Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and
Kinser, JJ., and Compton, Senior Justice
ARLINGTON COUNTY, ET AL.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 991374 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
April 21, 2000
ANDREW WHITE, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
Benjamin N. A. Kendrick, Judge
In this appeal, we consider whether a local governing
body acted ultra vires in extending coverage under its
self-funded health insurance benefits plan to unmarried
“domestic partners” of its employees.
On March 12, 1998, Andrew White, Diana White, and
Wendell Brown, residents and taxpayers of Arlington County
(the Taxpayers), filed a bill of complaint in the trial
court against Arlington County and its County Board
(collectively, the County). The Taxpayers sought a
declaration that the County lacked the authority to extend
coverage to the newly defined category of domestic partners
under its self-funded health insurance benefits plan. The
Taxpayers also sought to enjoin the County from
implementing the provision of benefits to domestic
partners.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
Holding that “Arlington County’s coverage for domestic
partners in its self-funded health benefit plan for County
employees violates the Dillon Rule,” 1 the trial court
granted the Taxpayers’ motion for summary judgment and
denied the County’s motion. We awarded the County this
appeal.
The record shows that in an Employee Relations
Benefits Newsletter, issued in May 1997, the County
announced that, effective July 1, 1997, “[t]he definition
of eligible dependents has been expanded under the
[County’s self-funded] health plan” to allow “for coverage
of one adult dependent, who can be [an employee’s] spouse,
domestic partner, or other adult who is claimed as a
dependent on [the employee’s] federal income tax return.”
The Newsletter listed eight criteria in defining an “adult
dependent” as “[t]he domestic partner . . . who”
- has resided with the employee for a 1 year period;
- shares with the employee the common necessities of
life and basic living expenses;
- is financially interdependent with the employee;
- is involved with the employee in a mutually
exclusive relationship of support and commitment;
- is not related by blood to the employee;
- is not married to anyone;
1
“[T]he powers of boards of supervisors are fixed by
statute and are limited to those conferred expressly or by
necessary implication.” Board of Supervisors v. Horne, 216
Va 113, 117, 215 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1975). This rule is
corollary to the Dillon Rule that municipal corporations
are similarly limited in their powers. Id. at 117, 215
S.E.2d at 455-56. Because the trial court and the parties
refer to the Dillon Rule, we will also in this opinion.
2
- was mentally competent at time of consent to
relationship;
- is 18 years of age or older.
A stipulation entered into by the parties states that
“[a] ‘domestic partner’ eligible for coverage as an adult
dependent of a County employee under the County’s health
benefits plan may be either a same-sex or opposite-sex
domestic partner of a County employee,” that “[a]n employee
applying for domestic partner coverage must certify that
the employee and the domestic partner meet the criteria
established by the County,” and that “[t]here are
individuals who currently are covered as domestic partners
of County employees under the County’s health benefits
plan, and who have received benefits under the plan.” It
was also stipulated that “[f]unds used by Arlington County
to provide health benefits coverage for County employees
and their adult dependents under the County’s self-funded
plan include local tax dollars.”
Citing Code §§ 15.2-1517(A) and 51.1-801, the County
correctly points out that “[t]he General Assembly
specifically authorizes a local government to provide self-
funded health benefit programs for its employees and their
dependents.” 2 The County notes that neither statute defines
2
Code § 15.2-1517(A) states that “[a]ny locality may
provide . . . health insurance programs for their officers
3
the term “dependent” or refers to other statutory
provisions that define the term for different purposes.
Continuing, the County further notes that no express
statutory provision specifies which employee dependents are
eligible to participate in a locality’s self-funded health
benefits plan or by what method their eligibility is to be
determined.
Under these circumstances, the County correctly
maintains, “[t]he power to determine who is an employee’s
dependent . . . is fairly and necessarily implied.”
Furthermore, the County asserts, “the locality must make
[the] determination itself”; indeed, it “could not carry
out its authority without exercising its discretion.” In
the process, the County submits, the term “dependent”
should be given its plain and ordinary meaning as one
“[r]elying on . . . the aid of another for support.” 3 The
American Heritage Dictionary 501 (2nd College Ed. 1985).
and employees . . . through a program of self-insurance,”
and § 51.1-801 states that a “local governing body may,
through self-funding . . ., provide . . . sickness
insurance coverage for officers and employees . . . and
their dependents.”
3
In this regard, however, we note that a dependant is
also defined as “one not able to exist or sustain oneself
without the power or aid of someone else.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 449 (7th edition 1999). Moreover, as a term of
art, a “legal dependent” is defined as “[a] person who is
dependent according to law; a person who derives principal
4
In the end, the County opines, the “appropriate
inquiry is whether [its] decision to include domestic
partners as dependents in its plan is a reasonable method
of implementing its authority.” This inquiry, the County
concludes, must be answered in the affirmative.
Under Dillon’s Rule, [local governing bodies]
have only those powers which are expressly granted by
the state legislature, those powers fairly or
necessarily implied from expressly granted powers, and
those powers which are essential and indispensable.
Where the state legislature grants a local government
the power to do something but does not specifically
direct the method of implementing that power, the
choice made by the local government as to how to
implement the conferred power will be upheld as long
as the method selected is reasonable. Any doubt in
the reasonableness of the method selected is resolved
in favor of the locality.
City of Virginia Beach v. Hay, 258 Va. 217, 221, 518 S.E.2d
314, 316 (1999)(citations omitted).
In light of these principles, we must decide whether
the County’s inclusion of domestic partners as defined by
the County is a reasonable implementation of the County’s
authority to define an employee’s dependent for purposes of
coverage in the County’s self-funded health benefits plan
pursuant to Code §§ 15.2-1517(A) and 51.1-801. For the
reasons that follow and giving the County the benefit of
support from another.” Id. (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, these definitions do not control our
resolution of this appeal.
5
any doubt, we conclude that the County’s definition of
dependent is not reasonable and, therefore, violates the
Dillon Rule. 4
In 1997, responding to an inquiry from a member of the
General Assembly, the Attorney General issued an opinion
that the statutory scheme which permits local governments
“to provide for their officers and employees [self-funded]
group life, accident, and health insurance programs . . .
[does not] contain any language from which a general
legislative intent to extend insurance coverage to persons
within the definition of ‘domestic partner’ may be
inferred.” 1997 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 131, 131-32. Citing
prior interpretations applying the Dillon Rule and its
corollary to the statutes at issue, id. at 131 n.8, the
Attorney General concluded that “[i]n the absence of any
statutory authority indicating an intent to permit a local
governing body to extend health insurance coverage provided
employees to persons other than the spouse, children or
dependants of the employee . . . a county lacks the power
to provide such coverage.” Id. at 132. In reaching this
conclusion, the Attorney General expressly noted that the
4
Accordingly, we need not address the Taxpayers’
argument that the County has attempted to legislate in the
field of domestic relations.
6
requirement that the employee be “financially
interdependent” with the “domestic partner” was contrary to
the established definition of a “dependant” as one who
“must receive from the taxpayer over half of his or her
support for the calendar year.” Id.
The County’s benefit plan extends coverage to a County
employee and one other adult, who may be the employee’s
spouse, another adult who is properly claimed as a
dependent on the employee’s federal tax return, or the
employee’s “domestic partner.” The County’s definition of
“domestic partner” includes eight criteria. Only two of
these criteria address financial dependency — sharing
expenses and being “financially interdependent.” Neither
of these criteria is synonymous with “financially
dependent.”
The inclusion of a spouse as a dependent for the
purpose of coverage under the County’s benefit plan does
not eliminate the significance of this distinction. It is
a matter of common knowledge and experience that a spouse
may or may not be financially dependent on the employee-
spouse. However, including a spouse as a dependent for
coverage such as this is of such long standing that, even
in the absence of financial dependence, there can be no
dispute that the General Assembly contemplated that a
7
spouse would be included for coverage under local benefit
plans.
It is, nevertheless, equally clear that the General
Assembly in leaving the definition of dependent to the
local governing bodies which adopt self-funded health
insurance benefit plans did not contemplate adoption of a
definition that does not require some aspect of financial
dependence rather than mere financial interdependence.
This is the essential position of the Attorney General’s
opinion cited above and, in our view, it is sound.
Considering Code §§ 15.2-1517(A) and 51.1-801 and the
Attorney General’s opinion, we are of opinion that the
expanded definition of dependants eligible to receive
coverage under the self-funded health insurance benefits
plan adopted by the County is not a reasonable method of
implementing its implied authority under those statutes and
is, therefore, an ultra vires act. Accordingly, the
judgment below will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE KINSER, concurring.
I join the majority opinion. However, I write
additionally to point out that the central issue presented
in this case is not, as stated in the dissenting opinion,
whether “Arlington County [has] the legal authority to
8
recognize common law marriages or ‘same-sex unions’ by
conferring certain health insurance benefits upon domestic
partners of County employees who are engaged in these
relationships.” Rather, the following comprise the
assignments of error in this appeal:
1. The Court below erred by finding that Arlington
County’s coverage of domestic partners in its
self-funded health benefits plan violates the
Dillon Rule, and in granting Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Summary Judgment.
2. The Court below erred by not finding that the
County has authority to define the term
“dependents” to include domestic partners for its
self-funded health benefits plan for County
employees, and in failing to grant the County’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.
3. The Court below erred in failing to recognize that
the County has authority under the reasonable
selection of method rule to define “dependents” to
include domestic partners for purposes of
administering its self-funded health benefit plan
for County employees, and in failing to grant the
County’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Furthermore, in the appellee Taxpayers’ brief filed in this
appeal, only one of their three main arguments in support
the circuit court’s judgment addressed the issue that the
dissent calls “fundamental” and “central.” In fact, the
rationale utilized by the majority to affirm the circuit
court’s judgment is the same as that contained in the
Taxpayers’ first argument on brief, i.e, that Arlington
County’s definition of the term “dependent” to include
9
individuals who are merely “interdependent” violates the
Dillon Rule.
If the present case were decided on the basis that
Arlington County’s definition of “dependant” for
purposes of its self-funded health benefit plan is not
a reasonable method of implementing its implied
authority because the definition bestows a
governmental benefit on certain relationships that
contravene Virginia’s public policy concerning
marriage, the same could be said with regard to the
tax benefit conferred pursuant to Code § 58.1-
322(D)(2)(a). 5 Under that section, a Virginia taxpayer
can claim a deduction for each personal exemption
available to the taxpayer for federal income tax
purposes. Under 26 U.S.C. § 151, a federal income tax
exemption is available for each “dependent” of the
taxpayer. The term “dependent” is defined in 26
U.S.C. § 152. In pertinent part, that section states
that the term ‘dependent’ means any of the following
individuals over half of whose support, for the
calendar year in which the taxable year of the
taxpayer begins, was received from the taxpayer: . . .
(9) An individual(other than an individual who at any
time during the taxable year was the spouse . . . of
the taxpayer) who, for the taxable year of the
taxpayer, has as his principal place of abode the home
of the taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer’s
household.
Subsection (b)(5) of 26 U.S.C. § 152 further states that
“[a]n individual is not a member of the taxpayer’s
household if at any time during the taxable year of the
taxpayer the relationship between such individual and the
taxpayer is in violation of local law.”
5
The Taxpayers argue on brief that Arlington County’s
definition of “dependent” conflicts with the definition of
that term under state and federal income tax laws.
10
If, as the dissent asserts, “[t]he County’s expanded
definition of eligible dependents is nothing more than a
disguised effort to confer health benefits upon persons who
are involved in either common law marriages or ‘same-sex
unions,’” then the allowance of an income tax deduction in
Virginia based on the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of
“dependent” could also be deemed a “disguised effort” to
confer a governmental benefit on taxpayers involved in the
same kinds of relationships. Aside from the requirement of
financial interdependence, as opposed to dependency, an
individual satisfying Arlington County’s definition of
“domestic partner” could also qualify as a "dependent"
under 26 U.S.C. § 152(a)(9). That fact does not mean that
such an individual can violate Virginia’s criminal statutes
proscribing lewd and lascivious cohabitation, Code § 18.2-
345; fornication, Code § 18.2-344; and consensual sodomy,
Code § 18.2-361.
I do not intend in any way to suggest that I condone
common law marriages or “same-sex unions.” Nor do I
question that such relationships do, indeed, violate the
public policy of Virginia. However, neither my personal
beliefs nor Virginia’s public policy make it necessary to
11
decide this appeal on grounds that could call into question
other sections of Virginia’s laws. 6
JUSTICE HASSELL, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO and SENIOR
JUSTICE COMPTON join, dissenting in part, and concurring in
judgment.
I.
I dissent because the majority ignores the fundamental
issue raised in this appeal: Does Arlington County have
the legal authority to recognize common law marriages or
"same-sex unions" by conferring certain health insurance
benefits upon domestic partners of County employees who are
engaged in these relationships? Even though a review of
the briefs and record filed in this appeal demonstrates
that this question is the primary issue raised in this
appeal, the majority decides this case on another legal
basis. Arlington County, the appellant, agreed in its
brief that "[t]he central question in this case is whether
Arlington County's action of including its employees'
6
I also note that under Virginia’s State and Local
Government Conflict of Interests Act, the term “dependent”
is defined as “a son, daughter, father, mother, brother,
sister or other person, whether or not related by blood or
marriage, if such a person receives from the officer or
employee, or provides to the officer or employee, more than
one-half of his financial support.” (Emphasis added.)
Code § 2.1-639.2. See also Code §§ 2.1-639.15, 2.1-
639.15:1, 2.1-639.31, 2.1-639.41, 26-69, 34-4, and 59.1-
365.
12
domestic partners as dependents in the County's self-funded
health benefits plan violates Dillon's Rule."
I respectfully disagree with the majority's decision
to ignore the central issue raised in this appeal. This
Court has a duty, as well as an obligation, to decide
issues of great importance to the citizens of this
Commonwealth when, as here, those issues are properly
presented to this Court.
II.
Arlington County implemented a self-funded health
benefits plan for its employees. Pursuant to the plan,
effective July 1, 1997, County employees were permitted to
"add one adult dependent to their health and/or dental
policy." The County stated, in its Employee Relations
Benefits Newsletter that:
"The adult dependent may be:
"a. The employee's legal spouse;
"- or -
"b. The domestic partner of the employee who:
"- has resided with the employee for a 1
year period;
"- shares with the employee the common
necessities of life and basic living
expenses;
"- is financially interdependent with the
employee;
13
"- is involved with the employee in a
mutually exclusive relationship of support
and commitment;
"- is not related by blood to the employee;
"- is not married to anyone;
"- was mentally competent at time of consent
to relationship;
"- is 18 years of age or older.
"- or -
"c. Other adult dependent who meets the IRS
definition of dependent and whom the
employee claims as a dependent on his/her
federal income tax return."
The County made the following stipulations of fact in
the circuit court:
"An employee who applies for health
insurance benefits coverage must complete a form
to certify the eligibility of any dependents for
whom coverage is requested. An employee applying
for domestic partner coverage must certify that
the employee and the domestic partner meet the
criteria established by the County. Arlington
County may require documentation to support
eligibility for coverage. Any employee who
provides false information is subject to
disciplinary action and appropriate legal
action."
Andrew White, Diana White, and Wendell Brown,
residents and taxpayers of Arlington County, initiated this
proceeding by filing a bill of complaint in the circuit
court challenging the County's authority to confer health
insurance benefits upon "unmarried domestic partners of its
employees." They sought a declaration that the County
lacked the statutory or constitutional authority to grant
14
health insurance benefits to the unmarried domestic
partners, and that Arlington County's policy of extending
health insurance benefits to the unmarried domestic
partners of Arlington County employees violates state
public policy favoring marriage of two adults over the
unmarried cohabitation of two adults. The taxpayers sought
to enjoin the County from granting health insurance
benefits to the domestic partners of its employees or from
expending any tax money on the health insurance benefits
for domestic partners of Arlington County employees.
The primary issue that the taxpayers raised in the
circuit court was that the County had violated the Dillon
Rule because the General Assembly had not conferred upon
the County the power to grant health insurance benefits to
domestic partners of County employees. The circuit court
entered a judgment in favor of the taxpayers which states
in relevant part that "Arlington County's coverage for
domestic partners in its self-funded health benefit plan
for County employees violates the Dillon Rule." The
circuit court, however, did not articulate the precise
reasons it relied upon in reaching its conclusion.
On appeal, the County argues that the circuit court
erred because the County's health insurance coverage for
its employees' domestic partners in its self-funded benefit
15
plan does not violate the Dillon Rule. The County also
argues that it has authority to determine which dependents
are eligible for coverage and that its decision to include
domestic partners of County employees as dependents in the
County's self-funded health benefits plan must be approved
as long as the County's action is reasonable.
We stated in City of Chesapeake v. Gardner
Enterprises, 253 Va. 243, 246, 482 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1997),
that
"[t]he Dillon Rule of strict construction
controls our determination of the powers of local
governing bodies. This rule provides that
municipal corporations have only those powers
that are expressly granted, those necessarily or
fairly implied from expressly granted powers, and
those that are essential and indispensable.
Ticonderoga Farms v. County of Loudoun, 242 Va.
170, 173-74, 409 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1991); City of
Richmond v. Confrere Club of Richmond, 239 Va.
77, 79, 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1990)."
Accord Board of Supervisors v. Countryside Inv. Co., 258
Va. 497, 503, 522 S.E.2d 610, 612-13 (1999); City of
Virginia Beach v. Hay, 258 Va. 217, 221, 518 S.E.2d 314,
316 (1999). We specifically discussed the application of
the Dillon Rule to counties in Board of Supervisors v.
Horne, 216 Va. 113, 117, 215 S.E.2d 453, 455-56 (1975):
"In Virginia the powers of boards of
supervisors are fixed by statute and are limited
to those conferred expressly or by necessary
implication. Gordon v. Fairfax County, 207 Va.
827, 832, 153 S.E.2d 270, 274 (1967); Johnson v.
16
Goochland County, 206 Va. 235, 237, 142 S.E.2d
501, 502 (1965). This rule is a corollary to
Dillon's Rule that municipal corporations have
only those powers expressly granted, those
necessarily or fairly implied therefrom, and
those that are essential and indispensable. City
of Richmond v. County Board, 199 Va. 679, 684-85,
101 S.E.2d 641, 644-45 (1958)."
Code § 15.2-1517(A), which permits a locality to
provide health insurance programs, states in relevant part
that "[a]ny locality may provide . . . health insurance
programs for their officers and employees . . . through a
program of self-insurance." Code § 51.1-801 provides in
relevant part that a "local governing body may, through
self-funding . . . provide . . . sickness insurance
coverage for officers and employees . . . and their
dependents." The General Assembly, however, did not define
the word "dependents." The County argues that the
"appropriate inquiry is whether [its] decision to include
domestic partners as dependents in its plan is a reasonable
method of implementing its authority."
We have stated the following principles that we must
apply when ascertaining whether a power may be implied from
a statutory grant to a county:
"In questions of implied power, the answer is to
be found in legislative intent. To imply a
particular power from a power expressly granted,
it must be found that the legislature intended
that the grant of the express also would confer
the implied.
17
"In determining legislative intent, the rule
is clear that where a power is conferred and the
mode of its execution is specified, no other
method may be selected; any other means would be
contrary to legislative intent and, therefore,
unreasonable. A necessary corollary is that
where a grant of power is silent upon its mode of
execution, a method of exercise clearly contrary
to legislative intent, or inappropriate to the
ends sought to be accomplished by the grant, also
would be unreasonable.
"Consistent with the necessity to uphold
legislative intent, the doctrine of implied
powers should never be applied to create a power
that does not exist or to expand an existing
power beyond rational limits. Always, the test
in application of the doctrine is reasonableness,
in which concern for what is necessary to promote
the public interest is a key element."
Commonwealth v. Arlington County Board, 217 Va. 558, 577,
232 S.E.2d 30, 42 (1977) (citations omitted); accord
Tidewater Ass'n of Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Virginia
Beach, 241 Va. 114, 119, 400 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1991).
The County's expanded definition of the word
"dependents" clearly and unequivocally violates the Dillon
Rule. This definition is an unreasonable method of
implementing the power granted to the County under Code
§§ 15.2-1517(A) and 51.1-801. The County's expanded
definition of eligible dependents is nothing more than a
disguised effort to confer health benefits upon persons who
are involved in either common law marriages or "same-sex
unions," which are not recognized in this Commonwealth and
are violative of the public policy of this Commonwealth.
18
The General Assembly, by enacting Code § 20-45.2, expressly
prohibited marriage between persons of the same sex. This
Code provision states in relevant part that "[a] marriage
between persons of the same sex is prohibited." Also, we
have held that Virginia does not recognize common law
marriages. Murphy v. Holland, 237 Va. 212, 219-220, 377
S.E.2d 363, 367-68 (1989).
Furthermore, and just as important, the County's
expanded definition of dependents is inappropriate because
it permits the County to legislate in the area of domestic
relations, a prerogative that lies within the exclusive
domain of the General Assembly of this Commonwealth. See
Cramer v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 561, 564-65, 202 S.E.2d
911, 914, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974). The General
Assembly, not a county, is entrusted with the
responsibility of recognizing and defining marital
relationships.
Certainly, the General Assembly did not intend, by its
enactment of Code §§ 15.2-1517(A) and 51.1-801, to grant
counties, like Arlington, the power to recognize common law
marriages or "same-sex unions." Even a cursory review of
Arlington County's eligibility criteria demonstrates that
Arlington County seeks to recognize such relationships
because the criteria require that the employee, who seeks
19
to add a non-employee as a dependent in the County's health
plan, certify that the employee has resided with his or her
domestic partner for a period of one year, "not [be]
married to anyone," "[share] with the employee the common
necessities of life and basic living expenses," "[be]
financially interdependent with the employee," "not [be]
related by blood to the employee," and "[be] involved with
the employee in a mutually exclusive relationship of
support and commitment." There can be no question or doubt
that Arlington County seeks to recognize, tacitly,
relationships that are violative of the public policy of
this Commonwealth.
The County states, in a footnote in its reply brief
filed in this Court, that "Virginia['s] state tax law
permits one member of an unmarried couple living together
to claim the other as a dependent for individual tax return
purposes." The County relies upon an Attorney General's
opinion as authority for this proposition. See 1985-1986
Att'y. Gen. 278, 279. Continuing, the County says that "if
state tax law permits this, then it does not contravene
state public policy for the County to provide health
benefits to an employee's domestic partner." The County's
contention is neither persuasive nor meritorious. The
General Assembly did not, in the State's taxation statutes,
20
alter Virginia's public policy prohibition against common
law marriages or "same-sex unions." Moreover, the state
taxation statutes do not confer upon a county in this
Commonwealth the authority to recognize, tacitly, common
law marriages or "same-sex unions."
The majority holds that Arlington County's decision to
provide health benefits to domestic partners of County
employees violates the Dillon Rule only because the
County's health benefits plan requires that the domestic
partner be "financially interdependent with the employee."
As I have already stated, the majority's opinion ignores
the central issue in this appeal. The majority's decision
to do so is troublesome because if the Arlington County
Board of Supervisors deletes from its health benefits plan
the provision that the majority finds offensive, and
implements a health benefits plan that confers benefits
upon partners of County employees who are involved in
common law marriages or "same-sex unions," the taxpayers
will be compelled to file another lawsuit to challenge the
legality of the County's actions.
I think that a purpose of the appellate process is to
render decisions that will adjudicate the primary
principles of an appeal, thereby ending the litigation when
possible. Unfortunately, because the majority has chosen
21
to ignore the primary issue in this appeal, the taxpayers
and the County may incur additional legal fees to
relitigate an issue that is already before the Court. The
majority's decision to ignore this issue may also result in
a waste of judicial resources because, presumably, the
circuit court and this Court will confront this issue
again. For these reasons, I cannot join in the opinion of
the majority.
22