after stating the facts: It has been repeatedly held with US that, under our registration law.s, no notice, however full and formal, as to the existence of a prior deed, will of itself supply the place of registration. Piano Co. v. Spruill, 150 N. C., 168; Tremaine v. Williams, 144 N. C., 116; Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 114 N. C., 145; Todd v. Outlaw, 79 N. C., 235. This being true, the de.ed to plaintiffs from Mrs. Sills and her children, the original owners, conveying the land and all that was on it of a permanent nature, including the growing timber, having been registered in Franklin County before any conveyance 'of the timber from these owners to defendant or to any one under whom the defendants claim, on the record as it now stands the plaintiffs have the better title, and the position is not affected because the deeds of defendants were first registered in Nash County, where a portion of the land is situate. Our statute, Revisal, 980, establishes priority of right from registration in the “county where the land lieth,” and the registration in Nash had no effect beyond the borders of that county. King v. Portis, 77 N. C., 25.
It is urged for defendant, the lumber company, that the plaintiffs are affected with legal notice of their claim, as we understand the argument, by reason of the registration in Franklin County of the deed from the Nash Timber Company to the lumber company, this deed having been registered in Franklin in 1907, and making some reference to the former deed of Alston and Taylor to said lumber company. There are decisions on the subject which hold that a deed by its recitals, etc., may so recognize and refer to the existence of a prior deed as to create an interest or engraft a trust upon the property conveyed, and so protect such interest or estate by registration of the latter instrument, an instance presented in Hinton v. Leigh, 102 N. C., 28, and one or two other cases in our Reports; but- in the case before us the provision is not at all of that character, but only refers to the Taylor and Alston deed for a better description of the property, and did not purport to have any further effect. Piano Co. v. Spruill, supra. And, if it were otherwise, the reference relied upon is to a deed from Taylor and Alston, and not to any deed or conveyance from Mrs. Sills and her children.
The purpose of our registration acts is to enable creditors and purchasers for value to ascertain the true owner, and the priority of right *342should arise from the prior registering of the deed passing the property from such owner. This, as we have seen, the plaintiffs have, and it must be held, therefore, as stated, that they hold the superior claims.
It is further insisted that his Honor, on some appropriate issue, should have submitted the question involved in the suit by Mrs. Sills and her children to correct the deed made by them to plaintiffs, on the ground of mistake; that by the terms of the agreement the timber was to have been excluded from this instrument. To correct a deed on account of mistake is a recognized subject of equitable jurisdiction, but in order to its exercise for the purpose of reforming the instrument because it does not properly express the agreement of the parties, it is established that the mistake must be mutual or it must be the mistake of one superinduced by the fraud of the other. Sills v. Ford, at present term; Shook v. Love, 170 N. C., 99; Pelletier v. Cooper, 158 N. C., 405; Floars v. Ins. Co., 144 N. C., 232; King v. Hobbs, 139 N. C., 170; Warehouse v. Ozment, 132 N. C., 839.
In Pelletier’s case, supra, it was held: “Equity will correct a mistake in law in the drawing of a written contract when it is made to appear that the contract, as therein expressed, does not carry out the actual agreement which both the parties had made and which it was their mutual intent to express in the writing.” And in Shook v. Love, supra, Associate Justice Brown delivering the opinion, it was said: “The power of a court of equity to reform written instruments so as to speak the real contract of the parties will not be exercised because of the mistake of one of the parties unless brought about by the fraud of the other; but an instrument will be reformed when the mistake is by all parties or when it is the mistake of the draftsman.”
Applying the principle, there is doubt if on proper consideration of the record there is sufficient evidence of mistake on the part of Mrs. Sills and her children to .justify a correction of this instrument, and we find no evidence whatever of any mistake or fraud on the part of the Allens. On the contrary, the facts tend to show that, having been approached by a real estate dealer, representing Mrs. Sills, with a proposition to sell the land, they had the record examined, and, finding the title clear, they bought and took a deed for the land and had the same properly registered, and that the timber on the portion of the land in Franklin County was one of the inducements to the purchase, and the deed and claim correctly expressed the contract which they made and intended to make. True,- there is testimony on part of Mrs. Sills that the purchase price paid for the land, $3,300, was entirely inadequate, and that the timber alone was worth that amount; but there is also evidence tending to show that the land, as conveyed, brought a full price, and, in any event, there is no such discrepancy of value and price a.s to affect the result. Doubtless, Mrs. Sills did not intend to *343convey tbe timber, wbicb sbe bad already sold, and ber son told tbe draftsman of tbe deed, in Greensboro, tbat tbe timber bad been already sold off; but tbe draftsman was tbe agent of Mrs. Sills, and we do not find tbat be was instructed to leave out tbe timber, and accordingly, tbe deed conveying botb land and timber, having been duly executed, was forwarded to tbe Allens at Louisburg, and there is nothing to show tbat they bad any knowledge or notice tbat it was not drawn pursuant to tbe agreement between tbe parties as they understood it, and tbe case presented is only an ordinary one where a second purchaser has obtained tbe title by having bis deed first registered pursuant to law.
Exceptions to rulings of tbe court on questions of evidence are without merit.
One J. A. Turner, a witness for defendants, to whom Mrs. Sills first wrote about selling ber land, and who negotiated tbe sale to plaintiffs, wa.s asked on cross-examination if, in tbe transaction, be represented tbe Allens in any way, as factor or agent, and answered be did not.
It is a recognized position, not infrequently presented, tbat tbe fact of agency cannot be proved by tbe declarations of an alleged agent; but we fail to see why this fact cannot be shown by tbe sworn testimony of tbe witness. Unless objectionable on some other principle, such testimony would seem to be directly relevant, and tbe cases so bold. Sutton v. Lyons, 156 N. C., 3; Machino Co. v. Seago, 128 N. C., 160.
The right of a woman as notary public to take tbe verification of a pleading of tbe probate of a deed is not involved in this appeal. No exception or assignment of error presents tbe question, nor is it discussed in tbe briefs, and for tbe reason, no doubt, tbat tbe verification and probate were taken in Yirginia, and tbe Constitution of tbat State provides tbat “Men and women 18 years of age shall be eligible to tbe office of notary public.” Art. II, see. 32. If this did not appear affirmatively, tbe presumption is tbat tbe officer of another State is acting under legal authority. Nicholson v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C., 33.
We find no error in tbe record, and tbe judgment in plaintiff’s favor is affirmed.
No error.