United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 96-60083.
Michael S. ALLRED, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MOORE & PETERSON, A Professional Corporation; Gaynell C.
Methvin; Mark David; Paul R. Aiello; Camille F. Gravel, Jr.,
Individual Member of Gravel Brady & Berrigan, a Partnership,
Defendants-Appellees.
July 21, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi.
Before GARWOOD, DAVIS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
The issue presented on this appeal is whether the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi had
personal jurisdiction over five of the defendants in this diversity
abuse of process/malicious prosecution case. The district court
dismissed the case on the grounds that it lacked personal
jurisdiction over all the defendants, Moore & Peterson, P.C., a
Dallas, Texas law firm, and Paul R. Aiello, Mark David, and Gaynell
C. Methvin, Texas residents and former members of Moore & Peterson
(collectively the Texas defendants); Gravel, Brady & Berrigan, an
Alexandria, Louisiana law firm; James J. Brady, Michael S. Baer,
III, Helen G. Berrigan, Camille F. Gravel, Jr., and Charles G.
Gravel, Louisiana residents and individual members of Gravel, Brady
& Berrigan; and Texas resident Charles C. Rush. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(2). Plaintiff-appellant Michael S. Allred appealed only the
1
district court's dismissal of appellees the Texas defendants and
defendant-appellee Camille F. Gravel, Jr. We affirm the district
court's dismissal of the appellees on the grounds that the district
court lacked personal jurisdiction.
Facts and Proceedings Below
Plaintiff-appellant Allred is a Mississippi lawyer who filed
this suit in state court in Mississippi alleging that various Texas
and Louisiana attorneys, during the course of their representation
of Charles C. Rush in a suit against Rush pending in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, brought
a frivolous third-party complaint against Allred, who, at the time,
was representing the Louisiana Insurance Commissioner in his
capacity as a party in the referenced suit against Rush.
As alleged by Allred, the underlying facts of the current
dispute go back almost twenty years to his representation of
American Public Life Insurance Company (APLIC) in 1977 in a suit
against Richard O. Rush, Charles C. Rush, and Southern Educators
Life Insurance Company (SELIC). According to Allred, this 1977
Mississippi lawsuit involved alleged violations of securities laws
and breach of fiduciary duties in the course of dealings between
APLIC and SELIC. The parties eventually settled in December 1978
and executed a "Mutual Release and Covenant Not To Sue" in February
1979.
In October 1984, the Insurance Commissioner of Louisiana
retained Allred to file suit against Charles C. Rush, among others,
on behalf of SELIC, which had been placed in rehabilitation, the
2
Commissioner being the Rehabilitator, and renamed First American
Life Insurance Company (FALIC). Allred filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana on May
14, 1985, naming numerous defendants.1 The Louisiana suit charged
Rush with fraud, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. In
April 1986, the defendants-appellees, as attorneys for Rush, filed
in the Louisiana suit a third-party complaint naming Rush as
third-party plaintiff and APLIC and Allred as third party
defendants, alleging breach of the 1979 covenant not to sue, and
asserting contribution and indemnification claims for any judgment
rendered against Rush. Process on Allred and interrogatories to him
were served by being sent certified mail from Dallas, Texas, to
Allred's Jackson, Mississippi law offices. Allred subsequently
either withdrew or was terminated from his role as attorney for the
Louisiana Insurance Commissioner as Rehabilitator of FALIC in the
Louisiana suit, allegedly due to the conflict of interest caused by
Rush's third-party complaint. The third-party complaint was
subsequently dismissed with prejudice when, pursuant to a
settlement agreement, Rush assigned the third-party claim to the
Rehabilitator of FALIC.
On August 20, 1993, Allred filed the instant suit in the
Circuit Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County,
Mississippi, alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process
1
Sherman A. Bernard, et al. v. Richard O. Rush et al., 641
F.Supp. 730 (M.D.La.1985). An amended complaint was filed on April
10, 1986. Eventually the case involved forty-five named
defendants.
3
against Moore & Peterson; the former individual members of Moore
& Peterson who represented Rush; Gravel, Brady & Berrigan, Rush's
local counsel; and the individual members of Gravel, Brady &
Berrigan.2 Allred's complaint alleged the facts set forth above
and asserted that he suffered economic and emotional injury as a
result of the third-party claim; specifically, a loss of business
income, opportunity, and reputation. The defendants were served by
certified mail delivered to them in Texas and Louisiana,
respectively. The defendants timely removed the case to the
district court below on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 28
U.S.C. § 1332.
On October 8, 1993, the Texas defendants filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)
on the ground that service of process by mail on Allred in
Mississippi did not establish sufficient contact with Mississippi
to allow the district court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
the defendants, who were citizens of Texas. On January 14, 1994,
defendants Gravel, Brady & Berrigan and its individual members
(including defendant-appellee Camille F. Gravel, Jr.), citizens of
Louisiana, filed a similar motion to dismiss. The district court
heard oral arguments on February 24, 1994 and on March 3, 1994,
announced its intention to rule in favor of the defendants on the
motions to dismiss. Allred, on September 26, 1994, filed a motion
for leave to amend his complaint to add a conspiracy claim pursuant
2
Final judgment in the Louisiana suit had been entered on
March 1, 1993.
4
to Rule 15(a). On September 30, 1994, without ruling on Allred's
motion to amend, the district court issued a final order of
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.3 Allred filed a
timely "Motion To Reconsider" pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 on the
grounds that the district court failed to consider his pending
motion to amend. The district court, construing Allred's motion as
a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), found
that the amended complaint did not allege that any conspiratorial
events took place in Mississippi and that the amended complaint
relied on precisely the same basis as the earlier complaint—namely,
that the service of process by certified mail in Mississippi was
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
district court denied Allred's Rule 59(e) motion on January 9,
1996. Allred filed a timely notice of appeal.4
Discussion
Allred's sole contention on appeal is that the district court
erred in holding it lacked in personam jurisdiction over the Texas
defendants and Camille F. Gravel, Jr.
A district court's dismissal for want of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) is subject to de novo
review. Jobe v. ATR Mktg., Inc., 87 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir.1996);
Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647-48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513
3
The district court had dismissed Charles C. Rush, initially
also a defendant in this action, for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because Rush had filed a suggestion of bankruptcy.
4
Allred does not appeal the district court's dismissal of
Gravel, Brady & Berrigan, Charles C. Rush, James J. Brady, Michael
S. Baer, III, Helen G. Berrigan, or Charles G. Gravel.
5
U.S. 930, 115 S.Ct. 322, 130 L.Ed.2d 282 (1994). "When a
nonresident defendant presents a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing the district court's jurisdiction over the
nonresident. The court may determine the jurisdictional issue by
receiving affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony,
or any combination of the recognized methods of discovery." Stuart
v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir.1985) (citing Thompson v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir.1985);
Washington v. Norton Mfrg. Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942, 99 S.Ct. 2886, 61 L.Ed.2d 313 (1979));
see also Jobe, 87 F.3d at 753.
A federal district court sitting in diversity may exercise
personal jurisdiction only to the extent permitted a state court
under applicable state law. Cycles, Ltd. v. W.J. Digby, Inc., 889
F.2d 612, 616 (5th Cir.1989); Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380,
1382 (5th Cir.1987). "The state court or federal court sitting in
diversity may assert jurisdiction if: (1) the state's long-arm
statute applies, as interpreted by the state's courts; and (2) if
due process is satisfied under the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution." Cycles, 889 F.2d at 616 (citing
DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th Cir.1983));
see also Jobe, 87 F.3d at 753; Rittenhouse, 832 F.2d at 1382;
Stuart, 772 F.2d at 1189.
It is undisputed that none of the appellees are or were ever
residents or citizens of Mississippi; the Texas defendants were at
6
all relevant times residents and citizens of Texas, and appellee
Gravel was at all relevant times a citizen and resident of
Louisiana. None of the appellees had an agent for service of
process in Mississippi, or engaged in business (or had any permit
to do so), or practiced law (or was licensed to do so), in
Mississippi; none represented parties in litigation in
Mississippi; none owned or leased property, or had any employees,
offices, bank accounts or telephone listings there, or advertised
or solicited business there. None traveled to Mississippi on a
regular basis. The only relevant conduct or connection on the part
of appellees related to Mississippi is the mailing from Dallas,
Texas, to Allred's Jackson, Mississippi law office of the third
party complaint and summons, and interrogatories, in the lawsuit
pending in the Middle District of Louisiana in which Allred was
counsel for the plaintiff, the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance.
I. The Mississippi Long-Arm Statute
On appeal, Allred relies exclusively on the tort prong of the
Mississippi long-arm statute to support the exercise of
jurisdiction by the district court over the appellees.5 The
5
Mississippi's long-arm statute provides in relevant part:
"Any nonresident person, firm, general or limited
partnership, or any foreign or other corporation not
qualified under the Constitution and laws of this state
as to doing business herein, who shall make a contract
with a resident of this state to be performed in whole or
in part by any party in this state, or who shall commit
a tort in whole or in part in this state against a
resident or nonresident of this state, or who shall do
any business or perform any character of work or service
in this state, shall by such act or acts be deemed to be
doing business in Mississippi and shall thereby be
7
Mississippi long-arm statute is not coextensive with federal due
process, requiring an analysis of the scope of the reach of the
statute itself. See Cycles, 889 F.2d at 616-17 (noting that the
Mississippi long-arm statute has a "relatively restrictive scope");
Rittenhouse, 832 F.2d at 1383 (same).
Under the tort prong of the Mississippi long-arm statute,
personal jurisdiction is proper if any element of the tort (or any
part of any element) takes place in Mississippi. See, e.g., Smith
v. Temco, 252 So.2d 212, 216 (Miss.1971); Western Chain Co. v.
Brownlee, 317 So.2d 418, 421 (Miss.1975); Rittenhouse, 832 F.2d at
1384; Jobe, 87 F.3d at 753; Cycles, 889 F.2d at 619. As the
Mississippi Supreme Court has observed consistently:
"The tort is not complete until the injury occurs, and if the
injury occurs in this State then, under the ... statute, the
tort is committed, at least in part, in this State, and
personam jurisdiction of the nonresident tort feasor is
conferred upon the Mississippi court." Temco, 252 So.2d at
216; see also Anderson v. Sonat Exploration Co., 523 So.2d
1024, 1025 (Miss.1988).
Our cases, however, have been careful to distinguish actual injury
from its resultant consequences. "[C]onsequences stemming from the
actual tort injury do not confer personal jurisdiction at the site
or sites where such consequences happen to occur." Jobe, 87 F.3d
at 753 & n. 2 (observing that "[t]he term "injury' commonly denotes
the invasion of any legally protected interest of another" whereas
"the term "damage' is understood to mean the harm, detriment or
loss sustained by reason of an injury"); see also Cycles, 889 F.2d
subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state." Miss.Code Ann. § 13-3-57 (1996 Supp.) (emphasis
added).
8
at 619 ("We have held that with respect to Mississippi's long-arm
statute a tort occurs where and when the actual injury takes place,
not at the place of the economic consequences of the injury.");
Rittenhouse, 832 F.2d at 1384 (same); Estate of Portnoy v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 730 F.2d 286, 290 (5th Cir.1984) (same).
At the outset, we reject Allred's reliance on Hyde
Construction Co. v. Koehring, 321 F.Supp. 1193 (S.D.Miss.1969), for
the proposition that "service of process on Allred in Mississippi
constituted the commission of a tort in Mississippi for purposes of
satisfying the requirements of the Mississippi long-arm statute."
Although the district court in Hyde, examining section 13-3-57's
statutory predecessor, acknowledged that the abuse of process tort
must "accrue" within the geographical limits of Mississippi and so
found, it nevertheless repeatedly emphasized what we think to have
been the determinative factor in its analysis: the defendant in
the abuse of process action had "domesticated itself or qualified
to do business within the State of Mississippi having appointed ...
[a] registered agent for service of process between [all relevant
dates]." Hyde, 321 F.Supp. at 1210 (noting that the defendant
corporation "was authorized to transact business in Mississippi").
Allred neither argued nor presented evidence that any defendant had
any contact whatsoever with Mississippi other than the service of
process by certified mail from Dallas, Texas to his Jackson,
Mississippi law office. To the extent that Hyde supports Allred's
questionable proposition, it must be limited to the case of a
person or entity subject to the general jurisdiction of the
9
Mississippi courts.
A. Malicious Prosecution
In Mississippi, malicious prosecution requires:
"(1) the institution or continuation of original judicial
proceedings, either criminal or civil; (2) by, or at the
instance of the defendants; (3) the termination of such
proceedings in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in instituting
the proceedings; (5) want of probable cause in the
proceedings; and (6) the suffering of damages as a result of
the action or prosecution complained of." Mississippi Road
Supply Co. v. Zurich-American Ins. Co., 501 So.2d 412, 414
(Miss.1987) (citing Harvill v. Tabor, 240 Miss. 750, 128 So.2d
863, 864 (1961)).
Allred does not contend that elements two through five of the tort
of malicious prosecution occurred in Mississippi. Rather, Allred
argues primarily that his economic, reputational, and emotional
"injuries" set forth in his affidavit were suffered in Mississippi
and, therefore, support jurisdiction under the tort prong.
Appellees concede that the damages Allred alleges may have occurred
in Mississippi, but argue that damages, alone, are insufficient to
support personal jurisdiction under the Mississippi long-arm
statute. Appellees are correct.
As discussed above, this Circuit has recognized consistently
that Mississippi does not permit damages to serve as a proxy for
injury in the personal jurisdiction calculus. The concepts are
distinct and we must endeavor not to conflate the existence of an
injury—and hence the completed tort—with the presence of its
economic consequences. See Jobe, 87 F.3d at 753 (noting that,
especially in a commercial tort situation, collateral consequences
can be quite far-reaching). The injury suffered in a malicious
prosecution tort is the institution of criminal or civil
10
proceedings where the institution ought not to have occurred (and
occurred for an improper reason). Allred's damages-qua-injury
argument for personal jurisdiction under the Mississippi long-arm
statute flies in the face of our rather clear guidance in Jobe,
Cycles, Rittenhouse, and Portnoy.
Allred has alleged no facts that support the exercise of
personal jurisdiction through the use of the Mississippi long-arm
statute over his malicious prosecution claim. Allred's insistence
that the service of process by certified mail from out of state can
support jurisdiction under the first element of the malicious
prosecution tort is misplaced. Service of process on Allred in
Mississippi was not a prerequisite to the institution of judicial
proceedings against him in the Louisiana suit. A lawsuit is
commenced under the federal rules when the complaint is filed.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as
"civil action'."); Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the court."). In Louisiana, the filing of
a lawsuit both commences the action and tolls the statute of
limitation. See La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 421 (West 1960)("A
civil action is a demand for the enforcement of a legal right. It
is commenced by the filing of a pleading presenting the demand to
a court of competent jurisdiction."); La. Civ.Code Ann. art. 3463
(West 1994) ("An interruption of prescription resulting from the
filing of a suit in a competent court and in the proper venue or
from service of process within the prescriptive period continues as
long as the suit is pending."); accord Segura v. Frank, 630 So.2d
11
714, 727(La.), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1142, 114 S.Ct. 2165, 128
L.Ed.2d 887 (1994). Even in Mississippi, Allred's preferred forum,
it is the filing of a lawsuit—and not the service of process—that
is the determinative event in the commencement of a lawsuit. See
M.R.C.P. 3(a) ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint
with the court."); Watters v. Stripling, 675 So.2d 1242, 1244
(Miss.1996); Erby v. Cox, 654 So.2d 503, 505 (Miss.1995) ("[D]oes
the simple filing of the complaint without process being issued
toll the statute of limitations? We answer in the affirmative.").
Stated simply, the injury that Allred complained of in his
malicious prosecution claim was the filing of the Louisiana
lawsuit, not the subsequent service of process. We have neither
found, nor been cited to, any relevant Mississippi authority that
supports the proposition that service of process is a necessary
element of the malicious prosecution tort in Mississippi.
B. Abuse of Process
In Mississippi, the elements of abuse of process are:
"(1) the party made an illegal use of the process, (2) the
party had an ulterior motive, and (3) damage resulted from the
perverted use of process." McLain v. West Side Bone & Joint
Ctr., 656 So.2d 119, 123 (Miss.1995) (citing Foster v. Turner,
319 So.2d 233, 236 (Miss.1975)).
For the reasons discussed above, we reject Allred's contention that
he can bootstrap his alleged damages incurred in Mississippi into
an injury to achieve personal jurisdiction over his abuse of
process claim for the purposes of the Mississippi long-arm statute.
Furthermore, as is readily apparent from the above quoted excerpt,
the abuse of process tort, in Mississippi as elsewhere, involves
12
the corruption of process—not merely the issuance of process
simpliciter.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has acknowledged that the abuse
of process tort does not address the case, as here, where the only
alleged abuse of process was the service of a summons without any
corruption or impropriety:
"What defendant complains of in his counterclaim is not based
on any perversion of any process, but simply the filing of the
suit.... Nothing unlawful was done under any process. It
cannot be argued that the process of the court was abused by
accomplishing a result not commanded by it or not lawfully
obtainable under it when the only process involved was the
simple summon to defend the suit." Edmonds v. Delta Democrat
Publishing Co., 230 Miss. 583, 93 So.2d 171, 175 (1957); see
also Foster, 319 So.2d at 235 ("[Abuse of process requires a]n
ulterior purpose, and the perversion of the process after its
issuance so as to accomplish a result not commanded by it or
not lawfully obtainable under it.") (citing Edmonds, 93 So.2d
at 174).
In Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1454 (5th Cir.1984), this Court
also addressed the point that Allred misunderstands concerning the
abuse of process tort. After considering the Restatement 's
description of the elements of the abuse of process tort, we
favorably quoted the comment:
" "The gravamen of the misconduct for which the liability
stated in this Section is imposed is not the wrongful
procurement of legal process or the wrongful initiation of
criminal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process,
no matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than
that which it was designed to accomplish. Therefore, it is
immaterial that the process was properly issued, that it was
obtained in the course of proceedings that were brought with
probable cause and for a proper purpose, or even that the
proceedings terminated in favor of the person instituting or
initiating them. The subsequent misuse of the process ...
constitutes the misconduct for which the liability is
imposed....' " Brown, 721 F.2d at 1454-55 (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 cmt. a (emphasis in Brown
)).
13
Prosser and Keeton on Torts speaks even more directly to the
question of whether the mere service of process—without any
allegation that the service of process itself was somehow
perverted—constitutes an element of abuse of process:
"The essential elements of abuse of process, as the tort has
developed, have been stated to be: first, an ulterior
purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of the process
not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Some
definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed
at an objective not legitimate in the use of the process, is
required; and there is no liability where the defendant has
done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized
conclusion, even though with bad intentions.... There is, in
other words, a form of extortion, and it is what is done in
the course of negotiation, rather than the issuance or any
formal use of the process itself, which constitutes the tort."
Prosser and Keeton on Torts 898 (5th ed.1984) (emphasis
added); see also Brown, 721 F.2d at 1455 (same).
Accordingly, because the only activity alleged by Allred to have
taken place within Mississippi was the service of process by
certified mail from Texas to his Mississippi law office—an event
which is simply not an element (or part of an element) of the tort
of abuse of process—we hold that Allred failed to allege any facts
that would support personal jurisdiction over the defendants under
the tort prong of the Mississippi long-arm statute.
Allred's reliance on Simon v. United States, 644 F.2d 490
(1981), is similarly misplaced. Simon, unlike the facts here
presented, involved allegations of corrupt and perverted abuse of
process by the defendant within the forum state. In Simon the
abuse of process defendant deliberately had issued a subpoena
containing Simon's incorrect name and address in Louisiana. Id. at
492. As a result of the defendant's misrepresentation, Simon was
unable to be served in Louisiana. Id. The defendant, however,
14
informed the federal district court judge in Georgia that Simon had
in fact been served and the judge subsequently caused a "subpoena
ticket" to be issued in Louisiana. Id. United States marshals
subsequently served Simon personally in Louisiana, who left for
Georgia the next day. Id. Upon his arrival in Georgia, Simon was
immediately arrested. Id.
Although the Simon defendant's activities within the forum
state were quite limited, we find it significant that, unlike here,
the service of process by the federal marshals in Louisiana
resulted directly from the defendant's "intentional misuse of
process"—i.e., lying to the federal judge to cause the subpoena to
issue and then lying again about whether Simon had in fact been
served—and not merely the proper service of a defendant for
purportedly improper motives. Here, the service of process was
entirely proper and in accordance with the applicable rules.
In summary, we hold that Allred failed to allege that any
element of the abuse of process tort occurred in Mississippi: (1)
to the extent that the tort requires corruption or perversion of
process, neither has been alleged, and (2) to the extent that the
tort requires an improper motive, it is uncontroverted that all
decisions regarding the third-party complaint were made in either
Louisiana or Texas. Accordingly, we find that the district court
appropriately determined that Allred failed to establish the proper
jurisdictional prerequisites to support the exercise of personal
15
jurisdiction under the Mississippi long-arm statute.6
II. Due Process
Even were we to accept Allred's arguments concerning the
operation of the Mississippi long-arm statute, we are nevertheless
convinced that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the
district court in Mississippi would violate due process.
The constitutional limitations on the reach of the personal
jurisdiction of a court are now quite familiar. The exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with
due process principles only when two requirements are met. First,
the nonresident defendant must have "purposefully availed himself
of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing
"minimum contacts' with that forum state." Felch v. Transportes
Lar-Mex, Sa De CV, 92 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Wilson
v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 930,
115 S.Ct. 322, 130 L.Ed.2d 282 (1994); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315-17, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95
(1945)); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-77, 105
S.Ct. 2174, 2184, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Second, the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant "must not
"offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
6
We are also in complete agreement with the district court
that Allred's attempt to add an "allegation of conspiracy to the
complaint attaches no additional merit to the assertion that the
defendants' mere service of process on the plaintiff by mail in a
Louisiana lawsuit was sufficient to establish in personam
jurisdiction in Mississippi." Like his original complaint, his
amended complaint also fails to allege any conspiratorial
agreements or acts took place in Mississippi.
16
' " Felch, 92 F.3d at 323 (quoting Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647; Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102,
113-15, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1033, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)).
This Court recently summarized the minimum contacts inquiry as
follows:
"The "minimum contacts' prong of the inquiry may be further
subdivided into contacts that give rise to "specific' personal
jurisdiction and those that give rise to "general' personal
jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction is appropriate when the
nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state arise
from, or are directly related to, the cause of action.
General jurisdiction, however, will attach, even if the
nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state are not
directly related to the cause of action, if the defendant's
contacts with the forum state are both "continuous and
systematic.' " Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647 (citing Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-16, 104
S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 nn. 8-9 (1984)).
Only if the nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state will the fairness of the exercise of personal
jurisdiction be evaluated.7
The attorney appellees' contacts with Mississippi do not
remotely approach the level required to support general
jurisdiction, and Allred does not contend otherwise. Rather,
Allred maintains that specific jurisdiction is appropriate because
the causes of action—malicious prosecution and abuse of process—are
7
"The fairness prong for personal jurisdiction requires
federal courts to consider (1) the burden upon the nonresident
defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state; (3) the
plaintiff's interest in securing relief; (4) "the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies'; (5) "the shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.' " Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 n. 5 (5th
Cir.1990) (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-15, 107 S.Ct. at 1033
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288-
90, 100 S.Ct. 559, 563, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980))).
17
directly related to appellees' contacts with Mississippi. In
support of his position, Allred cites a number of defamation cases
permitting the exercise of specific jurisdiction upon the existence
of a single, purposeful contact with the forum state. See, e.g.,
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804
(1984); Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 688 F.2d 328 (5th
Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023, 103 S.Ct. 1275, 75 L.Ed.2d
496 (1983).
We are not persuaded that the defamation cases present an
appropriate line of precedent for Allred. In the defamation cases
cited by Allred, the allegedly tortious acts—the publication of
defamatory statements—were expressly aimed at the forum state and
the nonresident defendants knew that their acts would have an
impact on the plaintiff in the forum state. See, e.g., Calder, 465
U.S. at 787-90, 104 S.Ct. at 1486-87 (allegedly libelous article
about plaintiff's drinking habits published in 604,000 copies of
the National Enquirer sold in the forum state); Brown, 688 F.2d at
333 (single, defamatory telephone call directed at the forum
state). The service of process here, however, is qualitatively
different than the publication of a defamatory statement or
article. In our view, it is simply not a part of either
Mississippi's malicious prosecution or abuse of process tort; and,
even if it were, it would constitute only the smallest portion of
one element of the claim. This is not the case with the
publication element of a defamation tort. That the "effects" test
of Calder applies outside of the defamation context is clear; but
18
the effects test is not a substitute for a nonresident's minimum
contacts that demonstrate purposeful availment of the benefits of
the forum state. Any publication in this case occurred in
Louisiana, upon the filing in the federal court there of the third
party complaint, a public document. There was no publication in
Mississippi, the process and complaint simply arrived at Allred's
office there by mail in an envelope addressed to him. Any
"effects" in this case are essentially the effects of being sued in
the Louisiana case, and it is immaterial to these effects when,
where or how service was affected (unlike the relation between the
"effects" of a libel and the place of its publication).
We agree with the Seventh Circuit's pronouncement that:
"The Supreme Court did not intend the Calder "effects' test to
apply only to libel cases. However, the "effects' of the
intentional tort of libel in the forum state (i.e., the
plaintiff's residence) are perhaps more pronounced than the
"effects' of most other intentional torts. Nevertheless, the
key to Calder is that the effects of an alleged intentional
tort are to be assessed as part of the analysis of the
defendant's relevant contacts with the forum. Whether these
effects, either alone or in combination with other contacts,
are sufficient to support in personam jurisdiction will turn
upon the particular facts of each case." Wallace v. Herron,
778 F.2d 391, 395 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122,
106 S.Ct. 1642, 90 L.Ed.2d 187 (1986).
The defendants' contacts with Mississippi fall far short of the
minimum contacts mark.
Allred's arguments notwithstanding, we agree with the district
court and the appellees that Wallace presents a factually
indistinguishable case. In Wallace, an Indiana resident sued in
Indiana a California law firm and three of its attorneys for
malicious prosecution in connection with a lawsuit defendants had
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filed in California. Wallace, 778 F.2d at 392. Only one of the
California defendants had even been to Indiana (to take a
deposition in an unrelated case). Id. at 394. Wallace, the
plaintiff, argued that the defendants' service in Indiana of
interrogatories and discovery requests provided sufficient minimum
contacts to comport with due process. Id. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of sufficient
minimum contacts with the Indiana forum.
As in Wallace, the defendants in the present suit caused
process to be served by mail on Allred on behalf of their clients
in Louisiana federal district court pursuant to a federal lawsuit
in Louisiana. No other contacts with Mississippi have been
alleged. It would indeed be unreasonable to require defendants to
appear in Mississippi to defend this suit on the basis of such
attenuated contacts. See id. at 395 ("The defendants filed these
papers on behalf of their California clients in a California court
pursuant to a California lawsuit.... [Defendants] took no action
that created the necessary connection with Indiana for them to
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.").
Accordingly, we hold that where process is issued in a
Louisiana lawsuit and is properly served in Mississippi on a
Mississippi resident by mailing from outside of Mississippi, such
service—absent any other Mississippi nexus—provides insufficient
contact with Mississippi to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by a Mississippi court over non-residents served
outside of Mississippi under the constraints of the due process
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clause.
Conclusion
Because the district court properly held it lacked authority
under the Mississippi long-arm statute to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendants-appellees and because the exercise
of personal jurisdiction by the Mississippi federal district court
would, in any event, be improper under the due process clause, the
district court's judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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