UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-4464
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
GEORGE THOMAS CABEL, a/k/a PY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, District
Judge. (CR-97-173)
Submitted: April 29, 1999 Decided: May 5, 1999
Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Craven, III, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Paul Alexander
Weinman, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
George Thomas Cabel appeals his conviction and sentence after
a jury trial for one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). Cabel claims on appeal
that the district court erred by admitting testimony of co-
conspirators who were promised assistance from the Government if
their testimony was helpful in Cabel’s prosecution, by applying a
four-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 3B.1.1(a) (1997) for being an organizer or leader of five or more
persons, by applying a two-level enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)
for possession of a firearm in the commission of the conspiracy, in
determining that the sentencing disparity between crack and cocaine
is constitutional, and in holding that his conviction was supported
by sufficient evidence. We find that the court did not clearly err
on any of the sentencing issues, that the court did not plainly err
in admitting the testimony of Cabel’s co-conspirators, that the
crack to cocaine ratio is constitutional, see United States v.
D’Anjou, 16 F.3d 604 (4th Cir. 1994), and that sufficient evidence
supported the conviction, see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80 (1942).
Cabel filed a motion to file a pro se supplemental brief. We
grant the motion. However, we find the claims raised to be either
duplicative of the formal brief, frivolous and without merit, or
ineffective assistance of counsel issues, which may not be raised
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on direct appeal because ineffective assistance does not appear
conclusively from the record. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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