ACOSTA

Interim Decision #2986

MATTER OF ACOSTA

In Deportation Proceedings

A-24159781

Decided by Board March 1, 1985

(1) Construction of the provisions the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, [1968] 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S.
268, is left by that agreement to each state that is party to the Protocol; accord-
ingly, the various international interpretations of the Protocol, including the
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the status of Refugees pub-
lished by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, are
useful tools in construing our obligations under the Protocol, but they are neither
binding upon the United States nor controlling as to construction of the Refugee
Act of 1980.
(2) An alien in an exclusion or deportation proceeding who seeks to demonstrate eli-
gibility for either asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982), or withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of
the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982), must make two related showings: he must meet
his evidentiary burdens of proof and persuasion as to the facts, and he must meet
the statutory standards of eligibility set out by the pertinent provisions in the
Act.
(3) It is the alien who bears the burdens of proof and persuasion in asylum and
withholding of deportation cases and he must establish the facts by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
(4) In order to meet the statutory standard of eligibility for asylum, an alien must
satisfy each of the following four elements in the definition of a refugee created
by section 101(aX42XA) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(aX42XA) (1982): (1) the alien
must have a "fear" of "persecution"; (2) the fear must be "well founded"; (3) the
persecution feared must be "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion"; and (4) the alien must be unable
or unwilling to return to his country of nationality or to the country in which he
last habitually resided because of persecution or his well-founded fear of persecu-
tion.
(5) The statutory standard for asylum requires the facts to show that an alien's pri-
mary motivation for requesting refuge in the United States is "fear," i e. , a genu-
me apprehension or awareness of danger in another country, no other motivation
will suffice.
(6) The term "persecution" in the definition of a refugee under the Act means harm
or suffering that is inflicted upon an individual in order to punish him for pos-

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sessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome; the word does
not encompass the harm that arises out of civil or military strife in a country.
(7) The requirement of a "well-founded fear of persecution" in section 101(aX42)(A)
of the Act means that an individual's fear of persecution must have its basis in
external, or objective, facts that show there is a realistic likelihood he will be per-
secuted upon his return to a particular country; this requires an alien to show
that his fear has a solid basis in objective facts or events and that it is likely he
will become the victim of persecution.
(8) In order for an alien to show that it is likely he will become the victim of perse-
cution, his evidence must demonstrate that (1) the alien possesses a belief or char-
acteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means of punishment of
some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware, that
the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capabil-
ity of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the
alien.
(9) The well-founded fear standard for asylum and the clear probability standard for
withholding of deportation are not meaningfully different and, in practical appli-
cation, converge.
(10) "Persecution on account of membership in a particular social group" refers to
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of
persons, all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. i.e., a character-
istic that either is beyond the power of the individual members of the group to
change or is so fundamental to their identities or consciences that it ought not be
required to be changed.
(11) In order for an alien tu show persecution on account of "political opinion"
within the meaning of the Act, it is not sufficient to show that a persecutor's con-
duct furthers his goals in a political controversy; rather, the alien must show that
it is his own, individual political opinion that a persecutor seeks to overcome by
the infliction of harm or suffering.
(12) The requirement that an alien must be unable or unwilling to return to a par-
ticular country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution re-
quires an alien to do more than show a threat of persecution in a particular place
or abode within a country—he must show that the threat of persecution exists fur
him country-wide.
CHARGE:
Order: Act of 1062—Sec. 241(aX2) [8 U.S.C. §1251(aX2)]—Entered without inspec-
tion

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
Evangeline G Abriel, Esquire William M. Darlington
Catherine Lampard, Esquire District Counsel
Ecumenical Immigration Services, Inc.
821 General Pershing Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70115

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Dunne, Morris, and Vacca, Board Members

In a decision dated December 22, 1983, the immigration judge
found the respondent deportable pursuant to section 241(a)(2) of the
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Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982), for
entering the United States without inspection, denied the respond-
ent's applications for a grant of asylum and for withholding of de-
portation to El Salvador, but granted the respondent the privilege
of departing voluntarily in lieu of deportation. The respondent has
appealed from that portion of the immigration judge's decision de-
nying the applications for asylum and withholding of deportation.
The appeal will be dismissed.
The respondent is a 36-year-old male native and citizen of El Sal-
vador. In a deportation hearing held before an immigration judge
over the course of 2 days in July and August 1983, the respondent
conceded his deportability for entering the United States without
inspection and accordingly was found deportable as charged. The
respondent sought relief from deportation by applying for a discre-
tionary grant of asylum pursuant to section 208 of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158 (1982), and for mandatory withholding of deportation to El
Salvador pursuant to section 243(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1982). 1 In an oral decision, the immigration judge denied the re-
spondent's applications for these two forms of relief finding that he
had failed to meet his burden of proof for such relief. It is this find-
ing that the respondent has challenged on appeal.
In order to be eligible for withholding of deportation to any coun-
try, an alien must show that his "life or freedom would be threat-
ened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Section
243(hX1) of the Act. We have held, and the Supreme Court of the
United States has recently affirmed, that this statutory provision
requires an alien to demonstrate "a clear probability" of persecu-
tion, on account of one of the five grounds enumerated in the Act.
INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). The Court has construed the
clear probability standard to require a showing that it is more
likely than not an alien would be subject to persecution. Id. at 424.
In order to be eligible for a grant of asylum, an alien must show
he or she is a "refugee" as defined by section 101(a)(42)(A) of the
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982). See section 208 of the Act. That
definition includes the requirement that an alien must have "a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion." See section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act. In INS v. Steviq supra,

Under the regulations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, any
asylum request made after the institution of deportation proceedings is also consid-
ered to be a request for withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the Act. 8
C.P.R. § 208.8(b) (1984).
Interim Decision #2986

the Supreme Court did not find it necessary to construe the mean-
ing of the phrase "well-founded fear of persecution." Rather, the
Court assumed for the purposes of analysis that the well-founded
fear standard for asylum is more generous than the clear probabili-
ty standard for withholding of deportation. INS v. Stevie, supra, at
425.
It has been our position that as a practical matter the showing
contemplated by the phrase "a well -founded fear" of persecution
converges with the showing described by the phrase "a clear proba-
bility" of persecution. See, e.g., Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379
(7th Cir- 1977); Matter of Dunar, 14 I&N Dec. 310, 319-20 (BIA
1973). Accordingly, we have not found a significant difference be-
tween the showings required for asylum and withholding of depor-
tation. Matter of Salim, 18 I&N Dec. 311, 314 (BIA 1982); Matter of
Lam, 18 I&N Dec. 15 (BIA 1981); accord Matter of Portales, 18 I&N
Dec. 239, 241 (BIA 1982).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
agreed with this position, holding that thre is no difference be-
tween the standards for asylum and withholding of deportation.
Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832, 836 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Rejaie v. INS,
691 F.2d. 139, 146 (3d Cir_ 1982) The Seventh Circuit has concluded
that the well-founded fear standard for asylum is not identical, but
"very similar," to the clear probability standard for withholding of
deportation and has described the showing for asylum as one re-
quiring actual persecution or some other "good reason" to fear per-
secution_ Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d. 562, 574-76 (7th Cir.
1984). This position also appears to have been adopted by the Sixth
Circuit. Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1984). The
Ninth Circuit, however, which has indicated that the well-founded
fear standard requires a "valid reason" to fear persecution, has
concluded that this standard is more generous to the alien than the
clear probability standard for withholding of deportation. Bolanos-
Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1984). In light of
the conflicting positions over the standards controlling asylum and
withholding of deportation, we shall reexamine our position on the
showings required for these forms of relief.
We begin with the understanding that au alien in an exclusion
or a deportation proceeding who seeks to demonstrate eligibility for
either asylum or withholding of deportation_ must necessarily make
two related showings. First, the alien must go forward with his evi-
dence and initially persuade the immigration judge that the facts
alleged to be the basis of the claim for asylum or withholding of
deportation are true, i.e., the alien must meet his evidentiary, bur-
dens of proof and persuasion. See generally, E. Cleary, McCormick's

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Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 336, at 783-85 (2d ed. 1975).
Second, the alien must demonstrate that the facts found to be true
meet the tests of eligibility for asylum or withholding of deporta-
tion set out in the Act, i.e., the alien must meet the statutory
standards of eligibility for these forms of relief. See sections 208
and 243(h) of the Act.

THE EVIDENTIARY BURDENS OF PROOF AND PERSUASION
FOR ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION

Case law and the regulations have always made clear that it is
the alien who bears the burden of proving that he would be subject
to, or fears, persecution. See INS v. Stevie, supra, at 422 n.16; 8
C.F.R. §§ 208.5, 242.17(c) (1984); see also Matter of Nagy, 11 I&N
Dec. 888, 889 (BIA 1966); Matter of Sihasale, 11 I&N Dec. 759, 760-
62 (BIA 1966). However, to date our decisions have not articulated
the burden of persuasion an alien must meet hi order to convince
the trier of fact of the truth of the allegations that form the basis
of the claim for asylum or withholding of deportation.
It is the general rule in both administrative and immigration law
that the party charged with the burden of proof must establish the
truth of his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. See E.
Cleary, supra, § 355, at 853; lA C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immi-
gration Law and Procedure § 5.10b, at 5-121 (rev. ed. 1984). 2 This is
the burden of persuasion generally applied to aliens when they
seek to prove their admissibility to the United States or when they
seek relief from deportation through such means as suspension of
deportation under section 244(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)
(1982), or adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1255 (1982). See Matter of Vorrais, 12 I&N Dec. 84 BIA
1967); IA C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra, §§ 3.20d, 5.10b, at 5-
121. We see no reason to depart from this burden of persuasion
when aliens seek asylum and withholding of deportation. Thus, in
such cases we consider it to be incumbent upon an alien to estalo-
lish the facts supporting his claim by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 3 Cf. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, supra, at 1320 n.5. In deter-

The Service's burden of proving an alien's deportability by clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence is an exception to this general rule. See Woodby v. INS, 385
U.S. 276 (1966).
° We note that is McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2c1 1912, 1916 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth
Circuit held that a "substantial evidence" standard of review applies in cases in
which aliens seek withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the Act. See
also Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, supno, at 567. The standard of review employed by a
Continued

01
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mining whether a preponderance of the evidence supports an
alien's allegations, it is necessary to assess the credibility and the
probative force of the evidence put forward by the alien. See, e.g.,
Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984).
In order to prove the facts underlying his applications for asylum
and withholding of deportation, the respondent testified, and at-
tested in an affidavit attached to his asylum application, to the fol-
lowing facts. In 1976 he, along with several other taxi drivers,
founded COTAXI, a cooperative organization of taxi drivers of
about 150 members. COTAXI was designed to enable its members
to contribute the money they earned toward the purchase of their
taxis. It was one of five taxi cooperatives in the city of San Salva-
dor and one of many taxi cooperatives throughout the country of
El Salvador. Between 1978 and 1981, the respondent held three
management positions with COTAXI, the duties of which he de-
scribed in detail, and his last position with the cooperative was
that of general manager. He held that position from 1979 through
February or March of 1981. During the time he was the general
manager of COTAXI, the respondent continued on the weekends to
work as a taxi driver.
Starting around 1978, COTAXI and its drivers began receiving
phone calls and notes requesting them to participate in work stop-
pages. The requests were anonymous but the respondent and the
other members of COTAXI believed them to be from anti-go-vern-
ment guerrillas who had targeted small businesses in the transpor-
tation industry for work stoppages, in hopes of damaging El Salva-
dor's economy. COTAXPs board of directors refused to comply with
the requests because its members wished to keep working, and as a
result COTAXI received threats of retaliation. Over the course of
several years, COTAXI was threatened about 15 times. The other
taxi cooperatives in the city also received similar threats.
Beginning in about 1979, taxis were seized and burned; or used
as barricades, and COTAXI drivers were assaulted or killed. Ulti-
mately, five members of COTAXI were killed in their taxis by un-
known persons. Three of the COTAXI drivers who were killed were
friends of the respondent and, like him, had been founders and offi-
cers of COTAXI. Each was killed after receiving an anonymous
note threatening his life. One of these drivers, who died from inju-
ries he sustained when he crashed his cab in order to avoid being

court in reviewing our decision is a separate and distinct standard from that im-
posed upon a party to measure his burden of persuasion on issues of fact. Woodby v.
INS, supra, at 282-83. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision in McMullen has no bear-
ing on the issue of an alien's burden of persuasion in withholding or asylum cases.

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shot by his passengers, told his friends before he died that three
men identifying themselves as guerrillas had jumped into his taxi,
demanded possession of his car, and announced they were going to
kill him.
During January and February 1981, the respondent received
three anonymous notes threatening his life. The first note, which
was slipped through the window of his taxi and was addressed to
the manager of COTAXI, stated: "Your turn has come, because you
are a traitor." The second note, which was also put on the respond-
ent's car, was directed to "the driver of Taxi No. 95," which was
the car owned by the respondent, and warned: "You are on the
black list." The third note was placed on the respondent's car in
front of his home, was addressed to the manager of COTAXI, and
stated: "We are going to execute you as a traitor." In February
1981, the respondent was beaten in his cab by three men who then
warned him not to call the police and took his taxi The respondent
is of the opinion that the men who threatened his life and assault-
ed him were guerrillas who were socking to disrupt transportation
services in the city of San Salvador_ He also has the impression,
however, that COTAXI was not favored by some government offi-
cials became they viewed the cooperative as being too socialistic.
After being assaulted and receiving the three threatening notes,
the respondent left El Salvador because he feared for his life. He
declared at the hearing that he would not work as a taxi driver if
he returned to El Salvador because he understands that there is
little work for taxi drivers now. He explained that the people are
too poor to call taxis. Additionally, he stated that the terrorists are
no longer active.
As evidence of the truth of his version of the facts, the respond-
ent submitted a letter from the present manager of COTAXI, stat
ing that the respondent was a member of that organization for 3
years. The respondent also submitted several articles reporting
that leftist guerrillas had threatened to kill American advisors and
personnel in El Salvador, had launched an offensive in three of the
provinces in the country, and had engaged in a campaign designed
to sabotage the transportation industry and the country's economy.
The Service did not submit any evidence refuting the respond-
ent's testimony. As required by regulation, the Service did submit a
written advisory opinion from the Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs in the Department of State pertaining to the
respondent's Request for Asylum in the United States (Form T - 539).
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7, 208.10(b) (1983). That opinion states that the
respondent does not appear to qualify for asylum because he failed
to show a well-founded fear of persecution in El Salvador on ac-

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count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.
The immigration judge found the respondent's testimony suffi-
cient to prove that he was a founder and member of COTAXI but
insufficient to prove that he had received several death threats and
had been assaulted by guerrillas. The immigration judge did not
make any finding that the respondent lacked credibility; rather, he
rejected a substantial portion of the respondent's testimony solely
because it was self-serving.
While the immigration judge's assessment of the evidence de-
serves deference, we disagree with his conclusion that the respond-
ent's testimony should be rejected solely because it is self-serving.
The respondent described in specific detail the circumstances sur-
rounding the deaths of his three friends shortly after they received
threatening notes, the threats he received, and the facts surround-
ing his assault. His testimony as to these matters was logically con-
sistent with his testimony about the threats made to COTAXI and
its members for failing to participate in guerrilla - sponsored work
stoppages. Moreover, the respondent submitted objective evidence
to establish his membership in COTAXI and to corroborate his tes-
timony that the guerrillas sought to disrupt the public transporta-
tion system of El Salvador. Thus, absent an adverse credibility
finding by the immigration judge, we find the respondent's testimo-
ny, which was corroborated by other objective evidence in the
record, to be worthy of belief. It remains to be determined, howev-
er, whether the respondent's facts are sufficient to meet the statu-
tory standards of eligibility for asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion.

THE STATUTORY STANDARD FOR ASYLUM
A grant of asylum is a matter of discretion. See section 208 of the
Act; INS v. Stevie, supra, at 423 n.18. However, an alien is eligible
for a favorable exercise of discretion only if he qualifies as a "refu-
gee" under section 101(aX42)(A) of the Act. Therefore, that section
establishes the statutory standard of eligibility for asylum. The per-
tinent portion of section 101(a)(42) provides as follows:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such per-
son's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in *Mel such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwill-
ing to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the pro-
tection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.... The term "refugee" does not include any person
who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any

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person on accourtt of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.
This section creates four separate elements that must be satisfied
before an alien qualifies as a refugee: (1) the alien must have a
"fear" of "persecution"; (2) the fear must be "well founded"; (3) the
persecution feared must be "on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion";
and (4) the alien must be unable or unwilling to return to his coun-
try of nationality or to the country in which he last habitually re-
sided because of persecution or his well-founded fear of persecu-
tion. 4
(1) The alien must have a "fear" of "persecution."

Initially, we mote that Congress added the elements in the defini-
tion of a refugee to our law by means of the Refugee Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. In so doing Congress intended to
conform the Immigration and Nationality Act to the United Na-
tions Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,
[1968] 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.LA.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 ("Proto-
col"), to which the United States had acceded in 1968. H.R. Rep.
No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 160, 160; S. Rep. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 14 - 15,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 141, 144, 154-55;
.

H.R. Rep. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 9-10 (1979); see also INS v.
Stevic, supra, at 422-23. Article 1.2 of the Protocol 5 defines a refu-
gee as one who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Compare 19 U.S.T. 6225 with 6261. 6

While the language of section 101(aX42XA) excludes from the definition of a ref-
ugee any person who "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person," we do not construe this language as establishing a fifth
statutory element an alien must initially prove before he qualifies as a refugee. This
provision is one of exclusion, not one of inclusion, and thus requires an alien to
prove he did not participate in persecution only if the evidence raises that issue.
5 Article 1.2 of the Protocol largely incorporated the definition of a refugee con-
tained in Article 1A(2) of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 ("U.N. Convention"), to which, the United
States was not a party.
Despite Congress' intention to conform our law to the Protocol, the actual defini-
tion of "refugee" adopted in the Act differs in several significant respects from that
Continued

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Since Congress intended the definition of a refugee in section
101(aX42XA) of the Act to conform to the Protocol, it is appropriate
for us to consider various international interpretations of that
agreement. However, these interpretations are not binding upon us
in construing the elements created by section 101(a)(42)(A) of the
Act, for the determination of who should be considered a refugee is
ultimately left by the Protocol to each state in whose territory a
refugee finds himself. See Young, Between Sovereigns: A Reexam-
ination of the Refugee's Status, Transnat'l Legal Probs. of Refugees:
1982 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. 339, 344-45 (1982); Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the
1951 Convention and the 1.967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees 1, 3-4 (Geneva, 1979) ("Handbook"); INS v. Stevie, supra,
at 428 n.22.
In adding the definition of a refugee to the Act, Congress did not
identify what one must show in order to establish a "fear of perse-
cution." The phrase "fcar of persecution" is not new to the Act.
Prior to 1980, it appeared in former section 203(a)(7), which provid-
ed for the conditional admission to the United States of certain
aliens if they fled a country because of persecution or "fear of per-
secution." See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)(A)(i) (1976) (repealed by the Ref-
ugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(c)(3), 94 Stat. 102,107). 7
Formesctin203(a)7wpledbySrvicofsnalt-
ing visas to immigrants abroad and by district directors in deter-
mining eligibility for adjustment of status under section 245 of the
Act. See, e.g., Matter of Ugricic, 14 I&N Dec. 384 (D.D. 19'72); Matter

in the Protocol and the U.N. Convention. First, the U.N. Convention excludes from
all of its provisions several groups of persons: (1) those who have committed crimes
against humanity; (2) those who have committed a serious nonpolitical crime; and
(3) those who are guilty of acts contrary to the principles of the United Nations.
Article 1F of the U.N. Convention at 19 U.S.T. 6263-64. Thus, these groups are not
eligible for refugee status under the U.N. Convention or the Protocol. The language
in section 101(aX42XA) of the Act does not contain this exclusion. Second, in a provi-
sion that does not pertain to grants of asylum, Congress provided that a person may
qualify as a refugee even if he is still inside his country of nationality or of habitual
residence so long as he has been specially designated by the President. Section
101(aX42)03) of the Act. Neither the Protocol nor the U.N. Convention definition of
"refugee" reaches persons still within the borders of their own countries. Martin,
The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, Transnat'l Legal Probs. of Refugees:
1982 l'ffich. Y.B. Intl Legal Stud. 91, 101-03 (1982).
7 Specifically, former section 203(aX7) allowed 17,400 persons each year to be con-
ditionally admitted to the United States if they could demonstrate that (1) they had
fled from a communist or communist-dominated country or from any country in the
Middle East, and (2) they had fed these countries because of persecution or fear of
persecution. See former section 203(aX7) of the Act.

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of Adarnska, 12 I&N Dec. 201 (R.C. 1967). Immigration judges and
the Board were without authority to decide applications brought
under former section 203(a)(7), and accordingly the meaning of the
phrase "fear of persecution" was never directly at issue, or con-
strued, in proceedings before the Board. See Matter of Guiragos-
sian, 17 I&N Dec. 161, 163 (BIA 1979).
"Fear" is a subjective condition, an emotion characterized by the
anticipation or awareness of danger. Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary 831 (16th ed. 1971). The Office of the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") has suggested
in the Handbook that the definition of a refugee found in the Pro-
tocol requires fear to be a person's primary motivation for seeking
refugee status. See Handbook, supra, at 11-12. While we do not con-
sider the UNHCR's position in the Handbook to be controlling,a
the Handbook nevertheless is a useful tool to the extent that it pro-
vides us with one internationally recognized interpretation of the
Protocol.
Given the prominence of the word "fear" in the definition of a
refugee created by Congress, and given the Handbook's persuasive
assessment in this instance that "fear" should be a refugee's pri-
mary motivation, we conclude that an alien seeking to quality
under section 101(aX42XA) of the Act must demonstrate that his
primary motivation for requesting refuge in the United States is
"fear," i.e., a genuine apprehension or awareness of danger in an-
other country. No other motivation, such as dissent or disagree-
ment with the conditions in another country or a desire to experi-
ence greater economic a_vantage
d or personal freedom in the

8 The Handbook was issued in September 1979, whereas hearings on the Refugee
Act were held in March and May 1979. and the Senate Judiciary Committee issued
its report in July 1979. Thus, it is highly unlikely that Congress consulted the
Handbook while drafting the definition of a refugee in the Refugee Act of 1980. But
see United States Refugee Program, Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on
immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sees. 24, 26 (1981) (memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, As-
sistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to David W. Crosland, General
Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service) (assuming Congress was aware of
the criteria articulated in the Handbook at the time of passage of the Refugee Act
in 1980, but nonetheless concluding the Handbook is only a guideline).
In addition, the jurisdiction of the UNHCR has been expanded over the years and
now encompasses large groups of persons displaced by civil strife or natural disas-
ters who simply do not qualify under the Protocol's limited definition of a "refu-
gee." Special Project, Displaced Persons: "The New Refugees," 13 Ga. J. Intl and
Comp. Law 755, 763-71 (1983) and authorities cited therein. Thus, it cannot be cer-
tain to what extent the position in the Handbook reflects concepts that are out-
side the strict definition of a "refugee" under the Protocol See infra p. 228.

091
Interim Decision #2986

United States, satisfies the definition of a refugee created in the
Act
Prior to 1980, "persecution" was construed to mean either a
threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or
harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded as offensive. See,
e.g., Kouac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969); Matter of Mac-
cauc4 14 I&N Dec. 429, 434 (BIA 1973); Matter of Dunar, supra, at
820; Matter of .Diaz, 10 I&N Dec. 199, 200 n.1 (BIA 1963); see also
Matter of Laipenieks, 18 I&N Dec. 433, 456-57 (BIA 1983). 9 The
harm or suffering inflicted could consist of confinement or torture.
See Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1961). It also
could consist of economic deprivation or restrictions so severe that
they constitute a threat to an individual's life or freedom. See, e.g.,
Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744, 746 (3d Cir. 1961); Matter of
Salama, 11 I&N Dec. 536 (BIA 1966); Matter of Eusaph, 10 I&N
Dec. 453, 454 (BIA 1964). Generally harsh conditions shared by
many other persons did not amount to persecution. See Cheng Kai
Fa v. mrs, 386 F.2d 750. 753 (2d Cir. 1967). cert. denier:4 390 U.S.
1003 (1968). Prosecution for violating travel restrictions and laws of
general applicability did not constitute persecution, unless the pun-
ishment was imposed for invidious reasons. See Soric v. INS, 346
F.2d 360, 361 (7th Cir. 1965); Matter of Janus and Janek, 12 I&N
Dec. 866, 876 (BIA 1968).
Two significant aspects of this accepted construction of the term
"persecution" were as follows. First, harm or suffering had to be
inflicted upon an individual in order to punish him for possessing a
belief or characteristic a persecutor sought to overcome. See, e.g.,
Matter of Diaz, supra, at 204. Thus, physical injury arising out of
civil strife or anarchy in a country did not constitute persecution.
Id. at 203. Second, harm or suffering had to be inflicted either by
the government of a country or by persons or an organization that
the government was unable or unwilling to control. See, e.g.,
McMullen v. INS, supra, at 1315 n.2; Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102
(1st Cir. 1971); Matter of McMullen, 17 I&N Dec. 542, 544-45 (BIA
1980); Matter of Pierre, 15 I&N Dec. 461, 462 (BIA 1975).
We conclude that the pre-Refugee Act construction of "persecu-
tion" should be applied to the term as it appears in section
101(a)(42)(A) of the Act. It is a basic rule of statutory construction
that words used in an original act or section, that are repeated in

9 The word "persecution" appeared not only in former section 203(a)(7) but also in
the predecessors to the present withholding of depurtailuu pLovision in section
243(h) of the Act and in the regulatory provisions pertaining to grants of asylum.
See INS v. Stevie, supra, at 414 and nn.6-7; 8 § 108 (1980). Prior to 1980, it
was construed by us and by the courts primarily in the latter two contexts.

222
 Interim Decision #2986

subsequent legislation with a similar purpose, are presumed to be
used in the same sense in the subsequent legislation. Lorillard v.
Pens, 484 U.S. 575, 581. (1978); see also IA C. Sands, Sutherland
Statutory Constrwetion § 22.33 (4th ed. 1972). Thus, we presume
that Congress, in using the term "persecution" in the definition of
a refugee under section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, intended to adopt
.

the judicial and administrative construction of that term existing
prior to the Refugee Act of 1980. See Commissioner v. Noel's Estate,
380 U.S. 678, 681 (1965); of McMullen v. INS, supra, at 544-45. Our
presumption is reinforced by the fact that in 1978, 2 years before
enacting the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress chose not to define the
word "persecution" when using it in other provisions of the Act be-
cause the meaning of the word was understood to be well estab-
lished by administrative and court precedents. See Matter of Lai-
penieks, supra, at 456.
As was the case prior to enactment of the Refugee Act, "persecu-
tion" as used in section 101(a)(42)(A) clearly contemplates that
harm or suffering must be inflicted upon an individual in order to
punish him for possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor
seeks to overcome. The word does not embrace harm arising out of
civil strife or anarchy. In fact, Congress specifically rejected a defi-
nition of a refugee that would have included "displaced persons,"
i.e., those who flee harm generated by military or civil disturb-
ances." This construction is consistent with the international in-
terpretation of "refugee" under the Protocol, for that term does not
include persons who are displaced by civil or military strife in their
countries of origin. See Special Project, supra note 8, at 763-69, and
authorities cited therein.
In the case before us, we find that the respondent has adequately
established that his primary motivation for seeking asylum is fear
of persecution. We must now consider whether it has been demon-
strated that this fear is well founded and whether the other ele-
ments necessary to establish eligibility for asylum have been satis-
fied.

" The Senate bill contained a definition of "refugee" that included "displaced
persons" and referred, in part, to "any person who has been displaced by military or
civil disturbance or uprooted because of arbitrary detention" who is unable to
return to "his usual place of abode." See S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a) (1979);
S. Rep. No. 256, St111177, at 4. The House bill did not contain such a provision. See
N.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a) (1979). The conference committee adopted
the House version, thereby rejecting a definition of "refugee" that included "dis-
placed persons." See H.R. Rep. No. 781, supra, at 19; see also section 101(aX42XA) of
the Act

999
Interim Decision #2986

(2) The fear of persecution must be "well founded."
In 1973, in Matter of Dunar, supra, we construed the meaning of
"well-founded fear of persecution," as that phrase is used in the
Protocol, as follows:
[T]he requirement that the fear be "well-founded" rules out an apprehension
which is purely subjective. . . . Some sort of showing must be made and this can
ordinarily be done only by objective evidence. The claimant's own testimony as to
the facts will sometimes be all that is available; but the crucial question is wheth-
er the testimony, if accepted as true, makes out a realistic likelihood that he will
be persecuted
Matter of Dunar, supra, at 319 (emphasis added). Our construction
of the Protocol's well founded fear standard was accepted by the
-

courts and thereafter "a well-founded fear" of persecution was un-
derstood to mean that an alien had to produce objective evidence
showing a likelihood or probability of persecution. See INS v.
Stevie, supra, at 419-20 and n.12 and cases cited therein; Kashani
v. INS, supra, at 379. Thus, during 1979 and 1980, the years in
which Congress drafted, considered, and enacted the definition of
"refugee" in. section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, the accepted adminis-
trative and judicial construction in this country of the well-founded
fear standard was oue that linked this standard to objective facts,
as opposed to purely subjective fear, and to the likelihood of perse-
cution. See INS v. Stevie, supra, at 419-20 and n.12.
Congress did not indicate in the legislative history of the Refugee
Act of 1980 that it intended to alter the accepted construction of "a
well-founded fear of persecution" by using this phrase in the defini-
tion of a "refugee" in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act. Moreover, the
pre-Refugee Act construction of "a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion" is nearly identical to that proposed by the authority on inter-
national refugee law, Atle Grahl-Madsen, in his treatise on the
meaning of the U.N. Convention and the Protocol:
The adjective 'well-founded' suggests that it is not the frame of mind of the
person concerned which is decisive for his claim to refugeehood, but that this
claim should be measured with a more ohjective yardstick.

We cannot find a meaningful denominator in the minds of refugees. We must
seek it in the conditions prevailing in the country whence they have fled.
'Well-founded fear of being persecuted' may therefore be said to exist, if it is likely
that the person concerned will become the victim of persecution if he returns to his
country of origin.

[T]he real test is the assessment of the likelihood of the applicant's becoming a
victim of persecution upon his return to his country of origin. If there is a real

224
 Interim Decision #2986

chance that he will suffer persecution, that is reason good enough, and his 'fear' is
'well-founded'.
1 A. Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law
§§ 76, 77, at 173, 175, 181 (1966) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Lastly, the pre-Refugee Act construction of "a well-founded fear of
persecution!' is consistent with the intention of the drafters of the
U.N. Convention, for by the use of this language the drafters were
seeking to introduce an objective, as opposed to a purely subjective,
test for the determination of refugee status. 1 A. Grahl-Madsen,
supra, § 78, at 179.'
Since there is no indication that Congress intended to depart
from the accepted judicial and administrative construction of "a
well-founded fear of persecution" and since this construction is con-
sistent with the U.N. Convention and the Protocol, we see no valid
reason for departing from the construction of the well-founded fear
standard that prevailed in this country prior to the Refugee Act of
1980. Accordingly, we continue to construe "a well-founded fear of
persecution" to mean that an individual's fear of persecution must
have its basis in external, or objective, facts that show there is a
realistic likelihood he will be persecuted upon his return to a par-
ticular country.
As has always been the case, our construction of the well-found-
ed fear standard reflects two fundamental concepts. The first is
that in order to be "well founded," an alien's fear of persecution
cannot be purely subjective or conjectural—it must have a solid
The committee that drafted the phrase, "a well-founded fear of persecution," in
the U.N. Convention defined the phrase to mean that a person actually must have
been a victim. of persecution or be able to show "good reason" why he fears persecu-
tion. Matter of Dunar, supra, at 319. That committee considered various proposals
defining refugee status in terms of being unwilling to return to one's country of
origin because of "serious apprehension based on reasonable grounds of . . . persecu-
tion," or a "justifiable fear of persecution," or a "fear of persecution," before select-
ing the term "well-founded" to describe the nature of the fear that qualified one as
a refugee. U.N. Does. E/AC.32/L.2, E/AC.32/L.3, E/AC.32/L.4 and Add. 1 (Jan. 17,
1060). In addition, the committee was guided by prior international agreements per-
taining to refugees, one of which was the Constitution of the International Refugee
Organization ("IRO"). See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Re-
lated Problems, U.N. Doc. E/1618 at 37 (Feb. 17, 1950). The IRO Constitution provid-
ed that refugees and displaced persons became the concern of the IRO if, inter alia,
they had valid objections to returning to their countries of origin such as "persecu-
tion or fear, based on reasonable grounds of persecution." Constitution of the IRO,
ratified Dec. 16, 1946, Part I, §§ A, B, C.1(aX1), 62 Stat. 3037, T.I.A.S. No. 1846, 18
U.N.T.S. 2 (effective Aug Rs, 19481 reprinted in 1948 U.S. Code Cong. Service 2042,
2051-52. Thus, we conclude that in using the phrase "well-founded fear of persecu-
tion," the drafters of the U.N. Convention were attempting to create an objective
measure of the fear of persecution.

225
Interim Decision #2986

basis in objective facts or events. Compare Matter of Martinez-
Ronwro, 18 I&N Dec. 75, 79 (BIA 1981) (an alien did not show a
well-founded fear of persecution because there were no objective
facts supporting his claim to asylum) with Matter of Dunar, supra,
at 319 (a showing of a well-founded fear of persecution rules out a
purely subjective apprehension and requires a showing to be made
by objective evidence). This concept, after all, is consistent with the
generally understood meaning of the term "well-founded," which
refers to something that has a. firm foundation in fact or is based
on excellent reasoning, information, judgment, or grounds. See
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra, at 2595.
The second fundamental concept that is, and always has been, re-
flected in our construction of "a well-founded fear of persecution"
is that in order to warrant the protection afforded by a grant of
refuge, an alien must show it is likely he will become the victim of
persecution. Compare Matter of Salim, supra, at 313-15 (an alien
established eligibility for asylum and met the well-founded fear
standard because he showed the requisite "likelihood" of persecu-
tion) with Mutter of Donor, .supra, at 319 (the crucial question
under the well-founded fear standard is whether a person has
shown a realistic "likelihood" of persecution). Since language by its
nature is inexact, we have used such words as "likelihood," or "re-
alistic likelihood," or even "probability" of persecution to express
this concept. See, e.g., Matter of Salim, supra; Matter of Dunar,
supra. By use of such words we do not mean that "a well-founded
fear of persecution" requires an alien to establish to a particular
degree of certainty, such as a "probability" as opposed to a "possi-
bility," that he will become a victim of persecution. Rather, as a
practical matter, what we mean can best be described as follows:
the evidence must demonstrate that (1) the alien possesses a belief
or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means
of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or
could easily become aware, that the alien possesses this belief or
characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capability of punishing
the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the
alien. The first of these factors is inherent in the showing that the
conduct the alien fears amounts to "persecution" under the Act,
i.e., the infliction of suffering or harm in order to punish an alien
because he differs in a way a persecutor deems offensive and seeks
to overcome. The second, third, and fourth factors are all indispen-
sable in showing that there is a real chance an alien will become a
victim of persecution, for if the persecutor is not aware or could
not easily become aware that an alien possesses the characteristic
that is the basis for persecution, or if the persecutor lacks the capa-
226
 Interim Decision # 2986

bility to carry out persecution, or if the persecutor has no inclina-
tion to punish the particular alien, then it cannot reasonably be
found that the alien is likely to become the persecutor's victim.
The issue of whether an alien's facts demonstrate these four factors
is one that ordinarily must be decided on a case by case basis, for
- -

the question of what kinds of facts show a likelihood of persecution
ultimately depends upon each alien's own particular situation.
"[The likelihood of becoming a victim of persecution may vary
from person to person. For example, a well-known personality may
be more exposed to persecution than a person who has always re-
mained obscure. . . . [TJherefore [it may be] necessary to assess
the situation of each person on its own merits." 1 A. Grahl-Madsen,
supra, § '76, at 175.
To date, the courts have not agreed upon a common description
of the well-founded fear standard in section 101(aX42XA) of the Act.
The Third Circuit has essentially adopted our language and con-
cluded that "a realistic likelihood" of persecution accurately de-
scribes the well founded fear standard. Compare Rejaie v. INS,
-

supra, at 146 with Matter of Dunar, supra, at 319. The Sixth, Sev-
enth, and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, appear to have chosen
the language "good reason" or "valid reason" to fear persecution to
describe this standard. Bolanos Hernandez v. INS, supra, at 1222;
-

Youkhanna v. INS, supra, at 362; Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, supra, at
574, 576-77; see also Stevie v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 405-06 (2d Qr.
1982), rev'd an other grounds, INS v. Stoic, supra. We think that
on their face descriptions such as "good reason" or "valid reason"
to fear persecution do not adequately describe the well-founded
fear standard. To the extent that such words could be interpreted
to mean that an alien's fear of persecution need only be plausible,:
they do not reflect the generally understood meaning of "well-
founded." See supra p. 226. Nor do these words reflect the under-
standing of Congress, and the meaning of the Protocol, that an
alien must show it is likely he will become a victim of persecution
before he is eligible for refuge. See supra pp. 224-25.
Moreover, as a practical matter, we are not certain that these de-
scriptions most accurately describe the analysis used by the courts
when ascertaining whether an alien's fear of persecution is "well
founded." No matter how the courts have described the well-found-
ed fear standard, they have required an alien to come forward with
more than his purely subjective fears of persecution; he has been
required to show that his fears have a sound basis in personal ex-
perience or in other external facts or events. See, e.g., Bulanos Her-
-

nandez v. INS, supra, at 1321 and n.11; Youkhanna v. INS, supra,
at 362; Carvajal Munoz, supra, at 5'74, 576-77; Rejaie v. INS, supra,
-

227
Interim Decision #2986

at 145-46. In addition, each of the courts has assessed an alien's
facts to determine whether he is likely to become a victim of perse-
cution and, in so doing, has looked for facts demonstrating some
combination of the four factors we have used to describe a likeli-
hood of persecution. See, e.g., Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, supra, at
1324; Daily v. INS, 744 F.2d 1191, 1196 (6th Cir. 1984); Carvajal-
Munoz v. ENS, supra, at 577-79; Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431,
1433-34 (9th Cir. 1984); Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079, 1083-84 (9th
Cir. 1983).
Our construction of "a well-founded fear of persecution" is also
consistent with some aspects of the UNHCR's interpretation of the
Protocol. Like us, the UNHCR is of the opinion that the term
"well-founded" requires a person's fear of persecution to be more
than a matter of personal conjecture and to be supported by an ob-
jective situation. Handbook, supra, para. 38, 41, at 11-13. Further-
more, the UNHCR is of the opinion that a person claiming a well-
founded fear of persecution must show that he is not tolerated by,
and has come to the attention of, a persecutor. Handbook, supra,
para. 80, at 19. However, we are not certain that the UNHCR's po-
sition adequately reflects the concept, inherent both in the Protocol
and in the construction of the well-founded fear standard at the
time Congress employed it in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, that
refuge in this country should be dependent upon a showing of a
likelihood of persecution. For example, the UNHCR advocates that
a well-founded fear of persecution is established merely if an alien
finds his return to a country to be "intolerable" or wishes to avoid
situations entailing some risk of persecution. Handbook, supra,
para. 42, 45. at 12-13. Therefore, to the extent that the UNHCR's
position in the Handbook does not require an individual to show he
is likely to become a victim of persecution, we find that position to
be inconsistent with Congress' intention and with the meaning of
the Protocol.
Given our construction of the showing required by the language
"a well-founded fear of persecution," it remains to be determined
how this showing compares with the "clear probability" of persecu-
tion required for section 243(h) withholding of deportation. The
Third and Seventh Circuits view the well -founded fear and clear
probability standards to be either identical or very similar to one
another. Sotto v. INS, supra, at 836; Carvajal-Munoz, supra, at 574-
75. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has concluded that the
well-founded fear standard is more generous to an alien than the
clear probability standard. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, supra, at
1321; see also Stevic v. Sava, supra, at 406.
228
 Interim Decision #2986

One might conclude that "a well-founded fear of persecution,"
which requires a showing that persecution is likely to occur, refers
to a standard that is different from "a clear probability of persecu-
tion," which requires a showing that persecution is "more likely
than not" to occur- As a practical matter, however, the facts in.
asylum and withholding cases do not produce clear-cut instances in
which such fine distinctions can be meaningfully made. Our in-
quiry in these cases, after all, is not quantitative, Le., we do not
examine a variety of statistics to discern to some theoretical degree
the likelihood of persecution. Rather our inquiry is qualitative: we
examine the alien's experiences and other external events to deter-
mine if they are of a kind that enable us to conclude the alien is
likely to become the victim of persecution. In this context, we find
no meaningful distinction between a standard requiring a showing
that persecution is likely to occur and a standard requiring a show-
ing that persecutiom is more likely than not to occur. As we con-
strue them, both the well-founded fear standard for asylum and the
clear probability standard for withholding of deportation require
an alien's facts to show that the alien possesses a characteristic a
persecutor seeks to overcome by punishing the individuals who pos-
sess it, that a persecutor is aware or could easily become aware the
alien possesses this characteristic, that a persecutor has the capa-
bility of punishing the alien, and that a persecutor has the inclina-
tion to punish the alien. Accordingly, we conclude that the stand-
ards for asylum and withholding of deportation are not meaning-
fully different and, in practical application, converge.
Our position is most consistent with what we perceive to have
been Congress' understanding of the relationship between asylum
and withholding of deportation at the time the present provisions
were enacted in the Refugee Act of 1980. Prior to 1980, asylum and
withholding of deportation were closely related forms of relief, and
asylum was available if an alien could show the same likelihood of
persecution that was required for withholding of deportation."

12 Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, a request for asylum filed after completion of
deportation proceedings was considered to be a request for section 243(h) withhold-
ing of deportation and for, inter alia, the benefits of Article 33 of the Protocol and
the U.N. Convention which prohibit the expulsion of a refugee to a place where his
"life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion." INS v. Stevie supra, at
s-17. 420 n.13: see also 8 C.F.R. § 108.3(a) (1980). An applicant for asylum had the
burden of proving that he "would be subject to persecution on account of race, reii
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8
C.F.R. § 108.3(c) (1980).
Continued

229
Interim Decision #2986

The legislative history of the Refugee Act does not contain any ex-
press indication that Congress intended to alter this relationship;
quite the contrary, the legislative history indicates that Congress
understood it was preserving this relationship."
Thus, under the changes made by the Refugee Act of 1980, an
alien is eligible for asylum if he meets all of the other elements in
the definition of a refugee under section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act
and can show "a well-founded fear of persecution," i.e., objective
facts that demonstrate it is likely he will become a victim of perse-
cution. Section 208(a) of the Act. A grant of asylum provides him
not only with temporary refuge in this country, but with the possi-
bility of obtaining permanent refuge here, i.e., an opportunity to
become a lawful permanent resident. Section 209(b) of the Act.
However, asylum is ultimately a matter of discretion. Section
208(a) of the Act. An alien may be denied asylum as a matter of
discretion, may be found deportable or excludable, and then may
find himself in the position of being expelled. In such a situation
he is nonetheless protected against expulsion to the country of per-
secution, so long as he qualifies for -withholding of deportation. See
section 243(h)(1) and (2) of the Act. However, withholding of depor-
tation only protects the alien from being expelled to the country in
which his life or freedom would be threatened, it does nut prevent

Similarly, withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the Act was con-
strued to be comparable to the benefit afforded by Article 33 of the Protocol and the
U.N. Convention. See Matter of Duna, supra, at 319-20. An alien seeking withhold-
ing of deportation, like an alien seeking asylum, was required to show he "would be
subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion." 8 C.F.R.
§ 242.17(e) (1930); see also INS v. Stevie supra> at 414 nn.6 & 7, 420 n.13.
"The Senate bill required that in order to be eligible for asylum an alien must
meet the well-founded fear definition of a refugee and must show that his deporta-
tion or return was prohibited by the section 243(h) withholding of deportation provi-
sion. S. 643, supra. § 203(e); S. Rep. No. 256, supra, at 16. The Senate assumed that
this did not change the then-existing substantive standard for asylum. S. Rep. No.
256, supra, at 9. The House bill contained an asylum provision that made no express
reference to withholding of deportation. See H.R. 2816, supra, § 203(e). However, the
House Judiciary Committee perceived asylum and withholding of deportation to be
related forms of relief accomplishing the same end, namely that of conforming
United States law to the obligation of Article 33 of the Protocol and the U.N. Con-
vention. H.R. Rep. No. 608, supra, at 17-18. The conference committee adopted the
House version of the asylum provision and thus in the language of the statute did
not link asylum to withholding of deportation. See H.R. Rep. No. 781, supra, at 5-
Nevertheless, in its report the committee perceived asylum and withholding of de-
portation to be interchangeable and did not distinguish them as separate forms of
relief. /d. at 20. We think these facts show that Congress understood the functions
of asylum and withholding of deportation to be closely related and the standards of
eligibility for these forms of relief to be essentially comparable. But see Carvajal-
Munoz v. INS, supra, at 574-75 n.15.

230
 Interim Decision #2986

his expulsion to some other country. Compare sections 243(a) and
(h) of the Act.
We note that the Seventh Circuit has viewed this statutory struc-
ture as lending support for the conclusion that the standards for
withholding of deportation and asylum are somewhat different
from one another, for the court has concluded that Congress rea-
sonably could have intended an entitlement to withholding of de-
portation to be available upon a greater showing than that re-
quired for a discretionary grant of asylum. Carvajal-Munoz, supra,
at 575. Conversely, however, the structure of the Act also lends
support for the conclusion that Congress intended withholding of
deportation to be available upon a lesser showing than that re-
quired for asylum, because the right to avoid deportation to one
particular country, which is afforded by withholding of deportation,
is a lesser benefit than the privileges of remaining in this country
under a grant of refuge and of becoming a permanent resident,
which are afforded by asylum. Since the structure of the Act rea-
sonably supports two contrary conclusions about the relationship
between the standards for asylum and withholding of deportation,
we do not find the Act's structure to be particularly helpful in as-
certaining Congress' understandiig or intention. Rather, we find a
better indication of Congress' intention in the legislative history
showing that Congress perceived the standards for asylum and
withholding of deportation to be comparable to one another.
In the case before us, the respondent claims he fears persecution
at the hands of two groups: the government and the guerrillas.
Therefore, under our construction of the well-founded fear stand-
ard, the respondent must show that his fear of persecution by these
groups is more than a matter of personal conjecture or speculation;
he must show by objective events that his fear has a sound basis in
fact and that persecution by the government or by the guerrillas is
likely to occur if he is returned to El Salvador. This means that he
must demonstrate that (1) he possesses characteristics the govern-
ment or the guerrillas seek to overcome by means of punishment of
some sort; (2) the government or the guerrillas are aware or could
easily become aware that he possesses these characteristics; (3) the
government or the guerrillas have the capability of punishing him;
and (4) the government and the guerrillas have the inclination to
punish him
The respondent's fear of persecution by the government has no
basis whatsoever in either his personal experiences or in other ex-
ternal events. To the contrary, by the respondent's own admission,
this fear is based solely on his impression that some officials in the
government may have viewed COTAXI as being too socialistic. This

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purely subjective impression is not sufficient to show a well-found-
ed fear of persecution by the government.
In addition, whatever the facts may have been prior to the re-
spondent's departure from El Salvador, those facts have changed
significantly since 1981. Most importantly, the respondent admitted
that he does not intend to work as a taxi driver upon his return to
El Salvador. The respondent's facts do not show that the persecu-
tion of taxi drivers continued even after they stopped working as
drivers. Furthermore, the respondent testified that the guerrillas'
strength has diminished significantly in El Salvador since 1981.
For these reasons, the respondent has not shown that at the
present time he possesses characteristics the guerrillas seek to
overcome or that the guerrillas have the inclination to punish him.
Thus, the facts do not demonstrate that there is a likelihood the
respondent would be persecuted by the guerrillas should he be re-
turned to El Salvador, and accordingly his fear of persecution upon
deportation has not been shown to be "well founded."

(3) The persecution feared must be "on account of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion."
The respondent has argued that the persecution he fears at the
hands of the guerrillas is on account of his membership in a par-
ticular social group comprised of COTAXI drivers and persons en-
gaged in the transportation industry of El Salvador and is also on
account of his political opinion.
The requirement of persecution on account of "membership in a
particular social group" comes directly from the Protocol and the
U.N. Convention. See supra p. 219. Congress did not indicate what
it understood this ground of persecution to mean, nor is its mean-
ing clear in the Protocol. This ground was not included in the defi-
nition of a refugee proposed by the committee that drafted the
U.N. Convention; rather it was added as an afterthought. 1 A.
Grahl-Madsen, supra, at 219. International jurisprudence interpret-
ing this ground of persecution is sparse. G. Goodwin-Gill, The Refu-
gee in International Law 30 (1983). It has been suggested that the
notion of a "social group" was considered to be of broader applica-
tion than the combined notions of racial, ethnic, and religious
groups and that in order to stop a possible gap in the coverage of
the U.N. Convention, this ground was added to the definition of a
refugee. 1 A. Grahl -Madsen, supra, at 219. A purely linguistic anal-
ysis of this ground of persecution suggests that it may encompass
persecution seeking to punish either people in a certain relation, or

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having a certain degree of similarity, to one another or people of
like class or kindred interests, such as shared ethnic, cultural, or
linguistic origins, education, family background, or perhaps eco-
nomic activity. G. Goodwin-Gill, supra, at 31. The UNHCR has sug-
gested that a "particular social group" connotes persons of similar
background, habits, or social status and that a claim to fear perse-
cution on this ground may frequently overlap with persecution on
other grounds such as race, religion, or nationality. Handbook
supra, at 19.
We find the well-established doctrine of ejusdem generis, mean-
ing literally, "of the same kind," to be most helpful in construing
the phrase "membership in a particular social group." That doc-
trine holds that general words used in an enumeration with specif-
ic words should be construed in a manner consistent with the spe-
cific words. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946);
2A C. Sands, supra, § 47.17. The other grounds of persecution in the
Act and the Protocol listed in association with "membership in a
particular social group" are persecution on account of "race," "reli-
gion," "nationality," and "political opinion." Each of these grounds
describes persecution aimed at an immutable characteristic: a char-
acteristic that either is beyond the power of an individual to
change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience
that it ought not be required to be changed. See 1 A. Grahl-Madsen,
supra, at 217; G. Goodwin-Gill, supra, at 31. Thus, the other four
grounds of persecution enumerated in the Act and the Protocol re-
strict refugee status to individuals who are either unable by their
own actions, or as a matter of conscience should not be required, to
avoid persecution.
Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we interpret the
phrase "persecution on account of membership in a particular
social group" to mean persecution that is directed toward an indi-
vidual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a
common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic
might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in
some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as
former military leadership or land ownership. The particular kind
of group characteristic that will qualify under this construction re-
mains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, whatever
the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one
that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not
be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual
identities or consciences. Only when this is the case does the mere
fact of group membership become something comparable to the
other four grounds of persecution under the Act, namely, some-

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thing that either is beyond the power of an individual to change or
that is so fundamental to his identity or conscience that it ought
not be required to be changed. By construing "persecution on ac-
count of membership in a particular social group" in this manner,
we preserve the concept that refuge is restricted to individuals who
are either unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience
should not be required, to avoid persecution.
In the respondent's case, the facts demonstrate that the guerril-
las sought to harm the members of COTAXI, along with members
of other taxi cooperatives in the city of San Salvador, because they
refused to participate in work stoppages in that city. The charac-
teristics defining the group of which the respondent was a member
and subjecting that group to punishment were being a taxi driver
in San Salvador and refusing to participate in guerrilla-sponsored
work stoppages. Neither of these characteristics is immutable be-
cause the members of the group could avoid the threats of the
guerrillas either by changing jobs or by cooperating in work stop-
pages. It may be unfortunate that the respondent either would
have had to change his means of earning a living or cooperate with
the guerrillas in order to avoid their threats. However, the interna-
tionally accepted concept of a refugee simply does not guarantee an
individual a right to work in the job of his choice. See 1 A. Grahl-
Madsen, supra, at 214. Therefore, because the respondent's mem-
bership in the group of taxi drivers was something he had the
power to change, so that he was able by his own actions to avoid
the persecution of the guerrillas, he has not shown that the con-
duct he feared was "persecution on account of membership in a
particular social group" within our construction of the Act.
Moxeover, the respondent did not demonstrate that the persecu-
tion he fears is "on account of political opinion." The fact that the
respondent was threatened by the guerrillas as part of a campaign
to destabilize the government demonstrates that the guerrillas' ac-
tions were undertaken to further their political goals in the civil
controversy in El Salvador. However, conduct undertaken to fur-
ther the goals of one faction in a political controversy does not nec-
essarily constitute persecution "on account of political opinion" so
as to qualify an alien as a "refugee" within the meaning of the Act.
As we have previously discussed, the term "persecution" means
the infliction of suffering or harm in order to punish an individual
for possessing a particular belief or characteristic the persecutor
seeks to overcome. It follows, therefore, that the requirement of
"persecution on account of political opinion" means that the par-
ticular belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in an
individual must be his political opinion. Thus, the requirement of
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"persecution on account of political opinion" refers not to the ulti-
mate political end that may be served by persecution, but to the
belief held by an individual that causes hirn to be the object of the
persecution. See 1 A. Grahl-Madsen, supra, at 212, 220; G. Goodwin-
Gill, supra, at 31. This construction is consistent with the other
grounds of persecution enumerated in the Act such as "race," "reli-
gion," "nationality," and "membership in a particular social
group," each of which specifies a characteristic an individual pos-
sesses that causes him to be subject to persecution. Moreover, this
construction is consistent with Congress' intention that not all
harm with political implications, such as that which arises out of
civil strife in a country, qualifies an alien as a "refugee." See dis-
cussion supra p. 223 & note 10.
In the respondent's case there are no facts showing that the
guerrillas were aware of or sought to punish the respondent for his
political opinion; nor was there any showing that the respondent's
refusal to participate in the work stoppages was motivated by his
political opinion. Absent such a showing, the respondent failed to
demonstrate that the particular belief the guerrillas sought to over-
come in him was his political opinion. Therefore he does not come
within this ground of persecution

(4) The alien must be unable or unwilling to return to his country of
nationality or to the country in which he last habitually resided be-
cause of persecution or his well-founded fear of persecution.
Traditionally, a refugee has been an individual in whose case the
bonds of trust, loyalty, protection, and assistance existing between
a citizen and his country have been broken and have been replaced
by the relation of an oppressor to a victim. See 1 A. Grahl-Madsen,
supra, at 97, 100. Thus, inherent in refugee status is the concept
that an individual requires international protection because his
country of origin or of habitual residence is no longer safe for him.
Id. We consider this concept to be expressed, in part, by the re-
quirement in the Act and the Protocol that a refugee must be
unable or unwilling to return to a particular "country." See section
101(a)(42)(A) of the Act. We construe this requirement to mean that
an alien seeking to meet the definition of a refugee must do more
than show a well-founded fear of persecution in a particular place
or abode within a country—he must show that the threat of perse-
cution exists for him country -wide.
In the respondent's case, the facts show that taxi drivers in the
city of San Salvador were threatened with persecution by the left-
ist guerrillas. However, the facts do not show that this threat exist-

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ed in other cities in El Salvador. It may be the respondent could
have avoided persecution by moving to another city in that coun-
try.14 In any event, the respondent's facts did not demonstrate that
the guerrillas' persecution of taxi drivers occurred throughout the
country of El Salvador. Accordingly, the respondent did not meet
this element of the standard for asylum.
In summary, the respondent's facts fail to show that (1) his
present fear of persecution by the government and the guerrillas is
"well founded"; (2) the persecution he fears is on account of one of
the five grounds specified in the Act; and (3) he is unable to return
to the country of El. Salvador, as opposed to a particular place in
that country, because of persecution. Thus, he has not met three of
the four elements in the statutory definition of a refugee created
by section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act. Accordingly, the respondent has
not shown he is eligible for a grant of asylum.

THE STATUTORY STANDARD FOR WITHHOLDING OF
DEPORTATION

Section 243(h) of the Act, which specifies the standard of eligibil-
ity for withholding of deportation, requires an alien to show a clear
probability of persecution, i.e., that it is more likely than not he
will be the victim of persecution, in a particular country. INS v.
Stevie, supra, at 425. As we indicated, supra p. 229, the showing of
the likelihood of persecution contemplated by this standard con-
verges, in practice, with the showing required by the well-founded
fear standard for asylum. Therefore, since the respondent has not
demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of persecution at the hands of
either the government or the guerrillas to make his fear "well-
founded," it follows that the respondent has not demonstrated the
"clear probability" of persecution needed for withholding of depor-
tation. Moreover, since the conduct the respondent fears has not
been shown to be inflicted on account of ` membership in a particu-
;

lar social group" or "political opinion" within our construction of
the Act, the respondent has also failed to show that he comes
within one of the five grounds of persecution specified in section
243(h). Accordingly, the respondent has not met the standard of eli-
gibility for withholding of deportation.

" It is unfortunate when persons may be obliged to give up their jobs and leave
their homes as a result of fear. But that is not the issue here. The issue is, once that
decision is made, does an individual have the right to come to the United States
rather than to move elsewhere in his home country.

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For the foregoing reasons the respondent has not shown he is eli-
gible either for asylum or withholding of deportation to El Salva-
dor. Therefore, we shall dismiss his appeal.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.