IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 96-60055
Summary Calendar
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CHARLES R CRAWFORD
Plaintiff-Appellant
versus
PAUL GOWDY; BILLY HUGHES; FAGIN MAUNEY; DAVID BENNETT;
DENNIS GRISHAM; F L ROWELL; KIRK FORDICE
Defendants-Appellees
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(4:94-CV-294-S-O)
_________________________________________________________________
July 1, 1996
Before KING, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Charles R. Crawford, a prisoner incarcerated in the
Mississippi Department of Corrections, appeals the district
court’s dismissal without prejudice of his civil rights suit
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to
comply with a court order and for failure to prosecute.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Crawford filed a
civil rights suit alleging that his living conditions at the
Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) amounted to cruel
and unusual punishment and violated his constitutional rights to
due process, equal protection, and access to the court. Crawford
sought a restraining order and monetary damages.
On June 16, 1995, a magistrate judge entered an order
granting Crawford’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and
staying the action for ninety days, during which time the
magistrate judge ordered Crawford to attempt in good faith to
exhaust the administrative remedies available at the MDOC. The
magistrate judge also ordered Crawford to “file a certificate
from the Administrative Remedy Program [(“ARP”)] that he has
exhausted his administrative remedies, or [to] file a statement
that he has attempted to obtain such a certificate but has not
been furnished with one, within one hundred and fifty (150) days
from the date of this order.” The magistrate judge warned
Crawford that the action would be dismissed with prejudice if he
did not “reasonably and in good faith attempt to exhaust his
administrative remedies.”
Crawford filed a statement with the court within ninety days
of the order indicating that he had submitted a copy of the
court’s order and a copy of his complaint to the legal claims
adjudicator requesting redress of his grievances, but that he had
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not yet received a response. Crawford indicated that he expected
his complaint to be rejected by the ARP because it contained more
than one issue; however, he stated that he could not file and
expect to have processed separate complaints with the ARP for the
twenty issues raised in his civil rights action within the ninety
days allowed for exhaustion of his administrative remedies by the
court’s order. He further stated that “[u]nder the present
operation of the ARP Program,” he was unable to obtain a
certificate of completion. The record indicates that Crawford’s
grievance complaint was rejected by the ARP because it included
more than one grievance issue.
On December 11, 1995, the district court dismissed
Crawford’s suit without prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b), for failure to comply with a court order and failure to
prosecute. The court stated that its earlier order had required
Crawford “to exhaust the available administrative remedies of the
[MDOC] within ninety (90) days,” and “to file a certificate from
the [ARP], with the court to show that he has exhausted the
administrative remedies.” The court determined that more than
150 days had passed and that Crawford had failed to comply with
the court’s order; however, the court did not include reasons for
its conclusion that Crawford failed to comply with the earlier
order.
Clearly, Crawford made at least some attempt to comply with
the earlier order, as he filed a grievance with the ARP and
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subsequently filed a statement with the court explaining his
actions. It is possible that the district court construed
Crawford’s doomed grievance petition as a failure to make a good
faith effort to exhaust his administrative remedies. However, on
this record, we cannot review the district court’s order of
dismissal because we cannot discern the district court’s reasons
for concluding that Crawford failed to comply with the earlier
order.
Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s order and REMAND
with instructions that the district court reconsider its order of
dismissal, and that if it decides to reinstate the dismissal, it
should provide reasons for its conclusion that Crawford failed to
comply with its earlier order.
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