United States v. Joseph Lampkin

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 98-4544 JOSEPH LAMPKIN, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CR-98-84) Submitted: August 5, 1999 Decided: August 12, 1999 Before MURNAGHAN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. _________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. _________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL Robert L. Jenkins, Jr., BRODNAX & JENKINS, Alexandria, Vir- ginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, James G. Duncan, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. _________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). _________________________________________________________________ OPINION PER CURIAM: Joseph Lampkin appeals his conviction for assault of a correctional officer. Lampkin asserts that the district court abused its discretion by limiting the impeachment of defense witness Robert Green. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. Green testified that, although he was in the vicinity, he did not see the incident for which Lampkin was convicted. At trial, the court pre- vented defense counsel from questioning Green regarding a prior con- versation between Green and counsel and from introducing the testimony of Ronald Wynn. According to defense counsel, Green had previously informed counsel that Lampkin was only defending him- self, and Wynn would likewise testify that Green told him that Lamp- kin was acting in self-defense. We find that the district court did not err. Because Green testified that he did not remember the incident, his testimony was not damag- ing to Lampkin. Therefore, while Lampkin accurately asserts that the proffered hearsay testimony by Green and Wynn would have been admissible only for impeachment purposes, impeachment of Green would not have aided Lampkin. See United States v. Ince, 21 F.3d 576, 581 (4th Cir. 1994) (where testimony does not affirmatively damage case, impeachment evidence has no probative value). Further, the content of the alleged prior inconsistent statements directly sup- ported Lampkin's testimony that he was merely defending himself. Thus, there was a substantial likelihood that the jury would have had difficulty confining use of the hearsay evidence to impeachment. See id. at 580-81. Finally, because Green's testimony did not harm Lamp- kin's case, any error in preventing impeachment of Green was harm- less. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1078 (4th Cir. 1988) (error in the district court's evidentiary rulings is subject to the harmless error test). 2 Accordingly, we affirm Lampkin's conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 3