UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4091
VINCENT LOUIS HAYNES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.
(CR-98-231-A)
Submitted: August 10, 1999
Decided: September 24, 1999
Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER,
Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Gregory B. English, ENGLISH & SMITH, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Sonya L. Sacks,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, Gene Rossi, Special Assis-
tant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Vincent Louis Haynes appeals his conviction for his role in a con-
spiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994), and for possession with intent to distribute
500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1994). Haynes was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to 151
months in prison. On appeal, Haynes contests the denial of his motion
to strike the testimony of a government informant, the results of his
suppression hearing, the denial of his motion for a mistrial, and the
rejection of his proposed instruction regarding the prosecution's role
in determining the availability of sentence reductions for cooperating
witnesses. Finding no merit to any of these assignments of error, we
affirm Haynes' conviction.
The Government in this case failed to disclose the fact that one of
its witnesses was a paid informant. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963). However, Haynes discovered this information before
the close of the Government's evidence and was therefore able to
make effective use of the exculpatory information that was initially
kept from him. See United States v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc.,
760 F.2d 527, 532 n.6 (4th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, the information
he received belatedly was sufficiently cumulative to survive a consti-
tutional challenge. See United States v. Hoyte , 51 F.3d 1239, 1243
(4th Cir. 1995). The district court did not err in declining to strike the
testimony of the paid informant.
Haynes assigns error to the district court's order denying Haynes'
motion to suppress the physical evidence discovered as a result of his
arrest. The district court correctly found that the arrest was amply
supported by probable cause stemming from considerably more infor-
mation that Haynes' mere association with the primary target of this
investigation. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see also
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Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979). Because the arrest was sup-
ported by probable cause and there is no plain error in the district
court's failure to find that Haynes' consent to search his hotel room
was somehow involuntary, see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
731-32 (1993); United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 938 (4th Cir.
1990), the court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the evi-
dence.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give
Haynes' proposed instruction. See United States v. Patterson, 150
F.3d 382, 389 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 67
U.S.L.W. 3436 (U.S. Jan 11, 1999) (No. 98-6967). The court cor-
rectly found that the prosecution's role in the possibility of sentence
reductions for cooperating witnesses was "substantially covered by
the court's charge to the jury." United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 32
(4th Cir. 1995). Neither did the district court abuse its discretion in
denying Haynes' motion for a mistrial. See United States v. Dorsey,
45 F.3d 809, 817 (4th Cir. 1995). Haynes failed to show that the man-
ner in which he was brought into the courtroom was"inherently prej-
udicial" or caused "actual prejudice." See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S.
560, 572 (1986).
Accordingly, we affirm Haynes' conviction and sentence. We dis-
pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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