A Ford coupé was stolen from appellee in ■ Abilene, Tex., and taken to the state of Florida, where it was sold to one John P. Cox. Appellee located the ear in the possession of Cox, and brought suit in the circuit court of Santa Rosa county, Fla., in the nature of a replevin against Cox to recover it. In connection with his suit, he executed a replevin bond in the principal sum of $1,000, with appellant as surety. The case was tried in the Florida court in the absence of appellee, and a judgment was rendered therein in favor of Cox and against appellee and his surety, the appellant, for the sum of $525, besides costs amounting to $15.62. The instant suit was instituted by appellant against appellee for reimbursement; it being alleged that appellant had paid off the judgment rendered.in Florida. Appellant also sought attorneys’ fees in the sum of $100, alleged to have been incurred as a direct result of its Suretyship. Various special defenses were interposed by the appellee. We find it unnecessary to consider these defenses, for the reason that the only question before us is the alleged error of the trial court in overruling the motion of appellant for a peremptory instruction. The cause was submitted to the jury on special issues embodying two of the defenses pleaded by appellee, which issues were answered in appellee’s favor.
Appellant’s brief contains eleven propositions, each assigning a different reason why it is claimed the peremptory instruction requested by it should have been given. We have concluded that the court did not err in overruling the motion for a peremptory instruction. The only evidence in the record that appellant ever paid off and discharged *819the judgment is an assignment of the judgment to it by the plaintiff, Cox. This assignment does not disclose what amount was paid by appellant in satisfaction of the judgment. It is a well-settled rule of law that a surety will not be allowed to speculate on his principal, but is entitled to recover against him only the amount or value which he (the surety) has actually paid. In the absence of any proof of this fact, appellant was not entitled to a peremptory instruction in its favor. 50 C. J. p. 274, § 457; 21 R. C. L. p. 1100, § 136; Id. p. 1124, § 161; Price v. Horton, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 526, 23 S. W. 501.
Our views on this question render it unnecessary for us to consider and determine whether there exist other reasons why the motion should not have been granted. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.