COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Fitzpatrick
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
ALLIED FIBERS and
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF ILLINOIS
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2862-95-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
SEPTEMBER 3, 1996
WALTER R. RHODES, SR.
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
S. Vernon Priddy, III (Mary Louise Kramer;
Jennifer G. Marwitz; Sands, Anderson, Marks &
Miller, on briefs), for appellants.
Gerald G. Lutkenhaus for appellee.
Allied Fibers contends that the Workers' Compensation
Commission erred by awarding Walter R. Rhodes, Sr. partial
disability benefits for permanent hearing loss caused by his
employment. Allied Fibers asserts that in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in The Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va.
186, 467 S.E.2d 795 (1996), Rhodes' hearing loss is not a
compensable disease under the Workers' Compensation Act because
it is a gradually incurred injury or a cumulative trauma
condition. Alternatively, Allied Fibers argues that the claim is
barred by the statute of limitations, that the commission erred
by remanding the case to the deputy commissioner to take
additional evidence on whether Rhodes' hearing loss is a disease,
and that the record does not establish "[b]y clear and convincing
evidence, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that
[Rhodes' hearing loss] arose out of and in the course of
employment," as required by Code § 65.2-401. We do not address
Allied Fibers' alternative claims because the Supreme Court's
decision in Jemmott mandates our holding that gradually incurred
industrial hearing loss is a noncompensable, cumulative trauma
condition or injury. Accordingly, we reverse the commission's
award and dismiss Rhodes' claim.
In awarding Rhodes benefits, the commission relied upon the
opinions of Dr. Aristides Sismanis, Dr. W. Copely McLean, and Dr.
Fred T. Shaia, all of whom diagnosed Rhodes as suffering from
bilateral sensorineural hearing loss due to noise exposure.
"Sensorineural hearing loss originates in the inner ear" or
cochlea. Robert A. Dobie, M.D., Medical-Legal Evaluation of
Hearing Loss 29 (1993). Exposure to noise causes the stereocilia
on the outer hair cells in the cochlea to
lose their stiffness and hence their ability
to vibrate in response to sound; this causes
a reversible hearing loss (temporary
threshold shift, or TTS). After repeated
hazardous exposures, the stereocilia become
permanently damaged, the hair cell dies, and
permanent threshold shift (PTS) occurs. The
more intense and prolonged the exposures, the
greater the degree of outer hair cell loss.
Eventually, inner hair cells and auditory
nerve fibers will be lost as well.
Id. at 135 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, typical
noise-induced hearing loss is a gradually incurred impairment
resulting from cumulative trauma.
Noise damage to sensorineural hearing belongs
under the general heading of traumatic injury
because it is strictly a physical force.
However, it does not fit the classic
definition of injury, namely a sudden event
- 2 -
produced by immediate trauma.
Attorney's Textbook of Medicine § 84.65 (Roscoe N. Gray & Louise
Gordy, eds., 3d ed., 1995).
In Jemmott, the Supreme Court reiterated that "[a]
definition of either 'injury' or 'disease' that is so broad as to
encompass any bodily ailment of whatever origin is too broad
because it would make unnecessary and meaningless the two
categories specifically set forth in the Act." 251 Va. at 194,
467 S.E.2d at 799-800 (quoting Holly Farms v. Yancey, 228 Va.
337, 340-41, 321 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1984)). See also Merillat
Indus., Inc. v. Parks, 246 Va. 429, 433, 436 S.E.2d 600, 602
(1993). Consequently, the Court rejected The Sloane-Dorland
Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary definition of disease that we
adopted in Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, 17 Va. App. 499, 438 S.E.2d
769 (1993), as being too broad. In rejecting a purely medical
definition of "disease," the Court noted that the meaning of
disease under the Act is a mixed question of law and fact, and
that "just because a doctor opines that a particular impairment
is a disease does not necessarily make it so." Jemmott, 251 Va.
at 198, 467 S.E.2d at 801. The Court further held that "an
impairment resulting from cumulative trauma caused by repetitive
motion . . . must be classified as an injury, not a disease, and
. . . under Merillat, is not compensable." Id. at 198, 467
S.E.2d at 802.
Rhodes contends that the Supreme Court's holding in Jemmott
- 3 -
applies only to cumulative trauma conditions caused by repetitive
motion. However, Rhodes "overlooks the fact that the opinion
represents a clear refusal 'to broaden the scope of the Act to
include job-related impairments arising from repetitive motion or
cumulative trauma.'" Id. at 199, 467 S.E.2d at 802 (quoting
Merillat, 246 Va. at 433, 436 S.E.2d at 601-02) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court's holding is clear and unequivocal, and leaves
no doubt that in Virginia cumulative trauma conditions,
regardless of whether they are caused by repetitive motion, are
not compensable under the Act.
Both this Court and the commission have long held that
hearing loss caused by exposure to noise at work is a compensable
disease. See Bader v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 10
Va. App. 697, 700, 396 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1990); Island Creek Coal
Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 8-9, 365 S.E.2d 782, 786-87
(1988); Hale v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 59 O.I.C. 112 (1981);
Mullins v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 58 O.I.C. 253 (1978); Lee v.
Norfolk Gen. Hosp., 57 O.I.C. 226 (1977); Rodahaver v. Allegheny
Airlines, 56 O.I.C. 270 (1975). However, when the Supreme Court
reversed this Court's decision in Jemmott, it also vacated and
remanded to this Court Tara K Coal Co. v. Glenn Collier, Record
No. 1327-95-3 (Unpublished, November 21, 1995), in which this
Court had held that sensorineural hearing loss was proved to be
an occupational disease. Viewed in this context, we conclude
that the holding in Jemmott logically leads to the conclusion
- 4 -
that a hearing impairment resulting from cumulative trauma is not
a disease under the Act. 1 Therefore, we hold that hearing loss
caused by prolonged exposure to noise at work is a noncompensable
gradually incurred injury. Accordingly, we reverse the
commission's award of benefits and dismiss the claim.
Reversed and dismissed.
1
As a result of Jemmott, Virginia departs from the course
followed by the overwhelming majority of the states in holding
that carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) caused by employment and
hearing loss caused by exposure to occupational noise are not
compensable. See 4 Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation App. B,
Table 12A (1995) (occupational hearing loss). See also Addendum
to this opinion (listing states that have allowed employees to
recover for CTS caused by employment).
We also note that the Indiana Court of Appeals has held that
cumulative trauma conditions, including hearing loss, are not
occupational diseases under the Indiana workers' compensation
scheme. See Duvall v. ICI Americas, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1122,
1124-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (cumulative trauma conditions);
Martinez v. Taylor Forge & Pipe Works, 368 N.E.2d 1176, 1179-80
(Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (hearing loss). However, cumulative trauma
conditions, such as carpal tunnel syndrome and occupational
hearing loss, are compensable under the Indiana Act as injuries
because the Indiana courts have interpreted that statutory phrase
"injury . . . by accident" to mean accidental injury and, thus,
to include gradually incurred injuries. See Evans v. Yankeetown
Dock Corp., 491 N.E.2d 969, 973-75 (Ind. 1986); Four Star
Fabricators, Inc. v. Barrett, 638 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994); Duvall, 621 N.E.2d at 1126. Ordinarily, these decisions
would be significant because "[t]he Virginia Workmen's
Compensation Act is based upon the Indiana statute, so . . . the
construction placed upon the Indiana law by the courts of that
state merits our consideration." Barksdale v. H.O. Engen, Inc.,
218 Va. 496, 499, 237 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1977). Nevertheless,
although the Virginia definition of "injury" under Code
§ 65.2-101 employs language nearly identical to that in the
Indiana statute, see Ind. Code Ann. § 22-3-2-2(a) (Burns 1992),
by court decision gradually incurred injuries are not compensable
under the Virginia Act. Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 589, 385
S.E.2d 858, 865 (1989). We are bound by the Supreme Court's
unequivocal rulings. Roane v. Roane, 12 Va. App. 989, 993, 407
S.E.2d 698, 700 (1991).
- 5 -
Coleman, J., concurring.
I agree with the majority that the Supreme Court's holding
in The Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d 795
(1996), compels us to hold that sensorineural hearing loss caused
by prolonged exposure to noise in the workplace is not a disease.
I reach this conclusion, not because hearing loss is
inconsistent with a definition of disease that the Supreme Court
has set forth, but because Jemmott classifies "job-related
impairments arising from repetitive motion or cumulative trauma"
as gradually incurred injuries. Id. at 199, 467 S.E.2d at 802
(emphasis added). Accordingly, because occupational hearing loss
is consistent with the definition of a gradually incurred injury,
it is not a disease, and because gradually incurred injuries that
result from cumulative trauma are not compensable under the Act,
Walter Rhodes' hearing loss is not compensable even though it
arose out of and in the course of his employment. Although I
agree with the majority, I write separately to express my concern
that even though today's decision is mandated by Supreme Court
precedent, it is inconsistent, in my opinion, with the expressed
intent of the legislature's 1986 amendment to the Act.
Furthermore, the decision is inconsistent with the decisions of
the commission and the Court which the legislature did not see
fit to change during its 1986 study and revisions.
When the Workers' Compensation Act was first enacted in
1918, "[c]ompensation for disease 'in any form' was excluded
- 6 -
except 'where it result[ed] naturally and unavoidably from [an]
accident.'" Jemmott, 251 Va. at 192, 467 S.E.2d at 798. Thus,
only diseases that were the consequence of or secondary to an
industrial accident were compensable. In 1944, the General
Assembly provided a schedule of occupational diseases, and a
condition other than an injury by accident was not compensable
under the Act unless it was listed in this schedule. See Code
§ 65.1-47 (repealed 1970); Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 584,
385 S.E.2d 858, 862 (1989). The legislature abolished the
schedule of compensable diseases in 1952, but then reenacted it
in 1958. In 1969, a study committee appointed by the General
Assembly recommended eliminating the schedule of diseases.
Report of the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council, Matters
Pertinent to the Industrial Commission of Virginia, Va. H. Doc.
No. 17, at 6 (1969). Significantly, the committee's
recommendation was based on its finding that the schedule was too
restrictive.
The schedule of occupational diseases as set
out in § 65.1-47 attempts to be all-
inclusive. However, the only possible effect
the schedule can have is to eliminate a
disease which may in fact be an occupational
disease. . . . The elimination of the
schedule insures the most comprehensive
coverage of occupational diseases; yet the
employer is not prejudiced because the
disease must in fact be an occupational
disease, arising out of and in the course of
employment.
Id. (emphasis added). The General Assembly accepted this
recommendation and repealed the schedule of occupational
- 7 -
diseases, replacing it with a statutory scheme for coverage of
occupational diseases that has remained essentially unchanged
since 1970. 1970 Va. Acts. 470.
Beginning in 1958 and continuing until the legislature
eliminated the schedule of occupational diseases in 1970, the
schedule included tenosynovitis. 2 See 1958 Va. Acts 457.
Tenosynovitis, like carpal tunnel syndrome, is a type of
tendon-sheath disorder and is "usually caused by the constant
repetition of stereotype movements." David F. Tver & Kenneth A.
Anderson, Industrial Medicine Desk Reference 282 (1986); see also
Lamberson v. Phillips Oldsmobile, Inc., 63 O.I.C. 212, 214 (1984)
(finding that CTS is "known as tendinitis or tenosynovitis in the
area of the median nerve and the carpal tunnel"). Thus, the
schedule of diseases, which was the precursor to the current
statutory scheme, was not limited to conditions caused by
infectious biological agents or exposure to environmental
hazards, but in fact, included a cumulative trauma condition
resulting from repetitive motion. Considering the legislative
history which shows that the General Assembly eliminated the
schedule of diseases for the expressed purpose of expanding
rather than restricting coverage of the Act, the interpretation
2
The General Assembly first enacted an occupational disease
schedule in 1944, and this schedule did not include
tenosynovitis. 1944 Va. Acts. 77. In 1952, the legislature
repealed the occupational disease schedule. 1952 Va. Acts 565.
Six years later, the legislature reenacted the schedule and
included tenosynovitis as an occupational disease. 1958 Va. Acts
457.
- 8 -
of Code § 65.2-400 rendered by the Supreme Court in Jemmott and
applied by us today is not in accord, in my opinion, with the
expressed legislative intent.
Today's holding departs from prior decisions of the
commission and this Court, both of which have held that hearing
loss from prolonged exposure to noise is a disease, albeit an
ordinary disease of life rather than an occupational disease.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Western Electric Co. v.
Gilliam, 229 Va. 345, 329 S.E.2d 13 (1985), the commission
routinely awarded claimants benefits for hearing loss caused by
exposure to noise at work. Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6
Va. App. 1, 8, 365 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1988); see Hale v.
Clinchfield Coal Co., 59 O.I.C. 112 (1981); Mullins v.
Clinchfield Coal Co., 58 O.I.C. 253 (1978); Lee v. Norfolk Gen.
Hosp., 57 O.I.C. 226 (1977); Rodahaver v. Allegheny Airlines, 56
O.I.C. 270 (1975). In Gilliam, the Supreme Court held that an
ordinary disease of life was not compensable under the Act
regardless of its causal connection to the claimant's employment.
Relying on that decision, we held that hearing loss was a
noncompensable ordinary disease of life. See Belcher v. City of
Hampton, 1 Va. App. 312, 338 S.E.2d 654 (1986). Soon after
Gilliam was decided, however, the General Assembly enacted Code
§ 65.2-401 3 (formerly Code § 65.1-46.1), which allows claimants
3
Code § 65.2-401. "Ordinary disease of life" coverage.
An ordinary disease of life to which the
general public is exposed outside of the
- 9 -
to receive compensation for ordinary diseases of life that are
sufficiently connected to their employment. The legislative
intent in enacting Code § 65.2-401 was to restore the law as it
existed prior to Gilliam. Island Creek Coal, 6 Va. App. at 9,
365 S.E.2d at 787; Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying
Workers' Compensation, H. Doc. No. 27, at 8 (1986).
Consequently, we have interpreted Code § 65.2-401 to provide
compensation for gradually incurred hearing loss from prolonged
noise exposure as an ordinary disease of life. Bader v. Norfolk
Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 10 Va. App. 697, 700, 396 S.E.2d
141, 143 (1990); Island Creek, 6 Va. App. at 8-9, 365 S.E.2d at
786. The General Assembly has not acted to reverse this
(..continued)
employment may be treated as an occupational
disease for purposes of this title if it is
established by clear and convincing evidence,
to a reasonable medical certainty, that it
arose out of and in the course of employment
as provided in § 65.2-400 with respect to
occupational diseases and did not result from
causes outside of the employment, and that:
1. It follows as an incident of
occupational disease as defined in this
title; or
2. It is an infectious or contagious
disease contracted in the course of one's
employment in a hospital or sanitarium or
laboratory or nursing home as defined in
§ 32.1-123, or while otherwise engaged in the
direct delivery of health care, or in the
course of employment as emergency rescue
personnel and those volunteer emergency
rescue personnel referred to in § 65.2-101;
or
3. It is characteristic of the
employment and was caused by conditions
peculiar to such employment.
- 10 -
interpretation. Generally, "[w]e presume that the legislature is
cognizant of the interpretation the statute has been given by
this Court . . . and of the commission's application of Virginia
precedent." 4 City of Norfolk v. Lillard, 15 Va. App. 424, 430,
424 S.E.2d 243, 247 (1992); see also Peyton v. Williams, 206 Va.
595, 600, 145 S.E.2d 147, 151 (1965).
As the Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he General Assembly
created the Workers' Compensation scheme as a carefully balanced
societal exchange between the interests of employers, employees,
insurers, and the public." Morris, 238 Va. at 584, 385 S.E.2d at
862. Today's decision reverses a relatively longstanding
practice of both the commission and this Court of awarding
benefits for occupational hearing loss, even though the
legislature's approval of treating occupational hearing loss as a
compensable disease was reflected in its 1986 amendments to the
Act, and subsequent acquiescence to this Court's interpretation
of those amendments. In my view, reversal of the award in this
case, which I agree is mandated by Jemmott, does not "adhere to
the view that it is peculiarly within the province of the General
Assembly to adjust the balance of competing interests inevitably
4
It should also be noted that the General Assembly has
expressly provided in the Workers' Compensation Act that
claimants shall be compensated for permanent total loss of
hearing. Code § 65.2-503(B)(15). Although Code § 65.2-503 does
not indicate whether hearing loss is a disease or an injury, we
presume that the legislature was cognizant when it last amended
the statute of decisions rendered by this Court and the
commission that characterized gradually incurred hearing loss as
a disease.
- 11 -
involved when such a fundamental policy change is contemplated."
Morris, 238 Va. at 588, 385 S.E.2d at 864. Nevertheless, I am
constrained to concur in the majority's holding.
- 12 -
Addendum
Alabama: Ala. Code § 25-5-1(9) (1975) (injury); Neely Truck
Line, Inc. v. Jones, 624 So. 2d 1385, 1386 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App.
1993) (injury).
Alaska: No decision.
Arizona: No decision.
Arkansas: Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Leisure, 675 S.W.2d 841, 842-44
(Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (occupational disease).
California: Cal. Labor Code § 3208.1 (West 1989) (injury may be
"specific or "cumulative"); Ashley v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Bd., 43 Cal. Rptr.2d 589, 590-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(implies CTS is compensable as an injury).
Colorado: Delta Drywell v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 868
P.2d 1155, 1157-58 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (CTS is compensable as
either a disease or an injury).
Connecticut: Erisoty v. Merrow Machine Co., 643 A.2d 898, 899
(Conn. App. Ct. 1994) (implies that CTS is compensable as an
injury).
Delaware: Torres v. Allen Family Foods, 672 A.2d 26, 28-29 (Del.
1995) (implies that CTS is compensable as an injury)
Florida: Simon Sez, Inc. v. Ferrer, 567 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (injury).
Georgia: Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Moss, 397 S.E.2d 445, 446
(Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (implies that CTS is compensable as an
injury).
Hawaii: No decision.
Idaho: Kinney v. Tupperware Co., 792 P.2d 330, 333 (Idaho 1990)
(occupational disease).
Illinois: Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home v. Industrial
Comm'n, 505 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ill. 1987) (injury).
Indiana: Duvall v. ICI Americas, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1122, 1124-27
(Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (injury).
Iowa: Noble v. Lamoni Prods., 512 N.W.2d 290, 293-94 (Iowa 1994)
(injury).
Kansas: Berry v. Boeing Military Airplanes, 885 P.2d 1261,
- 13 -
1267-68 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (CTS falls somewhere between the
definitions of disease and injury, but is compensable
nonetheless).
Kentucky: Brockway v. Rockwell Int'l, 907 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1995) (implies that CTS is a compensable injury).
Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:1031.1(B) (1996); Price v.
City of New Orleans, 672 So. 2d 1045, 1049 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(injury).
Maine: Ross v. Oxford Paper Co., 363 A.2d 712, 714 (Me. 1976)
(injury).
Maryland: Lettering Unltd. v. Guy, 582 A.2d 996, 998-99 (Md.
1990) (occupational disease).
Massachusetts: No decision.
Michigan: Illes v. Jones Transfer Co., 539 N.W.2d 382, 385-87
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (implies that CTS is compensable as an
injury).
Minnesota: Jones v. Thermo King, 461 N.W.2d 915, 916-17 (Minn.
1990) (injury).
Mississippi: Segar v. Garan, Inc., 388 So. 2d 164, 165-66 (Miss.
1980) (implies that CTS is a compensable injury).
Missouri: Weniger v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 860 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993) (occupational disease).
Montana: Bremer v. Buerkle, 727 P.2d 529, 531 (Mont. 1986)
(injury).
Nebraska: Morton v. Hunt Transp., Inc., 480 N.W.2d 217, 221
(Neb. 1992) (injury).
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 617.450 (1995) (listing tenosynovitis
as an occupational disease).
New Hampshire: In re Gilpatric, 639 A.2d 267, 268-69 (N.H. 1994)
(implies that CTS is compensable as an injury).
New Jersey: In re Musick, 670 A.2d 11, 14-15 (N.J. 1996)
(injury).
New Mexico: Salinas-Kendrick v. Mario Esparza Law Office, 879
P.2d 796, 798 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (implies that CTS is an
injury).
- 14 -
New York: Winn v. Hudson Valley Equine Ctr., 626 N.Y.S.2d 578,
579 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (occupational disease).
North Carolina: Seagraves v. The Austin Company of Greensboro,
Rec. No. COA95-853, 1996 WL 406457, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. July 16,
1996) (implies that CTS is compensable as an occupational
disease).
North Dakota: No decision.
Ohio: Frazier v. Mayfield, 582 N.E.2d 620, 622-23 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989) (occupational disease).
Oklahoma: Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Bradley, 855 P.2d 145,
146 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993) (implies that CTS is an injury).
Oregon: Sibley v. City of Phoenix, 813 P.2d 69, 71 (Or. Ct. App.
1991) (occupational disease).
Pennsylvania: Brooks v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Anchor Glass Container), 624 A.2d 821, 822 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993)
(injury).
Rhode Island: Vater v. HB Group, 667 A.2d 283, 285-86 (R.I.
1995) (implies that CTS is compensable).
South Carolina: Rodney v. Michelin Tire Corp., 466 S.E.2d 357,
359 n.1 (S.C. 1996) (holding that it has not been decided whether
CTS is compensable, and if so, whether it is compensable as an
injury or an occupational disease).
South Dakota: Schuck v. John Morrell & Co., 529 N.W.2d 894,
899-900 (S.D. 1995) (injury).
Tennessee: Barker v. Home-Crest Corp., 805 S.W.2d 373, 376
(Tenn. 1991) (injury).
Texas: Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 401.011(34) (West 1996) (defining
occupational disease to include "repetitive trauma injury").
Utah: Stouffer Foods Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 801 P.2d 179,
182-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (implies that CTS is compensable).
Vermont: No decision.
Washington: Davis v. Bendix Corp., 917 P.2d 586, 588 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1996) (occupational disease).
West Virginia: Lilly v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 225
S.E.2d 214, 217-18 (W. Va. 1976) (holding that cumulative trauma
conditions qualify as occupational diseases).
- 15 -
Wisconsin: Brown v. Labor & Industry Rev. Comm'n, Rec. No.
83-878, 1983 WL 161395, at *1-2 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1983)
(occupational disease).
Wyoming: Curnow v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation
Div., 899 P.2d 875, 877-78 (Wyo. 1995) (implies that CTS is
compensable as an injury).
- 16 -