Amchem Products, Inc. v. Newport News Circuit Court Asbestos Cases

Present:   All the Justices

AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC., ET AL.
                       OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 012576               June 7, 2002

NEWPORT NEWS CIRCUIT COURT
ASBESTOS CASES PLAINTIFFS

      FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
                    Robert W. Curran, Judge

                               I.

     In this interlocutory appeal, we consider whether the

circuit court erred by refusing to require the litigants to

resolve their purported dispute in accordance with an

arbitration provision in a contract.

                               II.

     Five hundred and ninety-seven individual plaintiffs filed

lawsuits in the circuit court against certain asbestos

manufacturers and/or distributors, including the defendants,

Amchem Products, Inc., C.E. Thurston and Sons, Inc., and Dana

Corporation.   The plaintiffs, who included personal

representatives of the estates of certain decedents, alleged

that they, or their decedents, sustained personal injury or

that their decedents died as a result of exposure to asbestos.

     The defendants are members of the Center for Claims

Resolution, a Delaware corporation composed of companies

formerly engaged in the manufacture, sale, and/or distribution

of asbestos and products that contain asbestos.   The Center
for Claims Resolution was created for the express purpose of

evaluating, negotiating, litigating, and settling asbestos-

related personal injury and property damage claims against its

members.   In July 2000, the Center for Claims Resolution and

its members entered into a Master Settlement Agreement with

the plaintiffs in this appeal.

     Pursuant to the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement,

the members of the Center for Claims Resolution agreed to

settle each plaintiff's claims against its members for sums

specified in the Master Settlement Agreement.   The Master

Settlement Agreement states in part that "[t]his Settlement

Agreement is made by and between the members of the Center for

Claims Resolution, specifically, Amchem Products, Inc.,

Armstrong World Industries, Inc., The Asbestos Claims

Management Corporation (formerly known as National Gypsum

Company); . . . C.E. Thurston & Sons, Inc.; Dana Corporation;"

and certain law firms.

     The Master Settlement Agreement, dated July 2000,

contained the following provision in paragraph 5(b):

          "To encourage the resolution of disputes
     without the need for arbitration, counsel for the
     parties shall meet face to face at least twice per
     year, and seven days prior to each meeting, the
     parties shall exchange a list of the disputed issues
     and/or individual cases and the pertinent
     information regarding those cases or issues. If
     counsel are unable to resolve any dispute arising
     under this agreement, including either its


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     interpretation or application, the matter shall be
     referred to the McCammon Mediation Group, which
     shall appoint an independent arbitrator to resolve
     the matter. In each case, the decision of the
     arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the
     parties, and the cost of arbitration, including the
     arbitrator's fees and expenses, shall be borne
     equally by the parties, and each party shall bear
     its own attorneys' fees."

     On October 16, 2000, Michael Rooney, chief claims officer

for the Center for Claims Resolution, forwarded a letter to

counsel for the plaintiffs.   This letter modified the Master

Settlement Agreement and stated in relevant part:

     "Pursuant to the Master Settlement Agreement between
     the Center for Claims Resolution and the law firms
     of Patten, Wornom, Hatten & Diamonstein, L.C., and
     Glasser & Glasser, P.L.C., for the resolution of
     qualified cases . . . the [Center for Claims
     Resolution] understands and consents that
     plaintiff's counsel intends to make payment to all
     of these qualified plaintiffs in three equal
     installments rather than in full to three separate
     groups . . . . Specifically, the [Center for Claims
     Resolution] understands that plaintiff counsel
     intends to pay each qualified plaintiff the
     settlement values set forth in Paragraph 2 of the
     agreement in three equal installments – the first of
     which is due on or about October 30, 2000, the
     second is due on or about April 30, 2001, and the
     third is due on or about October 30, 2001.

     "Each settling plaintiff will execute a release to
     the [Center for Claims Resolution] for the full
     amount of the settlement prior to receiving the
     first installment; however, it is specifically
     understood and agreed that these releases are not
     evidence of full satisfaction of the contractual
     obligation of the [Center for Claims Resolution] to
     pay the qualified plaintiffs the settlement values
     that have been agreed upon, and should the [Center
     for Claims Resolution] fail to timely make any or
     all of the payments required by the Master


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     Settlement Agreement, then in that event each
     settling plaintiff who has not received full payment
     may pursue a remedy in contract against the [Center
     for Claims Resolution] members for any deficiency.
     If such action is required, the [Center for Claims
     Resolution] members shall be responsible to pay the
     deficiency with interest at 8% per annum, and the
     [Center for Claims Resolution] members will
     reimburse each such settling plaintiff for
     reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses that may be
     required to collect this deficiency by lawsuit or
     otherwise.

     "This remedy in contract on the release will be the
     sole legal remedy of each plaintiff who has executed
     a release for the full consideration of his
     settlement but fails to receive timely payment in
     full."

     The plaintiffs' claims were accepted by the Center for

Claims Resolution under the Master Settlement Agreement as

modified, and each plaintiff executed a release absolving all

the Center for Claims Resolution members from any liability.

     Prior to the date that the Center for Claims Resolution

was required to make the payments specified in the Master

Settlement Agreement, two of its members defaulted on their

obligations to pay their prescribed share of the payments.

The Asbestos Claims Management Corporation declared itself

insolvent and failed to pay its obligations.   Armstrong World

Industries, Inc., filed a petition in bankruptcy and also

defaulted on its settlement obligations.   In January 2001, the

Center for Claims Resolution forwarded a check to plaintiffs'

counsel that represented the amounts due from the Center for



                               4
Claims Resolution member companies other than the Asbestos

Claims Management Corporation and Armstrong World Industries,

Inc.

       Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a "Motion To Enforce

Settlement Agreement" in the circuit court.   The plaintiffs

asserted that the Center for Claims Resolution and its member

companies are individually, jointly, and severally liable to

the plaintiffs for the payments due under the Master

Settlement Agreement, and interest and attorneys' fees

permitted by the agreement, including the October 16, 2000

modification.   The defendants, relying upon paragraph 5(b) of

the Master Settlement Agreement, asserted that a dispute

existed and, therefore, the plaintiffs were required to submit

their claims to binding arbitration as required by the Federal

Arbitration Act and the Virginia Arbitration Act.   The circuit

court denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration, and

the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal from that order.

                               III.

                                A.

       The defendants argue that the circuit court erred in

denying their motion to compel resolution of this purported

dispute by arbitration.   The defendants assert that the Master

Settlement Agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration

Act, and the Act reflects a liberal federal policy that favors


                                 5
enforcement of arbitration agreements.   The defendants state

that paragraph 5(b) of the Master Settlement Agreement

contains a mandatory arbitration provision and that the

October 16, 2000 letter does not alter the arbitration

requirement.

     Continuing, the defendants assert that a dispute exists

that is subject to binding arbitration because

     "the proper interpretation of the October Letter,
     and the proper application of the [Master Settlement
     Agreement] in light of the October Letter, is
     disputed by the parties. The plaintiffs read the
     letter to create a new contract remedy against 'all
     the [Center for Claims Resolution] members.' The
     defendants read the letter to confirm the
     plaintiffs' contract remedy against the 'defaulting
     [Center for Claims Resolution] members.' As such,
     the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement
     against the defendants herein necessarily depends in
     the first instance on an interpretation of the
     October Letter, and – under the arbitration clause
     in § 5(b) of the agreement – only an arbitrator has
     jurisdiction to render such an interpretation."

     Responding, the plaintiffs initially contend that this

Court lacks jurisdiction of the circuit court's order denying

the defendants' motion to compel arbitration because such

order cannot be challenged by an interlocutory appeal but must

be contested solely by a writ of mandamus.   Alternatively, the

plaintiffs assert that the October 2000 letter modified the

Master Settlement Agreement by providing the plaintiffs with a

new remedy against all members of the Center for Claims




                               6
Resolution for any deficiencies in payment as provided by the

Master Settlement Agreement.

     Continuing, the plaintiffs state that the language in the

October 2000 letter is clear, unambiguous, and not subject to

varying interpretations.   Thus, the plaintiffs assert that

there is no dispute that the October 2000 letter, which

modified the Master Settlement Agreement, gave them a

contractual right to pursue an action for breach of contract

and reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses against all the

Center for Claims Resolution members jointly and severally if

the Center for Claims Resolution fails to make the payments

required by the Master Settlement Agreement.

                               B.

     Initially, we observe that this Court has jurisdiction to

decide whether the plaintiffs' claims are subject to the

arbitration agreement.   Code § 8.01-581.01 states in part that

"[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to

arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to

arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the

parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, except upon

such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation

of any contract."   Code § 8.01-581.02 confers upon a circuit

court the power to compel or stay arbitration proceedings.

Code § 8.01-581.01 confers upon this Court jurisdiction to


                                7
review a circuit court's order that denies or compels

arbitration.

                                C.

     Our resolution of this appeal is governed in part by the

Federal Arbitration Act because the Master Settlement

Agreement, as modified by the October 2000 letter, "involved

interstate commerce."   Thus, we must apply the federal

substantive law to determine whether the parties must submit

to binding arbitration as required by the contract.     Allied-

Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268-70, 281-82

(1995); see 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (2000).    Therefore, we must

apply the following federal principles.

     The question whether a party has agreed to arbitrate a

particular issue is a matter of contract interpretation.    The

Supreme Court has stated that a "party cannot be required to

submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so

to submit."    United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf

Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).    The Federal

Arbitration Act contains "a congressional declaration of a

liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,

notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies

to the contrary.   The effect of [§ 2 of the Act] is to create

a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable

to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act."


                                 8
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460

U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

     The Supreme Court has stated that the Federal Arbitration

Act "establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts

concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved

in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the

construction of the contract language itself or an allegation

of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."     Id. at

24-25 (footnote omitted).   This strong presumption of

arbitrability mandates that a court must require the parties

to submit to arbitration if the scope of an arbitration clause

subject to the federal act is open to question.   American

Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d

88, 92 (4th Cir. 1996); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v.

Monumental Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1989).

     The Supreme Court has held that a court must compel

parties to arbitrate pursuant to the terms of an agreement

covered by the federal Act "unless it may be said with

positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not

susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted

dispute."   Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83;

accord Long v. Silver, 248 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 213 (2001).




                                9
     However, in determining whether a contractual dispute

exists that is subject to arbitration, we must review the

language contained in the Master Settlement Agreement and the

October 2000 modification to ascertain the meaning of these

documents, and in making this determination, we must apply the

substantive contract law of this Commonwealth.    The question

"[w]hether a party agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute is

an issue for judicial determination to be decided as a matter

of contract."     Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d

373, 377 (4th Cir. 1998); accord AT&T Technologies, Inc. v.

Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648-49

(1986); Arrants v. Buck, 130 F.3d 636, 640 (4th Cir. 1997).

In making this determination, the courts should apply

"ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of

contracts."     First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514

U.S. 938, 944 (1995); see also Arrants, 130 F.3d at 640

("[c]ourts decide whether there is an agreement to arbitrate

according to common law principles of contract law").

                                 D.

     The litigants agree that the letter that the Center for

Claims Resolution's Chief Claims Officer, Rooney, forwarded to

the plaintiffs' counsel changed the terms of the Master

Settlement Agreement.    It is well established that a written

contract can be modified by an express mutual agreement, which


                                 10
may be in writing.   Stanley's Cafeteria v. Abramson, 226 Va.

68, 72, 306 S.E.2d 870, 872 (1983).

     We have stated that "[c]ontracts between parties are

subject to basic rules of interpretation.   Contracts are

construed as written, without adding terms that were not

included by the parties."   TM Delmarva Power v. NCP of

Virginia, 263 Va. 116, 119, 557 S.E.2d 199, 200 (2002); accord

Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398

(1984).   Additionally, it is well established that when the

terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, a court must

give them their plain meaning.    Pocahontas Mining Co. v.

Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 263 Va. 169, 173, 556 S.E.2d 769, 771

(2002); Golding v. Floyd, 261 Va. 190, 192, 539 S.E.2d 735,

736 (2001); Bridgestone/Firestone v. Prince William Square,

250 Va. 402, 407, 463 S.E.2d 661, 664 (1995); Foods First,

Inc. v. Gables Associates, 244 Va. 180, 182, 418 S.E.2d 888,

889 (1992).   We must construe the words as written in the

contract, and we will not make a new contract for the parties.

Bridgestone, 250 Va. at 407, 463 S.E.2d at 664; Berry v.

Klinger, 225 Va. 201, 208, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983).

     Applying these contract principles, we are compelled to

conclude, with positive assurance, that the plaintiffs' claims

are not subject to the arbitration provision in the Master

Settlement Agreement because a legally cognizable dispute does


                                 11
not exist.   There is no dispute about the terms of the October

16, 2000 letter that modified the Master Settlement Agreement.

There is no dispute that the language contained in the second

paragraph of the October 2000 letter confers upon the

plaintiffs the right to "pursue a remedy in contract against

the [Center for Claims Resolution] members" for any deficiency

in the event the Center for Claims Resolution fails to timely

make any payments required by the Master Settlement Agreement.

There is no dispute that the Center for Claims Resolution

failed to pay the plaintiffs as required by the terms of the

Master Settlement Agreement.   Additionally, the October 2000

letter explicitly states that this "remedy in contract on the

release will be the sole legal remedy of each plaintiff who

has executed a release for the full consideration of his

settlement but fails to receive timely payment in full."

     The defendants, however, assert that the plaintiffs'

contractual remedies are limited to claims against the

defaulting members of the Center for Claims Resolution and not

"all the members of the Center for Claims Resolution."   Thus,

the defendants say that this difference in interpretation

creates a dispute subject to resolution by an arbitrator

pursuant to the terms of the arbitration provision in the

Master Settlement Agreement.




                               12
     Contrary to the defendants' assertions, there can be no

legally cognizable dispute regarding the meaning of the clear

and unambiguous language contained in the October 2000 letter.

As we have already stated, we must apply the plain meaning of

the contract language in ascertaining the parties' rights, and

pursuant to the plain meaning of the language used in the

October 2000 modification, the plaintiffs have the right to

"pursue a remedy in contract against the [Center for Claims

Resolution] members for any deficiency."   This clear and

unambiguous language does not limit the plaintiffs' contract

remedies to the defaulting Center for Claims Resolution

members.   We will not add words to the litigants' contract.

Rather, we must enforce the contract using the express words

that the Center for Claims Resolution chose to employ when

making the written modification to the Master Settlement

Agreement.   As we have held:

          "It is the function of the court to construe
     the contract made by the parties, not to make a
     contract for them. The question for the court is
     what did the parties agree to as evidenced by their
     contract. The guiding light in the construction of
     a contract is the intention of the parties as
     expressed by them in the words they have used, and
     courts are bound to say that the parties intended
     what the written instrument plainly declares."

Graphic Arts Mutual Ins. v. C.W. Warthen Co., 240 Va. 457,

460, 397 S.E.2d 876, 878 (1990) (quoting Magann Corp. v.

Electrical Works, 203 Va. 259, 264, 123 S.E.2d 377, 381


                                13
(1962)).   Moreover, a dispute that subjects a party to

arbitration must be real and not imagined.   A contrary

conclusion would permit a litigant to assert the existence of

a purported dispute when there is no basis in fact or law to

do so, thereby depriving the opposing litigant of valuable

contractual rights.

     Thus, reiterating, we hold that the circuit court did not

err in denying the defendants' request to arbitrate because,

applying the federal law and the Federal Arbitration Act, we

conclude with positive assurance that no legally cognizable

dispute exists that would subject the litigants to arbitration

and, thus, there is nothing for an arbitrator to decide.

                               IV.

     We will affirm the interlocutory order appealed from, and

we will remand this case to the circuit court so that the

plaintiffs may pursue their contract remedies.

                                          Affirmed and remanded.




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