UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 98-4474
ALFRED HEATH, a/k/a Alfred
Manning,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.
Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CR-97-240-MJP)
Submitted: April 20, 1999
Decided: September 21, 1999
Before NIEMEYER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS,
Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
John H. Hare, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. J. Rene Josey, United States Attorney, Jane
B. Taylor, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Caro-
lina, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Alfred Heath appeals his convictions for attempted possession and
possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1994), and using the United States Postal
Service to facilitate the commission of a felony in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 843(b) (1994).
Heath claims on appeal that the district court erred in its applica-
tion of the business records exception to the hearsay rule to permit the
introduction of mailing labels by the United States at trial. See Fed.
R. Evid. 803(6). We need not address the applicability of Rule 803(b)
because the evidence was not hearsay. See United States v.
Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1980). We also find that the
probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by
any unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Heath also claims that the district court erred when it denied his
motion for a mistrial. Heath asserts that in closing argument counsel
for the United States violated his constitutional rights by commenting
on his failure to testify. We disagree. A review of the alleged
improper comment shows that it was not manifestly intended to be,
nor was it of such character that the jury would naturally and neces-
sarily take it to be, a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.
See United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 701 (4th Cir. 1973).
Lastly, Heath claims that the district court should have excluded a
statement made by Heath before he was advised of his rights pursuant
to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, our review of
the matter indicates that the statement was in response to a routine
booking question regarding Heath's name. Such matters do not fall
within the scope of Miranda. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S.
582, 600-01 (1990) (plurality opinion). Furthermore, the question was
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not "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1980).
Accordingly, we affirm Heath's convictions. We also deny his
motion to file a supplemental brief. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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