Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc.

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

July 3, 2006
PU BL ISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Clerk of Court

TENTH CIRCUIT

G RIFF G . A RG O ,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.
No. 05-3114
BLUE CRO SS AN D B LUE SHIELD
OF KANSAS, IN C.,

Defendant - Appellee.

A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D .C . No. 03-CV-4119-JAR)

Pantaleon Florez, Jr., Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Alan L. Rupe, Kutak Rock LLP, W ichita, Kansas (Georgina Adami, Kutak Rock
LLP, W ichita Kansas, and Stacy A. Jeffress, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Kansas, Topeka, Kansas, with him on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee.

Before M U RPH Y, EBEL, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.

M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judge.
 This case presents an especially weak Title VII sex discrimination claim.

The Plaintiff, Griff Argo, was fired by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc.

(“Blue Cross Blue Shield”) following nearly a year of declining performance and

disciplinary problems, one day after arriving late for work and failing to complete

assigned work. He alleges that his termination was the product of reverse sex

discrimination, citing a handful of flirtatious comments by his female supervisor

over a period of several years. In the alternative, he alleges that he was

terminated in retaliation for his decision to file an internal sex discrimination

complaint. Both claims fall painfully short on summary judgment, and we affirm

the decision of the district court.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Griff Argo started work as an Individual Enrollment Specialist (“IES”) for

Blue Cross Blue Shield in January 1996. IESs spend 90% of the day on the

phone, selling health, dental, and life insurance policies to new and existing

customers. Blue Cross Blue Shield sets monthly and annual performance goals

for each IES, including a number of individual health and dental policies and a

dollar volume of life insurance. The company uses those performance goals as a

basis for evaluating its employees. On annual review forms during M r. Argo’s

tenure at Blue Cross Blue Shield, between 40% and 60% of the overall rating for

an IES depended on the three categories of performance goals.

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 On January 2, 1996, within his first few weeks of work, M r. Argo was

introduced to Brenda Oliva, who then worked in a different department. They had

met socially on a previous occasion, but M r. Argo did not immediately remember

M s. Oliva’s name. According to M r. Argo, she “kind of chuckled” and said, “‘oh,

so you’re too good to remember my name?’” App. 95PP. He did not consider the

comment a “come-on line,” but maintains that her “tone of voice . . . impl[ied] a

form of attraction, and I have to say sexual harassment.” Id.

Between 1997 and the beginning of 2002, M r. Argo’s performance ranged

from “commendable” to “distinguished.” See App. 176, 180, 182, 184–85,

187–88. Despite occasional “problems with tardiness” he was praised as “an

excellent employee and an asset to the IES team.” Id. at 175–76. In 1999, M s.

Oliva became M r. Argo’s supervisor. On both his 2000 and 2001 annual reviews,

she described M r. Argo as “a team player,” and wrote that she was “glad to have

him in my department.” Id. at 183–84, 187. In December 2001, her monthly

Goal Attainment Status report for M r. Argo was effusive: “You’ve had a great

year. I’m very proud of you. You’ve made all of your goals for 2001. I look

forward in [sic] working with you next year.” Id. at 118. M r. Argo alleges that

throughout this period he endured a “pattern of sexual harassment,” id. at 95PP,

but cites only a single incident in three years: once, upon seeing M r. Argo in the

office dressed in shorts and a tank top on his way to the gym, M s. Oliva joked,

“W hoa, nice legs.” Id. at 103.

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 Beginning in April 2002, M r. A rgo’s performance began a steady slide.

M s. Oliva’s comments on her monthly reports reveal her increasing anxiety.

From April 2002: “You didn’t meet your monthly goal on health but since you

were up the other three months, you are meeting your health goal year to date. . . .

Keep up the good work.” Id. at 108. From June 2002: “You didn’t make your

monthly goal for health and life. . . . W hat can we do to help you meet your

monthly goals? Is there anything I can do to help?” Id. at 110. From July 2002:

“This is your second month you didn’t make your monthly goal for health. . . .

W e need to overcome this. . . . Let’s get together and see what we can do.” Id. at

111. From September 2002: “[Y]ou’ve had 5 months that you did not make your

monthly goal. Can you please share with me what you plan on doing to assure me

you will make your 2002 health goal?” Id. at 113. From October 2002: “This is

your sixth month for not making your monthly goal. . . . Let me know what I can

do . . . .” Id. at 114. From November 2002: “Y ou did not make your monthly

goal for the 7th month this year. You need to start using your time wisely.” Id.

at 115.

During the same period, M r. Argo’s tardiness problems worsened. Since

June 2001, M s. Oliva had required M r. Argo to send her an email message upon

arriving at work, warning him further late starts would result in formal “written

probation.” Id. at 130. On M arch 28, 2002, she gave him a written warning,

admonishing him again for the “consistent amount of the time you were coming

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into work after 8:00.” Id. at 131. She cautioned that “if this continues it will be a

performance issue.” Id. In mid-November 2002, M r. Argo was caught reading a

book at his desk during the work day, and continued reading for fifteen minutes

before M s. Oliva confronted him. Phone records revealed that he had not made a

call in fifty-three minutes. The next day M s. Oliva directed him to call some

“old” prospective customers, but he refused. On November 22, she issued a

written reprimand “for poor performance, specific to your attitude and not using

your time correctly,” and a blunt warning: “If your attitude does not improve in

30 days and if directives continue to be ignored then I have no alternative but to

terminate you from Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas.” Id. at 136.

M eanwhile, M s. Oliva’s campaign of exceedingly mild flirtation continued.

On one occasion in July 2002, after monitoring one of M r. Argo’s calls and

offering constructive criticism, M s. Oliva smiled and winked at him. Two months

later, M s. Oliva gave him a birthday card— helpfully reproduced for us in full

color by the parties— featuring a picture of a buxom woman dressed in black

lingerie. The cover says, “A Birthday Riddle / W hy do men like women in

leather?” Inside, it continues, “Because they smell like a new car! / Happy

Birthday, Guy.” Id. at 162–63. The joke, you see, is that the sexually suggestive

setup is followed by a completely nonsexual punch line. Finally, while he was

being reprimanded on November 22 for his time management and attitude

problems, M r. Argo says that M s. Oliva placed “the tip of her shoe slightly over

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the tip of [his] shoe,” making him feel “slightly awkward,” and did so a second

time after he moved his foot away. Id. at 102.

Despite repeated warnings, M r. Argo failed to meet his performance goal

for health insurance in 2002. In her December 2002 monthly report, M s. Oliva

noted that he had missed his performance goals for eight consecutive months, and

said, “W e need to look at 2003 and see what you can do differently so we don’t

have a repeat of this year.” Id. at 116. On January 2, 2003, M r. Argo called in

sick at 9:10 am, more than an hour after he was expected at work. The next day,

in a written memorandum entitled “Performance,” M s. Oliva reminded M r. Argo

of his earlier w arnings regarding tardiness and said, “This is your last warning. If

you continue to not follow company or departmental policies which include but

are not limited to tardiness, time utilization, not following directives, not calling

in prior to 8:30 AM , etc., we will have no alternative but to terminate your

employment at Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas.” Id. at 138.

Three days later, on January 6, M r. Argo filed an internal complaint

“regarding a persistent and increasing hostile work environment that I have

endured for several months as a result of the conduct of the manager of individual

sales, Brenda Oliva.” Id. at 102. The complaint described the handful of

incidents of “sexual harassment” he had endured at the hands of M s. Oliva,

including the birthday card, the shoe tip touching, the wink, and the comments

“W hoa, nice legs” and “Oh, so you’re too good to remember my name?” Id. at

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102–03. These incidents, according to the complaint, “exemplif[y] [M s. Oliva’s]

objectification of men in general and her concentration on me in particular as an

object of attraction.” Id. at 103. Later M r. Argo added vague allegations of a

“male/female control thing.” Id. at 151. He told the company that he “dread[ed]

coming to work” and felt “miserable sometimes in not wanting to come to work to

face Brenda.” Id. at 152. To remedy the situation, he asked for a transfer to a

different supervisor and for “[m]y write-ups to be removed from my file.” Id. at

154. For her part, M s. Oliva reacted with “[t]otal shock.” Id. at 157. She denied

touching M r. Argo’s foot, and did not remember saying “nice legs” to him years

earlier. Id. at 157, 161. She acknowledged that the birthday card “was probably

inappropriate,” but explained that she thought “he would only see the humor in

it.” Id. at 161. Asked to speculate as to why M r. Argo would accuse her of

sexual harassment, she said, “[b]ecause I have written him up.” Id. at 157.

An internal company investigation comm enced immediately, but “was not

able to substantiate anything” and ended on January 20, 2003. Id. at 161.

Apparently M s. Oliva received counseling from her manager “on what is

appropriate behavior for someone in a management position,” but the company

took no other official action. Id.

M r. Argo missed all three of his monthly targets for January 2003. On her

monthly report, dated January 21, M s. Oliva issued an ultimatum: “If you do not

met [sic] your February and M arch monthly goal[s] you will be terminated from

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Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas 3-7-03.” Id. at 129. On January 29, M r. Argo

arrived late for work and failed to work on “old leads” as directed. The next day,

January 30, he was fired. A memorandum describing the decision cited the

infractions of January 29 as the precipitating events. As he left the office after

packing his belongings, M r. Argo told a co-worker, “you know what this is

about.” Id.

M r. Argo filed a law suit against Blue Cross Blue Shield in federal court,

alleging reverse sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. During his

deposition, counsel for Blue Cross Blue Shield pressed M r. Argo to explain why

he believed his termination was the product of discrimination “because of . . .

sex” as required under 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). W hen asked if any other IESs,

male or female, “ever had that difficulty with the job and either quit or [were]

fired,” M r. Argo replied, “There could have been, and I don’t recall specifically

any one person. There – it – it is possible, yeah.” App. 95H. Asked whether any

other IESs were fired for poor performance with respect to their sales goals, M r.

Argo replied, “I don’t recall . . . it could very well have happened.” Id. at 95I.

Blue C ross Blue Shield moved for summary judgment, noting that there

was no evidence in the record to suggest that female IESs received preferential

treatment. In response, M r. Argo filed an affidavit stating, in paragraph 21, that

“[n]o female Individual Enrollment Specialists was [sic] terminated during my

employment for failing to make monthly or yearly goals.” Id. at 269. The

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affidavit recited that M r. Argo was “personally familiar with the matters

contained within this affidavit.” Id. at 267. The district court struck paragraph

21 of the affidavit, disregarding it “as a self-serving, sham affidavit,” calculated

to manufacture a “sham” issue of fact. Id. at 305–07, 317. Specifically, the court

found that paragraph 21 “could not be based on personal knowledge” and that it

“contradicts his deposition testimony.” Id. at 317. W ith no other evidence to

support a claim of reverse sex discrimination, the district court held that M r. Argo

had failed to establish a prima facie case. As to the retaliation claim, the district

court found that Blue Cross Blue Shield had “easily” satisfied its burden to

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, and that M r.

Argo had failed to establish that its reasons were pretextual. Accordingly, the

district court granted summary judgment for Blue Cross Blue Shield on both

claims.

M r. Argo now appeals, not only from the summary judgment rulings but

also from the district court’s decision to strike paragraph 21 from the affidavit

and to disregard that evidence.

II. Discussion

W e review a district court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo,

resolving all factual disputes and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the

non-moving party. Fuerschbach v. S.W. Airlines Co., 439 F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th

Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings, depositions,

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answ ers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

At the summary judgment stage, evidence need not be submitted “in a form

that would be admissible at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324

(1986). Parties may, for example, submit affidavits in support of summary

judgment, despite the fact that affidavits are often inadmissible at trial as hearsay,

on the theory that the evidence may ultimately be presented at trial in an

admissible form. Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 432 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir.

2005). Nonetheless, “the content or substance of the evidence must be

admissible.” Thomas v. Int’l Bus. M achs., 48 F.3d 478, 485 (10th Cir. 1995).

Thus, for example, at summary judgment courts should disregard inadmissible

hearsay statements contained in affidavits, as those statements could not be

presented at trial in any form. See Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd. Co., 185 F.3d

1076, 1082 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999). The requirement that the substance of the

evidence must be admissible is not only explicit in Rule 56, which provides that

“[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall . . . set forth such facts as would be

admissible in evidence,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), but also implicit in the court’s role

at the summary judgment stage. To determine whether genuine issues of material

fact make a jury trial necessary, a court necessarily may consider only the

evidence that would be available to the jury. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. M agneTek,

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Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming summary judgment, in light

of the available evidence, because “[j]ury verdicts may not be based on

speculation or inadmissible evidence or be contrary to uncontested admissible

evidence”). We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings at the summary

judgment stage for abuse of discretion. Jones v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 1260, 1270

(10th Cir. 2003).

A. Paragraph 21 of M r. Argo’s A ffidavit

As an initial matter, M r. Argo appeals from the district court’s decision to

strike and disregard paragraph 21 of his affidavit opposing summary judgment,

which reads: “No female Individual Enrollment Specialists [sic] was terminated

during my employment for failing to make monthly or yearly goals.” App. 269.

The district court cited three related grounds for disregarding paragraph 21: (1)

that a “self-serving affidavit” is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material

fact on summary judgment; (2) that paragraph 21 contradicts M r. Argo’s

deposition testimony and attempts to create a “sham fact issue”; and (3) that the

allegations of paragraph 21 are not based on personal knowledge. App. 305–07.

W e focus on the district court’s third reason for excluding paragraph 21.

In finding that the allegations were not based on personal knowledge, the

district court relied on District of Kansas Rule 56.1(d), which requires that

“[a]ffidavits or declarations shall be made on personal knowledge,” but it might

just as easily have relied on Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

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which requires that “[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on

personal knowledge,” or Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which

requires that testifying witnesses “ha[ve] personal knowledge of the matter.”

Under the personal knowledge standard, an affidavit is inadmissible if “‘the

witness could not have actually perceived or observed that which he testifies to.’”

United States v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527, 1536 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting

M .B.A.F.B. Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc., 681 F.2d 930, 932 (4th

Cir. 1982)). Accordingly, at the summary judgment stage, “statements of mere

belief” in an affidavit must be disregarded. Tavery v. United States, 32 F.3d 1423,

1427 n.4 (10th Cir. 1994).

M r. Argo’s affidavit recites in paragraph 1 that he is “personally familiar”

with the matters contained in the affidavit based on his “over 7 years of

employment with the Defendant, Blue Cross Blue Shield.” App. 267. Yet the

claim in paragraph 21, that “[n]o female Individual Enrollment Specialists was

[sic] terminated during my employment for failing to make monthly or yearly

goals,” id. at 269, requires knowledge about the performance and discipline of

every female IES at the company. As a co-worker, and not a human resources

official, M r. Argo simply was not in a position to acquire such comprehensive

knowledge. In his deposition, he named only seven female IESs who worked at

Blue Cross Blue Shield during his tenure, and he admitted that two of them

resigned for reasons he did not fully understand while another may in fact have

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been terminated. M oreover, nothing in the record indicates that these women were

the only seven females employed by Blue Cross Blue Shield as IESs during the

relevant time period. At best, M r. Argo has personal knowledge that a handful of

female IESs, whose performance and disciplinary history he happened to learn

through workplace discussions, were not terminated for missing performance

goals. He may well believe the different, stronger claim in paragraph 21 of the

affidavit, but his personal knowledge does not extend so far. 1 In fact, his

deposition testimony acknowledges as much: asked directly whether there could

have been IESs, male or female, who were fired for performance problems, M r.

Argo said, “There could have been . . . . [I]t is possible, yeah.” Id. at 95H. The

district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in striking and disregarding

paragraph 21 of the affidavit for purposes of summary judgment.

B. M r. Argo’s R everse Sex Discrimination Claim

M r. Argo’s principal claim is that his termination was the product of reverse

sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)

(making it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to discharge any

individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex”). Under the burden-shifting

framew ork of M cDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973),

1
In his opening brief, M r. Argo also argues that “a factual basis for his
knowledge exists by virtue of his present sense impression,” Br. of Appellant 24,
a statement that betrays grave misunderstanding of the personal knowledge
requirement, the hearsay exception for present sense impressions, or both.

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the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of sex

discrimination, whereupon the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, and then back to the

plaintiff to show that the stated reason is pretextual. To establish a prima facie

case, a plaintiff ordinarily must show “that (1) the plaintiff belongs to some

protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position or benefit at issue,

(3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the plaintiff was

treated less favorably than others (e.g., the position at issue remained open after

the adverse employment action).” Exum v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 389 F.3d 1130,

1134 (10th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has held that such a prima facie case

“raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if

otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on consideration of

impermissible factors.” Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577

(1978). For most plaintiffs, establishing a prima facie case is perfunctory, and

liability turns on w hether the defendant’s stated explanation for the adverse

employment action is pretextual.

In a reverse discrimination case, however, a prima facie case of

discrimination requires a stronger showing. W e have held that a plaintiff alleging

reverse discrimination “must, in lieu of showing that he belongs to a protected

group, establish background circumstances that support an inference that the

defendant is one of those unusual employers who discriminates against the

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majority.” Notari v. Denver Water Dep’t, 971 F.2d 585, 589 (10th Cir. 1992).

Alternatively, a plaintiff may produce facts “sufficient to support a reasonable

inference that but for plaintiff’s status the challenged decision would not have

occurred.” Id. at 590. W e recently reaffirmed Notari, notwithstanding the

Supreme Court’s decisions in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523

U.S. 75 (1998), and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133

(2000). See M attioda v. White, 323 F.3d 1288, 1293 (10th Cir. 2003).

M r. Argo has failed to establish any circumstances that might justify a

presumption of reverse sex discrimination. By all accounts, Blue Cross Blue

Shield hired plenty of men as IESs, and M r. Argo has introduced not a whit of

statistical or even anecdotal evidence that men suffered adverse treatment as a

class in the workplace. Also, although he appears to have been well-qualified for

the job, at least before his performance began to decline in April 2002, M r. Argo

has produced no evidence suggesting that the position remained open or that he

was replaced by a woman. These circumstances do not support an inference that

Blue Cross Blue Shield has taken the “unusual” step of discriminating against

men. Nor has M r. Argo made a sufficient showing that, but for his sex, he would

not have been terminated. M s. Oliva’s actions— two flirtatious comments, a mock-

bawdy birthday card, and an incident of toe-touching— were incredibly mild. Even

viewed in the light most favorable to M r. Argo, they represent precisely the kind

of “ordinary socializing in the workplace” and “intersexual flirtation” about which

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Title VII is unconcerned. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. M oreover, nothing in the

record suggests a temporal or causal connection between M s. Oliva’s alleged

flirtation and the termination decision. Even if we assume M s. Oliva’s conduct

manifested an inappropriately sex discriminatory attitude tow ard M r. Argo, those

incidents began long before M r. Argo’s troubles, at a time when M s. Oliva’s job

evaluations of M r. Argo were effusive, and did not change or intensify as his work

performance deteriorated and evaluations soured. In this case, there was no post

hoc to which we could attach a propter hoc.

Because M r. Argo has failed to establish a prima facie case of reverse sex

discrimination, we affirm the district court’s decision granting summary judgment

to Blue Cross Blue Shield.

C. M r. Argo’s R etaliation Claim

Finally, M r. Argo argues that summary judgment was inappropriate on his

retaliation claim, again invoking the M cDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must

demonstrate (1) that he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, (2) that

a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially

adverse, 2 and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity

2
This Court had previously held that a prima facie case of retaliation under
Title VII requires an “adverse employment action,” but the Supreme Court
recently rejected that standard. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
— U.S. — , 2006 W L 1698953, at *10 (June 22, 2006). Instead, to prevail on a
Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff need only show “that a reasonable employee

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and the materially adverse action. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, —

U.S. — , 2006 W L 1698953, at *10 (June 22, 2006); M iller v. Auto. Club of N.M .,

Inc., 420 F.3d 1098, 1119 (10th Cir. 2005). Notably, these requirements do not

change when a plaintiff’s underlying opposition is to reverse discrimination— for

example, discrimination against men as a class. Title VII makes reverse

discrimination unlawful, and employers have no more freedom to retaliate against

those who oppose reverse discrimination than any other form of discrimination.

M r. Argo easily satisfies the requirements of a prima facie case of

retaliation. On January 6, 2003, he filed an internal grievance alleging sexual

harassment by his female supervisor, which certainly qualifies as protected

opposition to discrimination under Title VII. On January 30 he was fired, which

obviously qualifies as “materially adverse” in the sense that it might have

dissuaded a reasonable employee from making the complaint. The close temporal

proximity between the complaint and the termination— just 24 days— is sufficient

to allow an inference that a causal connection existed between the internal

grievance and the decision to terminate M r. A rgo. See Anderson v. Coors Brewing

Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (indicating that a period of six weeks

would have found the challenged action materially adverse, ‘which in this context
means it well might have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.”’” Id. (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438
F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue,
420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005))).

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gives rise to a rebuttable inference of a causal connection, but that a period of

three months does not).

The burden therefore shifts to Blue Cross Blue Shield to articulate a

legitim ate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. The company offers two

reasons. First, M r. Argo’s performance had steadily declined for nearly a year, as

demonstrated by his failure to meet one or more performance goals for nine

consecutive months as well as his annual goal for health policies in 2002. Second,

M r. Argo had received repeated warnings about his tardiness and “attitude”

problems, but persisted in arriving late, misusing his time, and failing to perform

work as directed. Both are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the

termination, and the burden shifts back to M r. Argo to demonstrate that the

proffered explanation is a pretext for retaliation.

To show pretext, M r. Argo must produce evidence of “‘such weaknesses,

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s

proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could

rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did

not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.’” M organ v. Hilti, Inc., 108

F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Olson v. Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 101

F.3d 947, 951–52 (3d Cir. 1996)). M r. Argo does not dispute that he missed a

string of performance goals and had frequent disciplinary problems, especially

tardiness. Instead, he emphasizes two facts: (1) the timing of his termination, just

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24 days after he filed his grievance and 10 days after the internal investigation

ended; and (2) the nature of his performance problems, which he characterizes as

modest.

First, M r. Argo contends that the timing of the termination, shortly after his

filing of an internal complaint, allows a jury to infer that its reasons are pretextual.

That argument has some force with respect to Blue Cross Blue Shield’s declining-

performance rationale. A lthough he had received warnings concerning his

performance goals for months, as late as January 21 M s. Oliva was inclined to give

M r. Argo more time for improvement: “If you do not met [sic] your February and

M arch monthly goal[s] you will be terminated from Blue Cross Blue Shield of

Kansas 3-7-03.” App. 129. If there had been no intervening events, Blue Cross

Blue Shield’s decision to terminate M r. Argo on January 30 instead of waiting

until M arch 7 might indeed have suggested pretext.

The timing argument is undermined, however, by the fact that M r. Argo

arrived late for work on January 29, and once again failed to work on “old leads”

as directed. M r. Argo was fired the next morning, January 30. These intervening

events defeat any inference of retaliation because the company’s concerns about

tardiness and “attitude” obviously predate M r. Argo’s internal complaint. M s.

Oliva’s January 2 “Performance” memorandum issued a “last warning” for

“tardiness, time utilization, [and] not following directives,” and specifically

threatened termination for future infractions. Id. at 138. Thus, the timing of the

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termination actually cuts against a finding of pretext by strongly suggesting that

Blue C ross Blue Shield acted in response to specific and continuing disciplinary

problems.

Second, M r. Argo argues that his performance problems in fact were not

serious. He concedes that he missed his health performance goal for 2002, but

notes that he exceeded other performance goals, and calculates that he would have

received at least an 83.75% overall evaluation on his 2002 annual review — “within

the expected range of overall performance levels.” Br. of Appellant 22–24. Yet

Title VII charges neither this Court nor the jury to act as a “‘super personnel

department’ that second guesses employers’ business judgments.” Simms v.

Oklahom a ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d

1321, 1330 (10th Cir. 1999). Blue Cross Blue Shield is free to conclude that a

long series of missed goals in one area justifies termination, notwithstanding

adequate or even strong performance in other areas. In any case, M r. Argo has no

answer to the charge that he repeatedly arrived late for work and failed to perform

tasks as directed. 3 Such behavior immediately preceded his termination, and was

cited by the company in internal documents describing the decision. Under the

3
To the surprise of the Court and opposing counsel, M r. Argo’s attorney
claimed at oral argument that a factual dispute exists as to whether M r. Argo was
late for work on January 29. A thorough review of the record reveals no such
factual disagreement, and we base our decision on the uncontested documents
produced by Blue Cross Blue Shield describing M r. Argo’s tardiness that day.

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circumstances, no reasonable jury could conclude that M r. Argo’s termination was retaliatory.

Because M r. Argo has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether Blue Cross Blue Shield’s stated reasons for the termination are a pretext

for retaliation, we affirm the decision of the district court.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court in

all respects.

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