biological descendants were
fixed and vested’’ at that time must also be rejected.
Other than these threadbare assertions, the plaintiff
has not sufficiently explained or demonstrated how the
decree vested any interest in any beneficiary of the
trust, let alone named or otherwise vested any interest
in her. Rather, the record shows that the 1949 decree
simply transferred to the trustee the rest, residue and
remainder of the estate so that the trustee, in turn,
could make distributions from the estate to the proper
beneficiaries. Although the plaintiff attempts to support
her arguments by pointing to a few cases; see, e.g.,
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, supra, 96 Conn. 61;
those authorities are inapposite to the facts of the pres-
ent case and the question presented in this appeal.
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The trust at issue, like many testamentary trusts,
provides that distributions are to be made on a periodic
basis into the future, with the beneficiaries under the
trust continually changing upon the birth and/or death
of the testator’s descendants. Although various distribu-
tions ‘‘of the estate or under the will’’ were made prior
to October 1, 1991; General Statutes § 45a-731 (11) (B);
other distributions were made and approved after that
date, including the distribution that the plaintiff chal-
lenges in this appeal. Given the nature of a testamentary
trust so described, we agree with the Superior Court
that, in a case like this, § 45a-731 (11) (B) applies only
to trust distributions made or approved to be made
pursuant to a court order entered prior to October 1,
1991. In other words, pursuant to the exception, subdivi-
sions (1) through (9) of § 45a-731 do not apply to trust
distributions made or approved to be made to a benefi-
ciary pursuant to a court order entered prior to October
1, 1991. However, subdivisions (1) through (9) of § 45a-
731 are generally applicable to trust distributions of a
person who died prior to October 1, 1959, that occur
after October 1, 1991.
Although the plaintiff would have us interpret the
statute to mean that subdivisions (1) through (9) of
§ 45a-731 have no application to a testamentary trust
of a person dying prior to October 1, 1959, if any transfer
is made from an estate to a testamentary trust prior to
October 1, 1991, so as to exempt from the modern
presumption favoring adopted persons any and all testa-
mentary trust distributions made after October 1, 1991,
such an interpretation effectively would render the ret-
rospective provision in § 45a-731 (11) a nullity. Under
the plaintiff’s interpretation, there effectively would be
no retrospective application of subdivisions (1) through
(9) to an estate or under a will of a person dying prior
October 1, 1959, except in instances in which adminis-
tration of the estate or under the will remained in limbo,
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until at least October 1, 1991—a period of not less
than thirty-two years after such person’s death. It is
axiomatic, however, that the legislature does ‘‘not
intend to promulgate statutes . . . that lead to absurd
consequences or bizarre results’’; (internal quotation
marks omitted) Dias v. Grady, 292 Conn. 350, 361, 972
A.2d 715 (2009); and ‘‘that reviewing courts should not
construe statutes in disregard of their context and in
frustration of the obvious legislative intent or in a man-
ner that is hostile to an evident legislative purpose . . .
or in a way that is contrary to common sense.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Banks, 321 Conn.
821, 842, 146 A.3d 1 (2016). Accordingly, we conclude
that the Superior Court properly determined that the
exception set forth in § 45a-731 (11) (B) was inapplica-
ble in this case.7
II
The plaintiff next claims that, even if the exception
in § 45a-731 (11) (B) does not apply, the exception in
§ 45a-731 (11) (A) applies because there is clear and
convincing evidence that the testator did not intend to
include adopted persons as beneficiaries under the
trust. In support of that claim, she argues that the testa-
tor’s use of the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ in the
trust, without any reference to adopted persons, is clear
7
In her appellate brief, the plaintiff makes a passing reference to a claim
that she has been deprived of property without due process of law. Although
the plaintiff asserted in her appeal to the Superior Court that the Probate
Court’s interpretation of § 45a-731 rendered that statute unconstitutional,
she did not pursue a constitutional claim in her motion for summary judg-
ment, her objection to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, or
in her appellate brief before this court. Because this claim was neither
decided by the Superior Court nor adequately briefed before this court, we
deem that constitutional claim abandoned. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Assn. v. Virgulak, 192 Conn. App. 688, 720 n.9, 218 A.3d 596 (2019)
(‘‘[t]o the extent that the plaintiff’s few passing references in its appellate
brief about the court’s decision . . . can be read to challenge that decision,
we conclude that the plaintiff abandoned such argument as a result of an
inadequate brief’’), aff’d, 341 Conn. 750, 267 A.3d 753 (2022).
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and convincing evidence that he intended to exclude
such persons as beneficiaries. She also argues that the
testator’s addition of the word ‘‘the’’ in the first codicil
to the trust demonstrates a clear intent by the testator
to exclude adopted persons as beneficiaries under the
trust. We are not persuaded.
Section 45a-731 provides in relevant part that ‘‘(11)
[t]he provisions of subdivisions (1) to (9), inclusive, of
this section shall apply to the estate or wills of persons
dying prior to October 1, 1959, and to inter vivos instru-
ments executed prior to said date and which on said
date were not subject to the grantor’s power to revoke
or amend, unless (A) a contrary intention of the testator
or grantor is demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence . . . .’’
Here, the parties dispute the retroactive application
of the definitions set forth in § 45a-731 (4). That subdivi-
sion provides in relevant part that the words ‘‘ ‘issue’ ’’
and ‘‘ ‘descendants,’ ’’ ’’when used in any will or trust
instrument shall include legally adopted persons unless
such document clearly indicates a contrary intention.’’
General Statutes § 45a-731 (4).
In order for the exception set forth in § 45a-731 (11)
(A) to apply, therefore, the plaintiff must show that
there is clear and convincing evidence that the testator
did not intend for adopted persons to be included as
beneficiaries under the testator’s trust. Our courts have
explained that ‘‘[c]lear and convincing proof is a
demanding standard denot[ing] a degree of belief that
lies between the belief that is required to find the truth
or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil
action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a
criminal prosecution.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Blackwell v. Mahmood, 120 Conn. App. 690, 700,
992 A.2d 1219 (2010). A plaintiff may sustain her burden
‘‘if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable
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Buzzard v. Fass

belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true,
that the probability that they are true or exist is substan-
tially greater than the probability that they are false
or do not exist.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277
Conn. 218, 226, 890 A.2d 509, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823,
127 S. Ct. 157, 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006).
The plaintiff argues that the testator’s use of the
words ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants,’’ alone, is clear and
convincing evidence that the testator did not intend for
adopted persons to be included as beneficiaries under
the trust because an adopted person was not among the
class of persons constituting ‘‘issue’’ or ‘‘descendants’’
when the testator executed his will in 1946. The plaintiff
contends that ‘‘the testator was a knowledgeable busi-
nessman, with a keen and sophisticated understanding
of the law, and a savvy and careful reviewer of legal
documents,’’ and that ‘‘the testator’s intent to include
only lineal blood descendants is clear beyond peradven-
ture.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)
Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, there was no
rule of law at the time the will was executed in 1946
excluding adopted persons from the definitions of
‘‘issue’’ or ‘‘descendants.’’ Under the common law, there
existed merely a presumption against including an
adopted person within the definitions of ‘‘issue’’ or
‘‘descendants’’ when a testator’s intent with respect to
that question was unclear. See, e.g., Trowbridge v.
Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 469, 473–74, 17 A.2d 517 (1941);
Ansonia National Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 751,
136 A. 588 (1927). Indeed, ‘‘[w]here no intent to include
the adopted child [could] be ascertained, the common
law favor[ed] ancestral blood and [would] presume that
the settlor did not intend that a stranger to his blood
take.’’ (Emphasis added.) Connecticut Bank & Trust
Co. v. Bovey, supra, 162 Conn. 207. Our Supreme Court
made clear, though, that this presumption was ‘‘merely
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an aid to construction’’; id.; ‘‘which cannot prevail over
an intent fairly deducible from the terms of the will
read in the light of the surrounding circumstances.’’
Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, supra, 474.
Although the presumption in effect around the time
the testator executed his will led to some courts inter-
preting terms, like the term ‘‘issue,’’ to exclude adopted
persons; see, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Pearson, 140
Conn. 332, 356, 99 A.2d 224 (1953); that presumption
is no longer the lens through which we review the
testamentary language. The statutory amendment that
the legislature adopted in 1991 altered that presump-
tion. See P.A. 91-83. As a result of that amendment, we
now presume that the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’
include legally adopted persons when we are interpre-
ting instruments that control distributions made in
accordance with a will or an estate of a person that
died prior to October 1, 1959. In light of that statutory
change and the legislature’s clear intent to reverse and
replace the old presumption that treated adopted and
biological children differently, we are not persuaded
that the legislature intended for its new presumption
to be rebutted by virtue of an instrument’s mere refer-
ence to terms such as ‘‘issue’’ or ‘‘descendants’’ that,
under the prior common-law presumption, excluded
adopted persons.
Moreover, the plaintiff’s argument that the testator’s
use of the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ in the trust
constitutes clear and convincing evidence of an intent
to exclude adopted persons because the old common-
law presumption excluded them conflates the actual
intent of a testator with a rule of construction. The
decision in Purifoy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 398 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (D. Md. 1974), aff’d, 567
F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1977), speaks directly to this point.
In Purifoy, the court addressed a nearly identical issue,
namely, whether the term ‘‘descendants,’’ as well as the
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Buzzard v. Fass

terms ‘‘child’’ and ‘‘children,’’ included an adopted child
in various testamentary instruments that were at issue.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 1077. The defen-
dants, like the plaintiff in this case, argued that the
testator clearly intended to exclude an adopted child
from the terms ‘‘child’’ or ‘‘children’’ because the law
in place when the testator executed the testamentary
instruments excluded such persons and the testator
was presumed to know the law when he executed the
will at that time. Id., 1079.
The court rejected that claim, noting that the defen-
dants’ argument ‘‘fail[ed] to properly distinguish
between the actual intent of the testator in employing
the words in question and the meaning that a rule of
construction assigns to them. . . . [F]or these words
to reflect a clear actual intention, this [c]ourt would
have to make the unwarranted assumption that the
testator actually considered the contingency of adop-
tion in choosing the words. The defendants, though, find
actual intention in a combination of the terms ‘child,’
‘children,’ etc. and the rule of construction prior to 1947,
which excluded adopted children of one other than the
testator. In other words, the defendants would have
an earlier rule of construction, without anything else,
become part of the testator’s actual intent so as to
defeat the retroactive application of a subsequent and
conflicting rule of construction. By definition, a rule of
construction is not synonymous with or a part of the
actual intent of the testator. Its function is to assign a
meaning to the words when the testator’s actual inten-
tion cannot be determined, and only after the failure
to find an intention can a rule of construction be consid-
ered. . . . Therefore, since the testators used only the
words ‘child,’ ‘children,’ and ‘descendants’ and since
the will and surrounding circumstances fail to reveal
that the contingency of adoption was ever considered,
no actual intention of the testator concerning adopted
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children is present. The meaning to be ascribed to the
words in question is to be found in one of the two
applicable rules of construction.’’ (Citations omitted;
emphasis added; footnote omitted.) Id.
The court in Purifoy was addressing competing rules
of construction created by statute—the defendants in
that case advocated for the earlier rule of construction,
whereas the plaintiff argued that the later rule of con-
struction must be applied. Id. Here, by contrast, the
plaintiff pits a prior common-law presumption against
a more recent, statutory presumption. The rationale of
Purifoy, however, applies equally. The plaintiff
attempts to equate the common-law presumption about
the meaning of the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’
with the actual intention of the testator. In the words
of the Purifoy court, this ‘‘[she] clearly cannot do.’’ Id.,
1079 n.3.
Section 45a-731 (11) changed the lens through which
the terms at issue here must be examined. Although
the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descendants’’ may have been
presumed at the time the will was executed in 1946 to
include only lineal descendants when no contrary intent
could be discerned from the instrument, the use of
these terms in a will or trust, in the absence of evidence
that the testator actually considered the contingency
of adoption, does not provide the requisite quantum
of proof (i.e., clear and convincing evidence) that the
testator actually intended to treat adopted persons dif-
ferently from biological children. In other words, the
use of the terms ‘‘issue’’ or ‘‘descendants’’ in a will or
trust, without more, does not suffice to satisfy the new
statutory burden of showing, by clear and convincing
evidence, the testator’s actual intention that adopted
persons be treated differently from biological children.
In a final effort to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the testator in this case intended to
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0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 29
Buzzard v. Fass

exclude adopted persons from receiving distributions
pursuant to the trust, the plaintiff points to the testator’s
first codicil, in which the testator added the word ‘‘the’’
into the trust document. The language so amended pro-
vides in relevant part: ‘‘If any of the original beneficiar-
ies or their successors in interest as herein determined
shall die either before or after my death leaving no
issue, the interest of the one so dying shall thereafter
be held upon the same terms for the benefit of the other
beneficiaries then living and/or their issue or successors
. . . in the same proportions in which they would
inherit from the one so dying without issue if he or she
were unmarried, under the laws covering the distribu-
tion of intestate estates then in force in the State of
Connecticut . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff argues that the addition of the word
‘‘the,’’ which did not appear in the original will but was
considered of such importance by the testator that it
was added in the first codicil, ‘‘clearly define[s] the
connecting words ‘other beneficiaries then living and/
or their issue or successors,’’ evincing an intent by the
testator to limit the class of distributees under the will
to the originally named ten individuals that he named
and their lineal blood descendants. We are not per-
suaded. As the trial court correctly noted, the addition
in the first codicil of the clarifying word ‘‘the’’ implies
nothing about adopted persons and certainly does not
constitute clear and convincing evidence of an intention
to exclude them. Although the plaintiff attempts to
show the testator’s intent to exclude adopted persons
by pointing to other areas of the will, those attempts
fall short for the same reasons. Nothing to which the
plaintiff points us speaks to the testator’s intention
regarding adopted persons.8
8
The plaintiff makes numerous references throughout her briefing to this
court suggesting that Fass’ adult adoption was a sham or otherwise improper.
The plaintiff made no such claim in her complaint and presented no evidence
to the Probate Court or to the Superior Court in support such a claim. In
addition, she fails adequately to brief any such claim on appeal. We therefore
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30 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Buzzard v. Fass

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that nei-
ther of the exceptions in § 45a-731 (11) are satisfied
in this case and, therefore, the interpretation of the
testamentary trust at issue is governed by § 45a-731 (4),
which provides that the terms ‘‘issue’’ and ‘‘descen-
dants’’ as used in the trust include legally adopted per-
sons. Accordingly, we conclude that the Superior Court
properly granted the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

deem her claim, to the extent she is making one to that effect, abandoned.
We further note that, to the extent the plaintiff’s arguments can be read
as calling into question the validity of adult adoptions in general, Connecticut
law expressly permits them. See General Statutes § 45a-734. Furthermore,
to the extent that the plaintiff suggests that Fass’ adoption as an adult
supports her claim concerning the testator’s intention to exclude adopted
persons, that argument also lacks merit. Fass’ adoption in 2008, as an adult,
is not evidence of the testator’s intent to exclude adopted persons when
he executed his will and codicils more than fifty years earlier. This is espe-
cially true in light of the fact that Connecticut has recognized adult adoptions
since as early as 1918, many years prior to the testator’s death. See General
Statutes (1918 Rev.) § 4882 (‘‘Any person of full age may, by written agree-
ment with another person of full age younger than himself, unless such
other person is his or her wife, husband, brother, sister, uncle or aunt of
the whole or half blood, adopt such other person as his child, provided,
such written agreement be approved by the court of probate for the district
in which the adopting parent resides or, if such adopting parent is not an
inhabitant of this state, for the district in which adopted person resides.
. . . Such child by virtue of such adoption shall inherit estate from its
adopting parent or parents, or the relatives of such adopting parent or
parents, the same as though such adopted child were the natural child of
such adopting parent or parents, and shall not inherit estate from his or
her natural parents or relatives . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.))