08-1731-cv
AMW Materials Testing, Inc. v. Town of Babylon
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
F OR THE S ECOND C IRCUIT
August Term, 2008
(Argued: August 7, 2009 Decided: October 19, 2009)
Docket No. 08-1731-cv
AMW M ATERIALS T ESTING, INC.,
A NTHONY A NTONIOU,
Plaintiffs-Counter-
Defendants-Appellants,
— v.—
T OWN OF B ABYLON,
Defendant-Counter-Claimant-
Cross-Defendant-Appellee,
N ORTH A MITYVILLE F IRE C OMPANY, INC.,
Defendants-Counter-Claimants-
Appellees.
Before:
M CL AUGHLIN, P OOLER, and R AGGI,
Circuit Judges.
_________________
In a case involving a fire at a commercial building during which hazardous materials
were released into the environment, plaintiff owners sued the local entities that responded
to the emergency in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Arthur D. Spatt, Judge) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., New York tort law, and New York
Navigation Law § 181(1), to recover cleanup costs. Plaintiffs now appeal a judgment in
favor of defendants entered after trial, arguing that defendants qualify as a matter of law
under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) as “operators” of the facility from which hazardous materials were
released, and that emergency response actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) cannot
constitute an affirmative defense to § 9607(a) liability. Both arguments are unpersuasive.
A FFIRMED.
J OAN M. F ERRETTI (Robert M. Lustberg, on the brief), Lustberg & Ferretti,
Glens Falls, New York, for Appellants.
R ICHARD F. R ICCI (Priya Rebecca Masilmani, on the brief), Lowenstein
Sandler, Roseland, New Jersey; S TEVEN C. S HAHAN , Tadeo & Shahan,
Syracuse, New York, for Appellees.
R EENA R AGGI, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs AMW Materials Testing, Inc., and its owner Anthony Antoniou appeal a
judgment entered in favor of defendants, the Town of Babylon and the North Amityville Fire
Company, after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York (Arthur D. Spatt, Judge). The case arises from defendants’ emergency response to a
2000 fire that destroyed the AMW building in North Amityville, in the course of which
hazardous materials stored in the building were released into the environment. Plaintiffs
2
sued defendants under federal law, specifically, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., as well as
under New York tort law and New York Navigation Law § 181(1), to recover costs incurred
in responding to this release.
In appealing the judgment entered on March 24, 2008, in favor of defendants on the
CERCLA claims, plaintiffs raise various challenges falling into two general categories. First,
plaintiffs submit that defendants were “operators” of the AMW facility at the time the
hazardous materials at issue were released and, therefore, are liable for cleanup costs under
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Second, plaintiffs assert that emergency response actions pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) cannot constitute an affirmative defense to § 9607(a) liability. Our
ability to address these arguments is somewhat complicated by the fact that the district
court’s inquiries to the jury and its own findings of fact and conclusions of law focused
primarily on the affirmative defense, with no findings made on the operator question.
Plaintiffs nevertheless submit that the trial record permits the operator question to be
answered in their favor as a matter of law. We are not persuaded. Moreover, we reject
plaintiffs’ argument that § 9607(d)(2) cannot afford an affirmative defense to their § 9607(a)
claims. We further reject plaintiffs’ various challenges to the judgment in favor of
defendants on their state law claims.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in favor of defendants.
3
I. Background
We begin with a brief summary of the facts, providing further details of the trial
evidence as necessary in our discussion of plaintiffs’ particular challenges on appeal.
A. The Fire
In 2000, plaintiffs owned an industrial facility in North Amityville, New York, where
they engaged in metal finishing for the aerospace industry. Pursuant to permits, plaintiffs
stored various “hazardous substances,” see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), 9602(a), in the AMW
facility for use in their work.
Sometime before 3:00 p.m. on October 9, 2000, a fire broke out in plaintiffs’ facility,
which Antoniou and an AMW employee unsuccessfully attempted to extinguish. Meanwhile,
individual callers and an automatic alarm system in the AMW facility alerted defendant
North Amityville Fire Company (“Fire Company”) – a volunteer association – to the fire.
Within minutes, members of the Fire Company responded to the scene.
Fire Company Chief Willie Tutt initially ordered firefighters into the AMW building
to fight the blaze from within. Almost immediately, the firefighters were compelled to
withdraw by the extremely high heat and thick smoke that they encountered. Soon after their
exit, the front wall and roof of the building collapsed. As a result, the Fire Company decided
to employ defensive firefighting techniques, using a deck gun and a tower ladder to suppress
the fire. Chief Tutt testified that, at the time, he understood that the building was likely lost.
After firefighters thus extinguished the accessible portions of the fire, Chief Tutt instituted
4
an “overhaul” phase in which payloaders removed portions of the collapsed roof so that
firefighters could gain access to the fire that continued to smolder underneath.
As a result of the fire and the subsequent building collapse, hazardous substances
stored in plaintiffs’ facility were released into the surrounding environment. During and after
the fire, plaintiffs took various steps to contain, remove, and remediate these hazardous
substances.
B. Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit and the Initial Award of Summary Judgment
On June 22, 2001, plaintiffs commenced this action against the Fire Company and
the Town of Babylon,1 seeking compensation under federal and state law for costs incurred
in dealing with the released hazardous substances. On December 20, 2004, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all claims. On appeal, a panel of this
court summarily affirmed the award on plaintiffs’ CERCLA contribution claims, see 42
U.S.C. § 9613, but reversed it on the CERCLA restitution claims, see id. § 9607(a), as well
as the state negligence and Navigation Law claims, see N.Y. Nav. Law § 181(1). See AMW
Materials Testing, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 187 F. App’x 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
C. The Trials
On remand, the first trial of plaintiffs’ claims ended in a hung jury and mistrial. At
a retrial in 2007, the district court used a verdict sheet to pose certain questions to the jury
relating to plaintiffs’ claims. As to plaintiffs’ state law claims, the jury answered all
1
North Amityville, a hamlet, is part of the Town of Babylon in Suffolk County.
5
questions in favor of defendants. As to plaintiffs’ CERCLA claims, the jury’s responses
were more ambiguous.2 Having previously determined that plaintiffs had no right to a jury
trial on their CERCLA restitution claims, the district court treated the jury’s responses on
those claims as only advisory. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c)(1). Making its own findings of fact
and conclusions of law with respect to CERCLA, and following the jury’s findings with
respect to the state law claims, the district court entered a final judgment in favor of both
defendants on all plaintiffs’ claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).
Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal.
II. Discussion
A. The CERCLA Claims
1. Statutory Background
Preliminary to discussing plaintiffs’ particular challenges to the judgment entered in
favor of defendants on the CERCLA claims, we discuss the relevant statutory scheme.
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 “to promote the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites
and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for the
2
For example, in response to the question, “Did the defendants prove that the
defendant North Amityville Fire Company was taking action ‘in response to an emergency
created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance’?” the jury answered,
“No.” Verdict sheet at 1. At the same time, however, in response to the question, “Did the
plaintiffs prove that some time during its presence at the scene of the fire, the defendant
North Amityville Fire Company was not taking action ‘in response to an emergency created
by the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance’?” the jury answered, “No.”
Id. Asked the same questions about the Town of Babylon, the jury answered the first
question, “Yes,” and the second question, “No.” Id. at 3-4.
6
contamination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1874
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute seeks to accomplish this goal through
three cost-shifting provisions: CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), which permits
recovery of cleanup and prevention costs; id. § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), which
creates a right of contribution for parties who have been compelled to clean up a site by a
court or administrative body; and id. § 113(f)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B), which creates
a similar right of contribution for parties that have resolved the issue of liability to the United
States by a settlement agreement. See generally Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v.
UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing statutory framework).3 This
court having affirmed the award of summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs’
contribution claim, see AMW Materials Testing, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 187 F. App’x at
26, only CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), providing for restitution, is relevant to this
appeal.
a. Section 9607(a) Liability
Title 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) defines four classes of “covered persons” subject to liability
for “response costs,” i.e., the costs “of cleaning up and preventing future contamination at
a site” onto which hazardous materials have been released. Consolidated Edison Co. of
N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d at 94-95. For purposes of this appeal, we focus on
3
For the remainder of our discussion, we refer to the relevant CERCLA provisions
in their codified form.
7
§ 9607(a)(2), the provision relied on by plaintiffs in suing defendants for restitution. Section
9607(a)(2) states that “any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of” is a
“covered person” for purposes of CERCLA. Although plaintiffs were undoubtedly the
owners of the AMW facility from which the hazardous materials at issue in this case were
released, they submit that defendants are liable under § 9607(a)(2) as the effective operators
of the facility throughout the time they fought the fire at the site.
b. Section 9607 Defense Provisions
The introductory language of § 9607(a) states that “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this
section,” persons “covered” under the subsection are strictly liable. Subsection (b), which
is not at issue in this case, affords an affirmative defense to a covered person who can
demonstrate that the damages attributable to the release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance were caused “solely” by an act of God, war, or a third party unrelated to the
covered person. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
In a 1986 amendment to CERCLA codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d), Congress
provided a further defense that is here at issue. Specifically, § 9607(d)(2) states as follows:
No State or local government shall be liable under this subchapter [4] for costs
4
The relevant subchapter, Subchapter I, is entitled “Hazardous Substances Releases,
Liability, Compensation” and spans those sections of CERCLA codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9630.
8
or damages as a result of actions taken in response to an emergency created by
the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance generated by or from
a facility owned by another person. This paragraph shall not preclude liability
for costs or damages as a result of gross negligence or intentional misconduct
by the State or local government. For the purpose of the preceding sentence,
reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct shall constitute gross negligence.
This subsection is followed by a “Savings provision,” which states that § 9607(d) “shall not
alter the liability of any person covered by the provisions of paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of
subsection (a) of this section with respect to the release or threatened release concerned.”
Id. § 9602(d)(3).
2. Plaintiffs’ Insistence that Defendants Are Liable as “Operators” Under
§ 9607(a)
Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in submitting a verdict sheet to the jury that
failed to ask first whether, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), defendants were “operators” of
the AMW facility at the time of the hazardous materials discharge at issue. They assert that
the trial record compels an affirmative answer to this question as a matter of law. Plaintiffs
further contend that any emergency response by defendants pursuant to § 9607(d)(2) cannot
serve as an affirmative defense to § 9607(a) liability. Neither argument is convincing.
a. Defendants’ Status as “Operators” of the AMW Facility Was
Not Established as a Matter of Law
On the initial appeal of summary judgment in this case, this court identified “a dispute
of fact over whether the Town and Fire Company were ‘operator[s]’ while they were
controlling the premises to extinguish the fire.” AMW Materials Testing v. Town of
Babylon, et al., 187 F. App’x at 27. Noting that in United States v. BestFoods, 524 U.S. 51
9
(1998), the Supreme Court interpreted the term operator broadly as “simply someone who
directs the workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility,” id. at 66, this court
remanded the case for trial of this issue. AMW Materials Testing v. Town of Babylon, et al.,
187 F. App’x at 27-28.
At trial, the district court structured the verdict sheet so that the jury first answered
questions relating to the emergency response defense in § 9607(d)(2). As a result of the
jury’s answers, the question of defendants’ status as operators was never addressed.
Plaintiffs submit that the trial record – more fully developed than the record on summary
judgment – is sufficiently clear to permit the question to be answered in their favor as a
matter of law. We cannot agree.
To explain, we return to the holding in BestFoods. In that case, the Supreme Court
dismissed as “tautolog[ical]” and “useless[]” CERCLA’s own definition of “owner or
operator” as “‘any person owning or operating such facility.’” Id. at 56, 66 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii)). Construing the phrase for itself, the Court concluded that it
reaches broadly to encompass “the facility’s owner, the owner’s parent corporation or
business partner, or even a saboteur who sneaks into the facility at night to discharge its
poisons out of malice.” Id. at 65. With specific reference to the word “operator,” the Court
observed that it means “simply someone who directs the workings of, manages, or conducts
the affairs of a facility.” Id. at 66. Plaintiffs submit that this definition necessarily
encompasses defendants because they had “exclusive control” over the AMW facility at the
10
time of the fire. Appellants’ Br. at 49. Specifically, defendants “controlled and operated the
payloaders, deck guns and tower ladders” used to fight the fire. Id.
Plaintiffs’ argument, however, overlooks the very next sentence in the BestFoods
opinion: “To sharpen the definition for purposes of CERCLA’s concern with environmental
contamination,” the Supreme Court ruled that “an operator must manage, direct, or conduct
operations specifically related to pollution, that is operations having to do with the leakage
or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental
regulations.” Id. at 66-67. This “sharpen[ed]” construction, while sufficiently broad to
extend beyond titular owners and day-to-day operators, nevertheless implies a level of control
over the hazardous substances at issue that is simply not manifested by the evidence in this
case. While defendants controlled firefighting operations at the AMW site, the hazardous
materials at issue were stored in a burning building to which firefighters could not gain safe
entry. These particular circumstances would not permit a conclusion as a matter of law that
defendants had sufficient control over the hazardous materials to “manage, direct, or conduct
operations specifically related to pollution.” Id. at 66.
Nor is a different conclusion warranted by the fact that defendants elected to use
payloaders to remove debris from the building site. Plaintiffs claim that the evidence showed
that hazardous materials were discharged in the removal process. We note that, in fact,
plaintiffs’ witnesses testified only to such a possibility. Considerable evidence indicated that
any discharge of hazardous materials occurred prior to the removal operations. In any event,
11
plaintiffs adduced no evidence demonstrating that defendants’ removal actions were
“specifically related to pollution” or to the disposal of hazardous materials. Id. at 66-67
(emphasis added). Rather, uncontroverted evidence showed that the payloader operations
were specifically related to putting out a fire, a task that incidentally required the removal of
debris from the building collapse. On these facts, we reject plaintiffs’ argument that
defendants were operators of the AMW facility as a matter of law. Indeed, we are doubtful
that any reasonable jury could have made an operator finding on the trial record.5
b. Section 9607(d)(2) Provides a Defense to § 9607(a) Claims
Plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in construing § 9607(d)(2) as a defense to
§ 9607(a) liability. In any event, they submit that the verdict sheet on this point is flawed,
and that the errors are not cured by the district court’s independent findings of fact because
they were entitled to a jury trial on this issue.
(1) Construing the Statutory Scheme
Plaintiffs submit that § 9607(d)(2) cannot be construed as a defense to § 9607(a)
liability without depriving the § 9607(d)(3) savings provision of meaning in contravention
of well-settled canons of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall
Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004) (noting that Court is “loath” to “render part of [a]
statute entirely superfluous”). Because this objection was preserved in the district court, our
5
Because defendants did not make this argument on appeal, we need not decide the
question, particularly as we identify other grounds to affirm the judgment in their favor on
the CERCLA claims in the next section of this opinion.
12
review is de novo. See Boyce v. Soundview Tech. Group, Inc., 464 F.3d 376, 390 (2d Cir.
2006) (“When a party challenges a court’s jury charge, this Court reviews the jury
instructions de novo and as a whole.”). On such review, we conclude that plaintiffs’
challenge is without merit.
We begin, as we must, with the plain text of the statute. See New York ex rel. N.Y.
State Office of Children & Family Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Admin.
for Children & Families, 556 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2009). The first sentence of § 9607(d)(2)
commands that “[n]o State or local government shall be liable under this subchapter” if it is
responding to the type of emergency defined in the provision, unless the alleged damages are
the result of gross negligence or intentional misconduct. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2). On its
face, the scope of this provision is unambiguous and unequivocal and permits no limitations
beyond those provided in the text.
Plaintiffs contend that § 9607(d)(3) provides such a textual limitation. They submit
that the statement that subsection (d) “shall not alter the liability of any person covered by
the provisions of paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (a) of this section with respect
to the release or threatened release concerned” precludes any application of the § 9607(d)(2)
defense to persons covered by § 9607(a). Defendants counter that § 9607(d)(3) is properly
construed to preserve § 9607(a) liability for states and local governments except in the
emergency circumstances referenced in § 9607(d)(2). CERCLA’s structure supports
defendants’ reading of § 9607(d)(3) and precludes plaintiffs’. See generally Conroy v.
13
Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 515 (1993) (“[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not,
depends on context.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Three provisions of CERCLA establish cost-shifting liability: §§ 9607(a), 9613(f)(1),
and 9613(f)(3). See supra at [7]. Clearly, § 9607(d)(2) must preclude state and municipal
liability under at least one of these provisions. A contrary interpretation would impermissibly
deprive § 9607(d)(2) of all meaning. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S.
at 166. At oral argument, plaintiffs suggested that, to give proper effect to § 9607(d)(3),
§ 9607(d)(2) should be construed to provide an affirmative defense to liability under either
§ 9613(f)(1) or (f)(3), but not to liability under § 9607(a). The argument makes little sense.
First, § 9607(d)(2) refers to “costs or damages.” Significantly, the term “damages” is used
only in § 9607(a), and not in § 9613(f)(1) or § 9613(f)(3). 6 The
6
Section 9607 provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest rate;
“comparable maturity” date
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section –
...
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed of . . . shall be liable for –
...
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing
such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a
14
release.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (emphasis added).
Section 9613 provides in relevant part as follows:
(f) Contribution
(1) Contribution
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who
is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title,
during or following any civil action under section 9606 of this
title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be
brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In
resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection
shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for
contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606
of this title or section 9607 of this title.
...
(3) Persons not party to settlement
(A) If the United States or a State has obtained less than
complete relief from a person who has resolved its
liability to the United States or the State in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement, the
United States or the State may bring an action against
any person who has not so resolved its liability.
(B) A person who has resolved its liability to the United
States or a State for some or all of a response action or
for some or all of the costs of such action in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek
contribution from any person who is not party to a
15
use of the term thus appears to signal Congress’s intent to link the defense provided in
subparagraph (d)(2) to the injuries described in subparagraph (a). Second, all liability for
response actions under CERCLA originates with § 9607(a). Section 9613(f)(1) provides in
relevant part that a “person may seek contribution from any person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (emphasis
added). Section 9613(f)(3) then provides that a party that has resolved its liability to the
United States for some or all of the costs of a “response action” may seek contribution,
presumably under § 9613(f)(1), from a person who is not a party to the settlement. Id.
§ 9613(f)(3)(B). Given that § 9613(f) liability thus derives from § 9607(a), we discern no
basis in the statutory scheme for concluding that Congress intended to provide states and
municipalities with a defense only to claims arising under the former but not the latter
statute.7 Rather, we conclude that § 9607(d)(2) provides an affirmative defense to all three
settlement referred to in paragraph (2).
(C) In any action under this paragraph, the rights of any
person who has resolved its liability to the United States
or a State shall be subordinate to the rights of the United
States or the State. Any contribution action brought
under this paragraph shall be governed by Federal law.
Id. § 9613(f).
7
Indeed, such a selective application of § 9607(d)(2) would mean that plaintiffs could
seek costs and damages from state or municipal defendants providing emergency responses
under § 9607(a), but could not seek contribution from such defendants under § 9613(f)(1)
“during or following any civil action under . . . section 9607(a),” even where the underlying
acts giving rise to liability are identical. See generally Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs.,
Inc., 543 U.S. at 165-68 (construing § 9613(f)(1)). We decline to adopt an interpretation of
16
cost-shifting provisions, which is further consistent with the expansive (d)(2) reference to all
of Subchapter I. See supra n.4.
Construing § 9607(d)(2) as an affirmative defense to a § 9607(a) claim does not
deprive § 9607(d)(3) of all meaning, as plaintiffs contend. Sections 9607(d)(2) and
9607(d)(3) together make clear that state and local governments cannot avoid § 9607(a)
liability for hazardous material releases that occur in the course of responses to emergencies
at sites they own. Similarly, state and local governments remain liable under § 9607(a) for
costs or damages caused by their gross negligence or intentional misconduct in responding
to emergencies. Finally, § 9607(d)(3) clarifies that state and local governments remain liable
under § 9607(a) for actions other than those involving emergency responses. This last
conclusion is consistent with the only case we have identified that specifically discusses
§ 9607(d)(3): United States v. Stringfellow, No. 83-cv-2501, 1993 WL 565393, at *130
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 1993).8 Stringfellow rejected a claim of § 9607(d)(2) immunity because
the state had taken numerous actions that went beyond the emergency response defined in
§ 9607(d)(2) that would premise its application solely on the timing of the plaintiffs’ claims
against state or municipal defendants.
8
The cited opinion was authored by a special master whose findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendations were adopted by the district court two years later
in United States v. Stringfellow, No. 83-cv-2501, 1995 WL 450856, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24,
1995). One other case cites to, but does not discuss, the § 9607(d)(3) savings provision. See
United States v. Berks Assocs., Inc., No. 91-cv-4868, 1992 WL 68346 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1,
1992).
17
the statute. See id.9 The opinion concluded that, “under § 9607(d)(3), the State, as an
otherwise liable party, is not entitled to exoneration under § 9607(d)(2).” Id. (emphasis
added). In short, Stringfellow interpreted § 9607(d)(3) as preserving state and local
government liability under § 9607(a) for acts other than those covered by § 9607(d)(2). We
here do the same.
This interpretation of the savings provision – preserving state and local government
liability under § 9607(a) for all acts other than the emergency responses specifically covered
by § 9607(d)(2) – is not only consistent with the structure of the statute, but also supported
by CERCLA’s legislative history. The House Conference Report notes that the savings
provision “clarifies that this subsection [i.e., § 9607(d)(2)] does not apply to or alter the
liability of any potentially responsible party who is otherwise covered by section [9607(a)].”
See H.R. C ONF. R EP. 99-962, 204, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3297 (emphasis
added).
The introductory language of § 9607(a) warrants no different conclusion. As
discussed earlier, § 9607(a) begins by stating that its definition of covered persons and the
scope of their liability applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and
9
Specifically, the state “select[ed], investigat[ed], design[ed], and supervis[ed]
construction of the Site.” United States v. Stringfellow, 1993 WL 565393, at *130. It also
“overs[aw] Stringfellow’s operation of the Site, operat[ed] the Site after Mr. Stringfellow
closed it . . . , and arrang[ed] for disposal of hazardous substances at the Site after closure.”
Id. Finally, the state conducted a “controlled release” of hazardous materials from the site.
Id.
18
subject only to the defenses set forth in [§ 9607](b).” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The amendment
history, however, demonstrates that Congress did not employ this language to nullify the
defense provided in § 9607(d)(2). See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 147
(1995) (relying on amendment history to discern Congress’s intent). The introductory
language in § 9607(a) was enacted in 1980 as part of CERCLA. See Pub. L. No. 96-510,
§ 107(a), 94 Stat. 2767, 2781 (1980). Congress added the § 9607(d)(2) affirmative defense
in a 1986 amendment to CERCLA. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1629. As the
Supreme Court has explained, “a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should
control our construction of the earlier statute, even though it has not been expressly
amended.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000)
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). In accordance with this authority, we
conclude that Congress’s 1986 policy decision to confer immunity on emergency responders
(except in cases of gross negligence or intentional misconduct), as embodied in § 9607(d)(2),
takes precedence over the 1980 introduction to § 9607(a), even though the latter was not
specifically amended in 1986.
We further note that our interpretation of § 9607(d)(2) as an affirmative defense to
a § 9607(a) claim finds support in the decisions of our sister circuits. The courts of appeals
that have interpreted § 9607(d)(2) have treated that subparagraph as granting immunity to
state and local governments providing emergency responses without reference to the savings
provision in § 9607(d)(3). See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 61 (1st Cir. 2001)
19
(“According to the plain language of § 9607(d)(2), state and local governments are immune
except in cases where their handling of the waste amounts to ‘gross negligence or intentional
misconduct.’”); United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that state department escapes § 9607(a) liability “because its actions were taken in
response to the Act’s environmental emergency provision”), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. BestFoods, 524 U.S. 51; FMC Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 29
F.3d 833, 841 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Although CERCLA permits the imposition of liability on
states and local governments for cleanup costs, section [9607](d)(2) expressly immunizes
them from liability for actions ‘taken in response to an emergency created by the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance generated by or from a facility owned by another
person.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2)); see also East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Commerce, 142 F.3d 479, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting in dicta that § 9607(d)(2) “gives
state and local governments a partial defense against claims arising from their emergency
remediation efforts, limiting their liability to cases of gross negligence or intentional
misconduct”). In dicta, we too have previously observed that “where a municipality acts in
response to an emergency caused by the release of hazardous substances from a facility
owned by another party and does not act with gross negligence or willful misconduct,
§ 9607(d)(2), no liability attaches.” B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1199 (2d
Cir. 1992). Moreover, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., the Supreme Court cited
§ 9607(d)(2) and noted that both states and local governments “enjoy special exemptions
20
from liability under CERCLA” pursuant to that subparagraph. 491 U.S. 1, 13 (1989),
overruled on other grounds by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). In
contrast to this well-established line of cases, we are unaware of any precedent supporting
plaintiffs’ reading of the § 9607(d)(3) savings provision to preclude a § 9607(d)(2) defense
to a § 9607(a) claim.
In sum, we conclude that Congress intended the § 9607(d)(3) savings provision to
preserve state and municipal liability under CERCLA except with respect to emergency
response actions falling within the scope of § 9607(d)(2). Consequently, in accord with the
plain language of the statute, the great weight of authority, and the legislative history, we
reject plaintiffs’ construction of the savings provision, and we conclude that § 9607(d)(2)
provides an affirmative defense to a § 9607(a) claim for actions taken by a state or local
government in response to an “emergency created by the release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance generated by or from a facility owned by another person.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(d)(2). We discern no error in the jury instructions to the extent they reflect this
understanding. Nor do we identify error in the court’s own consideration of whether the facts
established a § 9607(d)(2) defense.
(2) Plaintiffs’ Challenge to the Verdict Sheet
Because we reject plaintiffs’ argument that a § 9607(d)(2) defense is unavailable on
a § 9607(a) claim, we necessarily reject their related challenge to the inclusion of questions
about this defense on the verdict sheet. We nevertheless identify certain concerns about how
21
the questions were posed.
The verdict sheet asked the jury four identical CERCLA-related questions for each
of the two municipal defendants: questions one though four related to the Fire Company10
10
The questions pertaining to the Fire Company were as follows:
1. Did the defendants prove that the defendant North Amityville Fire Company was
taking action “in response to an emergency created by the release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance”?
YES _______ NO _______
If your answer to question 1 is “YES,” please answer question 2.
If your answer to question 1 is “NO,” you have found a verdict in favor of the
defendant North Amityville Fire District in the first Federal CERCLA cause of action.
Please proceed to question 3.
2. Did the plaintiffs prove that in its actions at the scene of the fire, the defendant North
Amityville Fire Company acted with gross negligence or intentional misconduct?
YES _______ NO _______
If your answer to question 2 is “YES,” you have found a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs AMW Materials Testing and Anthony Antoniou against the defendant North
Amityville Fire Company in the First Federal CERCLA cause of action. In that event,
please proceed to question 5.
If your answer to question 2 is “NO,” you have found a verdict in favor of the
defendant North Amityville Fire Compay in the first CERCLA cause of action.
Please proceed to question 3.
3. Did the plaintiffs prove that some time during its presence at the scene of the fire, the
defendant North Amityville Fire Company was not taking action “in response to an
emergency created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance”?
YES _______ NO _______
22
and questions five through eight related to the Town of Babylon. 1 1
If your answer to question 3 is “YES,” please answer question 4.
If your answer to question 3 is “NO,” you have found a verdict in favor of the
defendant North Amityville Fire Company in the Second Federal CERCLA cause of
action. Please proceed to question 5.
4. Did the plaintiffs prove that the defendant North Amityville Fire Company was an
“operator” of the AMW Materials Testing facility, as the Court defined that term for
you?
YES _______ NO _______
If your answer to question 4 is “YES,” you have found a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant North Amityville Fire Company in the Second
Federal CERCLA cause of action. Please proceed to question 5.
If your answer to question 4 is “NO,” you have found a verdict in favor of the
defendant North Amityville Fire Company in the Second Federal CERCLA cause of
action. Please proceed to question 5.
Verdict Sheet at 1-3 (first and second emphases added, third in original).
11
The questions pertaining to the Town of Babylon were as follows:
5. Did the defendants prove that the defendant Town of Babylon was taking action “in
response to an emergency created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance”?
YES _______ NO _______
If your answer to question 5 is “YES,” please answer question 6.
If your answer to question 5 is “NO,” you have found a verdict in favor of the
defendant North Amityville Fire District [sic] in the first Federal CERCLA cause of
action. Please proceed to question 7.
6. Did the plaintiffs prove that in its actions at the scene of the fire the defendant Town
of Babylon acted with gross negligence or intentional misconduct?
YES _______ NO _______
23
It appears that, at least as to questions one and five, plaintiffs objected to the verdict sheet
with the specificity required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. We therefore review those challenges de
If your answer to question 6 is “YES,” you have found a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs AMW Materials Testing and Anthony Antoniou against the defendant Town
of Babylon in the first Federal CERCLA cause of action. In that event, please
proceed to instructions preceding question 9.
If your answer to question 6 is “NO,” you have found a verdict in favor of the
defendant Town of Babylon in the first CERCLA cause of action. Please proceed to
question 7.
7. Did the plaintiffs prove that some time during its presence at the scene of the fire, the
defendant Town of Babylon was not taking action “in response to an emergency
created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance”?
YES _______ NO _______
If your answer to question 7 is “YES,” please answer question 8.
If your answer to question 7 is “NO,” you have found a verdict in favor of the
defendant Town of Babylon in the Second Federal CERCLA cause of action. Please
proceed to the instructions preceding question 9.
8. Did the plaintiffs prove that the defendant Town of Babylon was an “operator of” the
AMW Materials Testing facility, as the Court defined that term for you?
YES _______ NO _______
If your answer to question 8 is “YES,” you have found a verdict in favor of plaintiffs
and against the defendant Town of Babylon in the Second Federal CERCLA cause
of action. Please proceed to the instructions preceding question 9.
If your answer to question 8 is “NO,” you have found a verdict in favor of the
defendant Town of Babylon in the second Federal CERCLA cause of action. Please
proceed to the instructions preceding question 9.
Verdict Sheet at 3-5 (first and second emphases added, third in original).
24
novo. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd’s & Cos., 241 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2001).
Questions one and five incorrectly instructed the jury that a negative answer to the
emergency response inquiry would result in a verdict for defendants. In fact, a jury finding
that defendants were not responding to an emergency as defined in § 9607(d)(2) would mean
that defendants were not entitled to the (d)(2) affirmative defense. The concern raised by the
identified error is not merely hypothetical because the jury in fact answered “NO” to question
one (pertaining to the Fire Company), not reaching question two. By contrast, the jury
answered “YES” to question five (pertaining to the Town of Babylon) and “NO” to question
six, which asked whether plaintiffs had proved that the defendant acted with gross negligence
or intentional misconduct at the scene of the fire. As a result, the verdict sheet suggests a
jury determination that the Fire Company was not entitled to the § 9607(d)(2) defense, but
that the Town of Babylon was entitled to the defense. Given that the Town responded to the
fire principally through the Fire Company, a question arises as to how these seemingly
inconsistent answers might be harmonized.12
Further concerns are raised by questions three, four, seven, and eight, which focused
on the possibility that defendants’ actions after they arrived at the scene were not all part of
an emergency response. Unlike questions one and five, however, questions three and seven
placed the burden on plaintiffs to disprove the (d)(2) defense. In light of our earlier
12
Indeed, confusion in the jury response is amplified by the mistaken reference to the
Fire District in the instructive language following question five.
25
discussion of this affirmative defense in Part II.A.2, this burden assignment was improper,
making the jury’s negative responses to questions three and seven unreliable as a basis for
a judgment in favor of defendants.
As already noted, however, the challenged judgment was not based on these findings.
The district court treated the jury’s CERCLA responses as only advisory, and itself made
independent findings of fact and conclusions of law. Accordingly, we proceed to consider
plaintiffs’ argument that the challenged judgment was entered in violation of their Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury.
(3) Plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment Challenge
The Seventh Amendment affords a right to trial by jury in civil cases arising in law
rather than equity. See U.S. Const. amend. VII; City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708-09 (1999) (observing that Amendment requires jury trials
in actions analogous to suits at common law “‘in which legal rights were to be ascertained
and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized,
and equitable remedies were administered’” (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
433, 447 (1830) (Story, J.))). The district court concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled
to a jury trial on their § 9607(a) claims (or defenses related thereto) because the relief sought,
restitution, was grounded in equity rather than law. Because plaintiffs’ objection to this
ruling was preserved below, we review the district court’s decision de novo. See Merrill
Lynch & Co., Inc. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that
26
“resolution[s] of legal questions, including jurisdiction and the right to a jury trial, are subject
to de novo review”).
Courts that have considered the right to a jury trial under § 9607(a) have concluded
that the section provides for restitution, that restitution is an equitable remedy to be
determined by a court, and that a plaintiff therefore has no right to a jury trial on a § 9607(a)
claim. See, e.g., Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 59 F.3d 400, 414 (3d Cir. 1995); United
States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), aff’g United States v.
Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F. Supp. 1410, 1413 (W.D. Mich. 1988); United States v. Ne.
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 749 (8th Cir. 1986); see also State of N.Y. v. Lashins
Arcade Co., 91 F.3d 353, 362 n.7 (2d Cir. 1996) (collecting cases and stating in dicta that
district court’s ruling finding right to jury trial under CERCLA “stands alone (so far as we
are aware) in opposition to the overwhelming weight of authority on this issue”).
Each of these cases, however, was decided before the Supreme Court’s discussion of
restitution in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
In Great-West, the Court cautioned that “not all relief falling under the rubric of restitution
is available in equity” because, “[i]n the days of the divided bench, restitution was available
in certain cases at law, and in certain others in equity.” Id. at 212. The Court explained that
a plaintiff could seek restitution at equity “ordinarily in the form of a constructive trust or an
equitable lien, where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the
plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.”
27
Id. at 213. “Thus, for restitution to lie in equity, the action generally must seek not to impose
personal liability on the defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property
in the defendant’s possession.” Id. at 214. By contrast, claims for restitution at law “were
viewed essentially as actions at law for breach of contract (whether the contract was actual
or implied).” Id. at 213. A plaintiff could seek such a remedy through a writ of assumpsit
when “the plaintiff could not assert title or right to possession of particular property, but in
which nevertheless he might be able to show just grounds for recovering money to pay for
some benefit the defendant had received from him.” Id. (emphasis in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Such a claim was legal “because [plaintiff] sought to obtain a
judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of money.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In light of this explication, it is by no means clear that the restitution provided by
§ 9607(a) is equitable, rather than legal, in nature. If we were to conclude pursuant to Great-
West that the Seventh Amendment entitled plaintiffs to a jury trial on their § 9607(a) claim,
we might well remand the case to the district court with instructions (1) to treat the jury’s
responses on the CERCLA claims as binding rather than advisory; and (2) to harmonize the
jury’s findings to the extent they appear inconsistent or, if harmonization is not possible, to
grant a new trial. See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 427 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]f
the answers returned by the jury appear to be inconsistent with one another, it is the duty of
the . . . court to attempt to harmonize the jury’s answers, if it is at all possible under a fair
28
reading of the responses.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In fact, we need not decide the Seventh Amendment question in this case because we
conclude that, even if plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on their CERCLA claims, and
even if the jury responses do not permit harmonization, defendants are, in any event, entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on the trial record. See Neely v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co.,
386 U.S. 317, 322 (1967) (recognizing courts’ authority to enter judgment under Rule 50 on
appeal); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (“[A] court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify,
vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before
it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment,
decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the
circumstances.”).
(4) No Reasonable Jury Could Fail to Find Defendants
Entitled to a § 9607(d)(2) Defense to Plaintiffs’
§ 9607(a) Claims
(a) The § 9607(d)(2) Defense is Triggered by
Objective Proof of Defendants’ Response to an
Emergency Created by the Threatened Release of
Hazardous Materials Without Regard to
Defendants’ Subjective Awareness of that Threat
The trial evidence is overwhelming and undisputed that the emergency to which
defendants responded was created, at least in part, by the threatened release of hazardous
substances stored in the AMW facility. Indeed, plaintiffs concede the objective existence of
such an emergency. See Appellants’ Br. at 56.
29
Plaintiffs nevertheless assert that defendants are not entitled to a § 9607(d)(2) defense
in the absence of proof of their subjective awareness of such an emergency – as opposed to
a routine fire posing no threat of hazardous materials release – at the time of their initial
response. We expect that in many emergency response cases involving CERCLA, the
question of the responders’ initial subjective knowledge of a threatened release of hazardous
substances will not arise because the sole reason for a response is a threatened release. See,
e.g., United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d at 60 (holding municipal government immune under
§ 9607(d)(2) for acts taken in response to emergency posed by private individuals). The
presence of this subjective knowledge in some cases, however, does not support reading the
statute to require it in every case. We identify no basis in the text or structure of the statute
for placing such a subjective burden on defendants. Moreover, plaintiffs point to no case law
supporting such a construction.13
By their nature, emergency situations require quick responses, often before risks are
fully understood. The affirmative defense afforded by § 9607(d)(2) serves to ensure that
13
Plaintiffs point to some record evidence suggesting that, upon first responding to
the AMW fire site, members of the Fire Company did not think they were responding to a
threatened release of hazardous materials. To the extent a focus on the lack of such
subjective knowledge may have informed the jury response to the first question on the jury
sheet, that focus would have been wrong. In any event, any subjective unawareness was
short-lived. The Fire Company Alarm Detail Dispatch for the AMW fire said, “Please Note
Hazardous Materials.” Fire Company Chief Tutt testified that, within a minute of arriving
at the scene of the fire, he called Dispatch to note that there were “a lot of chemicals” on the
scene and to request assistance from the Environmental Protection Agency. Shortly
thereafter, representatives of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
and the Suffolk County Department of Health arrived at the scene.
30
states and municipalities are not dissuaded from responding to emergency situations by the
threat of strict liability under CERCLA. This goal would hardly be served by conditioning
§ 9607(d)(2) immunity on subjective knowledge, thereby encouraging delay in responding
to an emergency while such knowledge was acquired. As the House Report to the 1986
CERCLA amendments notes, § 9607(d)(2) “removes a disincentive for governments to
respond to emergencies covered by CERCLA.” H.R. R EP. 99-253, 73, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2855; see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 49 n.3
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting House Report). With this
understanding of the purpose and history of § 9607(d)(2), we conclude that the proper inquiry
under that section is solely objective, i.e., was the state or local government responding to
an emergency caused by the release or threatened release of hazardous substances. If so, then
regardless of what subjective knowledge the responders had about the hazards at issue when
they first arrived on the scene, their CERCLA liability under § 9607(a) is limited to “gross
negligence or intentional misconduct” in dealing with the emergency. 42 U.S.C
§ 9607(d)(2).
(b) Plaintiffs’ Failure to Prove Gross Negligence or
Intentional Misconduct
Having determined as a matter of law that defendants were in fact responding to an
emergency that threatened a release of hazardous substances, we conclude that plaintiffs’
pursuit of their § 9607(a) claim depended on their proving gross negligence or intentional
misconduct by defendants. The jury specifically found that plaintiffs failed to carry this
31
burden as to the Town of Babylon. Although the jury did not reach this question with respect
to the Fire Company, we conclude that the trial record would not permit any reasonable jury
to find that the costs or damages plaintiffs incurred in dealing with the hazardous materials
release were a result of gross negligence or intentional misconduct by the Fire Company.
Section 9607(d)(2) defines “gross negligence” as “reckless, willful, or wanton
misconduct.” This comports with the common law definition of gross negligence as
“conduct that evinces a reckless disregard for the rights of others or smacks of intentional
wrongdoing.” Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 13 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (applying standard and stating that rules establishing cause of action for gross
negligence are “well-settled under New York law”); Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 79
N.Y.2d 540, 554, 583 N.Y.S.2d 957, 963 (1992) (applying same standard). Indeed, this court
has identified “reckless conduct” as that which “generally imports the concept of heedless
indifference to consequences to another,” Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 985 (2d Cir.
1991), and as “conduct which is highly unreasonable and which represents an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care . . . to the extent that the danger was either
known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it,” Rolf
v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (internal quotation marks
omitted); accord Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 269 (1996); see also Saarinen v. Kerr,
84 N.Y.2d 494, 501, 620 N.Y.S.2d 297, 300 (1994) (holding that a standard of “reckless
disregard for the safety of others” required evidence that defendant had engaged in conduct
32
“of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as
to make it highly probable that harm would follow and ha[d] done so with conscious
indifference to the outcome” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Although plaintiffs adduced some evidence questioning particular decisions made by
the Fire Company in fighting the blaze at the AMW facility, they do not argue on appeal that
the decisions manifested gross negligence, nor could they in light of evidence that the
decisions, far from representing “an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care,”
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d at 47, fell well within industry standards, see
Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d at 269 (noting that facts alleged to support recklessness
must be “strong circumstantial evidence” of that recklessness (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Instead, they argue that defendants’ alleged violation of the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (“OSHA”) regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120, requiring training
for persons engaged in hazardous substance operations, demonstrates defendants’ gross
negligence or intentional misconduct. The argument merits little discussion.
Section 1910.120 is meant to ensure the safety of employees engaged in operations
at hazardous waste sites, see id. § 1910.120(a)(1)(i)-(iii); at hazardous waste treatment,
storage, or disposal facilities, see id. § 1910.120(a)(1)(iv); and at the site of an emergency
response to the release, or threatened release of hazardous substances, see id. at
§ 1910.120(a)(1)(v). See generally Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88,
96 (1992) (observing that OSHA regulations were promulgated in furtherance of Congress’s
33
intent “‘to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions’” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 651(b))). It says nothing about
protecting owners from property damage caused by untrained workers. Assuming without
deciding that a factfinder could have concluded that the Fire Company failed to comply with
OSHA training requirements meant to promote employee safety, some further evidence was
necessary to demonstrate that the failure manifested intentional misconduct toward plaintiffs
or so “extreme [a] departure from the standards of ordinary care” as to constitute gross
negligence. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d at 47. Moreover, some further
evidence was necessary to link defendants’ intentional misconduct or gross negligence to the
costs or damages for which plaintiffs sought compensation. Indeed, the trial court so
instructed the jury, without objection:
The plaintiffs claim that the defendants violated certain OSHA regulations.
That’s up to you to determine whether they proved that by a preponderance of
the evidence. If you find that the defendants violated these OSHA regulations
that apply to this case, you may consider the violation as some evidence of
negligence along with other evidence in the case, provided that such violation
was a substantial factor in causing damages. However, if you find that the
plaintiffs proved such a violation of OSHA regulations, it is not conclusive.
It is only some evidence of negligence.
Trial Tr. at 2273 (emphasis added). Because such further evidence is lacking from the trial
record, we conclude that the § 9607(d)(2) defense was established as a matter of law in this
case, and that judgment on the CERCLA claims was properly entered in favor of defendants.
34
B. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims
1. Negligence
Plaintiffs submit that the judgment in favor of defendants on their negligence claim
is infected by an error in the district court’s jury instructions regarding the “special
relationship” giving rise to a municipal duty in tort. See Pelaez v. Seide, 2 N.Y.3d 186, 198-
99, 778 N.Y.S.2d 111, 117 (2004). Because plaintiffs failed to object to this part of the
charge at trial, our review is limited to fundamental error.14 SCS Commc’ns, Inc. v. Herrick
Co., Inc., 360 F.3d 329, 343 (2d Cir. 2004). In fact, we identify no error in the court’s
instructions.
In Pelaez v. Seide, 2 N.Y.3d at 198-202, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 116-19, the New York Court
of Appeals held that, in determining whether a municipality has voluntarily assumed a duty,
the breach of which gives rise to tort liability, a factfinder must consider four factors set forth
in Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (1987). The
Court of Appeals explained:
Most of our municipal special relationship cases have centered on whether a
municipality has assumed an affirmative duty that generated justifiable
14
At the first trial, the district court explained that “in order to prove that [plaintiffs]
had a special relationship with the Town of Babylon or the North Amityville Fire Company,
the plaintiffs must show, must prove, the following factors. And I go through the four Cuffy
factors. Yes?” Trial 1 Tr. at 2746-47. The district court continued, “However, if the plaintiff
proves the four factors that are set forth in Cuffy, then there could be liability, and that’s what
I’m going to charge the jury.” Id. at 2747-48. Plaintiffs did not object at any time during this
discussion, and the district court’s instructions to the jury at the second trial were consistent
with these observations.
35
reliance by the plaintiff. We laid out the test in Cuffy v. City of New York . . . .
It requires (1) an assumption by a municipality, through promises or actions,
of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the injured party; (2) knowledge on
the part of a municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some
form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party;
and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative
undertaking.
Pelaez v. Seide, 2 N.Y.3d at 202, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 119. This is precisely the approach the
district court adopted in its jury instruction. See Trial Tr. at 3567-68. Accordingly, because
we identify no error, let alone fundamental error, in the court’s charge, we affirm the
negligence judgment in favor of defendants.
2. New York Navigation Law
Plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in denying their motion for judgment as a
matter of law or a new trial on their New York Navigation Law claim for a petroleum
discharge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, 59. Where, as here, a jury has deliberated in a case and
actually returned its verdict, a district court may set aside the verdict pursuant to Rule 50 only
where there is “such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury’s
findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or there is such an
overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded
men could not arrive at a verdict against him.” Cross v. New York City Transit Auth., 417
F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2005) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Although
we review the district court’s denial of a Rule 50 motion de novo, we are bound by the same
stern standards.” Id. A district court may grant a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 even when
36
there is evidence to support the jury’s verdict, so long as the court “determines that, in its
independent judgment, the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or its verdict is a
miscarriage of justice.” Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 392 (2d Cir. 2005)
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The standard for ordering a new trial is
therefore somewhat less stern than that for entering judgment as a matter of law, but our
review of a district court’s disposition of a Rule 59 motion is more deferential, and we will
not reverse except for abuse of discretion. Id.
New York law holds “[a]ny person who has discharged petroleum . . . strictly liable,
without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs and all direct and indirect damages,
no matter by whom sustained, as defined in this section.” N.Y. Nav. Law § 181(1). Plaintiffs
argue that there was “not a scintilla of evidence” to support the jury’s finding that defendants
did not discharge petroleum in the course of fighting the AMW fire. Appellants Br. at 66.
The record is to the contrary. Notably, defendants’ expert Andrew Barber testified that none
of the data collected on the night of the fire indicated a release of petroleum. Indeed, Barber
testified that a fire as large as the one at the AMW facility would likely have consumed any
petroleum on the site. Barber further testified that the oil-soaked soil behind the AMW
warehouse did not necessarily point to a petroleum release during the fire because that site
involved a “dry well that probably hadn’t been cleaned out in some period of time.” Trial Tr.
at 2802. Similarly, Nick Acampora, a New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation spill inspector who responded to the fire, testified that he did not recall seeing,
37
nor did his contemporaneous notes mention, a “petroleum sheen” on any of the runoff water
from the fire. Id. at 1775. He testified that observation of any such sheen would have been
sufficiently important to include in his report. Janet Gremli, a Suffolk County Department of
Health employee who responded to the fire, testified that she had no recollection of a
petroleum sheen on any of the runoff water. Assuming as we must that this testimony was
credited by the jury, it suffices to support a verdict in favor of defendants on the Navigation
Law claim and the denial of plaintiffs’ motion to enter judgment in their favor or to grant a
new trial.
In further support of their new trial motion on the Navigation Law claim, plaintiffs
submit that they were denied a fair trial by defendants’ display to the jury, during summation,
of documents not in evidence purportedly supporting their argument that no petroleum was
discharged. The district court specifically instructed the jury that the documents had not been
received in evidence and were not to be considered during deliberations. The law recognizes
a strong presumption that juries follow such limiting instructions unless there is an
overwhelming probability of their inability to do so. See, e.g., United States v. Snype, 441
F.3d 119, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2006) (collecting cases). This case poses no such probability.
Although plaintiffs now complain that the court’s instruction was deficient in various respects,
because they voiced no such objection before the jury began its deliberations, our review is
limited to fundamental error, and we identify none in this case. See SCS Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Herrick Co., Inc., 360 F.3d at 343. Accordingly, we identify no merit in this part of
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plaintiffs’ new trial argument.
III. Conclusion
To summarize, we conclude as follows:
(1) Section 9607(d)(2) of Title 42 is an affirmative defense to CERCLA liability
under § 9607(a), and, accordingly, the district court did not err in treating it as such;
(2) Whether the § 9607(a) claims in this case were properly tried to a jury or to the
court, on the trial record no reasonable factfinder could decline to find that defendants are
entitled to the affirmative defense set forth in § 9607(d)(2);
(3) The district court properly referenced the factors set forth in Cuffy v. City of New
York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (1987), in charging the jury as to plaintiffs’
theory of defendants’ municipal liability for negligence under New York law.
(4) The district court properly denied plaintiffs’ motion for judgment as a matter of
law or a new trial on their claim for the discharge of petroleum under N.Y. Nav. Law
§ 181(1).
Accordingly, the judgment in favor of defendants is hereby A FFIRMED.
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