IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0123
Filed November 13, 2014
ANTHONY LAWSON,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George L.
Stigler, Judge.
Anthony Lawson appeals the district court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Katie Fiala, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Kimberly Griffith, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
2
VOGEL, P.J.
Anthony Lawson appeals the district court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief. Lawson asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge the voluntariness of his guilty plea and for failing to pursue a motion to
suppress. He further argues the postconviction court applied the incorrect legal
analysis when adjudicating his claims and, to the extent error was not preserved,
postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to assert the ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claims under the correct standard. We conclude that,
though Lawson did not preserve error regarding his claim that the district court
used the improper standard, Lawson nonetheless failed to carry his burden
showing postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to do so.
Consequently, we affirm the district court’s denial of Lawson’s application for
postconviction relief.
On December 9, 2011, Lawson attacked his live-in girlfriend with a knife
while two minor children were present in the home. This was the second time he
physically assaulted the victim that day. The second attack resulted in severe
lacerations to the victim’s wrists and chest, as well as injuries to the areas of her
body where he kicked her. Lawson was charged by two trial informations with
numerous offenses, which included one class “C” and one class “D” felony, as
well as six aggravated and two serious misdemeanors. On February 29, 2012,
Lawson pleaded guilty to pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970), to willful injury, going armed with intent, first-degree harassment,
domestic abuse assault by use of a dangerous weapon, two counts of child
endangerment, domestic abuse assault with intent to cause serious injury, and
3
domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury. The court imposed a sentence that
resulted in a total of ten years from the pleas stemming from the first trial
information and two years from the second trial information, the terms to run
consecutively. Lawson did not directly appeal his convictions and sentence.
On August 26, 2013, Lawson filed a pro se application for postconviction
relief, which alleged: (1) the police conducted an illegal search and seizure of the
victim’s home; (2) trial counsel failed to file pretrial motions; (3) no factual basis
existed supporting his Alford plea; and (4) various convictions should be merged.
On October 10, 2013, postconviction counsel amended Lawson’s application,
claiming that trial counsel was ineffective because: (1) counsel withdrew a
pending motion to suppress; (2) no deposition was taken of the victim, who made
inconsistent statements; (3) counsel was too involved in another murder case;
and (4) counsel coerced Lawson into taking the plea. Following a hearing, the
district court denied Lawson’s application, and Lawson appeals.
We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v.
Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006). To succeed on this claim, the
defendant must show, first, that counsel breached an essential duty, and,
second, that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure. Id. The claimant bears the
burden of showing both prongs by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). To the extent we are
addressing whether the district court employed the proper legal standard, we
review those claims for correction of errors at law. See DeVoss v. State, 648
N.W.2d 56, 60 (Iowa 2002).
4
Lawson argues the district court’s ruling indicated it did not consider
whether “trial counsel breached a duty in advance of the guilty plea that rendered
the plea involuntary or unintelligent,” in violation of Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d
789, 793 (Iowa 2011). See also State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 642 (Iowa
2009) (holding the applicant is required to show trial counsel was ineffective
before the plea is entered, and the ineffective assistance rendered the plea
involuntary and unintelligent). Specifically, Lawson claims that if the court had
properly applied Castro, it would have concluded the pre-plea actions of trial
counsel rendered the plea involuntary and unintelligent because Lawson was
“coerced” into pleading guilty and because trial counsel withdrew the motion to
suppress. Lawson then argues in the alternative that if we conclude error was
not preserved, postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the
issues.
We agree with the State that, because Lawson did not present the
improper-standard argument during the hearing or in a post-trial motion, he did
not preserve this claim for appellate review. See Lamasters v. State, 821
N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012) (noting that the party must raise the issue before
the district court, which must then consider and rule on the issue, in order for
error to be preserved). However, Lawson has failed to carry his burden showing
postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the arguments he now
presents on appeal.
Lawson is correct in his assertion that if trial counsel’s performance is
ineffective to the extent it resulted in the plea being involuntary and unintelligent,
“all categories of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims can potentially survive
5
a guilty plea.” Carroll, 767 N.W.2d at 644. However, to demonstrate prejudice,
Lawson must show he would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel’s
ineffectiveness. See id. At the postconviction hearing, when asked whether she
believed Lawson understood the nature of the plea and whether he was facing
eighty years, trial counsel testified that:
I don’t remember how much time he was actually looking at. I know
there were discussions regarding whether or not he would be
charged with attempted murder. I am not sure where he got that
number 80, but, no I fully believe he knew what he was doing and
was certainly competent to make the decision. We repeatedly had
discussions on and off the record that day to make sure that
everything was very clear to him. Pleading guilty and accepting
that plea was, in my estimation, what he wanted.
Trial counsel further testified regarding Lawson’s state of mind in the following
exchange:
Q: And so who is the—who is the one that made the
decision to plead guilty? A: That was completely Mr. Lawson’s
decision.
Q: You had filed a motion to suppress also? A: Correct.
Q: You had withdrawn that when he decided he wanted to
plead? A: Correct.
Q: And then he had sent you a letter asking that you not be
his attorney anymore or expressing some feelings in that regard?
A: I can’t—let me look at this here. Yes. He actually was a fairly
prolific writer and wrote several letters expressing various degrees
of displeasure over a number of things not related to my
representation, but many things and he had indicated that he
wanted new counsel in early January I believe and we addressed
that when I visited with him. He decided he didn’t want to pursue
that. It’s my understanding he never wrote to the court requesting
new counsel. But I brought it up at the time of plea and sentence
just to make sure that he had the opportunity to talk about it at that
time if he—that was still something he wanted to do. That was
about, probably close to two months later.1
1
On the record the district court noted it found trial counsel’s testimony to be more
credible than that of Lawson’s.
6
Lawson also presented testimony during the hearing. He complained of
trial counsel’s performance in the following manner:
She had said that I agreed and was happy with everything. I
wasn’t. When we entered the courtroom, she—I was like, I just
want to go to the speedy trial. She is like, Well, I am telling you if
you don’t plead on this, they’re not going to give you another deal.
You are going to get 80-some years. I am like, I didn’t do it. [The
victim] got jumped. She’s like, Well, if you don’t do it, they’re going
to—I thought the speedy trial had—had a certain time and then I go
to the court date. She said they was [sic] going to cancel that and
make another court at a time. I was like I thought you couldn’t
cancel the speedy trial. She said yeah, they can. She is like, I’m
telling you this is the last deal they are going to give you and if I
was you I would go with that. I didn’t want to do it. I kept on
hesitating. I looked at the judge like what should I do? He looking
at me and I told her that I wasn’t happy on what she was doing. I
even wrote her a letter saying that I wanted her to go ahead with
the property, to get everything submitted, for the warrantless entry.
She wrote me a letter saying that they’re not going to give me that
because of what was said and everything. I never sat up there and
told her that I did that. That I did the crime. Not once. She just
said that I told her that. I never told her I did that. Ever. I don’t
believe she sat and—I told her that I stabbed that girl and beat her
up. I never not once told her that.
This testimony does not support Lawson’s argument he was coerced into
the plea, and, other than Lawson’s bare assertion that he was unhappy with
counsel’s performance, no other evidence shows Lawson’s plea was entered into
involuntarily or unintelligently. Rather, the transcript of the plea hearing
demonstrates Lawson understood and accepted the consequences of his guilty
plea. Trial counsel’s testimony at the postconviction hearing also supported this
conclusion. Specifically, after a lengthy discussion regarding the plea agreement
and likely sentence to be imposed, as well as the role the parole board would
serve, the following record was made at the plea hearing:
The Court: All right. Are you cleared up now after talking to
[trial counsel]? Defendant: Yeah.
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The Court: And do you want to accept the plea offer that’s
been offered by the state? Defendant: Yeah.
The Court: Has anyone made any threats to you or promises
to you to get you to come in here and plead guilty? Defendant: No.
The Court: Are you doing this voluntarily and of your own
free will? Defendant: Yeah.
The Court: Are you doing this because you’re satisfied that it
is in your best interests to do this? Defendant: Yeah.
....
The Court: And do you agree that if your cases were to go to
trial that there’s a strong likelihood that you would be convicted?
Defendant: Yeah.
The Court: And then are you balancing that, the risks
associated with going to trial against the benefits that you’d get
under this agreement? Defendant: Right.
....
The Court: Are you satisfied with the services [your attorney]
has provided for you? Defendant: Yes.
Given this record, we conclude postconviction counsel was not ineffective
for failing to further Lawson’s claim that he was coerced into taking the plea
within the Castro framework.
To the extent Lawson argues postconviction counsel was ineffective for
failing to contend the filing of a motion to suppress would have resulted in
Lawson not pleading guilty, that argument, if properly presented, would have
been meritless as well. Lawson offered no evidence—other than a lone
assertion that counsel was ineffective—showing he would not have pleaded
guilty but for trial counsel’s failure to pursue a motion to suppress. Trial counsel
specifically testified she filed a motion to suppress, which she only withdrew due
to Lawson’s decision to plead guilty. It is also apparent from Lawson’s testimony
that counsel believed the motion to suppress would have either been denied or
8
would not have dramatically affected Lawson’s case.2 Allegations of prejudice,
without more, do not satisfy the applicant’s burden to show both ineffective-
assistance prongs by a preponderance of the evidence. See Ledezma, 626
N.W.2d at 142. Because any assertion that trial counsel was ineffective based
on her withdrawing the motion to suppress would have failed, postconviction
counsel was not ineffective for failing to expand this argument within the context
of Castro.3
Additionally, to the extent Lawson challenges the district court’s denial of
his other claims that do not directly relate to his guilty plea, the court properly
concluded it could not address the merits of these claims. See State v. Burgess,
639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001) (holding that “[a] guilty plea freely and
voluntarily entered waives all defenses and objections, including constitutional
guarantees”). Consequently, the district court correctly denied Lawson’s
application for postconviction relief, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
2
This opinion is likely due to the community caretaking exception to the warrant
requirement, as, given the officer’s observation of the victim’s severe wounds and
knowing there were children in the residence, the motion to suppress would likely have
been denied. See State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 173 (Iowa 2013) (noting that the
community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement occurs when the officer is
actually motivated to render assistance because of a perceived threat, and when a
reasonable person would have believed an emergency existed). Additionally, regardless
of whether or not the motion would have resulted in a favorable ruling, Lawson would still
have had to contend with the children’s statements they saw him attack their mother.
3
When presented with Lawson’s motion-to-suppress argument, the district court stated:
“There was never a trial, so there was never any evidence introduced, so none of that
really matters, does it? This is going to turn on whether he wisely pled guilty or not.”
Anthony Lawson, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa
Combined Opinion