Allers v. Willis

No. 81-379
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

-~
-

THEODORE R. ALLERS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
VS.

RICHARD JOSEPH WILLIS,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead
Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Warden, Christiansen, Johnson & Berg, Kalispell,
Montana
For Respondent:
Hoyt and Trieweiler, Great Falls, Montana

Submitted on briefs: February 25, 1982
Decided :
151
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

The r e s p o n d e n t , T h e o d o r e A l l e r s , b r o u g h t a n a c t i o n i n

t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l District of t h e

S t a t e of Montana, in and for the County of Flathead, by

c o m p l a i n t d a t e d J u n e 1 8 , 1979, a l l e g i n g t h a t on J a n u a r y 21,

1979, he was injured and sustained property damage in a

c o l l i s i o n b e t w e e n h i s c a r a n d a t r u c k d r i v e n by a p p e l l a n t ,

Richard Willis. Respondent's complaint alleged that the

c a u s e o f t h e a c c i d e n t was t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f t h e a p p e l l a n t i n

driving h i s vehicle.

On May 1 4 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e c o m p l a i n t was a m e n d e d , and t h e

r e s p o n d e n t r e q u e s t e d t h a t p u n i t i v e damages be awarded.

On J u l y 2 , 1980, appellant counterclaimed, alleging

t h a t t h e r e s p o n d e n t had a s s a u l t e d him i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e

accident.

The District Court granted respondent's motion for

summary judgment in July 1980 as to the appellant being

negligent per se, but denied the motion as to proximate

cause, damages and all matters concerning comparative

ney 1i g e n c e .

A j u r y t r i a l was h e l d May 4 t h r o u g h 7 , 1 9 8 1 , and t h e

jury rendered a special verdict i n favor of t h e respondent

i n t h e amount o f $128,000 a c t u a l damages and $15,000 puni-

t i v e damages f o r a t o t a l judgment o f $143,000.

On May 2 2 , 1 9 8 1 , t h e a p p e l l a n t moved t h e c o u r t f o r a

new t r i a l o n g r o u n d s o f e x c e s s i v e d a m a g e s , insufficiency of

t h e e v i d e n c e t o j u s t i f y t h e damages and e r r o r i n law. The

District Court denied t h e motion, and a p p e l l a n t a p p e a l e d t o

t h i s C o u r t on J u l y 1 3 , 1981.

At approximately 12:15 a.m., on January 21, 1979,
respondent, Theodore Allers, was struck from behind by a

pickup truck being driven by the appellant, Richard J.

Willis. The accident occurred on U.S, Highway 40 in

Columbia F a l l s , Montana, near a restaurant known a s T o d d ' s

Cafe. The r o a d i s s t r a i g h t , l e v e l , paved and w e l l l i g h t e d ,

b u t was v e r y i c y a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t .

Allers, at t h e time of the accident, was traveling

e a s t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w e n t y t o t w e n t y - f i v e m i l e s p e r h o u r and

was p r e p a r i n g to turn right i n t o Todd's Cafe f o r a cup of

coffee. H e was s t r u c k from b e h i n d , and t h e f o r c e was s u f -

f i c i e n t t o t e a r t h e f r o n t s e a t m o u n t s from t h e f l o o r where

they were bolted and to propel h i s car at least 120 f e e t

into a steel pole 011 the s i d e of the road. Respondent's

vehicle was totaled, and appellant's truck sustained

a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 1 , 0 0 0 i n damages.

Willis, by his own admission, had been drinking

a l c o h o l i c beverages steadily for eight hours prior to the

collision. He testified that he had consumed somewhere

between t w e l v e and eighteen beers and at least two mixed

drinks i n t h e eight-hour period before the collision, His

b l o o d a l c o h o l c o n t e n t was found t o be . 2 0 % when a t e s t was

a d m i n i s t e r e d a t t h e N o r t h V a l l e y H o s p i t a l i n Columbia F a l l s .

The c o l l i s i o n and the events leading up t o i t were

w i t n e s s e d by Rhonda C o v e r d a l e , who was d r i v i n g h e r c a r e a s t

on Highway 40 behind respondent, She testified that the

appellant had pulled onto the highway without stopping,

accelerated rapidly, f i s h t a i l e d and was g o i n g about forty-

f i v e m i l e s p e r hour a t t h e t i m e o f t h e c o l l i s i o n . The s p e e d

l i m i t was t w e n t y - f i v e m i l e s per hour. Also, she t e s t i f i e d

that the appellant did not use his brakes or attempt to
s w e r v e o u t o f t h e way.

Immediately af t e r the collision, both men exited

their vehicles and headed towards each o t h e r . A scuffle

e n s u e d and A l l e r s s t r u c k W i l l i s i n t h e s h o u l d e r . Both men

then ended up on t h e ground w i t h A l l e r s on top trying to

hold down W i l l i s who was flailing his arms and swearing.

A l l e r s , Rhonda C o v e r d a l e and M i c h a e l S t o t t s , t h e o f f i c e r who

investigated the accident, all testified that W i l l i s was

grossly intoxicated. Officer Stotts also testified that

W i l l i s had a reputation in the community of becoming

"belligerent and possibly violent" after he had a lot to

drink.

Allers alleged that his back and neck were perma-

nently injured by the automobile c o l l i s i o n . The injuries

were alleged to be "cervical and lumbrosachal radiculitis

secondary to soft tissue swelling, and injury to the

l i g a m e n t s and j o i n t c a p s u l e s i n t h o s e r e g i o n s of t h e s p i n e . "

A s a r e s u l t , A l l e r s a l l e g e d t h a t he w i l l c o n t i n u e t o e x p e r i -

e n c e p a i n f o r t h e r e s t o f h i s l i f e whenever he p a r t i c i p a t e s

in strenuous a c t i v i t i e s . A l l e r s was t w e n t y - s e v e n years old

a t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t and had been a manual laborer

his entire adult l i f e .

Allers was not able to go back to work until six

months a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t when h i s p h y s i c i a n r e l e a s e d him.

The evidence revealed that Allers was still experiencing

pain when a t work and t h r e e months later, on O c t o b e r 14,

1979, he fell and reinjured h i s back. He has not worked

since.

The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d f o r d i s c u s s i o n a r e :

1. Whether the District Court erred by excluding
e v i d e n c e o f a pending w o r k e r s ' compensation c l a i m ?

2. Whether the D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d in dismissing

a p p e l l a n t ' s counterclaim for battery?

3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d in instructing

t h e j u r y concerning l o s s of earning c a p a c i t y ?

4. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d in instructing

t h e j u r y on p u n i t i v e damages?

5. Whether t h e v e r d i c t was e x c e s s i v e ?

The District Court properly excluded the evidence

conce rn i n g a pending w or k e r s ' compensation claim. The v a s t

rnajority of jurisdictions have ruled that the prejudicial

i m p a c t of allowing a jury to r e c e i v e evidence of a plain-

t i f f ' s pending workers' compensation c l a i m v a s t l y outweighs

the probative value. 77 A.L.R.2d 1154, 1156; 47 A.L.R.3d

234; P o z z i e v. Mike S m i t h , Inc. ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 33 I l l . A p p . 3 d 343,

337 N.E.2d 450. I t h a s been s t a t e d a t 77 A.L.R.2d a t 1156,

" G e n e r a l l y , i t h a s been h e l d t o c o n s t i t u t e
e r r o r , r e q u i r i n g a r e v e r s a l o r new t r i a l , t o
bring to the jury's attention the f a c t t h a t
the p l a i n t i f f in a personal i n j u r y or death
a c t i o n is e n t i t l e d t o workmen's c o m p e n s a t i o n
benefits. The c o u r t s h a v e r e a s o n e d t h a t s u c h
i n f o r m a t i o n would t e n d t o p r e j u d i c e t h e j u r y
and i n f l u e n c e t h e i r v e r d i c t , e i t h e r a s t o
l i a b i l i t y o r damages, a s s u c h i n f o r m a t i o n i s
o r d i n a r i l y i m m a t e r i a l and i r r e l e v a n t . "

H e r e , t h e f a c t t h a t A l l e r s r e i n j u r e d h i s b a c k a t work

some ten months after the accident was properly admitted

i n t o e v i d e n c e , b u t t h e f a c t t h a t h e had a pending w o r k e r s'

c o r n p e n s a t i o n c l a i m was c l e a r l y i n a d m i s s i b l e .

I t was n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r when t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

dismissed a p p e l l a n t ' s counterclaim for battery. In Collins

v. I t o h ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160 Mont. 461, 503 P.2d 36, t h i s Court held:

"This Court, on a number of occasions, has
 s t a t e d t h a t c a s e s and i s s u e s s h o u l d n o t he
w i t h d r a w n from a j u r y u n l e s s r e a s o n a b l e and
f a i r - m i n d e d men c o u l d r e a c h o n l y o n e c o n c l u -
s i o n from t h e f a c t s . P i c k e t t v . Kyger, 1 5 1
Mont. 87, 439 P.2d 57; B r i d g e s v . M o r i t z , 1 4 9
Mont. 273, 425 P.2d 721; H o l l a n d v . Konda,
1 4 2 Mont. 5 3 6 , 385 P.2d 272. Genuine i s s u e s
o f f a c t s h o u l d be s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y .
H o w e v e r . w h e t h e r e v.....................o f a
idence on b e h a l f
p l a i n t i f f is s u f f i c i e n t t o t a k e a c a s e t o t h e
i s a que s t i o n of law f o r t h e
j u r y .................................. t r i a l
j udge .
C r ) , 212 F.2d
Lovas v , G e n e r a l M o t o r s Corp.
805.
(6
A b a r e s c i n t i l l a of
evidence is not sufficient to
.....................................r e q u i r e
submission t o t h e jury. Volume 2B, B a r r o n
and H o l t z o f f , s e c t i o n 1 0 7 5 , and J o h n s o n v .
C h i c a g o , Milwaukee and S t . P a u l Ry. Co., 7 1
Mont. 390, 230 P. 52." 503 P.2d a t 42.
(Emphasis added.)

The o n l y e v i d e n c e t h a t a p p e l l a n t p r e s e n t e d at trial

c o n c e r n i n g t h e a l l e g e d b a t t e r y and h i s r e s u l t i n g r i b i n j u r y

was h i s own t e s t i m o n y . However, e v e n h i s t e s t i m o n y a t t h e

trial was contrary to his statements in a previous

deposition. I n t h e d e p o s i t i o n h e s t a t e d t h a t he had i n j u r e d

h i s r i b s a s a r e s u l t of t h e c o l l i s i o n , n o t a s a r e s u l t o f a

blow by respondent. Further, appellant did not call his

p h y s i c i a n t o t h e s t a n d , and he r e f u s e d r e s p o n d e n t ' s p r e t r i a l

d i s c o v e r y r e q u e s t t o produce t h e p h y s i c i a n ' s medical r e p o r t .

The r e c o r d was v o i d o f a n y c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e t h a t would l e a d

a reasonable person t o b e l i e v e t h a t respondent caused appel-

lant's r i b injury. A p p e l l a n t ' s c o u n t e r c l a i m was " f a n c i f u l ,

frivolous, gauzy o r merely s u s p i c i o u s " e v e n when construed

i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o him. Van Uden v . H e n d r i c k s e n

(1980) , - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 2 2 0 , 224, 37 St.Rep. 1431.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t e r r when instructing the

j u r y concerning impairment of e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y . Appellant's

contention that the respondent failed t o p r o v e by l e g a l l y

s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e i n j u r i e s which h e r e c e i v e d were

attributable to the automobile accident is w i t h o u t m e r i t .
I m p a i r m e n t o f e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y and t h e b u r d e n t o p r o v e t h e

same was w e l l d e f i n e d by t h i s C o u r t i n Thomas v . W h i t e s i d e

( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 8 Mont. 394, 421 P.2d 449, where we s t a t e d :

"Impairment of e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y is d i f f e r e n t
from l o s s o f wages. I t is t h e permanent
d i m i n u t i o n o f t h e a b i l i t y t o e a r n money i n
the future, The l o s s i s a p a r t o f g e n e r a l
damages which may b e i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e n a t u r e
of t h e i n j u r y without proof of a c t u a l earn-
i n g s o r income. P r o o f of t h e i n j u r e d p e r s o n ' s
previous health, age, occupation, s k i l l s ,
e d u c a t i o n , p r o b a b l e number o f p r o d u c t i v e
y e a r s r e m a i n i n g , p h y s i c a l and m e n t a l i m p a i r -
ment p r o x i m a t e l y c a u s e d by t h e i n j u r y and
similar factors are sufficient to infer a
l o s s of an e s t a b l i s h e d e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y .
C o n n o l l y v . Pre-Mixed C o n c r e t e Co., 49 C a l . 2 d
483, 319 P.2d 343; Murray v , Mossman, 52
Wash.2d 8 8 5 , 329 P.2d 1089; Jackson v.
S o u t h w e s t e r n P u b l i c S e r v i c e Co., 6 6 N.M. 458,
349 P.2d 1829." 421 P.2d a t 451.

The appellant cites Wilson v. Northland Greyhound

L i n e s ( D . Mont. 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 6 6 F.Supp. 667, a s a u t h o r i t y f o r h i s

contention t h a t t h e respondent f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h a s u f f i -

c i e n t causal connection. The W i l s o n c a s e s t a t e s :

"The g e n e r a l r u l e r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o o f r e -
q u i r e d t o e s t a b l i s h c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n between
an a c c i d e n t and t h e i n j u r y c l a i m e d is s t a t e d
by C o r p u s J u r i s Secundum a s f o l l o w s : 'Plain-
t i f f m u s t p r o v e by l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t e v i -
d e n c e t h a t a l l t h e i n j u r i e s f o r which he
c l a i m s damages a r e p r o p e r l y a t t r i b u t a b l e , i n
a medical s e n s e , t o t h e a c c i d e n t . While
p l a i n t i f f need n o t e s t a b l i s h s u c h c a u s a l con-
n e c t i o n w i t h c e r t a i n t y , h e m u s t do s o w i t h
r e a s o n a b l e c e r t a i n t y o r by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f
the evidence, A mere g u e s s o r c o n j e c t u r e on
the subject, expert or otherwise, is not
s u f f i c i e n t , nor should d i f f i c u l t y i n estab-
l i s h i n g t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f an i n j u r y
prompt t h e c o u r t t o d i s p e n s e w i t h proof
thereof; b u t t h e j u r y may i n f e r t h e c a u s e o f
a n i n j u r y from t h e f a c t s p r o v e d , There can
be no r e c o v e r y f o r an i n j u r y o r c o n d i t i o n
which t h e e v i d e n c e shows m i g h t h a v e r e s u l t e d
from two o r more c a u s e s , f o r o n l y one o f
which d e f e n d a n t i s r e s p o n s i b l e . So, t o o , i t
is n o t s u f f i c i e n t f o r one s e e k i n g damages f o r
a c o n d i t i o n c l a i m e d t o h a v e r e s u l t e d from a n
a c c i d e n t o r i n j u r y t o show t h a t s u c h a c c i d e n t
o r i n j u r y might o r could have caused t h e
c o n d i t i o n ; o t h e r c a u s e s s h o u l d be e x c l u d e d . '
 25 C . J . S . Barnages s e c t i o n 1 6 2 , pp. 822-824."
106 F.Supp. a t 675-676. ( E m p h a s i s added.)

Both Thomas and W i l s o n s t a t e t h a t an i n f e r e n c e c a n be

drawn by t h e t r i e r o f f a c t a s t o t h e c a u s e o f an i n j u r y . In

t h i s case, t h e jury chose t o infer from t h e e v i d e n c e p r e -

s e n t e d t h a t t h e a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t was t h e d i r e c t c a u s e o f

respondent's i n j u r i e s and we w i l l n o t s u p p l a n t t h e i r find-

i n g s w i t h o n e o f o u r own. Lauman v . Lee ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Ivlont .
, 626 P.2d 8 3 0 , 833, 38 S t . R e p . 499. R e s p o n d e n t may n o t

have e s t a b l i s h e d a c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n w i t h c e r t a i n t y , b u t t h e

trier of f a c t determined he had done so "with reasonable

c e r t a i n t y o r by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e evidence." Wilson,

supra.

The jury was properly instructed by the District

C o u r t on p u n i t i v e damages. Appellant's contention t h a t the

j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n was i m p r o p e r b e c a u s e i t a l l o w e d t h e j u r y t o

award punitive damages based upon ". . . r e c k l e s s n e s s ,
wantonness, o r malice of another . . ." is c o n t r a r y t o t h e
overwhelming w e i g h t o f a u t h o r i t y . Further, the appellant's

argument that the Montana statute on punitive damages,

s e c t i o n 27-1-221, MCA, i s modeled a f t e r a s i m i l a r C a l i f o r n i a

statute and that, therefore, the case of Gombos v. Ashe

( 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 5 8 Cal.App.2d 517, 322 P.2d 933, prevents a jury

from a w a r d i n g p u n i t i v e damages f o r t h e a c t c o m p l a i n e d o f is

only p a r t i a l l y correct.

W h i l e i t is c o r r e c t t h a t t h e C a l i f o r n i a s t a t u t e and

the Montana statute are virtually identical, the case of

Gombos v . Ashe, s u p r a , was o v e r r u l e d i n Taylor v. Superior

Ct. of Los A n g e l e s C t y . ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 157 C a l . R p t r . 6 9 3 , 598 P.2d

854. The California Supreme Court held in Taylor that

anyone who v o l u n t a r i l y commenced and t h e r e a f t e r c o n t i n u e s t o
consume alcol-iolic beverages to the point of intoxication

knowing that they thereafter will be operating a motor

vehicle, demonstrates such a conscious and deliberate

d i s r e g a r d of t h e i n t e r e s t s o f o t h e r s , t h a t t h e i r c o n d u c t may

be c a l l e d w i l l f u l o r wanton; accordingly, p u n i t i v e damages

a r e recoverable i n a personal i n j u r y a c t i o n brought a g a i n s t

an intoxicated driver. This reasoning c o m p o r t s we11 w i t h

this Court's principles concerning punitive damages. We

stated i n Graham v . C l a r k s Fork N a t i o n a l Bank (1981), -

Mont . -, 631 P.2d 7 1 8 , 721, 38 St.Rep. 1 1 4 0 , 1143-1144:
"To w a r r a n t t h e r e c o v e r y o f s u c h damages
[ p u n i t i v e damages] t h e a c t c o m p l a i n e d o f m u s t
n o t o n l y b e u n l a w f u l , b u t must a l s o p a r t a k e
somewhat o f a c r i m i n a l o r wanton n a t u r e . And
i t i s an a l m o s t u n i v e r s a l l y r e c o g n i z e d r u l e
t h a t s u c h damages may be r e c o v e r e d i n c a s e s ,
a n d o n l y i n s u c h c a s e s , where t h e w r o n g f u l
a c t c o m p l a i n e d o f i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y some
such circumstances of aggravation a s w i l l f u l -
n e s s , wantonness, malice, o p p r e s s i o n , b r u t a l -
i t y , i n s u l t , recklessness, gross negligence,
o r g r o s s f r a u d on t h e p a r t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t .
( 8 R.C.L.585, 586.)"

See a l s o : Lauman v . Lee (1981) , - Mont. -, 626 P.2d
830, 833, 38 St.Rep. 499; Butcher v. Petranek (1979), -
,Non t . -, 593 P.2d 743, 36 S t . R e p . 830; B u t l e r s v. Mince

(Colo.App. 1 9 8 0 ) , 605 P.2d 922; S v e j c a r a v . Whitman ( 1 9 7 1 ) ,

82 N.M. 7 3 9 , 487 P.2d 167; 65 A.L.R.3d 656.

A p p e l l a n t ' s argument that the verdict in t h i s case

was e x c e s s i v e is e r r o n e o u s . T h i s Court h a s addressed t h e

question of what constitutes an excessive verdict in

numerous cases. In Salvail v. Great Northern Railway

Company ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 6 Mont. 1 2 , 473 P.2d 5 4 9 , we h e l d :

"The amount t o be awarded a s damages i s
p r o p e r l y l e f t t o t h e j u r y and t h i s C o u r t w i l l
n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t o f t h e
j u r y p a r t i c u l a r l y where, a s h e r e , t h e t r i a l
c o u r t h a s a p p r o v e d t h e v e r d i c t by d e n y i n g a
new t r i a l . .. I t i s o n l y where t h e amount
 awarded is s o g r o s s l y o u t o f p r o p o r t i o n t o
t h e i n j u r y a s t o shock t h e c o n s c i e n c e t h a t
t h i s Court w i l l intervene." 473 P.2d a t 5 6 0 ,

Again, i n Lauman v. Lee, s u p r a , we h e l d :

"Our f u n c t i o n i n r e v i e w i n g t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f
p r o o f of a c t u a l damages i s t o d e t e r m i n e whe-
t h e r t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e
in the record t o support the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t .
W must v i e w t h e e v i d e n c e i n a l i g h t most
e
f a v o r a b l e t o Lauman, t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y
b e l o w , and where t h e r e c o r d p r e s e n t s con-
f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e , r e s o l v e d by t h e j u r y , t h i s
Court is precluded from d i s t u r b i n g t h e
verdict. This r u l e is p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p l i -
c a b l e when t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h a s p a s s e d upon
t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e on m o t i o n f o r
new t r i a l and h a s u p h e l d i t s s u f f i c i e n c y .
S t r o n g v . W i l l i a m s ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 4 Mont. 65,
68-69, 460 P.2d 9 0 , 92." 626 P.2d a t 833.

See a l s o : Yates v. Hedges (1978), 1 7 8 Mont. 488, 585 P.2d

1290; S m i t h v . Kenosha Auto T r a n s p o r t ( D . C . Mont. 1 9 6 4 ) , 226

Applying t h e above a u t h o r i t y t o the f a c t s presented

here, it is clear that there was substantial credible

evidence t o support the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t , and t h e v e r d i c t d i d

not "shock the conscience" of this Court. Respondent

requested $52,116.34 in compensatory damages, $25,000 in

punitive damages, and left to the jury the amount that

s h o u l d be awarded f o r impairment of earning capacity. The

fact that the jury awarded a total of $143,000 (approxi-

m a t e l y $75,000 for impairment of earning capacity, $15,000

i n p u n i t i v e damages, and $52,116.34 i n c o m p e n s a t o r y damages)

is not s u f f i c i e n t grounds t o change t h e v e r d i c t . Indeed,

t h e amounts r e q u e s t e d and t h e amounts received are not in

d i s c o r d , nor a r e t h e y e x c e s s i v e .

Respondent contends that this appeal should be

dismissed because t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s insurer failed t o post a

s u p e r s e d e a s bond f o r t h e f u l l amount o f t h e judgment. This
contention is w i t h o u t m e r i t . The respondent's remedy for

a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o p o s t a s u p e r s e d e a s bond i s t o e x e c u t e

on t h e judgment. The f a c t t h a t a s u p e r s e d e a s bond was n o t

p o s t e d d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e r i g h t t o an a p p e a l . However, t h e

a p p e a l may b e moot i f t h e r e s p o n d e n t i s a b l e t o e x e c u t e on

the judgment. Gallatin Trust & Savings Bank v. Henke

( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 4 Mont. 1 7 0 , 461 P.2d 448, 451.

The j udgment is a f f i rmed .

W concur :
e

Chief J u s t i c e